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1. INTRODUCTION2 
 
I like very much what Joseph Kelliher, former chairman of the U.S. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, once said about the U.S. wholesale power markets. He said: 
‘Our goal is perfect competition, textbook competition, competition that is so 
beautiful it would make an economist weep.’3 Electricity markets in Europe might be 
different from those in the U.S. in many respects, but the goals of regulators on both 
sides of the Atlantic are shared. More than two decades have passed since the 
European Commission (‘the Commission’) decided to open up national energy 
markets to competition and gradually integrate them, to create Europe-wide markets 
for electricity and gas.4 5 The levels of competition reached in these markets may have 
made economists weep, but not necessarily with tears of joy yet.6 Nevertheless, the 
EU electricity sector has undergone major changes over recent years. The 
Commission has extensively intervened in the market structure and market rules, and 
continues to do so in order to meet the ambitious political target for completing the 
internal energy market by 2014.7  
 
1.1. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
 
This thesis concerns the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the 
completion of the European internal electricity market. 
 
                                                           
2 My sincere thanks to Massimo Motta, Klaus Heine, Leigh Hancher, Hans Vedder and Roger Van den Bergh 
for their helpful comments and suggestions on the early draft of this thesis. 
3 J. T. KELLIHER, ‘Quest for Security: Strategies for a New Energy Future’, speech at CERAWEEK 
Conference, States of US Competitive Wholesale Power Markets, 11-15.02.2008, Houston, Texas. 
4 See European Commission, The internal energy market, Commission working document, COM (88) 238 final, 
Brussels, 02.05.1988. 
5 By ‘energy markets’ are meant electricity and gas markets. Gas markets are beyond the scope of this research, 
but the term ‘energy markets’ is nevertheless sometimes used throughout this thesis, especially when reference 
is made to the EU energy policy and the objective of completing the internal energy market, as both markets are 
high on the Commission’s regulatory agenda and subject to similar reforms at the EU level.  
6 European Commission, Making the internal energy market work, Communication from the Commission, 
COM(2012) 663 final, Brussels, 15.11.2012, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/internal_market_en.htm> accessed 20.05.2013. 
7 This target was set by the European Energy Council on 04.02.2011. See European Council, Conclusions on 
energy, Brussels, 04.02.2011, available at 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/119253.pdf> accessed 20.05.2013. 
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European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being EU 
regulation and competition enforcement.8 The interplay between these two 
instruments has been much discussed in the context of different sectors, and still 
attracts a lot of scholarly attention, both from academics and practitioners.9 One of the 
major concerns in this debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been 
observed that competition enforcement in Europe is triggered not only as a response to 
an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a 
powerful tool in the Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory rather than purely 
competition goals. This is particularly true in case of formerly state-owned 
monopolies. Since their liberalisation, these industries have become an interface 
between a new type of sector-specific regulation and newly applied competition rules. 
As a result, the two regimes converged to some degree. On the one hand, sector-
specific regulation aims now to facilitate competition in the newly created markets 
and often protects them from monopolistic practices.10 On the other hand, competition 
law in these sectors is sometimes applied beyond its proper limits in order to meet the 
objectives of sector-specific regulation.11 The latter phenomenon, i.e. instrumentalised 
                                                           
8 In this thesis ‘antitrust law’ is viewed as a subsection of ‘competition law’. By antitrust enforcement is meant 
prohibition of cartels and abuses of dominant position (Article 101 and 102 TFEU). Competition enforcement 
encompasses antitrust enforcement and also includes merger control, state aid rules and supervision of 
undertakings with special and exclusive rights. 
9 For instance, see third panel discussion at the CRA Annual Conference – Economic developments in European 
competition policy, Brussels, 05.12.2012, entitled: ‘Competition vs regulation for abusive conduct: back to the 
future?’. 
10 For an overview of regulatory measures in the electricity markets, see section 1.2.3 below. 
11 The competition versus regulation debate usually relates to industries where some sort of sector-specific 
regulation is already present or at least appears desirable because the markets have (A) natural monopoly or (B) 
network monopoly characteristics. (A)-type markets are e.g. telecommunications, electricity, gas, railway and 
postal services. (B)-type markets are prone to monopolisation due to the presence of network effects (e.g. new 
technologies). Application of competition policy as regulation has been a well-known phenomenon in the U.S 
antitrust enforcement. Back in 1979, justice Breyer expressly called antitrust enforcement a form of government 
regulation, an alternative (to ‘classical’ regulation) regulatory tool to deal with market failures. See S. BREYER, 
‘Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform’ (1979) 92 Harvard Law 
Review 3, 547-609, p. 578. See also three short articles included in the 1995 Fall Issue of Antitrust dedicated to 
consent decrees (U.S. equivalent of commitment decisions) – ‘Consent Decrees: Antitrust Enforcers as 
Regulators?’, 10 Antitrust 1: H. FIRST, ‘Is Antitrust “Law”?’, 9-12, discusses the influence of politics on the 
U.S. antitrust law and its shift to bureaucratic regulatory “culture”. A. D. MELAMED, ‘Antitrust: The New 
Regulation’, 13-15, observes that consent decrees (the U.S. equivalent of commitment decisions) ‘enabled the 
government officials to address issues that are politically or economically important, but legally ambiguous’, i.e. 
remedies imposed by a consent decree went beyond what could have been achieved by litigating the case. M. L. 
WEINER, ‘Antitrust and the Rise of the Regulatory Consent Decree’, 4-8, argues that through consent decrees 
agencies seek to recast behaviour in accordance with their policy objectives. On the same topic see also M. 
FURSE, ‘The Decision to Commit: Some Pointers from the US’ (2004) 25 European Competition Law Review 
1, 5-10. J. R. ATWOOD, ‘Observations on Negotiating Government Antitrust Settlements in the United States’, 
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competition enforcement,12 might have a substantial impact both on competition 
policy and regulation, and ultimately on markets to which they apply, and is thus 
worth considering closely. This thesis fits well into this debate, because it deals with 
the use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the internal market for 
electricity.13  
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in B. HAWK (ed.) 2005 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute, International Antitrust 
Law and Policy, Juris Publishing, New York 2006. For a more recent contribution on the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Trinko and Credit Suisse cases, see H. SHELANSKI, ‘The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and 
Regulation (2011) 109 Michigan Law Review, 683-732. 
In Europe, much has been written on the role of competition policy in the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector. Commission extensively applied competition rules to this sector during the 1990s 
and, as observed by the commentators at that time, these targeted antitrust actions significantly contributed to 
the liberalisation of the telecommunications markets. For an extensive discussion on the use of competition rules 
as a regulatory driver in the telecommunications sector and the legitimacy of such use see P. LAROUCHE, 
Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000, pp. 321-358. 
See also H. UNGERER, ‘Use of EC Competition Rules in the Liberalisation of the European Union's 
Telecommunications Sector. Assessment of Past Experience and Conclusions for Use in other Utility Sectors’, 
COMP/C/2/HU/rdu, Brussels, 06.05.2001, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2001_009_en.pdf> accessed 20.05.2013. L. GARZANITI, 
Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet: EU Competition Law and Regulation, 2nd ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2003, pp. 537-551. S. VANNINI, ‘Competition and Regulation in Network Industries: Not an 
Easy Balance to Strike. Comments on Koski and Kretschmer’ (2004) Journal of Industry, Competition and 
Trade. Bank Papers, 49-65. D. GERADIN and R. O’DONOGHUE, ‘The Concurrent Application of 
Competition Law and Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector’ 
(2005) 1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2, 355-425. P. LAROUCHE, ‘Contrasting legal solutions 
and the comparability of EU and US experiences’ (2006) Tilburg University, TILEC Discussion Paper 2006-
028. N. ECONOMIDES, ‘Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction’ in D. JANSEN (ed.) The 
New Economy and Beyond: Past, Present and Future, Edward Elgar, Northampton 2006, 96-121. P.A. 
BUIGUES, ‘Competition Policy vs Sector-Specific Regulation in Network Industries – The EU Experience’, 
paper submitted to UNCTAD's Seventh Session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law 
and Policy, Geneva, 30.10-02.11.2006, available at 
<http://unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p14_en.pdf> accessed 20.05.2013. A. DE STREEL, ‘The 
Relationship between Competition Law and Sector Specific Regulation: The case of electronic communications’ 
(2008) XLVII Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique 1, 55-72. G. MONTI, ‘Managing the Intersection of 
Utilities Regulation and EC Competition Law’ (2008) 4 The Competition Law Review 2, 123-145. J. TEMPLE 
LANG, ‘European Competition Policy and Regulation: Differences, Overlaps and Constraints’ in F. LÉVÊQUE 
and H. SHELANSKY (eds.) Antitrust and Regulation in the EU and US: Legal and Economic Perspective, 
Edward Elgar, Northampton 2010. P. IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, ‘On the Application of Competition Law as 
Regulation: Elements for a Theory’ in P. EECKHOUT and T. TRIDIMAS (eds.) Yearbook of European Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, pp. 261-306. L. ORTIZ BLANCO and A. LAMADRID DE PABLO, 
‘EU Competition Law Enforcement: Elements for a Discussion on Effectiveness and Uniformity’ in B. HAWK 
(ed.) International Antitrust Law & Policy: 2011 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law 
Institute, Juris Publishing, Huntington, N.Y. 2012, pp. 80-82 and roundtable discussion, pp. 137-138. 
12 This phenomenon is sometimes labelled ‘regulatory antitrust’. See G. MONTI, supra n. 11, p. 138. 
13 EU legislative reforms encompass electricity and gas markets. This thesis studies the application of 
competition rules to the electricity sector only. 
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1.2. CONTEXT 
 
The purpose of this section is to explain the connection between commitment 
decisions, electricity sector and the objective of completing internal electricity 
market. 
 
1.2.1. What are commitment decisions? 
 
Recital 13 of Regulation 1/200314 reads: 
 
Where, in the course of proceedings which might lead to an agreement or practice 
being prohibited, undertakings offer the Commission commitments such as to meet its 
concerns, the Commission should be able to adopt decisions which make those 
commitments binding on the undertakings concerned. Commitment decisions should 
find that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission without 
concluding whether or not there has been or still is an infringement. Commitment 
decisions are without prejudice to the powers of competition authorities and courts of 
the Member States to make such a finding and decide upon the case. Commitment 
decisions are not appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine. 
 
The option to close antitrust cases in this way is formally provided by Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003 which reads: 
 
(1) Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement 
be brought to an end and the undertakings concerned offer commitments to meet 
the concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment, 
the Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the 
undertakings. Such a decision may be adopted for a specified period and shall 
conclude that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission. 
                                                           
14 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16.12.2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1.  
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(2) The Commission may, upon request or on its own initiative, reopen the 
proceedings:  
(a) where there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the 
decision was based; 
(b) where the undertakings concerned act contrary to their commitments; or 
(c) where the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading 
information provided by the parties. 
 
When the Commission has concerns that a dominant undertaking engages in 
anticompetitive conduct15 and decides to open an antitrust investigation under Article 
102 TFEU, it faces the following procedural routes.16 Firstly, it may decide that there 
are no grounds for action and close the case accordingly. Secondly, the investigation 
might show that the concerns are sufficiently serious to warrant further proceedings 
and the adoption of an infringement decision under Article 7. This is a standard 
infringement procedure whereby the Commission prohibits anticompetitive conduct in 
question and can impose a fine and/or remedies which can be behavioural or structural 
in nature. In order to do so, the Commission needs first to establish a breach of 
competition rules, i.e. that the undertaking is in fact dominant and that it abused its 
dominant position on the market. Lastly, as provided for in Article 9, if the 
                                                           
15 The same considerations apply to a situation when two (or more) undertakings enter into an anticompetitive 
agreement or concerted practice in violation of Article 101 TFEU. However, these types of infringements will 
not be discussed here. Even though commitment decisions are adopted in Article 101 cases as well, Article 102 
constituted the legal basis of most energy-related cases, and they are the focus of this thesis. 
16 Initiation of proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, supra n. 14. See also 
Commission notice on the best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
[2011] OJ C 308/6, at point 2.3 and 2.13. The Commission can also act outside this procedural framework and 
settle a case by reaching an informal deal with an undertaking. In fact, such informal agreements (settlements) 
are common practice. See, for instance, the Commission’s settlement with IBM, European Commission, XIVth 
Report on Competition Policy, 1984, paras. 94-95. Other examples include: La Poste/SWIFT + GUF (Case No 
IV/36.120), European Commission, XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy, 1997, par. 68, Wood Pulp (here the 
settlement with the Commission involved only reductions in fines in exchange for promises from companies 
which were parties to a cartel, see joint cases C-89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125-129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö et 
al. v. Commission (Wood Pulp) [1993] ECR I-1307), Digital Equipment (IP/97/857 of 08.10.1997), Marathon 
(IP/04/573 of 30.04.2004) and Interbrew (IP/04/574 of 30.04.2004). For a list of further examples, see R. 
WHISH, Competition Law, 5th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, p. 210, or J. TEMPLE LANG, 
‘Commitment decisions under Regulation 1/2003 - legal aspects of a new kind of competition decision’ (2003) 
24 European Competition Law Review, pp. 347-356, at note 12. The notion of a ‘settlement’ is usually given a 
broad meaning in competition literature. It captures both formal (e.g. commitment decisions or U.S. consent 
decrees) as well as informal (i.e. reached outside the existing procedures) deals between a competition authority 
and the investigated undertakings (see infra n. 38). In this thesis the term ‘settlement’ is not used in the context 
of Article 9 commitment decisions in order to avoid confusion with these other types of settlement mechanisms.  
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anticompetitive concerns are serious and the Commission intents to pursue the 
proceedings and adopt an infringement decision, it does not have to go down the 
Article 7 route, if the undertaking is willing to negotiate and offer voluntary 
commitments addressing these concerns. As long as the Commission finds these 
commitments sufficient, it makes them binding upon undertaking in a commitment 
decision. Otherwise, it negotiates with the undertaking in order to reach a deal that is 
acceptable for both parties. In case negotiations over commitments fail, the 
Commission can always follow the standard infringement procedure, i.e. establish a 
breach of competition rules and adopt an Article 7 decision.17 
 
1.2.1.1. Potential benefits of commitment procedure and the incentives to engage 
in negotiations 
 
Unlike a prohibition decision, a commitment decision does not establish an 
infringement of competition rules, which makes Article 9 procedure much quicker and 
simpler, thus attractive both for the Commission and for the undertakings alike. 
Negotiations over commitments might take some time,18 but the Commission avoids 
an even more time-consuming and very often complex exercise of finding an abuse 
which would warrant an infringement decision and the imposition of remedies. Thus, 
Article 9 option enhances administrative efficiency and effectiveness of competition 
enforcement, because it allows the Commission to streamline its procedures in less 
important cases and focus on more serious anticompetitive practices.19 Formal 
findings of Article 102 abuses usually undergo harsh public scrutiny, which further 
explains why the Commission might be inclined to use Article 9, especially in less 
straightforward cases.20 Given their consensual nature, commitment decisions are 
                                                           
17 The Commission may also close the case for other reasons. Examples are provided by D. WAELBROECK, 
‘The Development of a new “settlement culture” in competition cases. What is left to the Courts?’ in C. 
GHEUR and N. PETIT (eds.), Alternative Enforcement Techniques in EC Competition Law, Bruylant, Brussels 
2009, 221-260, p. 225 at note 9. 
18 The Microsoft case (see Table 1) involved several rounds of negotiations over commitments before the 
Commission agreed to the proposed package. 
19 European Commission, Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, Communication from the 
Commission, COM(2009) 206 final, Brussels, 29.04.2009, para. 13. 
20 D. GERARD, ‘Breaking the EU Antitrust Enforcement Deadlock: Re-Empowering the Courts?’ (2011), 36 
European Law Review, 457-479, p. 464. 
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never appealed by the undertakings submitting commitments, so the Commission 
faces little risk of litigating the case in court.21 Moreover, commitment decisions, if 
challenged at all, are only subject to a limited judicial review.22  This is because, 
according to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Commission enjoys a 
substantial margin of discretion in making commitments binding or rejecting them, 
which the Courts do not wish to encroach upon.23 Last but not least, commitments are 
not subject to the strict proportionality test applied to remedies imposed under Article 
7, which in practice means that commitments may go beyond what is considered 
appropriate and necessary to remedy an anticompetitive problem.24 In sum, negotiated 
process coupled with the Commission’s discretion may produce more customised and 
innovative solutions than a fully contested proceeding under Article 7. Negotiations 
over commitments bring together the Commission’s expertise in competition law 
compliance and the undertaking’s sector-specific knowledge. Thus, the undertaking 
can make sure that its commitments demonstrate an economically viable and workable 
solution, whereas the Commission provides a clear set of competition guidelines for 
the undertaking’s future business conduct. From this perspective, negotiated outcomes 
might prove to be useful in complex and novel cases, where unilaterally devising 
effective remedies under Article 7 would be not only costly, but generally problematic 
                                                           
21 Affected third parties and Member States might have some interest in challenging commitment decisions. 
However, only two commitment decisions have been appealed by third parties so far, and only one of them, the 
ALROSA + de Beers decision, has been reviewed by the European Courts (case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission 
[2007] ECR II-2601 and case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949). Two appeals following 
the REPSOL decision have been rejected on procedural grounds (cases T-274/06, Estaser El Mareny, SL v. 
Commission [2007] ECR II-143 and T-45/08, Transportes Evaristo Molina v. Commission [2008] ECR II-265 
(Orders of the General Court of 25.10.2007 and 14.11.2008 respectively). An appeal against the order in case T-
45/08 is pending before the ECJ (case C-36/09 P, appeal brought on 28.01.2009, OJ C 82, 04.04.2009, 16-17). 
See infra Table 1 for cases. 
22 Judicial review of commitment decisions is confined to examining whether the Commission’s assessment was 
manifestly incorrect (case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, par. 42). To the contrary, 
infringement decisions are (at least in theory) subject to full and unqualified review in law and in fact. In 
practice this is often not the case. Complex technical appraisals (usually economic assessments) carried out by 
the Commission are also subject to limited judicial review under the ‘manifest error of assessment’ standard. In 
practice, this excludes most Article 102 cases from full judicial review. For a recent account criticising the 
proliferation of the ‘manifest error of assessment’ standard see I.S. FORRESTER, ‘A Bush in Need of Pruning: 
the Luxuriant Growth of “Light Judicial Review”’ in C.-D. EHLERMANN and M. MARQUIS (eds.) European 
Competition Law Annual 2009: Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2011, available at http://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2009/2009-
COMPETITION-Forrester.pdf  accessed 20.05.2013, and also D. GERARD, supra n. 20. For the Alrosa case 
and its implications see infra n. 237. 
23 C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 90. 
24 See infra section 1.5.2.1 for discussion. 
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given the Courts’ rather conservative stance on remedies.25 Similarly, certain types of 
agreements (e.g. airline alliances) might be particularly suitable for an Article 9 
decision, because the Commission can accept tailor-made commitments without 
trumping largely desirable and pro-competitive effects of these agreements.26 The 
same reasoning lies behind a number of commitment cases involving intellectual 
property rights, which are indispensable to provide incentives to innovate, but which, 
at the same time, restrict competition.27 In some cases, however, Article 9 might not 
be the Commission’s preferred option. This is usually the case of blatant 
infringements of competition rules by ‘object’ (e.g. collusive practices) where 
sufficient punishment and deterrence effects can be achieved only by an infringement 
decision and imposition of fines. But there might be other cases, where, according to 
the Commission, potential benefits of finding an infringement (for instance, setting a 
clear precedence) outweigh efficiencies of commitment procedure.  
 
An undertaking makes a cost benefit analysis too. It weighs the benefits of the 
commitment procedure (avoiding costly and possibly long proceedings with an 
unpredictable outcome, clear and immediate guidance on how to run its business in 
compliance with competition rules, control over the remedy package, insight into the 
                                                           
25 As Temple Lang forecasted in 2003, ‘[c]ommitments, duly negotiated, will probably be the way in which the 
Commission develops its so far rather unimaginative practice in relation to remedies.’ J. TEMPLE LANG 
(2003), supra n. 16, p. 354. See also J. TEMPLE LANG, ‘Commitment Decisions under Regulation 1/2003’ in 
C. GHEUR and N. PETIT (eds.) Alternative enforcement techniques in EC competition law: Settlements, 
commitments and other novel instruments, Bruylant, Brussels 2009, 121-144, p. 142. See also F. WAGNER-
VON PAPP, ‘Best and even better practices in commitment procedures after Alrosa: The dangers of abandoning 
the “Struggle for Competition Law”’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 3, 929-970, pp. 965-966, 
suggesting that allowing the Commission to have more freedom in devising proactive remedies under Article 7 
would make the standard infringement procedure more attractive. 
26 However, see critical comments by J. TEMPLE LANG (2009), supra n. 25, pp. 126-129, on the 
Commission’s approach in the AuA/SAS, SkyTeam and CISAC cases. For a more supporting view on the 
Commission’s commitment policy in airline sector see K. KOSTOPOULOS, ‘Commitment Decisions: The New 
Kind of Settlement in European Competition Law. Application in Air Transport’ (2009) 34 Air and Space Law 
1, 13-19, pp. 16-17, who advocates the use of Article 9 in cases of airline alliances, because certain types of 
commitments like the release of slots to competitors, sharing with them frequent flyer programmes, or entering 
into interline or intermodal agreements might have substantial pro-competitive effects on the market. In the 
same line, S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A. SUKHTANKAR, ‘Commitments in EU Competition Cases. 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, its application and the challenges ahead’ (2010) 1 Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 3, 171-188, p. 177. 
27 E.g. agreements between collecting societies or joint selling of media rights for football matches. In this 
respect commitment decisions replace exemption decisions with conditions, which the Commission used to 
adopt in cases of such agreements under Regulation 17/62 (Council Regulation No 17 (EEC): First Regulation 
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty [1962] OJ 013, 21.02.1962, 204-211, abolished by Regulation 
1/2003, supra n. 14). See infra n. 48.  
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Commission’s approach to investigation and its reasoning) and the absence of 
infringement (no fine28, reduced risk of follow-on private actions29, no negative 
publicity and the subsequent stigma of being in a dominant position) against the 
probability of winning the case in appeal. If the Commission has strong evidence 
indicating abusive conduct and the scope for contesting liability is limited, the 
undertaking might be willing to offer voluntary commitments. In more complex cases, 
where the Commission’s theory of harm is less compelling, an undertaking might 
prefer to take the risk and litigate the case rather than offer commitments under Article 
9. In practice, various other factors may influence this simple logic. For instance, even 
though an undertaking believes its conduct was legitimate and has a strong case, it 
might nevertheless prefer to keep a ‘clean’ record and a good relationship with the 
Commission and not to engage in contested proceedings.30 It might also prefer to 
voluntarily offer certain commitments which do not materially affect its business than 
face the risk of fines or remedies imposed by the Commission. Further, it might have 
other strategic interests in offering certain commitments.31  
 
It should be noted that the Commission used to make deals with the investigated 
undertakings and close antitrust cases in exchange of certain promises also before the 
                                                           
28 Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14, states that commitment decisions are not appropriate in cases in 
which the Commission intends to adopt a fine. Despite its misleading formulation, the aim of this provision is to 
exclude cases of competition law violations ‘by object’ (mostly cartels) and not all cases where fines are 
considered. See Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16, para. 116: ‘Commitment decisions are not 
appropriate in cases where the Commission considers that the nature of the infringement calls for the imposition 
of a fine. Consequently, the Commission does not apply the Article 9 procedure to secret cartels that fall under 
the Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases.’ In practice, it been observed that the 
Commission used to accept commitments in cases in which it would normally impose a fine under Article 7. For 
references, see infra, n. 207. See also comments by D. GERARD, supra n. 20, p. 459, who observes that the 
increase in antitrust fines ‘together with the typical aversion of businesses to uncertainty, have rendered the 
temptation to offer commitments instead of litigating cases almost irresistible, to the point of becoming the 
norm.’ 
29 F. WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, at note 73, argues that even though damages actions do not pose a 
substantial threat in non-cartel cases for the time being in Europe but that the companies might also fear private 
actions seeking injunctive relief in the wake of an infringement decision. 
30 For similar arguments see F. WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, p. 948. 
31 J. TEMPLE LANG (2009), supra n. 25, p. 134, discusses a scenario, where a dominant undertaking offers 
commitments not to discriminate on price or not to offer selective price reductions, which ultimately might be 
an excuse for not competing on price or for not offering selective discounts. As the author observes, ‘a 
commitment that at first sight might seem to constrain only the interests of the dominant enterprise might in 
reality harm the interests of its customers.’ The E.ON case discussed in chapter 3 is another illustrating example 
where the investigated undertaking might have strategic interests in offering certain commitments. 
 20
adoption of Regulation 1/2003.32 However, settlements of this type were not 
enforceable, because they were reached outside the legal framework. All the 
Commission could do in cases of breach of such an informal deal was to reopen the 
case and follow the standard infringement route. Also the undertakings had no legal 
guarantee that the Commission’s investigation was definitely over.33 The novelty of 
Article 9 consists thus in making commitments binding and enforceable upon 
undertakings by a formal decision. On the one hand, the Commission can ensure 
compliance with the offered commitments. Namely, in case of a breach of a 
commitment, the Commission may not only reopen proceedings34 (and maybe 
eventually adopt an infringement decision) but also impose heavy fines and periodic 
penalties, the same that it could impose pursuant to an infringement decision, but even 
without having to prove an infringement.35 On the other hand, undertakings can be 
sure that the Commission formally closed its investigation.36 37 In sum, Article 9 
commitment decisions combine the flexibility of a negotiated solution with legal 
certainly of a formal decision.38  
                                                           
32 For an overview of the Commission’s settlement practice and criticism it provoked see I. VAN BAEL, ‘The 
Antitrust Settlement Practice of the EC Commission’ (1986) 23 Common Market Law Review 1, 61-90, or D. 
WAELBROECK, ‘New Forms of Settlement of Antitrust Cases and Procedural Safeguards: Is Regulation 17 
Falling Into Abeyance?’ (1986) 11 European Law Review, 268-280. For examples of the Commission’s 
settlements see supra n. 16. 
33 However, settlements may still give rise to legitimate expectations. See e.g. E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER, ‘The 
Modernisation of European Competition Law: First Experiences with Regulation 1/2003’ in H. KOECK and M. 
KAROLLUS (eds.) The Modernisation of European Competition Law, FIDE Congress, Linz 2008, or W.P.J. 
WILS, ‘Settlement of EU Antitrust Investigations: Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation No. 
1/2003’ (2006) 29 World Competition 3, 345-366, p. 347. 
34 Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14.  
35 Article 23(2)(c) of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14, gives the Commission power to impose fines up to 10% of 
the undertaking’s worldwide turnover for a breach of commitments. Further, on the basis of 24(1)(c) of 
Regulation 1/2003 the Commission can impose periodic penalties in order to ensure that the undertakings 
comply with the commitments. 
36 A commitment decision states that there are no longer grounds for action on the part of the Commission. 
Moreover, the Commission can reopen proceedings only in three exceptional cases listed in Article 9 (2). 
37 The existence of Article 9 does not prevent the Commission from entering into settlements outside the legal 
framework. In fact, the Commission has settled a few cases informally since Regulation 1/2003 entered into 
force.  
38 Commitment decisions can be seen as a part of a more general tendency in the EU competition enforcement to 
move away from litigation towards consensus-generating processes and negotiated solutions, just as the 
simultaneous use of settlements outside the legal framework or leniency programme in cartel cases. 38 As 
Commissioner Almunia said at the 2011 conference in St. Gallen, ‘[o]ne trend that is emerging from a growing 
number of antitrust cases is our search for effective — and sometimes structural — commitments when they 
would more efficiently prevent competition concerns in the longer term.’ (SPEECH/11/243 of 08.04.2011). This 
shift towards ‘negotiated solutions’, or – as Denis Waelbroeck calls it – the emergence of a ‘settlement culture’ 
in the EU antitrust enforcement, has been pointed out and analysed by several commentators. See L. ORTIZ 
BLANCO and A. LAMADRID DE PABLO, supra n. 11, p. 73. D. WAELBROECK (2009), supra n. 17, pp. 
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1.2.2. Making the link with electricity markets 
 
Article 9 entered into force on 1 May 2004 as a provision of Regulation 1/200339 and 
has been widely discussed from the outset.40 The novelty of Article 9 and its concise 
wording quickly raised a number of questions, both of material and procedural 
nature.41 It seems that the Commission deliberately did not provide much guidance on 
the application of Article 9, but even emphasised that ‘the conditions for its use are 
flexible,’42 leaving some discretion as to when and how use Article 9 in its future 
enforcement practice.43  
 
And in fact, the Commission’s use of Article 9 has caused some controversy. Almost a 
decade has now passed since the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 and one can easily 
observe that commitment decisions have become an increasingly important tool in the 
EU competition law enforcement.44 Contrary to the expectations that Article 9 would 
be used sparingly,45 it actually became a common way of closing EU antitrust 
investigations.46 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
221-260. D. GERARD, supra n. 20, pp. 457 and 465. F. WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, p. 929 at note 1. 
See also D. WAELBROECK, ‘Le développement en droit européen de la concurrence des solutions négociées 
(engagements, clémence, non-contestation des faits et transactions): que va-t-il rester aux juges?’ (2008) GCLC 
(Global Competition Law Centre) Working Paper 01/08.  
39 Supra n. 14. Regulation 1/2003 is often called ‘the Modernisation Regulation’, as it introduced substantial 
changes to the EU competition enforcement.  
40 For references including recent accounts see infra n. 122. 
41 See infra n. 125. 
42 MEMO/04/217 of 17.09.2004. 
43 The Commission initially expected that commitment decisions would be adopted rather in exceptional cases, 
which might explain why Article 9 guidelines were low on its priority list in the early years of Regulation 
1/2003. In fact, it took the Commission as much as 7 years to provide more guidance in that regard. See 
Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16, paras. 115-133. See also recently adopted by the Commission, 
Antitrust: Manual of Procedures, Internal DG Competition working document on procedures for the application 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, March 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/information_en.html accessed 20.05.2013, chapter 16 on Commitment 
Decisions (pp. 177-188). Further, see comments of Davies during the ‘Settlements of Government Civil 
Proceedings and Private Actions Roundtable’ in B. HAWK (ed.) International Antitrust Law and Policy: 
Fordham Corporate Law 2005, Juris Publishing, New York 2006, pp. 352-353. 
44 S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 185. 
45 See e.g. M. FURSE, supra n. 11, 5 and 10. J. TEMPLE LANG, ‘Commitment Decisions and Settlements with 
Antitrust Authorities and Private Parties under European Antitrust Law’ and also comments made by Ducore 
during the ‘Settlements of Government Civil Proceedings and Private Actions Roundtable’, in B. HAWK (ed.) 
International Antitrust Law and Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2005, Juris Publishing, New York 2006, 265-
324, p. 270. R. WHISH, ‘Commitment Decisions Under Article 9 of the EC Modernisation Regulation: Some 
Unanswered Questions’ in M. JOHANSSON, N. WAHL and U. BERNITZ (eds.) Liber Amicorum in Honour of  
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Table 1 provides an overview of all antitrust cases closed by commitment decision 
over the course of eight years, between 2004 and 2012. Since the entry into force of 
Article 9, the Commission has adopted 30 commitment decisions. In contrast, only 17 
prohibition decisions have been adopted in this period, out of which only 3 over the 
last 4 years.47 A closer look at the targeted sectors allows for the following 
conclusions. First of all, the second half of the 2000s was marked by an increased 
antitrust intervention in the energy sector following the 2005 energy sector inquiry 
(discussed in section 1.2.3.2). As a result, energy-related cases constitute 1/3 of the 
Commission’s overall commitment practice (cases highlighted in red), half of which 
in the electricity sector.48 Second, whereas the Commission adopted commitment 
decisions both in cases of anticompetitive agreements (Article 101 TFEU49) as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Sven Norberg: A European for All Seasons, Bruylant, Brussels 2006, p. 564. E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER, supra n. 
33, p. 43. 
46 For a discussion on the optimal use of commitment decisions see infra section 1.5.1.1. 
47 Table 1 does not report prohibition decisions, as well as the few cases which have been still settled informally. 
Four commitment decisions listed in this table have been adopted in one case regarding major car manufactures 
(cases 8-11). Also the two decisions on wholesale and balancing markets (12 and 13) were adopted in one 
investigation against E.ON. In 4 open antitrust investigations commitments have already been offered. This 
calculation excludes cartels, because they always involve fines and commitment decisions are not appropriate in 
such cases (see Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003, n. 14 above). For a list of settlements post-2004, see S. RAB, 
D. MONNOYEUR and A SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 174, Table 1. 
48 Another visible trend is a substantial number of cases involving intellectual property rights (17 cases marked 
with a star, see Table 1). This latter trend might be explained by the particular nature of IP rights. Where 
allegedly anticompetitive behaviour often demonstrates pro-competitive effects, negotiating a tailor-made 
commitment package might reflect a more balanced approach than a prohibition decision. In particular, this is 
the case of agreements of collecting societies (Cannes Agreement) and joint selling of media rights for popular 
sport events (Deutsche Bundesliga and Premier League). E.g. in all these cases agreements were ultimately 
approved, just subject to certain conditions. Further, many of these cases needed fast procedures and quickly 
implemented remedies, as they involved high-tech industries. Lengthy infringement proceedings (often 
protracted by an appeal) would not keep pace with these dynamic and constantly changing markets, so 
commitment decisions might have been more practical. See J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 45, p. 292-293, 
S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 179, as well as comments by Bruno 
Lasserre in L. ORTIZ BLANCO and A. LAMADRID DE PABLO, supra n. 11, p. 133 (roundtable discussion). 
Whish also suggests that the first commitment cases were a way of dealing with a backlog of troublesome cases 
left by Regulation 17/62, supra n. 27 (e.g. cases concerning media and music rights). See R. WHISH (2006), 
supra n. 45, 564. In the same line G.S. GEORGIEV, ‘Contagious Efficiency: The Growing Reliance on U.S.-
Style Antitrust Settlements in EU Law’ (2007) Utah Law Review 4, 971-1037, 1002. For a more detailed 
overview of these cases see H. SCHWEITZER, ‘Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003: 
The Developing EC Practice and Case Law’ in C.-D. EHLERMANN and M. MARQUIS (eds.) European 
Competition Law Annual 2009: Antitrust Settlements under EC Competition Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland 2010, available online as EUI (European University Institute) Working Paper LAW 2008/22, pp. 5-10 
of the working paper. For a similar practice developing at the national level see H. SCHWEITZER, 
‘Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member States: Functions and risks of a new instrument of 
competition law enforcement within a federal enforcement regime’ (2012) e-Competitions Bulletin (Special 
Issue on Commitment Decisions, August 2012), preliminary draft available online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101630 accessed 20.05.2013, at notes 60-64 and the accompanying text.  
49 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Further referred to as the ‘Treaty’. 
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abuses of dominance (Article 102 TFEU), energy-related commitments were accepted 
predominantly in abuse of dominance cases.50 
 
Table 1. Overview of antitrust cases closed by commitment decision between 2004 
and 2012. 
No CASE 
CASE 
REFERENCE 
SECTOR YEAR 
LEGAL 
BASIS 
1 Deutsche Bundesliga* COMP/37.214 TV, broadcasting 2005 101 
2 Coca-Cola COMP/39.116 soft drinks 2005 102 
3 ALROSA/de Beers group COMP/38.381 mining 2006 102 
4 Premier League* COMP/38.173 TV, broadcasting 2006 101 
5 REPSOL COMP/38.348 fuels 2006 101 
6 Cannes Agreement* COMP/38.681 recorded media 2006 101 
7 Distrigaz COMP/37.966 energy (gas) 2007 102 
8 Daimler Chrysler* COMP/39.140 motor vehicles 2007 101 
9 Fiat* COMP/39.141 motor vehicles 2007 101 
10 Toyota Motor Europe* COMP/39.142 motor vehicles 2007 101 
11 Opel / GM* COMP/39.143 motor vehicles 2007 101 
12 E.ON – wholesale market COMP/39.388 energy (electricity) 2008 102 
13 E.ON – balancing market COMP/39.389 energy (electricity) 2008 102 
14 RWE gas foreclosure COMP/39.402 energy (gas) 2009 102 
15 IACS – Ship Classification* COMP/39.416 ship classification 2009 102 
16 GDF foreclosure COMP/39.316 energy (gas) 2009 102 
17 RAMBUS* COMP/38.636 computers  2009 102 
18 Microsoft* COMP/39.530 computers  2009 102 
19 Long term el.  contracts (F) COMP/39.386 energy (electricity) 2010 102 
20 Swedish Interconnectors COMP/39.351 energy (electricity) 2010 102 
21 E.ON gas foreclosure COMP/39.317 energy (gas) 2010 102 
22 BA/AA/IB COMP/39.596 airline 2010 101 
23 ENI COMP/39.315 energy (gas) 2010 102 
24 Visa (MIF) COMP/39.398 financial services  2010 101 
25 Standard and Poor’s COMP/39.592 financial services  2011 102 
26 IBM Maintenance Service* COMP/39.692 computers 2011 102 
                                                           
50 A relatively high number of 102 cases among commitment cases is remarkable, given that Article 101 
investigations usually prevail in the EU competition enforcement, whereas Article 102 cases are less common. 
Moreover, as D. GERARD, supra n. 20, p. 464, notices, most Article 102 cases are now closed under Article 9. 
He explains that the Commission might prefer to accept commitments in Article 102 cases just to avoid public 
scrutiny of formal findings of abuses. 
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27 SIEMENS / AREVA COMP/39.736 energy (electricity) 2012 101 & 102 
28 Rio Tinto Alcan* COMP/39.230 aluminium  2012 102 
29 Thomson Reuters* COMP/39.654 financial services 2012 102 
30 Ebooks* COMP/39.847 sale of e-books 2012 101 
31 CEZ & others COMP/39.727 energy (electricity) open 1 102 
32 AC/LH/UA/ COMP/39.595 airline open 2 101 
33 SABAM (Belgium)* COMP/39.151 recorded media - 3 101 
34 BUMA (Netherlands)* COMP/39.152 recorded media - 3 101 
35 CISAC Agreement* COMP/38.698 recorded media - 4 101 
36 AuA/SAS COMP/37.749 airline - 5 101 
37 SKYTEAM COMP/37.984 airline - 6 101 
* Cases involving intellectual property issues. 
1 Commitments offered and Market Test Notice issued on 10.07.2012. 
2 Commitments offered on 21.12.2012. 
3 Commitments offered on 25.04.2005 (BUMA) and 10.05.2005 (SABAM), Market Test Notice issued on 
03.08.2005. No formal Article 9 decision. 
4 Some of the Societies offered commitments. The Commission did not accept them and issued an infringement 
decision on 16.07.2008. Several societies appealed to the EGC, appeals are pending (see cases T-398/08, OJ C 
285, 08.11.2008, p. 53, T-401/08, OJ C 313, 06.12.2008, p. 38, and T-422/08, OJ C 327, 20.12.2008, pp. 31–
32). 
5 Commitments offered on 12.07.2005, Market Test Notice issued on 22.09.2005, closure of proceedings on 
13.03.2008. 
6 Commitments offered on 19.10.2007, closure of proceedings on 26.01.2012.  
 
Source: Own table based on the Commission’s record of cases between 1.05.2004 (Regulation 1/2003 entered 
into force) and 1.01.2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/index.html accessed 
20.05.2013. 
 
In order to better illustrate this trend, Table 2 lists all antitrust investigations launched 
between 2004 and 2012 in the energy sector. At present,51 antitrust enforcement in the 
energy sector amounts to 20 investigations and 14 in the electricity sector only. 13 
investigations have been closed, and only three of them did not follow the 
commitment route (highlighted in blue). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
51 At the time of writing this chapter (01.2013). 
 25
Table 2. Energy antitrust investigations 2004 – 2012. 
No CASE 
CASE 
REFERENCE 
YEAR 
LEGAL 
BASIS 
DECISION 
1 Distrigaz COMP/37.966 2007 102 commitments 
2 German el.  wholesale market* COMP/39.388 2008 102 commitments 
3 German el. balancing market* COMP/39.389 2008 102 commitments 
4 RWE gas foreclosure COMP/39.402 2009 102 commitments 
5 E.ON / GDF* COMP/39.401 2009 101 infringement 
6 GDF foreclosure COMP/39.316 2009 102 commitments 
7 French long term contracts* COMP/39.386 2010 102 commitments 
8 Swedish Interconnectors* COMP/39.351 2010 102 commitments 
9 E.ON gas foreclosure COMP/39.317 2010 102 commitments 
10 ENI COMP/39.315 2010 102 commitments 
11 SIEMENS / AREVA* COMP/B-1/39.736 2012 101, 102 commitments 
12 Belgian long term contracts* COMP/39.387 2011 102 no decision 
13 Greek lignite* COMP/38.700 open1 106(1), 102 infringement 
14 French el. wholesale market* COMP/39.442 open2 102 - 
15 CEZ & others* COMP/39.727 open3 102 - 
16 Deutsche Bahn II* COMP/39.731 open4 102 - 
17 Upstream gas suppliers in CEE COMP/39.816 open5 101, 102 - 
18 Power exchanges* COMP/39.952 open6 101 - 
19 BEH Electricity COMP/39.767 open7 102 - 
20 OPCOM / Romanian PX COMP/39.984 open8 102 - 
* Electricity-related cases. 
1 The case was re-opened in 2011. The 2008 decision found an infringement of Article 106 (1) TFEU read in 
combination with Article 102 TFEU. In order to comply with this decision, Greece proposed measures which 
were subsequently made binding by the Commission in 2009. Following changes in Greek national energy 
policy, the Greek government proposed an alternative set of measures in 2011. These new measures are 
currently market tested. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see section 1.4. 
2 Inspections on 11.03.2009. 
3 Commitments offered and Market Test Notice issued on 10.07.2012. 
4 Opening of proceedings on 13.06.2012. 
5 Opening of proceedings on 04.09.2012. 
6 Inspections on 07.02.2012. 
7 Opening of proceedings on 04.12.2012. 
8 Opening of proceedings on 06.12.2012. 
Source: Own table based on the Commission’s record of cases between 1.05.2004 (Regulation 1/2003 entered 
into force) and 1.01.2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/cases_en.html accessed 
20.05.2013. 
 
The first one concerned a market-sharing agreement between E.ON and GDF Suez 
regarding the MEGAL pipeline. According to Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003 (cited 
above) and the Commission’s memorandum of 2004 commitments are not appropriate 
in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine.52 This suggests that hard-
                                                           
52 MEMO/04/217 of 17.09.2004. See also R. WHISH (2006), supra n. 45, 558. 
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core restrictions to competition (like E.ON/GDF market-sharing cartel) require a 
finding of an infringement followed by a punishment and thus warrant an 
infringement decision.53 The second one involves an investigation into alleged vertical 
foreclosure of the Belgian electricity market by Electrabel, where the Commission, 
having investigated the case, decided not to pursue it. The third investigation is not a 
regular antitrust case, but an action against Greece under Article 106 TFEU in 
connection with Article 102 TFEU. The Commission accused the Greek state of 
breaching competition rules by securing privileged access to lignite to PPC, its state-
owned electricity supplier. Following an appeal from PPC, the General Court annulled 
the Commission’s decision in 2012 and the case is currently pending before the ECJ. 
The Greek lignite case is discussed in more details in section 1.4 below.  
 
The remaining 10 energy antitrust investigations are abuse of dominance cases closed 
under Article 9. This shows that (1) commitment decisions have been the most 
common way of closing antitrust cases in the energy sector and (2) antitrust 
enforcement in energy boils down to abuse of dominance cases. One could speculate 
about the reasons for this trend. In particular, a high number of Article 102 cases (the 
second observation) might be explained by the structure of the European deregulated 
energy markets, in which former legal monopolists remained dominant players in 
open market conditions and concerns that they might be abusing their dominance are 
legitimate. Article 102-based concerns might in turn explain the inclination towards 
commitment decisions in the energy cases (the first observation). The concept of 
abuse of dominance is far from clear-cut,54 which makes an outcome of a fully 
contested Article 102 case difficult to predict. The prospect of going through drawn-
                                                           
53 The Commission imposed heavy fines on E.ON and GDF totalling 1,106 billion EUR (553 million EUR 
each). These were the first fines imposed by the Commission for an antitrust infringement in the energy sector 
and the second highest fine ever imposed by the Commission. See IP/09/1099 of 08.07.2009 and J. BATTISTA, 
A. GEE and U. VON KOPPENFELS, ‘Commission imposes heavy fine on two major European gas companies 
for operating a market-sharing agreement (2009) Competition Policy Newsletter 3, 38-40. Both undertakings 
appealed to the General Court which eventually reduced the fine for each undertaking to 320 million EUR due 
to the Commission’s errors regarding the duration of the infringement. See case T-360/09, E.ON Ruhrgas and 
E.ON AG v. Commission [2012] n.y.r., and case T-370/09, GDF Suez SA v. Commission [2012] n.y.r. (GC 
judgments of 29.06.2012). 
54 See J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 45, 272, at note 17. On unresolved issues regarding pricing abuses 
see discussion by J. TEMPLE LANG and R. O’DONOGHUE, ‘Defining Legitimate Competition: How to 
Clarify Pricing Abuses under Article 82 EC’ (2002) 26 Fordham International Law Journal, 83-162. 
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out proceedings and dwelling over complex abuse of dominance issues might prompt 
both parties into Article 9 negotiations.55 On the one hand, the possibility of closing a 
case by accepting commitments might encourage the Commission to come up with 
abuse of dominance concerns, as it will not be required to prove them at a later stage 
in order to establish an infringement of Article 102. On the other hand, year-long 
proceedings and outcome uncertainty might also explain why undertakings are not 
venturing into litigation but are willing to offer commitments instead. What further 
increases incentives to offer commitments in Article 102 cases on the part of the 
undertakings are little chances of a successful appeal. If they eventually decide to 
challenge the Commission’s decision (which would substantially protract the case and 
involve additional litigation costs), the European Courts refuse to review Article 102 
decisions on substantial grounds as these usually involve ‘complex technical 
appraisals’.56 As a result, the Commission hasn’t lost any Article 102 case in court 
yet.57 Further, those Article 101 cases which involve collusive practices (infringement 
‘by object’) usually necessitate a fine and this excludes Article 9 from the outset.58 For 
Article 102 abuses it might be more important to make an (allegedly) dominant 
undertaking aware of what it can and cannot do in order to comply with competition 
rules. And this can be reached with a commitment decision. But this is not the end of 
the story. As argued in this thesis, a relatively high number of Article 102 actions 
against energy incumbents primarily relates to the Commission’s objective to create 
an internal market for electricity. The following paragraphs take a closer look at this 
link.  
 
 
 
                                                           
55 Also prior to Regulation 1/2003 most significant antitrust settlements involved abuse of dominance concerns.  
See J. TEMPLE LANG (2003), supra n. 16, p. 353, J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 45, p. 292, at note 36, 
G.S. GEORGIEV, supra n. 48, 996, or H. SCHWEITZER (2010), supra n. 48, p. 9 of the working paper. S. 
RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p.178. 
56 Commission decisions resulting from ‘complex technical appraisals’ are subject to limited judicial review. 
See e.g. case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para. 88. 
57 Appeals of Article 102 decisions were successful only on secondary procedural issues. L. ORTIZ BLANCO 
and A. LAMADRID DE PABLO, supra n. 11, pp. 76-77. D. GERARD, supra n. 20, p. 465.  
58 Supra n. 28. For references see infra n. 207. 
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1.2.3. What’s at stake? – Internal market for electricity 
 
In the recent communication on the internal energy market the Commission points out 
the key role of competition rules in ensuring a level playing field and signals that it 
will continue to actively enforce competition rules in the energy markets.59 This is not 
a new message. The Commission has been plainspoken from the outset about its plans 
to enforce competition rules in the energy sector and the underlying reason: fostering 
liberalisation and integration of electricity and gas markets.60 Promoting market 
integration has always been one of the main goals driving the EU competition policy, 
reflected by the 50 years of EU competition enforcement and recognised by the 
European courts.61 Moreover, competition rules have recently proved to be an apt tool 
in liberalising telecommunications sector62 and it was believed that harnessing them 
again to foster the completion of the internal energy market would deliver positive 
results as well.  
 
Without taking an a priori view on whether it is legitimate to use competition rules for 
this purpose or not, the following paragraphs briefly outline the major steps in the 
liberalisation and integration of electricity markets, highlighting the involvement of 
competition law, and more specifically commitment decisions, in this process. 
 
                                                           
59 European Commission, Making the internal energy market work, supra n. 6, p. 8. 
60 N. KROES, ‘More competitive energy markets: building on the findings of the sector inquiry to shape the 
right policy solutions’, SPEECH/07/547 of 19.09.2007, European Energy Institute, Brussels. 
61 EU competition policy is guided not only by economic but also political and social goals, like promoting 
market integration, economic freedom, ensuring fair market access and level playing field, protecting small 
enterprises and other policy considerations. Promoting (and then protecting) internal market was the 
Commission’s primary concern especially in the early days of the EU integration. The first three decades of 
competition enforcement were dominated by cases involving restrictions to cross-border trade, which reflected 
the Commission’s enforcement priorities. See the flagship cases 56/64 & 58/64, Éstablissements Consten SARL 
& Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission [1966] ECR 299, 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 
207 and C- 33/94 P, Tetra Pak v. Commission [1994] ECR II- 5951. However, even now, despite the recent shift 
towards economic efficiency and consumer welfare, other non-economic goals are still present in the EU 
competition enforcement, albeit less pronounced. For a comprehensive debate on the EU competition policy 
objectives, see M. MOTTA, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2004, pp. 17-30. A. JONES and B. SUFRIN, EC Competition Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press (OUP), 
Oxford 2004, pp. 3-18. R. WHISH (2005), supra n. 16, pp. 17-23.  
62 Supra n. 11.  
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Nowadays it is not possible to discuss EU energy policy without mentioning climate 
change issues. The European Union shifts to a low-carbon economy.63 This transition 
is going to have an unprecedented impact on the energy sector and requires a well-
functioning, competitive and fully integrated electricity and gas markets across 
Europe. At the meeting of the European Council last year, the EU leaders called thus 
for urgent completion of the internal energy market, a process which started already in 
the mid 1990s.64  
 
Electricity markets in Europe used to be regulated. Each European country usually 
had one vertically integrated and state-owned company which enjoyed monopoly 
rights for electricity supply across the country (electricity incumbent). In simple 
terms, creating the internal market for electricity involves two major processes. The 
first one is market liberalisation,65 by which monopoly rights awarded to electricity 
incumbents are abolished and markets open up to (national) competition. The second 
one is market integration, by which differences in national market designs are 
eliminated, which facilitates cross-border trade in electricity and cross-border 
competition can take place. These two processes often run in parallel. However, cross-
border trade cannot take place if national markets are not deregulated, so market 
integration is to some extent preconditioned by market liberalisation. Market 
integration also requires substantial investments in interconnectors66 in order to 
provide sufficient transmission capacity to accommodate cross-border electricity 
flows.  
 
Liberalisation and integration of electricity and gas markets have been gradually 
implemented across Europe primarily by a centrally driven programme of reforms at 
                                                           
63 European Commission, Energy Roadmap 2050, Communication from the Commission, COM/2011/0885 
final, Brussels, 15.12.2011. 
64 Supra n. 7 
65 This thesis refers to market liberalisation in the broad sense, which comprises both deregulation (market 
liberalisation in the narrow sense) as well as all regulatory measures which are intended to inject more 
competition in the market.  
66 Cross-border electricity transmission lines. 
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the EU level.67 The following paragraphs briefly describe the main steps of this 
process and what has been achieved so far. A fully-fledged discussion of these 
reforms is beyond the scope of this thesis.68 Rather, the following summary provides 
necessary context for the subsequent chapters. Inasmuch as this thesis focuses on 
electricity, the measures discussed here apply to electricity markets only.  
 
1.2.3.1. Early legislative reforms – the 1st and the 2nd Energy Package 
 
The 1997 Electricity Directive brought about important structural and regulatory 
changes and as such constituted the first big step in a long and difficult process of 
liberalisation and integration of national electricity markets.69 First of all, legal 
monopolies were abolished in order to allow new market entry in generation and 
supply segments. Construction of new generation capacity was made possible through 
standard licensing or tendering procedures. Markets were supposed to open to 
competition gradually and the directives set minimum targets for that as well. First 
were the large consumers to choose their supplier.70 Transmission and distribution 
services remained regulated, but all competitors were given free and fair access to 
networks by means of a ‘regulated’ or ‘negotiated’ Third Party Access (TPA). Given 
that grids were owned by vertically integrated energy companies, directives provided 
for minimum unbundling requirements (separation of accounts and ‘Chinese walls’). 
                                                           
67 Whereas some Member States started to open up their energy markets to competition before it was required 
by the EU legislation (e.g. the UK and the Nordic countries), the liberalisation process in Europe would be much 
slower without a coordinated liberalisation and integration policy at the EU level. See T. JAMASB and M. 
POLLITT, ‘Electricity Market Liberalisation and Integration in the European Union’ (2006) CESifo DICE 
Report 2/2006. 
68 For a comprehensive discussion of the EU energy reforms see e.g. C. JONES, EU Energy Law:The Internal 
Energy Market – Volume 1, 2nd ed., Claeys & Casteels, Leuven 2006. P.D. CAMERON, Competition in Energy 
Markets: Law and Regulation in the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007. A more detailed 
summary is provided by F. DE LA PEÑA FERNÁNDEZ-GARNELO, ‘Has Merger Control Made a 
Contribution Towards the Liberalisation of the Gas and Electricity Markets in the EU?’(2012) doctoral thesis 
0234750/02, King’s College London, 2012, 104-115. 
69 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19.12.1996 concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity [1997] OJ L 27/1. Before that, minor harmonisation at the EU level took 
place in 1990 regarding transparency of electricity prices and electricity transit. See Council Directive 90/377 
concerning a Community procedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to 
industrial end-users [1990] OJ L 185/16 and Council Directive 90/547 on the transit of electricity through 
transmission grids [1990] OJ L 313/33.  
70 For a detailed discussion on the first Electricity Directive, see M. MARQUIS, Introducing Free Markets & 
Competition to the Electricity Sector in Europe, Wisdom House, Leeds 2001, p. 76. 
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Further, Member States were required to appoint independent transmission system 
operators in charge of operation, maintenance and development of transmission grids. 
Similarly, newly designated distribution system operators were responsible for 
distribution networks. 
 
This first step towards electricity liberalisation proved insufficient. Despite market 
opening in generation and supply, competition did not happen in these segments. 
Markets were still highly concentrated. A wave of energy mergers in the aftermath of 
liberalisation resulted in even higher concentration rates and further discouraged new 
entry.71 Unbundling requirements imposed on vertically integrated incumbents 
weren’t strong enough to prevent discriminatory behaviour. Further, the first Directive 
allowed for national competition, but it was criticised for failing to address cross-
border trade in electricity.72 More far-reaching market reforms seemed essential to 
allow for more competition and create conditions for market integration. The 2nd 
Energy Package was adopted in 2003 and included a new Electricity Directive and a 
Regulation on cross-border trade in electricity.73 This 2nd Electricity Directive brought 
about full market opening by 2007. Also, it reinforced the existing provisions with 
respect to network unbundling (legal, managerial) and network access (‘regulated’ 
TPA only). The Directive strengthened the role of regulatory oversight. Member 
States were required to establish a regulatory body with substantial powers and 
independent from the electricity business.74 Among others, these national regulators 
were supposed to monitor interconnector capacity and ensure a non-discriminatory 
                                                           
71 These mergers were strongly supported by governments which aimed to promote their ‘national champions’. 
See A. G. SOARES, ‘“National Champions” Rhetoric in European Law. Or many faces of protectionism’ 
(2008) 31 World Competition: Law and Economics Review 3, pp. 353-368. 
72 See B. EBERLEIN, ‘Regulation by Cooperation: The “Third Way” in Making Rules for the Internal Energy 
Market’ in P. D. CAMERON (ed.), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation. Implementing the New Directives 
on Electricity and Gas Across Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, p. 64. G. MONTI, EC 
Competition Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, p. 462. 
73 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26.07.2003 concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC [2003] OJ L 176/37. Regulation (EC) No 
1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26.06.2003 on conditions for access to the network 
for cross-border exchanges in electricity [2003] OJ L 176/1. 
74 Article 23 of Directive 2003/54/EC, supra n. 73. The provision refers to the regulators’ independence from the 
interests of the industry, but does not speak about their independence from the government.  
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access to the networks.75 Cross-border electricity exchange was for the first time 
addressed in a separate and directly applicable Regulation in a more comprehensive 
way (Cross-border Regulation).76   
 
1.2.3.2. The use of competition toolbox – energy sector inquiry and the follow-
up actions 
 
While the implementation of the 2nd Energy Package advanced slowly and in fits and 
starts in the face of national protectionism, Regulation 1/2003 opened up new 
possibilities to use antitrust enforcement in order to support or sometimes even 
substitute efforts made on the regulatory and political fronts. Electricity liberalisation 
required good knowledge of the markets, quick actions and major structural changes. 
The new antitrust provisions, which empowered the Commission to carry out sector 
inquiries,77 adopt commitment decisions and impose structural remedies, created a 
toolbox of particular value to implement the Commission’s conception of the 
competitive electricity markets.  
 
In 2005 it became obvious that the second wave of reforms had not removed the key 
obstacles to competition: high market concentration and the presence of vertically 
integrated firms. Electricity wholesale prices not only did not drop, as expected, but 
even started to rise slowly. The lack of progress and dissatisfaction of energy-
                                                           
75 TSOs were required to submit network access tariffs (or at least their calculation methods) to national 
regulators for authorisation.  
76 Regulation 1228/2003, supra n. 73, was the outcome of discussions undertaken within the Florence Electricity 
Regulatory Forum. Established in 1998, the Florence Forum is a platform to discuss the creation and 
development of the internal electricity market. Participants include governments of the Member States, national 
regulators, the Commission and, most importantly, market participants: TSOs, traders, consumers, grid users 
and power exchanges. For more information on the Florence Forum see e.g. C. MUSIALSKI, ‘The ENTSO’s 
Under the Third Energy Package’ in B. DELVAUX, M. HUNT and K. TALUS (eds.), EU Energy Law and 
Policy Issues, ELRF Collection 3, Intersentia 2011, p 37.  
77 Sector inquiries were carried out also before the 2004 reform, on the basis of Article 12 of Regulation 17/62, 
supra n. 27 (e.g. the 1999 telecommunications sector inquiry or the 2004 inquiry into sports rights to Internet 
and 3G mobile operators). However, despite the similar wording of the two articles, the Commission launched 
sector inquiries under the old provision only occasionally. This might be explained by the fact, that the previous 
system of notifications and exemptions provided the Commission with constant flow of market information and 
also left it less time and resources to seek such information on its own initiative. See more on this and generally 
on the role of sector inquiries in the EU competition law G. OLSEN and B. ROY, ‘The New World of Proactive 
EC Antitrust Enforcement? Sector Inquiries by the European Commission’ (2007) 21 Antitrust 3, 82-88, 82. 
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intensive consumers prompted the Commission to make use of competition policy 
instruments and launch a sector inquiry into the functioning of the electricity and gas 
markets.78  
 
A sector inquiry is a comprehensive fact-finding exercise, an extensive investigation 
usually into a particular industry79 which raises competition concerns and is therefore 
of potential interest for competition enforcement. The Commission’s powers to 
conduct sector inquiries are set forth in Regulation 1/2003, the same which regulates 
commitment procedure. According to Article 17, the Commission may open an 
inquiry into a sector in which ‘the trend of trade between Member States, the rigidity 
of prices or other circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted or 
distorted within the common market.’ The provision appears very broad in scope 
when it comes to indicating which industries may be subject to an inquiry and what 
might be the reasons for it. It basically allows the Commission to take action on the 
basis of a vaguely defined ‘restriction’ or ‘distortion’ of competition.80 If the sector 
inquiry confirms anticompetitive concerns, the Commission may then follow up with 
individual antitrust actions under Article 101 and 102 TFEU. Sector inquiries can be 
therefore considered a ‘curtain-raiser’ of competition enforcement preparing the 
ground for individual antitrust proceedings.81 
 
                                                           
78 European Commission, Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas 
and electricity sectors, Communication from the Commission, COM(2006)851 final, Brussels 10.01.2007, as 
well as European Commission, DG Competition report on energy sector inquiry, SEC(2006)1724, Brussels, 
10.01.2007 (in the following ‘Final Report’). Documents are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/index.html accessed 20.05.2013. 
79 The Commission may also investigate in this way a certain type of agreements across various sectors (see Art. 
17 Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14) In practice, however, inquiries targeting a particular sector of economy have 
been more common so far.  
80 See A. VAN HAASTEREN and G.S. GEORGIEV, ‘Commission launches inquiries into the energy and 
financial service sectors’ (2005) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter, Autumn Issue, 51-53, p. 51: ‘Essentially, the 
Commission can open a sector inquiry if it has concerns that competition may not be working as well as it 
should but the reasons for that are unclear.’ In comparison to this, launching an individual investigation would 
require a more specific reason, e.g. a suspicion that an infringement of competition rules has occurred. See N. 
PETIT and M. RATO, ‘From Hard to Soft Enforcement of EC Competition Law – A Bestiary of “Sunshine” 
Enforcement Instruments’ in C. GHEUR and N. PETIT (eds.) Alternative enforcement techniques in EC 
competition law: Settlements, commitments and other novel instruments, Bruylant, Brussels 2009, p. 200. 
81 In this line G. OLSEN and B. ROY, supra n. 77, 83. For a different view, see N.PETIT and M. RATO, supra 
n. 80, pp. 200-201. 
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Highly concentrated electricity and gas markets with barriers to entry and rising 
wholesale prices made a good candidate for a sectoral screening.82 In early 2005 the 
Commission announced a more pro-active application of competition rules in the 
energy sector and underlined its role in shaping European competitive markets.83 The 
energy sector inquiry was opened a few months later, and the Commission for the first 
time mentioned the use of competition rules to foster energy market liberalisation and 
integration, as a complementary instrument to reforms taking place on the EU 
regulatory front.84 The inquiry took two years. In 2007 the Commission issued a 
report summarising its findings (Final Report). The main conclusion was that the 
process of market liberalisation has not delivered expected results and European 
electricity and gas markets are not functioning as they should. The Final Report 
pointed at several competition problems which mostly stemmed from concentrated 
market structure, vertical integration and the lack of cross-border market integration 
and competition.85 
 
Energy sector inquiry had an important informative function. The Commission 
collected a vast amount of market data, analysed it, identified problem areas which 
required remedy actions and in some cases even suggested concrete remedies to 
address them.86 This gave effect to a wave of individual antitrust investigations 
against electricity and gas incumbents which marked the second half of the 2000s 
(listed in Table 2 above). The investigations targeted problems identified in the sector 
inquiry (i.e. market concentration, vertical integration, lack of cross-border 
integration) and clearly built on its findings to a great extent, and sometimes even did 
not go much beyond them.87 As pointed out before, almost all follow-up cases have 
been closed under Article 9 and in many cases companies offered substantial 
                                                           
82 MEMO/05/203 of 13.06.2005 
83 European Commission, Working together for growth and jobs, a new start for the Lisbon strategy, 
Communication of the Commission, COM(2005) 24 final, Brussels, 02.02.2005, pp. 8 and 18. 
84 Press release IP/05/716 of 13.06.2005.  
85 See Final Report, supra n. 78, para. 4. See also N. KROES, ‘Introductory remarks on Final Report of Energy 
Sector Competition Inquiry’, SPEECH/07/4, Press Conference, Brussels, 10.01.2007. 
86 For instance, the Final Report recommended ownership unbundling to address conflict of interests resulting 
from vertical integration. This was later reflected by commitments of E.ON, RWE and ENI to divest their 
transmission networks under Article 9. See Final Report, supra n. 78, paras. 53-55. See also P. IBANEZ 
COLOMO, supra n. 11, pp. 286-287. 
87 The E.ON case, discussed in chapter 3, is here an illustrative example. 
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structural commitments to address the Commission’s concerns. In sum, following the 
energy sector inquiry, commitment decisions have become the standard of the 
Commission’s antitrust enforcement in the energy sector.  
 
Remarkably, in addition to investigations at the European level, energy firms have 
come under increasing scrutiny from the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) 
and National Regulatory Authorites (NRAs) over their market practices. Prompt by 
the Commission’s active competition enforcement in the energy sector, NCAs open 
antitrust investigations based on their own sector inquiries or market studies carried 
out by national energy regulators. These national cases often focus on areas 
indentified in the Commission’s energy sector inquiry and its antitrust 
investigations.88 While competition enforcement at the national level is not the focus 
of this thesis, section 3.7 (Annex 2 to chapter 3) illustrates how NCAs in Spain, 
Denmark, Germany, the UK, Italy and Belgium investigated their electricity 
wholesale markets looking for evidence of capacity withholding and/or excessive 
bidding, four of them shortly after the Commission’s energy sector inquiry and its 
decision in the E.ON case.  
 
1.2.3.3. Where do we stand now?  – The 3rd Energy Package 
 
Antitrust actions target individual undertakings, so they can only provide one-off 
tailor-made remedies to more straightforward anticompetitive practices. They cannot 
replace a comprehensive regulatory solution where the underlying problem is the 
market structure itself. Despite the Commission’s enhanced competition 
enforcement,89 major developments in the electricity sector were to come through 
regulatory reforms. In 2007 the Commission came up with new legislative proposals. 
                                                           
88 For an interesting overview of NCAs’ Article 102 decisions in the energy sector adopted between 01.2010 
and 09.2012 see M. ABEL and P. WILLIS, ‘National Article 102 cases in the energy sector’ (2011) presented at 
the IBC Legal’s 6th Annual Competition Law in the Energy Sector conference, 29.11.2011, Brussels. 
89 This thesis focuses on antitrust actions and does not consider other competition law instruments which can 
have a similar function with respect to the energy markets (state aid rules and merger control). For an in-depth 
study on the role of EU merger control in liberalisation of energy markets in Europe see the doctoral thesis of F. 
DE LA PEÑA FERNÁNDEZ-GARNELO, supra n. 68. 
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Electricity markets were subject to the 3rd Electricity Directive90 and a revised Cross-
border Regulation.91 This so-called 3rd Energy Package was adopted in 2009 and also 
included corresponding acts regulating gas markets and a new Regulation establishing 
an Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) responsible for cross-
border issues.92  
 
With the 3rd Energy Package the Commission attempted to address the major 
shortcomings identified in the sector inquiry. Firstly, the 3rd Electricity Directive 
introduced a higher degree of network unbundling in order to eliminate once and for 
all the conflict of interest resulting from vertical integration. However, the 
Commission’s initial proposal imposing full ownership unbundling has met with 
strong opposition in several Member States and has been watered down in the 
Council. As a result, Member States could have opted for three less intrusive 
unbundling regimes, each of which allowed electricity incumbents to retain the 
ownership of their networks, provided that they either hand over their technical and 
commercial operation to independent bodies designated by Member States93 or 
comply with a more detailed set of rules on ‘Chinese walls’, compliance monitoring 
and regulatory supervision which would guarantee their autonomous operation.94 
Secondly, the 3rd Package focused on increasing cross-border trade in electricity and 
fostering market integration. To this aim the newly created ACER complements and 
coordinates the work of national regulatory authorities and monitors the functioning of 
electricity markets. It also coordinates regional and cross-regional initiatives 
promoting market integration and can take binding decisions regarding access 
conditions and operational security of cross-border infrastructure. Further, the new 
Cross-border Regulation strengthened cooperation between national network 
operators by creating the European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
                                                           
90 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13.07.2009 concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L 211/55. 
91 Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13.07.2009 on conditions for 
access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 
[2009] OJ L 211/15. 
92 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13.07.2009 establishing an 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators [2009] OJ L 211/1. 
93 Independent System Operator (ISO model). 
94 Independent Transmission Operator (ITO and ITO+ models). 
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Electricity (ENTSO-E). Under this umbrella association network operators have been 
assigned important EU-wide planning and operations tasks in order to provide for new 
cross-border infrastructure (EU-wide network development plans) and gradually 
integrate different regulatory regimes governing national transmission grids 
(development of network codes).  
 
1.2.3.4. Actions for non-compliance 
 
Member States are under an obligation to transpose EU laws into their respective legal 
systems.95 If they fail to do that, the Commission has powers under Article 258 TFEU 
to take procedural steps in order to enforce their compliance, and if necessary, bring 
them to the ECJ (action for non-compliance). The Commission monitors all the 
implementing measures taken by Member States following the 2nd and the 3rd Energy 
Packages and has already launched a number of Article 258 actions against Member 
States which have not yet transposed the Packages or have failed to do it correctly. 
According to the Commission’s update from October 2012, 7 infringement cases are 
still pending on 2nd Energy Package and 13 cases on the 3rd Energy Package.96 
 
Non-compliance has a broad meaning and includes any failure by a Member State to 
fulfil its obligations under EU law, whether it is done by the government itself or by 
any state agency,97 and whether it is action, e.g. adoption of measures incompatible 
with EU law or omission, e.g. non-implementation of EU law within the prescribed 
time limit. 
 
Action for non-compliance consists of two phases. The first phase is administrative 
                                                           
95 Article 4(3) TEU and the European Courts’ settled case law dating back to case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL 
[1964] ECR 585. 
96 The list of on-going infringement cases for non-transposition of the provisions of the 2nd and the 3rd Energy 
Package is provided in the European Commission’s Energy Markets in the European Union in 2011, 
Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2012) 368 final, Brussels, 15.11.2012, accompanying the 
document European Commission, Making the internal energy market work, supra n. 6, and available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/20121217_energy_market_2011_lr_en.pdf accessed 20.05.2013, 
Part IV. 
97 Executive, legislative or judicial, even if it is a constitutionally independent institution. See case 77/69, 
Commission v Belgium [1970] ECR 237. 
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and involves direct negotiations between the Commission and the Member State 
(infringement proceedings). 98 At this stage the Commission closely examines the case 
in order to examine the nature and extent of the suspected breach of EU law. The 
investigated Member State, on its part, has a possibility to clarify the situation, which 
consititutes an important guarantee of its right of defence. But most importantly, it is 
given an opportunity to bring the alleged infringement voluntarily to an end. In this 
sense, the infringement proceedings are comparable to commitment procedure under 
Article 9. If no amicable settlement is reached during the administrative phase, the 
Commission may then decide to enter the second, litigation phase by refering the case 
to the ECJ. 
 
1.2.3.5. On the home straight? 
 
Out of the three EU packages of energy reforms, the 3rd and last one is viewed as the 
major step towards the completion of the internal market.99 However, the 2014 
deadline set by the Council is tight and the Commission is going to step up its efforts 
to ‘make the internal market work’.100 It is expected that the Commission will not 
cease to pursue Article 258 TFEU infringement proceedings in order to tacle delays in 
transposition of the EU energy law into national legal systems.101 Further, more 
attention will be paid to developing and implementing complementary legislation and 
technical rules stemming from the 3rd Energy Package.102 According to the 
                                                           
98 This initial, administrative phase consists of several formal stages and is preceded by a fact-finding stage, 
whereby the Commission closely examines the problem in order to establish a breach of EU law and may also 
engage in informal negotiations with the investigated Member State. If the case is to answer, it sends out a letter 
of formal notice, requesting the investigated Member State to submit its observations regarding the alleged 
breach of an obligation under the Treaty within a specified time period. If the Commission finds not satisfactory 
the explanations provided by a Member State, it may deliver a reasoned opinion, which among others informs 
the Member State about the measures the Commission considers necessary to bring the alleged infringement to 
an end. Member State may then agree to take measures proposed by the Commission, but it must be given 
sufficient time to do implement them. At this point the administrative phase is exhausted, and if the Member 
State still does not comply with the reasoned opinion, the Commission may decide to enter the second phase by 
taking proceedings before the ECJ.  
99 See, for instance, the speech of EU Commissioner for Energy G. OETTINGER, ‘The completion of the EU 
internal energy market “Getting to 2014”’, SPEECH/11/614 of 29.09.2011, DG Energy Internal Market 
Conference, Brussels. 
100 European Commission, Making the internal energy market work, supra n. 6. 
101 Ibid., para. 3.1.1. 
102 For instance, implementation of REMIT - the EU Regulation No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25.10.2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency [2011] OJ L 326/1 (for 
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Commission, these activities on the regulatory front will be complemented by an 
active enforcement of competition rules.103 
 
Figure 1. Well-functioning and competitive electricity markets according to my 
nephews and my sister. 
 
Source: Made by Nicolas (5 and a half), Maks (almost 4) and Ania (looks 25) on 27th April 2013 in Maaseik, 
Belgium. 
 
1.3. ENERGY POLICY AND COMPETITION POLICY: DEFINITIONS 
 
The previous section shows that it might be sometimes difficult to distinguish between 
competition policy and energy policy in the context of the Commission’s efforts to 
create a well-functioning and competitive internal market for electricity. This section 
attempts to define what is considered here to be ‘EU competition policy’ and ‘EU 
energy policy’, to identify their common denominator and to determine where the 
dividing line between the two policies should be drawn.  
 
Even though the EU competence to regulate some energy-related areas dates back to 
the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, it is only since the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 that one can truly speak about a common and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
more information, see infra text accompanying n. 424-429), development of guidelines for trans-European 
energy infrastructure (European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC, 
COM/2011/658 final – 2011/0300 (COD), Brussels, 19.10.2011), development and adoption of network codes. 
103 European Commission, Making the internal energy market work, supra n. 6, para. 3.1.2. 
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comprehensive EU energy policy.104 The Union’s competence to regulate energy 
matters has been explicitly recognised in Article 194 TFEU which constitutes a new 
chapter on energy. As set forth therein, the EU energy policy is to (1) ensure the 
functioning of the energy market, (2) ensure security of energy supply in the Union, 
(3) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy and (4) promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
The four guiding objectives of EU energy policy address various challenges facing 
Europe in relation to energy such as climate change, growing energy demand, 
increasing import dependency, maintaining operational security of the network in 
view of increasing reliance on intermittent energy sources and progressing market 
integration.  
 
While recognising that EU energy policy deals with a wide spectrum of challenges, 
this thesis narrows it down to the Commission’s goal of creating the EU internal 
market for electricity. As a consequence, EU energy policy is discussed here only in 
the context of electricity sector. Moreover, some of the energy objectives listed in 
Article 194 TFEU are emphasised whereas others are ignored. Energy goals which 
receive here a lot of attention are (1) ensuring the functioning of the energy market, 
which is referred to as market liberalisation, and (4) promoting network 
interconnection, labelled here market integration.105  
 
EU competition policy aims to ensure free and fair competition in the European 
internal market. The underlying idea is that undistorted competition benefits European 
consumers, because it results in lower prices, higher quality and a broader range of 
goods. In order to protect competition within the EU, the Commission is active in five 
main areas: (1) prohibition of cartels and abuses of a dominant position capable of 
affecting competition in the common market, (2) preventive control of mergers with 
an EU dimention as they can result in restriction of competition, (3) supervision of aid 
                                                           
104 Prior to the Lisbon reform, EU used to adopt measures in relation to energy based on its other ce.g. internal 
market provisions, rules on trans-European networks, competition and environmental protection, and eventually 
Article 352 TFEU (ex Article 308 TEC) permitting the EU to decide in areas not specifically covered by the 
Treaties. However, there was no explicit EU competence to legislate on energy issues.  
105 See supra section 1.2.3 for definitions. 
 41
granted by Member States which may also distort competition by giving certain 
undertakings or certain goods a competitive advantage, (4) efforts to open markets up 
to competition (market liberalisation) and (5) cooperation with national competition 
authorities in Member States in order to ensure effective and consistent application of 
competition rules.106  
 
Again, this thesis does not deal with all these aspects of EU competition policy, but 
only looks at the supportive role of Article 102 TFEU in achieving the EU internal 
electricity market (areas (1) and (4)). The energy sector inquiry and antitrust 
investigations which then followed (section 1.2.3.2 above) make a good example of 
competition policy’ involvement for the completion of the EU internal market for 
electricity, a goal shared with EU energy policy, and even more generally, with EU 
internal market policy.  
 
It follows from the above that the completion of the EU internal market for electricity 
lies at the intersection of energy policy and competition policy. Transformation of 
electricity industry with monopolistic structures gives rise to a number of competition 
problems which can be then addressed by enforcing competition rules. In that sense, 
EU competition policy supports EU energy policy, and vice versa, and both of them 
play an important role in completing the EU internal electricity market. However, 
even tough the goal is shared, each policy uses different instruments to achieve it. In 
that sense they should be seen as complements rather than substitutes. Whereas energy 
policy abolishes legal monopolies and develops a new regulatory framework for the 
functioning of the internal electricity market, it is for the competition policy to remove 
factual obstacles to its functioning. Put differently, energy policy creates conditions 
for competition to take place, and competition policy prevents private arrangements or 
practices which would de facto hamper the emerging competition. This is exactly 
where the dividing line between the two policies should fall. 
 
                                                           
106 European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/what_en.html  accessed 20.05.2013.  
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This thesis looks at instances where this dividing line between competition policy and 
energy policy gets blurred. This is the case where EU energy policy does not bring the 
expected results in terms of market liberalisation and integration, and the Commission 
reaches for competition policy to achieve the same ‘regulatory’ result. Next chapters  
attempt to demonstrate what happens when competition enforcement stops to be seen 
as complementary to energy policy measures, but starts to be a replacement for them.  
 
1.4. DEALING WITH GAP CASES: SOME COMMENTS ON THE GREEK 
LIGNITE CASE 
 
The attempt of the previous section was to distinguish between the application of EU 
competition policy and EU energy policy in the European electricity markets. 
Whereas energy policy targets state monopolies at the regulatory level, competition 
policy deals with factual barriers to competition. In particular, Article 102 TFEU 
applies to the conduct of undertakings and in most cases its enforcement ignores the 
presence of the state, assuming that undertakings act independently from the state and 
are fully responsible for their conduct in the market. Antitrust investigations studied in 
this thesis result in bilateral agreements between the Commission and the investigated 
undertaking, leaving governments out of the picture. However, and despite 
advancements in deregulation, the European electricity sector remained subject to 
heavy state intervention, albeit of a different nature.107 The presence of state measures 
regulating the industry gives rise to less clear-cut cases where barriers to competition 
are either created or supported by the state itself. Anticompetitive state measures are 
addressed at the EU level by means of (1) supervision of state aid, (2) provisions 
concerning public undertakings (Article 106 TFEU).108 This is an area of EU 
competition policy which gets very close to EU energy policy, because it often deals 
with state measures supporting ‘national champions’ and protecting state monopolies. 
                                                           
107 See comments of VEDDER H., ‘Competition in the EU energy sector – an overview of developments in 
2009 and 2010’ in M. ROGGENKAMP and U. HAMMER (eds.), European Energy Law Report VIII, 
Intersentia 2011, p. 16. 
108 Apart from enforcing competition rules, the Commission can also challenge anticompetitive state measures 
by initiating infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU (supra section 1.2.3.4) or in the context of the 
duty of loyal cooperation set forth in Article 4 (3) TEU. 
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Whereas these provisions are beyond the scope of this thesis, as a way of example, the 
following paragraphs discuss the Commission’s decision in the Greek lignite case, 
where the Greek state measures were found in breach of antitrust rules in connection 
with Article 106 (1) TFEU. 
 
Article 106(1) TFEU prohibits Member States adopting or maintaining in force, in the 
case of public undertakings and the undertakings to which they grant special or 
exclusive rights, measures contrary to the rules contained in the Treaty, in particular 
competition rules.109 Thus, Article 106 (1) TFEU provides a legal basis for the 
Commission’s action only when used in combination with other provisions of the 
Treaty. In the Greek lignite case, the Commission applied Article 106 (1) TFEU in 
connection with Article 102 TFEU, prohibiting undertakings abusing a dominant 
position on the market in so far as this affects cross-border trade.  
 
1.4.1.1. The case 
 
Lignite is a type of soft brown coal and its low extraction costs make it the cheapest 
fuel for electricity generation in Greece. A half of lignite reserve in Greece remains in 
the hand of the Public Power Corporation (PPC), the Greek electricity incumbent, to 
which the Greek state assigned exclusive rights to mine lignite. PPC also operates all 
lignite-fired power plants in Greece. No mining rights have been allocated with 
respect to the other half of lignite deposits and they remain unexplored.   
 
PPC was created back in the 1950s as a state-owned utility enjoying monopoly for 
production, transmission and supply of electricity. Already at that time, PPC was 
granted exclusive rights to exploit Greek lignite reserves. Once the electricity market 
in Greece was liberalised in 2001, PPC turned into a limited liability company. 
However, the state retained full control over PPC as its majority shareholder with 
more than 51 % of the voting shares. The measures adopted by the Greek government 
                                                           
109 Subject to Article 106 (2) TFEU. 
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which first granted and then maintained privileged access to lignite in favour of PPC, 
remained in force.110  
 
Upon a complaint filed in 2003, the Commission investigated this case and adopted a 
decision in 2008 concluding that Greece infringed Article 106 (1) TFEU in 
conjunction with Article 102 TFEU. Namely, the state measures in question created an 
inequality of opportunities between market players as regards access to primary fuels 
for electricity generation permitting PPC to maintain or strengthen its dominant 
position on the wholesale electricity market by excluding or hindering any new entry 
to the market.111 According to the Commission, the infringement had lasted at least 
since the Greek electricity market was formally liberalised in 2001. In its decision, the 
Commission called on Greece to take steps in order to end the infringement.112 
 
PPC appealed to the General Court claiming, among others, that the Commission 
failed to establish the existence of an actual or potential abuse of a dominant position 
on the markets concerned, which was necessary in order to apply Article 106 (1) 
                                                           
110 The measures in question were adopted by the Greek State between 1959 and 1994 and include Article 22 (1) 
of the Legislative Decree No 4029/1959 of 12.11.1959 and 13.11.1959 (FEK A’ 250), Article 3 (3) of the Law 
No 134/1975 of 23.08/1975 and 29.08.1975 (FEK A’ 180), as well as Decisions by the Minister of Industry, 
Energy and Technology published in the Official Journal of the Hellenic Republic, volume B, issue No 282, of 
3.03.1976, volume B, issue No 596, of 24.08.1988 and volume B, issue No 633, of 22.08.1994.  
111 Ibid., Article 1. The Commission identified two separate markets, one for the supply of lignite (upstream 
market), and one for electricity production (downstream market). According to the Commission, PPC holds 
approx. 97% share in the market for lignite supply and more than 85% share in the market for electricity 
production – the result of awarding PPC exclusive mining rights over lignite deposits. See Commission 
Decision of 05.03.2008 on the granting or maintaining in force by the Hellenic Republic of rights in favour of 
Public Power Corporation S.A. for extraction of lignite, C(2008) 824 final, paras. 108-109 and 174. 
112 Greece proposed a number of measures ensuring that PPC’s competitors get access to about 40% of all Greek 
lignite deposits, mostly by allocating new exploitation rights for yet unexplored lignite deposits. The 
Commission made these measures binding in 2009 (Commission Decision of 04.08.2009 establishing the 
specific measures to correct the anti-competitive effects of the infringement identified in the Commission 
Decision of 05.03.2008 on the granting or maintaining in force by the Hellenic Republic of rights in favour of 
Public Power Corporation S.A. for extraction of lignite, C(2009) 6244 final). In 2011, however, Greece asked 
the Commission to review the commitments due to changes in its energy policy which do not support opening 
new lignite mines. As an alternative measure to comply with the 2008 decision, Greece proposed to give to 
competitors of PPC access to 40% of lignite-fired generation through drawing rights in existing lignite-fired 
power plants of PPC. Furthermore, participants will be offered participation in future power plant projects using 
currently available lignite. See Description of alternative measures to be adopted by the Hellenic Republic for 
the further liberalisation of the Greek wholesale electricity generation market, including lignite-fired generation 
of 13.01.2011, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38700/38700_716_14.pdf 
accessed 20.05.2013. At the time of writing this chapter (01.2013), no decision has been adopted regarding the 
new measures yet. See press release IP/11/34 of 14.01.2011. 
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TFEU in connection with Article 102 TFEU.113 The Greek State intervened in this 
case in support of PPC. In 2012 General Court ruled in favour of PPC and Greece, 
setting aside the Commission’s 2008 decision.114 
 
The General Court explained that in the case of a combined application of Articles 
106 (1) TFEU and 102 TFEU, the contested state measure must infringe Article 102. 
In other words, the Commission has to identify the specific (actual or potential) abuse 
of a dominant position by an undertaking to which the state measure in question led, 
or at least could lead. The Court found that the Commission failed to establish that 
granting PPC privileged access to lignite was capable of creating a situation in which, 
by the mere exercise of its exploitation rights, PPC could have been able to commit an 
abuse of a dominant position on the market for electricity generation or was led to 
commit such an abuse.115 According to the Court, the Commission misinterpreted the 
existing case law on the combined application of Articles 106 (1) TFEU and 102 
TFEU where state measures resulted in an ‘inequality of opportunities’ between 
undertakings.116 In that respect, the mere finding that PPC continues to maintain a 
dominant position on the wholesale electricity market by virtue of the advantage 
conferred upon it by privileged access to lignite and that that situation creates an 
inequality of opportunities between market players, is not sufficient to find an 
infringement of Article 106 (1) TFEU in combination with Article 102 TFEU. 
                                                           
113 Case T-169/08, Action brought on 13.04.2008 — DEI v Commission [2008] OJ C 183/24. The 2009 decision 
was also challenged (Case T-421/09, Action brought on 19.10.2009 – DEI v. Commission [2010] OJ C 11/28). 
114 Case T-168/08 (and Case T-421/09) Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou AE (DEI) v. Commission [2012] not yet 
reported. Judgment of the General Court of 20.09.2012.  
115 Ibid., para. 92. By reference to its case law, the Court stressed that a Member State infringes Article 106 (1) 
TFEU in combination with Article 102 TFEU if the undertaking in question is led, by the mere exercise of the 
exclusive or special rights conferred upon it, to abuse its dominant position or where those rights are capable of 
creating a situation in which that undertaking is led to commit such an abuse. As then observed by the Court, it 
does not follow from these cases that the mere fact that the undertaking finds itself in an advantageous situation 
in comparison with its competitors, by reason of a state measure, in itself constitutes an abuse of a dominant 
position. See ibid., paras. 95-103, and the cases discussed therein: Case C-163/96, Raso and Others [1998] 
ECR I-533; para. 27, Case C-41/90, Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, para. 29; Case C-179/90, Merci 
convenzionali porto di Genova [1991] ECR I-5889, para. 17; Case C-55/96, Job Centre [1997] ECR I-7119, 
para. 31; and Case C-49/07, MOTOE [2008] ECR I-4863, paras. 50-51. 
116 As for the case law cited by the Commission in support of its findings, the Court argued that the Commission 
had relied on expressions used by the Court with no regard to the factual context of those cases. See ibid., paras. 
104-118. 
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Following the Commission’s appeal, the Greek lignite case is currently117 pending 
before the ECJ.118 
 
1.4.1.2. Discussion 
 
Commissioner Kroes’ statement from 2008 reflects a strong political flavour of the 
Greek lignite decision: ‘Customers are denied the benefits of competition in the 
electricity sector when one operator controls virtually all access to Greek lignite 
reserves […]. Greece should act decisively to establish a level playing field by 
ensuring within the framework of its national lignite policy, that competitors have 
access to substantial volumes of lignite.’119 In 2003 it was clear that the 2nd Energy 
Package in Greece has not delivered the expected results. A wholesale electricity 
market was created but, with PPC enjoying privileged access to the cheapest fuel 
source, competition in electricity supply could not take place. It was in the state’s 
interest to protect PPC, the Greek ‘national champion’.  
 
Unlike Article 9 cases studied in this thesis, the Greek lignite case is not a standard 
abuse of dominance investigation against an undertaking subsequently closed by 
commitments. Yet it can be seen as another attempt of instrumentalisation of 
competition rules, this time to create more competition in the Greek electricity market. 
In this case the Commission found an infringement of Article 102 TFEU in 
connection with Article 106 (1) TFEU, without identifying any specific abuse of a 
dominant position that PPC committed or could have committed by virtue of state 
measures in question. In fact, the existing case law on the combined application of 
these provisions is far from clear and leaves some room for interpretation.120 
According to the Commission, it is enough to show that the state measure in question 
                                                           
117 At the time of writing this chapter (01.2013). 
118 Cases C-553/12 P & C-554/12 P: Appeal brought on 30.11.2012 by the Commission against the judgment 
delivered by the General Court on 20.09.2012 in cases T-169/08 and T-421/09 DEI v Commission [2013] OJ C 
32/10-11. 
119 Press release IP/08/386 of 05.03.2008. 
120 See H. VEDDER, ‘A Burning Desire to Clarify (?) The Law For Public Undertakings: The Judgment in 
Greek Lignite (Case T-169/08)’, post of 04.10.2012, European Law Blog. News and comments on EU law, 
available at http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=935 accessed 20.05.2013. 
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distorts competition by creating an ‘inequality of opportunities’ between market 
players. The underlying premise is that antitrust rules can be used not only to put an 
end to a specific (actual or potential) abusive behaviour, but also to correct less 
competitive market structures. This broadens the scope of application of Article 102 
(in connection with Article 106 (1) TFEU), allowing the Commission to 
instrumentalise competition policy and capture state measures which maintain 
anticompetitive market structures but do not lead to any specific (actual or potential) 
abuse of a dominant position. In this case, the Commission concluded that PPC’s 
competitors would need to have access to a minimum of 40% of lignite resources in 
order to create a level playing field in the electricity market and called upon Greece to 
change its current lignite policy to ensure this access. 
 
The General Court did not support the Commission’s approach and set aside the 
Greek lignite decision. The final outcome of this case, currently pending before the 
ECJ, depends on the Court’s interpretation of its case law on combined application of 
Articles 106 (1) TFEU and 102 TFEU. The annulment of this decision highlights the 
role of judicial control over the Commission’s exercise of powers. Appeals from 
infringement decisions are common, and when opting for this route, the Commission 
has to factor in risk that any ‘creative’ interpretation of competition provisions in 
order to broaden the scope of their application and use them for non-competition 
objectives will likely result in an annulment of its decisions. In that respect, 
commitment cases do not pose a high risk of appeal and thus provide a safer route to 
use competition law in pursue of other objectives, like the completion of the internal 
market for electricity.  
 
If the ECJ upholds the GC ruling, setting a high standard for showing harm in 
electricity markets, this may only encourage commitment cases, because the 
Commission will find the stardard for showing the infringement of competition rules 
too high.  
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1.5. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This thesis lies at the intersection of two scholarly debates and casts some more 
light on a borderline area which has not been fully explored yet. 
 
It has been mentioned at the outset that this research falls under a wider debate on the 
interplay between competition policy and regulation. Yet a closer look discloses at 
least two more specific debates and the topic of this thesis lies somewhere at their 
intersection (see Figure  2). One debate concerns Article 9 commitments. Insofar as it 
tackles the use (or abuse) of commitment decisions for non-competition regulatory 
goals, it becomes part of the competition vs. regulation debate. This debate is not 
electricity-specific, but looks at the Commission’s commitment practice across 
different sectors. Sometimes it refers to electricity markets as an example of the 
Commission’s fierce antitrust intervention and far-reaching structural commitments. 
The other debate can be viewed as a fraction of the competition vs. regulation 
debate. It raises questions about the role of competition policy in achieving the 
internal market for electricity. This debate does not focus specifically on commitment 
decisions, but takes a comprehensive look at all competition law instruments which 
find their application in the energy sector, often helping the Commission to implement 
its regulatory agenda, like ‘classical’ antitrust enforcement (including commitment 
decisions), merger control, state aid rules and supervision of undertakings with special 
or exclusive rights.121 Inasmuch as it discusses the role of Article 9, it overlaps with 
the first debate and enters the scope of this research. 
  
                                                           
121 E.g. the Commission has been known for negotiating particularly far-reaching (regulatory) merger remedies 
with energy incumbents. See K. BACHOUR, G. CONTE, P. EBERL, C. MARTINI, A. PAOLICCHI, P. 
REDONDO, A. VAN HAASTEREN and G. WILS, ‘Gaz de France/Suez: keeping energy markets in Belgium 
open and contestable through far-reaching remedies’ (2007) Competition Policy Newsletter 1, Spring Issue, 
pp.83-91. 
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Figure  2. Positioning the research topic in the context of current scholarly debates. 
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Source: Own illustration. 
 
The structure of this section follows the arrow in Figure  2, that is, it leads the reader 
towards the center of the diagram starting from its bottom-left corner. It begins with 
some general insights from the commitment debate, in particular regarding the optimal 
use of commitment decisions, and signals concerns expressed in this debate that the 
introduction of Article 9 to competition enforcement may result in suboptimal 
outcomes. Then, it argues that suboptimal outcomes might to a great extent result 
from instrumentalisation, i.e. the use of commitments for regulatory purposes, and 
also explains how the relaxed legal framework of Article 9 may encourage 
instrumentalisation on the part of the Commission. Finally, it refers to the 
Commission’s antitrust enforcement in the electricity sector and observes that there is 
still scope for more case-oriented research.   
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1.5.1. Debate on commitments 
 
The debate on commitment decisions has been going on for almost a decade and the 
recent articles suggest that this topic has not yet been exhausted.122 Generally 
                                                           
122 In addition to the already mentioned contributions of J. TEMPLE LANG (2003), supra n. 16, M. FURSE 
(2004), supra n. 11, J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 45, R. WHISH (2006), supra n. 45, W.P.J. WILS 
(2006), supra n. 33, G.S. GEORGIEV (2007), supra  n. 48, E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER (2008), supra n. 33, D. 
WAELBROECK (2008), supra n. 38, D. WAELBROECK (2009), supra n. 17, K. KOSTOPOULOS (2009), 
supra n. 26, J. TEMPLE LANG (2009), supra n. 25, H. SCHWEITZER (2010), supra n. 48, P. IBÁÑEZ 
COLOMO (2010), supra n. 11, S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A SUKHTANKAR (2010), supra n. 26, D. 
GERARD (2011), supra n. 20, L. ORTIZ BLANCO and A. LAMADRID DE PABLO (2012), supra n. 11. H. 
SCHWEITZER (2012), supra n. 48. F. WAGNER-VON PAPP (2012), supra n. 25, also in a chronological 
order: E.-J. MESTMÄCKER, ‘The EC Commission’s Modernization of Competition Policy: a Challenge to the 
Community’s Constitutional Order’ (2000) 1 European Business Organization Law Review 3, 401-444. M. 
SOUSA FERRO, ‘Committing to commitment decisions – unanswered questions on Article 9 decisions’ (2005) 
26 European Competition Law Review 8, 451-459. C. FERNÁNDEZ ‘Commitment Decisions under EC 
Regulation 1/2003’ in P. LOWE and M. REYNOLDS (eds.) Antitrust Reform in Europe – A Year in Practice, 
International Bar Association, Brussels 2005. J.P. GRUBER, ‘Verpflichtungszusagen im europäischen 
Kartellrecht’ (2005) 7 Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht, 310-315. C.J. COOK, ‘Commitment 
Decisions: The Law and Practice under Article 9’ (2006) 29 World Competition 2, 209-228. J. DAVIES and M. 
DAS, ‘Private Enforcement of Commission Commitment Decisions: A Steep Climb, Not a Gentle Stroll’, 199-
226, D.P. DUCORE, ‘Settlement of Competition Conduct Violations at the United States Antitrust Agencies 
and at the European Commission – Some Observations’, 227-242, in B. HAWK (ed.) 2005 Annual Proceedings 
of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: International Antitrust Law and Policy, Juris Publishing, New York 
2006. O. ARMENGOL and A. PASCUAL, ‘Some reflections on Article 9 Commitment Decisions in the Light 
of the Coca-Cola Case’ (2006) 27 European Competition Law Review 3, 124-129. W.P.J. WILS, ‘The Use of 
Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles’ (2008) 31 World Competition 3, 335-
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speaking, most commentators view the introduction of Article 9 commitment 
decisions as a positive development in the EU competition enforcement, considering 
all the benefits of this mechanism.123 However, negotiated solutions are not deeply 
embedded in the European legal culture,124 so the concept of Article 9 and its 
application raises a lot of questions and generates much commentary.125 In particular, 
the incentives of the Commission and the undertakings to engage in negotiations and 
settling cases are widely recognised in the literature.126 In fact, these incentives are 
considered so strong, that almost all commentators raise concerns about the potentially 
excessive use of Article 9. At the same time, only few explain what they actually mean 
by the (socially) optimal use of commitment decisions and how it might be influenced 
by those incentives.127  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2012) 5 Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 6, 169-192. M-T. RICHTER, ‘The Settlement Procedure: 
A Comparison and Impact Analysis’ (2012) 11 European Competition Law Review, 537-542. Accounts on 
national settlements equivalent to Article 9 are not reported here. 
123 See discussion in section 1.2.1.  
124 Comparing with the longstanding use of settlements in the U.S. 
125 Early contributions often focused on more technical questions regarding the procedural framework and legal 
effects of commitment decisions, but obviously could only speculate about the way the Commission was going 
to apply Article 9 and to what effect. At that time much discussed was the nature and scope of preliminary 
assessment especially in relation to the statement of objections, lack of important procedural safeguards 
protecting the right of defence under commitment procedure (e.g. no statement of objections required, no oral 
hearing, no access to file), meaning and binding effect of a commitment decision and its effect on the powers of 
national competition authorities and national courts regarding past (allegedly anticompetitive) conduct, position 
of third parties under commitment procedure, public and private enforcement of commitment decisions under 
national law, the possibility of appeal to the European Courts, the scope of judicial review, the impact of 
commitment procedure on the existing practice of (informal) settlements, the use of similar procedures by 
national competition authorities and the comparison of commitment decisions to the U.S.-style settlement 
practice based on consent decrees. Only once the Commission started to make use of its new powers, a number 
of practical issues have been clarified (for instance, it was initially believed that the Commission has to issue a 
statement of objections also in commitment cases). Some important issues have finally been settled by the ECJ 
in the Alrosa case (e.g. the Court ruled on the proportionality of commitments which for many years has been an 
open question and many commentators believed that commitments should undergo a strict proportionality test 
analogous to remedies under Article 7, until the ECJ ruled to the contrary). However, many issues are still not 
entirely clear, e.g. whether the undertaking offering commitments can subsequently appeal the decision making 
them binding. 
126 For a more comprehensive discussion on the Commission’s and companies’ incentives see e.g. J. TEMPLE 
LANG (2006), supra n. 45, pp. 271-276 (as well as his comments during the panel discussion, 368-369). In the 
same line C.J. COOK, supra n. 122, pp. 210-213. I.S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, pp. 7-10 (working paper). F. 
WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, pp. 958-960.  
 S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, pp. 175-176. D. GERARD, supra n. 20, p. 
464.  
127 To the author’s knowledge, the question of the optimal enforcement (and more specifically, the optimal use 
of Article 9 commitment decisions) has been (directly or indirectly) addressed by seven academic papers so far. 
In the chronological order: W.P.J. WILS (2006), supra n. 33. E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER (2008), supra n. 33. 
W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122. A.J. PADILLA and K. EDWARDS (2009), supra n. 122. I.S. FORRESTER 
(2009), supra n. 122. N. PETIT (2009), supra n. 122. P. IBÁÑEZ COLOMO (2010), supra n. 11. To the 
contrary, the law and economics literature on the optimal use of settlements in the U.S. litigation, and more 
specifically, in antitrust trials, is extensive and deals mostly with the potential divergence between, on the one 
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1.5.1.1. The optimal use of commitment decisions 
 
The optimal use of commitment decisions is mentioned, if at all, in the context of a 
broader question about the optimal antitrust enforcement. This discussion departs 
from restating well-known objectives which antitrust enforcement is supposed to 
achieve, namely, to put an end to anticompetitive practices in breach of Articles 101-
102 TFEU128 and also prevent their reoccurrence in the future. In view of these goals 
and the Commission’s limited resources it is attempted to determine (1) when to 
intervene, i.e. establish the optimal standard of antitrust intervention both in terms of 
(1a) identifying cases which deserve an intervention and prioritising among them (1b) 
defining an adequate antitrust law response, as well as (2) how to intervene, i.e. strike 
the optimal balance between, on the one hand, fully contested proceedings possibly 
leading to an infringement decision often followed by a court litigation and, on the 
other hand, a more rapid and less costly disposal of a case by a commitment decision. 
 
To the contrary, this thesis deals with an instrumental use of commitment decisions, a 
situation where antitrust enforcement is disconnected from the objectives rooted in 
Articles 101-102 TFEU129 and instead pursues non-competition (regulatory) goals. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
hand, the parties’ own interests in settling a case and, on the other hand, social welfare gains from court 
litigation. For instance, A.M. POLINSKY and D.L. RUBINFELD, ‘The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and 
Trials’ (1988) International Review of Law and Economics 8, 109-116, show that settlements are not always 
socially optimal. Their transaction costs are lower in comparison to trials, but they might also have lower 
deterrence effects. For an out-of-court settlement to take place, the victim’s expected gain from litigation must 
be less that the injurer’s expected loss from litigation. S. SHAVELL, ‘The Level of Litigation: Private versus 
Social Optimality of Suit and of Settlement (1999) International Review of Law and Economics 19, 99-115, 
shows that the use of settlements might be suboptimal from the social perspective, because the parties consider 
only their own legal costs (and not the cost of the other party or the state) and they don’t consider the impact on 
deterrence or reduction of harm. Further, Shavell argues that the settlement option may have a negative impact 
on deterrence (because the injurer pays less than in litigation) and cause excessive lawsuits (as settlements make 
them cheaper). To alleviate these socially undesirable effects, Shavell proposes to impose a tax on settling 
injurers, and to increase fees for bringing lawsuits should be increased.  J.M. PERLOFF, D.L. RUBINFELD and 
P. RUUD, ‘Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes’ (1996) 78 The Review of Economics and Statistics 3, 
401-409, build an empirical model which estimates both the probability of settlements and success at trial in 
private antitrust cases. According to the authors, a 1% increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff wins at trial 
raises the probability of a settlement by 0,13% which shows that in many cases parties enter a settlement simply 
because they are risk averse. They also find defendants do not care much about their reputation, so their risk 
aversion has a minor role in determining whether the parties go for a settlement or not. See also R.A. EPSTEIN, 
Antitrust Consent Decrees in Theory and Practice. Why Less Is More, The AEI Press, Washington D.C. 2007, 
for interesting in-depth case studies. 
128 Supra n. 15. 
129 Supra n. 15. 
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These ‘alien’ goals imported from other policies affect the parties’ incentives leading 
to suboptimal outcomes both in terms of standard of antitrust intervention and the 
balance between infringement decisions and commitment decisions. However, before 
focusing on these suboptimal outcomes, it is perhaps a good starting point to take a 
closer look at what is considered an optimum. The literature on commitment decisions 
provides some guidance on how to define optimal antitrust enforcement and when 
commitment decisions can or cannot be considered socially desirable.  
 
(1) An optimal standard of antitrust intervention130 can be defined by the gravity of the 
infringement identified and the intrusiveness of the antitrust response necessary to 
solve the anticompetitive problem. It is presumed that the relationship between the 
gravity of the infringement and the antitrust response is linear, i.e. the more serious 
the infringement, the farther-reaching the response.  
 
In terms of (1a) the optimal case selection and prioritisation, the Commission should 
intervene in cases, where enforcement gains outweigh its costs. Given the 
investigatory resources are limited, they  should be primarily allocated to cases where 
the infringement is sufficiently grave, so that its termination as a result of the 
Commission’s intervention would result in a substantial increase in consumer welfare. 
In other words, the Commission should not intervene below a certain threshold of 
gravity. Another aspect is the cost of enforcement which increases with the 
complexity/uncertainty of the case. The Commission should first pursue ‘strong’ cases 
(clear-cut infringement, sufficient evidence to prove it) where the probability of 
finding an infringement is high without investing too much investigatory resources. 
‘Weak’ cases (legally ambiguous or lacking sufficient evidence) are much more 
expensive to investigate, and the Commission’s intervention can be justified only if 
enforcement gains exceed the costs of proving an infringement. 
 
                                                           
130 Based on Ibáñez Colomo’s model of ‘expected standards of intervention’, adapted for the purpose of this 
thesis. P. IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, supra n. 11, pp. 277-278. 
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(1b) The antitrust response might take form of remedies and/or fines imposed under 
Article 7 or commitments accepted under Article 9. Remedies and/or fines are 
generally supposed to bring the infringement to an end and restore effective 
competition (mostly in case of remedies) as well as punish and deter (mostly in case 
of fines). Commitments accepted under Article 9 are generally supposed to bring the 
alleged infringement to an end and restore competition in the market.131 The 
intrusiveness of antitrust response, whatever form it takes, should be in direct 
proportion with the gravity of the infringement. In the context of Article 9, optimal 
enforcement would thus require that commitments are proportional to the alleged 
infringement identified by the Commission.132  
 
(2) An optimal balance between commitment decisions and infringement decisions is 
determined by, on the one hand, efficiency gains of the commitment procedure and, 
on the other hand, considerations derived from the objectives of Articles 101-102 
TFEU. In principle, cases should be closed by a commitment decision when the cost 
of further investigation and litigation is higher than the benefit resulting from it. For 
instance, Wils (2006) argues that an optimal use of commitment decisions would 
require to settle under Article 9 only these cases where the benefits of a commitment 
decision (earlier termination of the infringement and costs savings linked to shorter 
proceedings) outweigh the benefits of an infringement decision in terms of 
clarification of law, bringing an infringement to an end, public censure, deterrence, 
disgorgement of illicit gains, punishment and facilitation of damages actions.133 
                                                           
131 Commitments are not supposed to punish, given that cases are closed without finding a breach of competition 
rules. It is less clear whether commitments can in any way contribute to deterrence effects, or (according to a 
more popular view) whether they just decrease them. The Commission and many commentators find that 
commitment decisions have precedence value (see infra n. 221-222 and the accompanying text) so they might 
well deter other undertakings from engaging in anticompetitive conduct subject to a commitment decision, albeit 
to a lesser extent than infringement decisions (see European Commission, Antitrust: Manual of Procedures, 
supra n. 43, chapter 16, especially paras. 6 and 12). Further, to the extent that commitment cases free up some of 
the Commission’s resources and allow it to focus on detecting serious infringements, they might indirectly 
increase deterrence. However, A.J. PADILLA and K. EDWARDS, supra n. 122, find that commitment 
decisions (or more generally, settlements – see infra n. 135) have a negative impact on ex ante deterrence, 
because a possibility to avoid fines by negotiating a commitment package with the Commission might 
encourage undertakings to engage in anticompetitive practices in the first place.  
132 W.P.J. WILS (2006), supra n. 33, p. 352. P. IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, supra n. 11, pp. 277-278. I.S. 
FORRESTER, supra n. 122, pp. 14-15 (working paper). 
133 W.P.J. WILS (2006), supra n. 33, pp. 348-350. In the same vein A. KLEES (2009), supra n. 122, pp. 376-
377. 
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Similarly, in Padilla and Edwards’ model a commitment decision is socially desirable 
when the costs of infringement proceedings and the loss in consumer welfare resulting 
from continued or unsuccessful Article 7 investigation are greater than the cost of 
settling the case under Article 9 in terms of foregone fines and diminished 
deterrence.134 In other words, they weight the cost of infringement decision (i.e. the 
expected loss in consumer welfare associated to uncertain and protracted litigation 
plus the cost of litigation) against the cost of commitment decision (i.e. foregone 
benefits in terms of fines and deterrence effects).135 
 
In addition, some authors and more recently, the Commission itself,136 came up with 
certain ex ante criteria which would help to ‘get the balance right’. Just to illustrate, 
Wils (2008) argues that in order to ensure optimal enforcement (i) the use of 
commitment decisions should be within the Commission’s discretionary powers, (ii) 
the threat of successful enforcement under Article 7 should be credible (maintained by 
a record of infringement decisions upheld by the Courts), (iii) commitments should 
not be accepted before all the relevant facts are established to diminish the risk of an 
inadequate commitment package (iv) commitment procedure should be subject to 
regular evaluation.137 Further, these authors usually try to restrict the scope of Article 
9 rather than promote its use for certain types of cases. It is generally recognised that 
commitment decisions should not be used in cases of serious infringements, where 
goals such as deterrence, public censure, and punishment make the case worth 
pursuing to the end.138 According to some, commitment decisions should also be 
excluded in cases involving novel questions, because of lost opportunity to clarify the 
                                                           
134 A.J. PADILLA and K. EDWARDS, supra n. 122. 
135 Padilla and Edwards’ model applies to all antitrust settlements, and not specifically to commitment decisions. 
Given the focus of this thesis on commitment decisions, their arguments are put in the context of Article 9 (e.g. 
‘competition authority’ is replaced with ‘the Commission’, ‘settlements’ are replaced with ‘commitment 
decisions’). This also applies to contributions by some other authors (e.g. Petit, Wils(2008)) concerning 
settlement mechanisms in general. Cartel settlements as well as national settlement mechanisms equivalent to 
Article 9 commitment decisions are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
136 European Commission, Antitrust: Manual of Procedures, supra n. 43, chapter 16, paras. 5-18.  
137 W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, pp. 14-15 (online version). 
138 Advocated by E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER, supra n. 33, p. 42. W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, p. 13 (online 
version) and N. PETIT, supra n. 122, p. 37. The latter author refers to long-lasting restrictions of competition, 
but the context (consumer harm) implies that they are also serious.  
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law.139 Also the Commission states that it is not going to accept commitments if it 
wants to establish a precedence; it will opt for Article 7 route instead.140 Finally, 
several authors propose to exclude commitment decisions in cases of clear-cut 
infringements,141 however difficult this task may be in practice, given that the 
Commission does not fully investigate commitment cases.142 In sum, these all 
suggestions in the literature to exclude commitment decisions in certain types of cases 
seem to be prompted by Recital 13, which, due to its misleading wording, requires 
‘corrective’ interpretation.143 However, one should bear in mind that even though 
commitment decisions might not always be the best choice in certain types of cases, to 
the extent that they allow the Commission to focus on more serious infringements 
(and boost its detection rates), they may actually result in a more optimal use of 
resources overall.144 Moreover, the proposed exclusions should not imply that 
commitment cases outside the no-go zone of serious and novel cases would always be 
socially desirable. Authors are generally careful about their use145 and like Wils 
(2008), emphasise the importance of successful disposal of cases under Article 7 in 
parallel to commitment cases to keep both deterrence146 and the Commission’s 
                                                           
139 Advocated by E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER, supra n. 33, p. 42. W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, p. 13 (online 
version) and I.S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, p. 10 (working paper). 
140 European Commission, Antitrust: Manual of Procedures, supra n. 43, chapter 16, para. 11. 
141 E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER, supra n. 33, p. 42. W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, p. 13 (online version). 
142 As noted by Mel Marquis, ‘if the undertaking concerned proposes commitments before a persuasive case is 
built upon solid evidence, the infringement cannot yet be called clear-cut.’ See M. MARQUIS, ‘Cartel 
Settlements and Commitment Decisions’ in C.-D. EHLERMANN and M. MARQUIS (eds.) European 
Competition Law Annual 2008: Antitrust Settlements under EC Competition Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2009, at note 18. 
143 Recital 13 does not permit the Commission to adopt a commitment decision when it intends to impose a fine. 
See, in that respect, N. PETIT, supra n. 122, p. 38, who finds that the restriction imposed by Recital 13 conflicts 
with the very nature of a commitment decision, because firms would not offer commitments if they didn’t face 
the risk of being sanctioned. Petit concludes that it is not the prospect of fine that should be the criterion for 
excluding cases from the scope of Article 9, but the type of infringement. One can observe that this is exactly 
the approach taken by the Commission in its enforcement practice, because it uses commitments also in cases 
which would otherwise lead to a fine. Article 9 is explicitly excluded only in ‘secret cartels that fall under the 
Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases.’ See Commission notice on best practices, 
supra n. 16, para. 116. See also supra n. 28 and infra n. 207 for references. 
144 A.J. PADILLA and K. EDWARDS, supra n. 122, at note 18 (working paper). 
145 E.g. E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER, supra n. 33, p. 43, argues that commitment decisions should be used sparingly 
and should not become a standard device to dispose of cases at the EU level, especially because the current 
regime of decentralised enforcement was so designed to allow the Commission to deal with cases on the front 
burner in terms of prosecution and retribution, and these in principle should not be commitment cases.  
146 W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, p. 14 (online version). A.J. PADILLA and K. EDWARDS, supra n. 122, 
pp. 13-15 (working paper). The authors find that the very possibility of reaching a deal with the Commission 
under Article 9 (and thus avoiding a fine) increases the undertaking’s incentive to engage in anticompetitive 
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bargaining power147 at a sufficient level. Lastly, it seems important that the 
Commission always makes an informed choice between commitment procedure and 
infringement procedure instead of rushing into  Article 9 negotiations in uncertain 
cases.148 
 
1.5.1.2. Suboptimal use of commitment decisions 
 
Not surprisingly, the question of the optimal use of Article 9 emerges in the 
commitment discussion only because it is feared that suboptimal outcomes are very 
likely, both in terms of (1) standard of the Commission’s intervention and (2) the 
balance between infringement decisions and commitment decisions. To be more 
pricise, concerns have been expressed that the introduction of commitment procedure 
might: 
 
(1) facilitate deviations from the optimal standard of intervention,  
(1a) causing a distortion in the Commission’s enforcement priorities149 and  
(1b) resulting in disproportional antitrust response,150 and  
 
(2) lead to suboptimal outcomes both in form of excessive and insufficient use of 
commitment decisions, whereby most authors find the latter scenario unlikely.151 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
behaviour and might thus lower deterrence effects. In order to prevent this, the authors suggest dedicating 
sufficient resources to the detection of anticompetitive behaviour (i.e. a record of successful Article 7 decisions). 
147 W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, p. 14 (online version). G.S. GEORGIEV, supra n. 48, p. 1024. 
148 E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER, supra n. 33, p. 42. W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, p. 14 (online version). See 
also European Commission, Antitrust: Manual of Procedures, supra n. 43, chapter 16, para. 10. 
149 W.P.J. WILS (2006), supra n. 33, p. 351. W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, pp. 15-17 (online version). A.J. 
PADILLA and K. EDWARDS, supra n. 122. I.S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, p. 12 (working paper). N. PETIT, 
supra n. 122. P. IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, supra n. 11, p. 278-279. 
150 P. IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, supra n. 11, p. 279-280. I.S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, pp. 14-15 (working paper). 
151 Supra n. 127, except for Padilla and Edwards. According to them, suboptimal outcomes might occur both in 
form of excessive and insufficient use of commitment decisions. Whether there is an excess or a deficit of 
commitment decisions will depend on whether the Commission’s preferences in terms of protecting short-term 
consumer welfare and deterrence reflect those of society, or whether it has a bias in favour of any of the two 
objectives. For instance, if the Commission has a bias in favour of deterrence, it prefers to litigate cases and 
there will be too few commitment decisions. If, on the other hand, the Commission values short-term 
consumers’ well-being more than ensuring deterrence effects, the number of commitment cases might exceed 
the social optimum. Whether there is an excess or a deficit of commitment decisions further depends on the 
incentives on the part of the undertaking, as they must consent for the commitment route. From the 
undertakings’ perspective, the incentive to enter into commitment negotiations with the Commission increases 
with the costs of infringement proceedings, the potential fine, probability of finding an infringement but drops 
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1.5.2. Debate on the use of commitments for regulatory purposes 
(instrumentalisation).  
 
The previous section explained what means an optimal use of commitment decisions 
and signaled that suboptimal outcomes might occur. These suboptimal outcomes have 
been subject to an extensive discussion in the literature. They will be revisited here, 
but particular attention will be paid to concerns about instrumentalisation of 
commitment decisions, i.e. their use for regulatory purposes. In other words, this 
section enters a broad area of competition versus regulation debate (see Figure  2).152  
 
1.5.2.1. Suboptimal outcomes and the risks of instrumentalisation 
 
(1a)  Concerns have been raised that the introduction of Article 9 option might cause a 
distortion in the Commission’s case selection and prioritisation.153 In practice, the 
question whether to intervene or not depends entirely on the Commission, which is 
free in setting its enforcement priorities.154 If the Commission decides that the case is 
not worth pursuing, because the enforcement costs would be disproportionately high 
to the enforcement gains, it will state that there are ‘insufficient grounds for acting’.155 
It is argued that the accountability of the Commission to the outside world (obligation 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
when the additional profits from pursuing its anticompetitive practice (in case no infringement is found) are 
substantial. So, for instance, if deterrence effects of the Commission’s enforcement are low (e.g. low fines) and 
anticompetitive gains are high, undertakings might prefer to take the risk, carry on with their anticompetitive 
practice and let the Commission impose a fine in an infringement decision which they subsequently appeal, 
rather than abandoning their practice immediately following a commitment decision. 
152 To the author’s knowledge, concerns related to the instrumental use of commitment decisions are most 
comprehensively discussed by G.S. GEORGIEV, supra n. 48, pp. 1023-1029. A recent contribution by P. 
IBANEZ COLOMO, supra n. 11, pp. 276-280, provides the most developed analytical framework for the 
application of competition law in a regulatory fashion and also identifies these problems, however with no 
specific focus on commitment decisions.  
153 W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, pp. 15-17 (online version). I.S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, p. 12 
(working paper). P. IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, supra n. 11, pp. 278-279. 
154 See cases T-24/90, Automec Srl v. Commission (Automec II) [1992] ECR II-2223, paras. 77-83, and C-
119/97, Union Francaise de l’Express (UFEX) v. Commission [1999] ECR I-1341, paras. 88-95. 
155 Also known as the ‘lack of Union interest’. See Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7.04.2004 
relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty 
[2004] OJ L 123/18. See also Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16, para. 136: ‘Rejections based on 
“insufficient grounds for acting” concern in particular complaints where, given the limited likelihood of 
establishing the proof of the alleged infringements and the substantial investigatory resources which the 
Commission would have to invest in order to verify their existence, allocating the resources necessary to further 
investigate the case would be disproportionate, in light of its expected limited impact on the functioning of the 
internal market and/or the possibility of the complainant to have recourse to other means.’ 
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to show results, make headlines) forces it to allocate its investigatory resources in an 
optimal way.156 However, the option to settle cases under Article 9 lowers the 
enforcement costs and thus affects its initial cost-benefit exercise at case selection. 
Given that the intervention is cheaper with Article 9 option, the Commission might be 
encouraged to intervene in cases which otherwise would not be high on its priority 
list, because they would be too expensive in relation to the enforcement gains. This 
relates to cases that are (i) either not serious enough (small enforcement gains)157 or 
(ii) not ‘strong’ enough,158 i.e. complex/uncertain, which makes their investigation 
particularly costly, or (iii) both. Case resolution through commitment decisions would 
quickly boost up the Commission’s enforcement statistics at least cost. Further, it is 
argued that suboptimal case selection might be encouraged by the undertakings 
themselves. Given that the notification system has been abolished, undertakings, in 
search for legal certainty, might want to approach the Commission and seek its 
approval for their contracts in exchange for some minor commitments (notification 
through the back door).159 In order to avoid suboptimal case selection, Wils (2008) 
suggests to develop ‘strict and effective internal procedures and controls ensuring that 
weak cases are not opened, or, if already opened, swiftly closed, without recourse to 
formal commitments.’160  
  
The above discussion shows that the Commission can deviate from the socially 
desirable optimum solely because the existence of the commitment procedure lowers 
its enforcement costs and cases, which until now were socially too expensive to 
handle, now become available. Since the commitment procedure allows the 
Commission to intervene under competition rules there, where there might be no 
competition problems at all, and still achieve results in form of commitments, it has 
been suggested that the Commission might well misuse Article 9 to achieve desired 
                                                           
156 W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, p. 16 (online version). I.S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, p. 12 (working 
paper). 
157 W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, pp. 16-17 (online version). P. IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, supra n. 1111, pp. 
278-279. 
158 I. S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, p. 12 (working paper). 
159 W.P.J. WILS (2006), supra n. 33, p. 351. The risk of ‘notification through the back door’ is well-recognised 
by the Commission. See Antitrust: Manual of Procedures, supra n. 43, chapter 16, para. 16. 
160 W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, p. 17 (online version). 
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results beyond the scope of its competition powers.161 The cost-benefit calculation 
behind the intervention remains the same in principle (enforcement cost < 
enforcement gains), only that under ‘enforcement gains’ is meant not the termination 
of infringement (and the resulting increase in consumer welfare) but other non-
competition goals. Obviously, the risk of misuse of Article 9 is greater in sectors 
which are high on the Commission’s regulatory agenda, where the Commission has 
developed a clear idea about the results it wants to achieve.162 Thus, many authors are 
concerned that the Commission might be tempted to intervene in a regulatory manner 
in certain less competitive markets and ‘correct’ them through far-reaching 
behavioural and structural commitments.163 This brings us to the second suboptimal 
outcome resulting from the Commission’s deviation from its standard of intervention, 
namely, disproportionate antitrust response.  
 
(1b) It has been argued that commitments may either go beyond addressing 
anticompetitive concerns or might not be related to them164 or even worse, might be 
anticompetitive.165 This mismatch arises mostly from the very logic of a settlement 
mechanism. Commitments are offered voluntarily, and nothing prevents an 
undertaking from offering more than it should have. More importantly, commitments 
are negotiated between the Commission and the undertaking in order to find a 
                                                           
161 W.P.J. WILS (2006), supra n. 33, pp. 351-352. 
162 I.S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, p. 12 (working paper).  
163 W.P.J. WILS (2006), supra n. 33, pp. 351-352, points at the antitrust settlement practice of the US 
Department of Justice (DoJ) and observes that also in Europe competition authorities (or their officials) might 
be tempted to use commitments in order to achieve desired results beyond the scope of their legal powers. N. 
PETIT, supra n. 122, p. 32, observes that commitment decisions (and antitrust settlements in general – see supra 
n. 135) allow competition authorities to ‘intrusively regulate markets through behavioural and structural 
commitments’. G. BRUZZONE and M. BOCCACCIO, supra n. 122, p. 99, pointing at the excessive use of 
commitment decisions to increase competition on the various markets. See also S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and 
A SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 180, pointing at this risk of illegitimate competition enforcement in IP-
related cases. 
164 See in particular P. IBANEZ COLOMO, supra n. 11, pp. 279-280 and other references, infra n. 167. 
165 Since the Commission does not fully investigate the case, it risks accepting commitments putting an end to 
legitimate (and sometimes even pro-competitive) business conduct, which would amount to restriction of 
competition on the merits. Undertakings offering commitments act in their own business interest and do not 
reliably represent the interest of protecting competition. J. TEMPLE LANG (2009), supra n. 25, pp. 134-135. F. 
WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, pp. 950 and 955. See H. SCHWEITZER (2012), supra n. 48, p. 3 of the 
manuscript. 
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workable compromise, and not to come up with a commitment package mimicking an 
Article 7 outcome.166  
 
It is beyond dispute that Article 9 needs a more relaxed procedural framework in order 
to serve its primary aims (administrative efficiency) and generate other benefits 
(finding innovative and tailor-made solutions to anticompetitive problems). However, 
it is feared that the Commission might be tempted to take an undue advantage of 
Article 9 route and extract far-reaching commitments from undertakings which it 
would otherwise not have been able to impose under Article 7.167 This might happen, 
in particular, when the Commission’s competition enforcement is affected by other 
policy considerations, like for instance, the need to correct less competitive sectors 
(1a). In other words, the Commission might want to pursue regulatory objectives and 
shape markets by extracting far-reaching commitments to obtain results, which it has 
no power to obtain under competition rules.168 As Temple Lang puts it, ‘the difference 
is in the essence that competition law allows [the Commission] only to prevent or to 
put an end to identified illegal conduct that restricts competition, but does not 
empower [it] to take steps to make a legal market more competitive, however 
desirable it may seem.’169  
 
                                                           
166 J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 45, pp. 283-285, lists other reasons why commitments negotiated under 
Article 9 might not correspond to the obligations which the Commission would have been able to impose on the 
undertaking in an infringement decision.  
167 J. TEMPLE LANG (2003), supra n. 16, p. 356. J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 45, pp. 275, 316-320. M. 
FURSE, supra n. 11, 5. M. SOUSA FERRO, supra n. 122, p. 451 and 458. C.J. COOK, supra n. 122, p. 219 and 
221. W.P.J. WILS (2006), supra n. 33, pp. 351-352. G.S. GEORGIEV, supra n. 48, p. 1028. A. PERA and M. 
CARPAGNANO, supra n. 122, p. 672. D. WAELBROECK (2008), supra n. 38, p. 3. D. WAELBROECK 
(2009), supra n. 17, p. 234. A. KLEES (2009), supra n. 122, p. 377. H. SCHWEITZER (2010), supra n. 48, p. 
11 of the working paper. G. BRUZZONE and M. BOCCACCIO, supra n. 122, p. 99. K. KOSTOPOULOS 
(2009), supra n. 26, p. 17-18. N. PETIT, supra n. 122, at note 138. S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A 
SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 181. M. KELLERBAUER, supra n. 122, p. 4. L. ORTIZ BLANCO and A. 
LAMADRID DE PABLO, supra n. 11, p. 79. I. S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, p. 14-15 (working paper). F. 
WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, pp. 931 and 955, speaks about ‘proactive’ or ‘extra-legal’ remedies.  
168 See J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 45, pp. 317-318, for a list of competition cases where the 
Commission acted in a regulatory manner and tried to achieve results which could have been done only by 
means of regulation. See also L. ORTIZ BLANCO and A. LAMADRID DE PABLO, supra n. 11, and p. 76 and 
also p. 134 for comments of Bruno Lasserre on instances where the French competition authority was accused 
of acting as a price regulator. According to I.S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, p. 12 (working paper): ‘The risk of 
selecting weak cases is particularly high in industries which are high on the Commission’s regulatory agenda, 
where influencing how the market functions may exceed in importance sound competition law enforcement.’ 
169 J. TEMPLE LANG (2009), supra n. 25, p. 137. 
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(2) Moreover, much has been said about the potential bias on the part of the 
Commission in favour of commitment decisions. Ultimately it is the Commission to 
decide whether to pursue infringement proceedings or close a case under Article 9, if 
an undertaking is willing to settle.170 The rationale of Article 9 is to provide a faster 
track to handle clear-cut or less serious infringements, so that the Commission can 
shift its limited investigatory resources to more serious cases, which, due to higher 
enforcement gains, are worth pursuing under Article 7. However, it is feared that the 
Commission might settle under Article 9 also these latter cases in order to bypass 
Article 7 route, if this one appears to be too complex, time-consuming or uncertain 
(so-called ‘exit strategy’).171 The underlying argument for this concern is that closing 
‘difficult’ cases under Article 9 does not best serve public interest, as the Commission 
foregoes the opportunity to clarify law through a precedence and leaves the business 
and competition community in a state of legal uncertainty.172 Further, closing doubtful 
cases under Article 9 without fully investigating them might also have a chilling effect 
on possibly legitimate and pro-competitive conduct in an individual case (risk of type 
I errors).173 Also, as Georgiev points out, once commitment decisions become 
surrogates for infringement decisions the quality of the commitment decisions might 
drop. This is because the lack of effective enforcement under Article 7 and 
consequently, the lack of a credible threat of such enforcement would substantially 
                                                           
170 The only restraint on the Commission provides Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14, according to 
which commitment decisions are not appropriate in cases which might give rise to a fine. The Commission’s 
practice demonstrates a very narrow interpretation of this provision, i.e. commitment decisions are excluded 
only in cartels which fall under the cartel settlement procedure. See supra n. 28 and infra n. 207 for references. 
For case law on the Commission’s discretion in setting its enforcement priorities, see supra n. 154. 
171 R. WHISH (2006), supra n. 45, 570. J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 45, p. 316. C.J. COOK, supra n. 
122, p. 213. G.S. GEORGIEV, supra n. 48, pp. 1023-1026. H. SCHWEITZER (2010), supra n. 48, p. 10-11 of 
the working paper. N. PETIT, supra n. 122, p. 33, calls it ‘exit strategy’. S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A 
SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 186. A. KLEES (2009), supra n. 122, p. 377. F. WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra 
n. 25, pp. 931 and 961. I.S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, p. 3 (working paper). L. ORTIZ BLANCO and A. 
LAMADRID DE PABLO, supra n. 11, p. 79 and comments by Ortiz Blanco at p. 135 (roundtable discussion). 
172 This criticism comes from the literature on alternative dispute resolution (ADR). See F. WAGNER-VON 
PAPP, supra n. 25, p. 961, about abandoning the “struggle for law”, i.e. litigation. See also his critical remarks 
about closing the Rambus case under Article 9, p. 963. However, commitment decisions might have some 
precedence-setting value. See discussion, infra section 1.5.2.3.  
173 E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER, supra n. 33, p. 42. See, however, J. TEMPLE LANG (2009), supra n. 25, pp. 143-
144, who observes that commitment decisions might be a pragmatic way to deal with novel and complex 
exclusionary abuses, where the risk that the Commission gets the story wrong and impose an inadequate and 
unsatisfactory remedy under Article 7 is high. According to the author, in such cases accepting commitments 
might be better than nothing. In the same line S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, 
p. 175. 
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decrease the Commission’s bargaining power under Article 9, so that it could not 
extract sufficient commitments.174  
 
High number of commitment decisions (in comparison to Article 7 decisions) in 
certain sectors might indicate that the Commission uses competition law for 
regulatory purposes. Looking at the Commission’s enforcement so far, the biggest 
cluster of commitment decisions can be observed in the energy sector following the 
energy sector inquiry. But also commitment decisions adopted outside the energy 
sector relate to areas where the Commission pursues clear policy (i.e. joint selling of 
media rights for sport events, payment cards).175 When the Commission decides to 
take action for non-competition purposes, the balancing exercise it makes in order to 
choose between Article 7 and Article 9 route might be much simpler. Article 7 route 
loses on its ‘attractiveness’ because all its benefits (clarification of law, bringing an 
infringement to an end, public censure, deterrence, disgorgement of illicit gains, 
punishment and facilitation of damages actions) are not relevant anymore, since 
Article 101-102 objectives are replaced with regulatory objectives. All what still 
counts is the enforcement cost and, most importantly, quick results, and both speak for 
Article 9 route. 
 
1.5.2.2. Formlessness of Article 9 and the opportunities it creates 
 
Those, who raise concerns about potential instrumentalisation of commitment 
decisions, point at the flexible legal framework of Article 9. It is argued that 
commitment procedure in its current form leaves too much scope for a potential abuse 
of competition powers inviting the Commission to realise its regulatory-like ambitions 
                                                           
174 G.S. GEORGIEV, supra n. 48, p. 1024. See also A.J. PADILLA and K. EDWARDS, supra n. 122, who 
argue that the possibility of settling cases might have a negative impact on the deterrence effect of antitrust 
enforcement and should therefore be accompanied by an increase in resources dedicated to the detection of 
anticompetitive behaviour.  
175 H. SCHWEITZER (2012), supra n. 48, pp. 12-15 (online version), observes that national competition 
authorities use commitment decisions (based on national provisions) in the same areas, as if executing the policy 
set by the Commission.   
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through extracting excessive commitments.176 In particular, the following six 
arguments speak for the risk of instrumentalisation: 
 
First of all, the European Court of Justice ruled in the 2010 Alrosa case that the 
Commission can accept commitments which go beyond what it could itself impose 
under Article 7.177 Under Article 9 the Commission needs only to make sure that 
accepted commitments address its concerns expressed in the preliminary assessment 
and that they do not manifestly go beyond what is necessary to address these 
concerns.178 However, the Commission is under no obligation to seek out less onerous 
solutions than the ones proposed to it.179 This means that as long as the commitments 
offered meet the Commission’s concerns identified in the preliminary assessment and 
are not manifestly disproportionate, it can make them binding, regardless of whether it 
could itself impose the same measures after a thorough examination under Article 7 or 
not. This relates, in particular, to structural measures, which are generally seen as a 
remedy of last resort under Article 7, but which the Commission can easily extract in 
form of commitments.180 In this way, a disproportionate and thus illegal hypothetical 
remedy imposed by the Commission under Article 7 can become proportionate and 
                                                           
176 J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 45, pp. 316-320. J. TEMPLE LANG (2009), supra n. 25, pp. 136-137. 
H. SCHWEITZER (2010), supra n. 48, pp. 11 and 27 of the working paper. N. PETIT, supra n. 122, p. 32. H. 
SCHWEITZER (2012), supra n. 48, p. 3 (online version). T. KOZIEŁ, ‘Commitment Decisions under the Polish 
Competition Act – Enforcement Practice and Future Perspectives’ (2010) 3 Yearbook of Antitrust and 
Regulatory Studies 3, 71-91, p. 85 (in the context of the Polish commitment practice). 
177 Case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, paras. 47-48. The ECJ took account of the 
voluntary nature of commitments and stated that the obligation on the Commission to ensure that the principle 
of proportionality, which is a criterion for the lawfulness of any act of the EU institutions (para. 36), has a 
different extent and content under Article 9 (para. 38). 
178 Case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, paras. 41 and 120. Commission notice on best 
practices, supra n. 16, para. 115, restates this, referring to the judgment.  
179 The Commission must only make sure that the undertaking has not offered other less onerous commitments 
that also address those concerns adequately (case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 
41). In that respect the Court refers to the specific circumstances of the Alrosa case, where two different sets of 
commitments were submitted in two parallel investigations. In such a case the Commission would have to 
choose the less onerous set of commitments, provided it meets its concerns (necessity test). Usually, however, 
the undertaking offers only one set of commitments. However, see F. WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, pp. 
937-938, about the possibility of engaging in so-called ‘salami tactics’, whereby an undertaking offers several 
sets of commitments of different scope which would force the Commission to engage in proportionality analysis 
in order to choose the least onerous set.  
180 Under Article 7, even though the Commission is allowed to impose remedies of structural and behavioural 
character, there is a general preference for behavioural remedies (see Article 7 and Recital 12 of Regulation 
1/2003, supra n. 14). There is no such requirement under Article 9, because the Commission doesn’t have to 
look for less onerous commitments than the ones proposed by the undertaking (C-441/07 P, Commission v. 
Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 41). 
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legal if it is offered by the undertaking as a commitment under Article 9. Given that 
the Commission can during negotiations proactively suggest commitments which 
undertakings are expected to offer,181 Article 9 opens a possibility to implement far-
reaching remedies which are beyond the Commission’s powers as an antirust 
enforcer.182  
 
As already established, the commitments must address the Commission’s 
anticompetitive concerns following its preliminary assessment. Assuming that the 
Commission wants to extract far-reaching remedies, it needs to come up with serious 
concerns. The second argument for a potential instrumentalisation of competition 
rules is that Article 9 does not sufficiently shield those undertakings which consider 
that the Commission’s allegations are far-fetched and would like to challenge them 
before offering any commitments. More in detail, since the Commission is not 
required to fully investigate the case, it does not need to issue a statement of 
objections, which would set out the exact scope of the suspected infringement and 
create on the part of the undertaking procedural rights to respond and defend its 
conduct.183 Instead, what happens in practice is that the Commission presents its 
preliminary concerns to the undertaking in the so-called ‘state-of-play meeting’. This 
is also when potential commitments are discussed. After these initial negotiations184 
the Commission issues a document which states its concerns (‘preliminary 
assessment’ in the wording of Article 9) and which serves the undertaking merely ‘as 
a basis […] to formulate appropriate commitments addressing the competition 
concerns expressed by the Commission, or to better define previously discussed 
commitments’.185 It is a relatively short document and doesn’t need to be as detailed 
                                                           
181 Such a possibility was implicitly acknowledged by the ECJ in the Alrosa ruling, case C-441/07 P, 
Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 86. 
182 See also comments by Alexander Italianer in L. ORTIZ BLANCO and A. LAMADRID DE PABLO, supra 
n. 11, p. 136 (roundtable discussion): ‘I agree, it may happen in theory that certain commitments proposed could 
go beyond what might be considered strictly necessary. But that is the nature of the process.’ 
183 Issuance of the statement of objections creates procedural rights of defence on the part of the investigated 
undertaking: the right to access to the file (Article 27(2) of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14, and Article 15 of 
Regulation 773/2004, supra n. 155), the right to respond to the statement of objections in writing and orally 
(Article 27(1) of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14, Articles 10, 11(1) of Regulation 773/2004, supra n. 155) and 
finally, the right to a formal oral hearing (Article 12 of Regulation 773/2004, supra n. 155). 
184 Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16, para. 121 in fine. 
185 Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16, para. 122. 
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as a statement of objections.186 In fact, it can even be issued once the commitments 
have already been agreed.187 In practice, this often leaves undertakings under-
informed with respect to the infringement they are accused of. Not only they might 
find it difficult to devise appropriate commitments, but also have no formal possibility 
to react to the charge (whether it is legitimate or not).188 189 
 
Thirdly, it is unclear whether the undertaking is sufficiently protected once it has 
offered commitments. At that stage the Commission, and only if it finds that the 
commitments prima facie address its concerns,190 must publish them to allow 
interested third parties to submit their observations.191 This so-called market test 
constitutes the only and imperfect reality check of the proposed measures. It is the 
only one, because the Commission does not fully investigate the case and sometimes 
might lack necessary industry-specific expertise to accurately assess all potential 
                                                           
186 European Commission, Antitrust: Manual of Procedures, supra n. 43, chapter 16, para. 26: ‘[Preliminary 
Assessment] does not require the same length and level of detail as a Statement of Objections. The length of a 
Preliminary Assessment may vary from case to case, depending, for example, on the complexity of the case or 
the Commission's interest to set a precedent case in the later commitment decision (which will, in turn, be based 
on the Preliminary Assessment).’ See also para. 18: ‘The required level of detail of a commitment decision may 
be lower than in the case of a "prohibition" decision or "imposed" remedy decision under Article 7 (e.g. facts 
pointing at a potential infringement is usually sufficient for a commitment decision, and some elements of the 
theory of harm – such as objective justifications - may not be discussed in detail). However, the Commission 
must have at its disposal sufficient facts to make an informed and sound assessment of the relevant competition 
concerns. In other words, the Commission must have reached the conclusion – even if only on a preliminary 
basis – that there may be or may have been an infringement of EU competition law which should be addressed. 
Often the preliminary assessment will contain considerably more detail than the commitment decision itself.’ A 
standard preliminary assessment has about 20 pages, substantially less than a statement of objection which may 
reach up to 200 pages in complex cases. See E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER, supra n. 33, p. 35. 
187 This happened at least in two cases (Coca-cola and REPSOL listed in Table 1), see H. SCHWEITZER 
(2010), supra n. 48, pp. 8-9 of the working paper. D. WAELBROECK (2009), supra n. 17, p. 234. S. RAB, D. 
MONNOYEUR and A. SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 173. 
188 For an alternative view, see e.g. S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 175, 
who find that bilateral negotiations over commitments offer undertakings an opportunity to explain and/or 
defend its conduct in contrast to a more unilateral approach under Article 7. For a more detailed discussion on 
preliminary assessment with sometimes diverging opinions, see C.J. COOK, supra n. 122, pp. 215-216. W.P.J. 
WILS (2006), supra n. 33, pp. 352-356. O. ARMENGOL and A. PASCUAL, supra n. 122, pp. 125-126. G.S. 
GEORGIEV, supra n. 48, p. 1005 and 1017-1020. D. WAELBROECK (2008), supra n. 38, p. 21. D. 
WAELBROECK (2009), supra n. 17, pp. 233-234. E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER, supra n. 33, pp. 33-35. 
189 Further, neither a preliminary assessment nor a statement of objections can be challenged before the General 
Court (the EGC), as these are merely provisional measures leading to a final decision. See case 60/81, IBM v. 
Commission [1981] ECR 2639, para. 10. 
190 Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16, para. 129. 
191 Pursuant to Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. According to the provision, the Commission 
‘shall publish a concise summary of the case and the main content of the commitments or of the proposed course 
of action’ in the Official Journal, whereas the full text of the commitments in their original language has to be 
made available online (MEMO/04/217 of 17.09.2004). Interested third parties have then minimum one month to 
submit their observations.  
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effects of a complex commitment package. It is the imperfect one, because third 
parties (especially competitors) might not always be objective in their observations.192 
If, on the basis of the market test results, the Commission finds that commitments do 
not address its concerns, it may reject them and/or ask the undertaking to modify them 
without giving reasons as to why it has changed its position following the market 
test.193 Also, it is unclear whether the Commission is required to give the undertaking 
access to third parties’ observations submitted during the market test.194  
 
Fourthly, third parties are left out of the negotiations over commitments. It is true that 
while the Commission generally enjoys discretion in assessing the proportionality of 
commitments, it still needs – following the Alrosa ruling – ‘to take into consideration 
the interests of third parties.’195 196 In theory, the Commission complies with this 
obligation already, because it has to conduct market testing of commitments in each 
case.  However, the fact that the Commission consults third parties and takes their 
observations into account does not mean that it is under any obligation to follow 
them.197 Nor it is required to provide feedback to third parties regarding their 
                                                           
192 Third parties might pursue their own legal/commercial interests. E.g. competitors would generally be in 
favour of extensive commitments, regardless of whether they are proportionate or not. I.S. FORRESTER, supra 
n. 122, p. 14 (working paper) points at the risk of the Commission’s intellectual capture. 
193 C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, paras. 92 and 95. Commission notice on best 
practices, supra n. 16, paras. 132 and 133, states only that the Commission will inform the undertaking orally 
and in writing of the substance of the market test replies during another state-of-play meeting. In case market 
test results change the Commission’s view, ‘this will be brought to the attention of the undertakings offering the 
commitments’. This was, in fact, the Commission’s approach in the Alrosa case, see C-441/07 P, Commission v. 
Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 16. 
194 See D. GERARD, supra n. 20, p. 464. C.J. COOK, supra n. 122, p. 220.  
195 C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 41. By saying this, the ECJ wished to recognise 
Alrosa’s right to be heard in the specific context of this case, once the Commission rejected its joint 
commitments with De Beers. For details of the case, see discussion infra n. 237 and the accompanying text. 
196 See F. WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, pp. 949-951, for a number of reasons why the Commission might 
not be such a reliable agent for third-party interests (and the public interest) in the commitment procedure as it is 
in the infringement procedure. 
197 The ECJ ruling implies also that if third parties offer alternative and – in their view – less onerous 
commitments (as happened in the Alrosa case), the Commission has discretion to reject them and make binding 
commitments originally offered by the undertaking concerned. See C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] 
ECR I-5949, paras. 92-95. 
For instance, as discussed in chapter 5, the Commission discarded valid third parties’ observations which were 
against SvK’s commitment to introduce market splitting. But see D. WAELBROECK (2009), supra n. 17, p. 
237, at note 48, providing examples to the contrary, i.e. cases where third parties’ observations were duly taken 
into account by the Commission. However, it must be noted that in cases he refers to (Alrosa and Premier 
League, see Table 1) third parties considered commitments as insufficient to remedy anticompetitive concerns, 
whereas in the SvK case third parties found market splitting too onerous and asked for lighter commitments. See 
discussion in chapter 5. 
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submissions or, for instance, conduct another market test, once commitments have 
been amended following the negative responses during the first market testing.198 It 
seems that apart from exercising their right to submit comments in the market test, 
third parties have no control over the commitment package, even in case they are 
directly affected by the commitments.199 The lack of third parties’ control over 
commitments makes Article 9 an attractive tool for the Commission to implement 
regulatory-like measures short-circuiting at the same time more democratic and thus 
much slower alternative routes.200  
 
Third parties whose concerns are neglected by the Commission in the market test may 
want to seek annulment of an unfavourable commitment decision before the European 
Courts. This leads to the fifth argument, namely the lack of sufficient judicial control 
over the Commission’s commitment decisions. To start with, it appears unlikely that 
an undertaking which has offered commitments can subsequently file an appeal for 
annulment of the Commission’s decision to the European Courts on substantive 
grounds (e.g. manifest disproportionality of commitments).201 So far, no such appeal 
has been filed which also suggests that undertakings have little interest in challenging 
decisions, which they, at least seemingly, previously agreed to. To the contrary, the 
right of affected third parties to appeal a commitment decision is not disputed202 and 
in fact happened in practice.203 However, if a third party manages to file an appeal to 
                                                           
198 A new market test will be conducted only if ‘the amended version of the commitments alters the very nature 
or scope of the commitments’, see Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16, par. 133. Again, only the 
Commission can decide whether modifications of commitments need to be subject to another market testing. 
199 For their right to appeal, see infra next paragraph. 
200 See discussion in chapter 5 in the context of the SvK case.  
201 This question is still unsettled in the literature. Such a possibility is supported by R. WHISH, supra n. 45, p. 
570, W.P.J. WILS (2006), supra n. 33, 363, W.P.J. WILS (2008), supra n. 122, p. 6 (online version), S. RAB, D. 
MONNOYEUR and A SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 184, and, with some caution, D. WAELBROECK 
(2008), supra n. 38, pp. 23-24 and (2009), supra n. 17, pp. 235-237. To the contrary argue J. TEMPLE LANG 
(2006), supra n. 45, p. 296, and C.J. COOK, supra n. 122, pp. 220 and 221-223, unless on procedural grounds. 
H. SCHWEITZER (2012), supra n. 48, at note 96 and the accompanying text (online version), points at the ECJ 
ruling in Alrosa and finds that a waiver of the right to appeal by the undertaking offering commitments seems to 
be ‘part of the deal’. C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 48. 
202 C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 90.  
203 So far, a third party appeal has been brought in 2 cases but only one has been reviewed by the Courts (the 
other one has been rejected on procedural grounds). See supra n. 21. It should be noted that in order to get locus 
standi, a third party needs to demonstrate that the Commission’s decision is of direct and individual concern to 
them (see Art. 263 (4) TFEU)). Participation in the market test might be indicative of this, but doesn’t 
automatically grant the right to appeal. Similarly, it is doubtful that the Court’s statement in Alrosa requiring the 
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the European Courts, the standard of their review, i.e. the degree of scrutiny exercised 
by the Courts over the legality of the commitment decision would be limited. 
According to the ECJ, the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion in making 
commitments binding or rejecting them,204 and the Courts, in order not to intrude on 
this discretion, would only examine whether the Commission’s assessment was 
manifestly incorrect.205  
 
Of course, one could always argue that the voluntarily nature of commitments is a 
sufficient guarantee that the Commission doesn’t abuse its policy-making powers. 
After all, an undertaking doesn’t have to offer disproportionate commitments.206 This 
reasoning usually meets a counterargument that undertakings do not care about 
competition policy and whether it is misused for other purposes or not. They only care 
about their own interests and it might be that concessions they make are for them the 
lesser of two evils. It is argued that undertakings demonstrate a strong short-term 
interest to close the proceedings and avoid fines207 and that they might value it more 
than their interest not to be exposed to far-reaching regulatory measures in the 
medium-long term.208 This is the sixth and last argument explaining why undertakings 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Commission to take third parties’ interests into account would be sufficient to grant such right. See F. 
WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, p. 967. 
204 C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 94. 
205 The European Court of Justice (the ECJ) ruled in the Alrosa case that commitment decisions are subject to 
limited judicial control under the so-called ‘manifest error of assessment’ standard. See C-441/07 P, 
Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 42. F. WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, at note 47, doubts 
whether third parties could challenge the Commission’s decision on proportionality grounds. H. SCHWEITZER 
(2012), supra n. 48, p. 19 (online version), finds that in the light of the Commission’s discretion and the 
European Courts’ deferential approach, ‘a strong private enforcement seems to remain the only route by which 
effective judicial control can still be ensured.’ 
206 For instance, M. KELLERBAUER, supra n. 122, p. 8. 
207 Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14, according to which commitment decisions are not appropriate 
in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine, has been narrowly interpreted by the Commission so 
far, i.e. Article 9 is excluded only in hard-core cartel cases. See D. WAELBROECK (2008), supra n. 38, pp. 12-
16. D. WAELBROECK (2009), supra n. 17, p. 235, at note 39. D. GERARD, supra n. 20, p. 464, at note 30. E. 
GIPPINI-FOURNIER, supra n. 33, pp. 28-29. T. KOZIEŁ, supra n. 176, p. 81, at note 52. H. SCHWEITZER 
(2012), supra n. 48, p. 6 (online version). F. WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, at note 65. However, 
alternative views have also been expressed, see G. BRUZZONE and M. BOCCACCIO, supra n. 122, p. 100. M. 
KELLERBAUER, supra n. 122, p. 2. A. KLEES (2009), supra n. 122, p. 379. 
208 G. BRUZZONE and M. BOCCACCIO, supra n. 122, p. 100. W.P.J. WILS (2006), supra n. 33, p. 352. D. 
WAELBROECK (2009), supra n. 17, p. 235. H. SCHWEITZER (2012), supra n. 48, p. 3 (online version). In a 
recent account, F. WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, pp. 943-956, points out important differences between 
commitments and private contracts and concludes that ‘the voluntary nature of commitments is not a sufficient 
guarantee for the “correctness” of the negotiated outcome. In addition to the partial constraint that the 
requirement of consent undoubtedly exercises, the control of the substantive correctness of commitment 
decisions requires additional, external constraints.’ (at p. 956). 
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offer extensive commitments voluntarily. A dramatic rise in antitrust fines over the 
last decade substantially enhances their short-term incentives to engage in Article 9 
negotiations.209  
 
Summing up, undertakings’ inclination to settle ‘at all costs’ coupled with the 
Commission’s broad discretion as to proportionality of commitments, insufficient 
procedural safeguards protecting undertakings’ right of defence with the attendant 
lack of public participation and, on the top of that, limited judicial control all together 
create opportunities for the Commission to instrumentalise competition rules and 
extract commitments which go beyond the Commission’s purview.210 As noted by 
some authors, the only (and rather unreliable) safeguard against the Commission’s 
abuse of powers is its own self-restraint.211 
 
1.5.2.3. Some final remarks  
 
It has been argued in the literature that the problem of disproportionate commitments 
involves mainly two scenarios, i.e. (i) commitments addressing competition concerns 
but going beyond them or (ii) commitments not addressing competition concerns (or 
even further restricting competition). However, the potential mismatch between 
commitments and anticompetitive concerns might also involve a third scenario, which, 
for whatever reason, has received less attention in this debate.212 Namely, (iii) the 
Commission accepts less than is required to remedy an anticompetitive problem. After 
                                                           
209 See generally D. GERARD, supra n.20, pp. 459-465, and W.J.P. WILS, ‘The Increased Level of EU 
Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review and the ECHR (2010) 33 World Competition: Law and Economics Review 1, 5-
29. 
210 This concern appears all the more legitimate given the peculiar EU institutional setting which allows the 
Commission to combine prosecution and decision-making powers D. WAELBROECK (2009), supra n. 17, p. 
223. 
211 Advocated by W.P.J. WILS (2006), supra n. 33, p. 352. Other authors are rather skeptical, see e.g. H. 
SCHWEITZER (2012), supra n. 48, p. 19 (online version). F. WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, pp. 931-932, 
967-970. 
212 This scenario receives attention only insofar as it would have an impact on the possibility of follow-on 
antitrust investigations by national competition agencies and private enforcement, i.e. if the commitments made 
binding by the Commission do not eliminate all anticompetitive concerns, it is more likely that national 
competition authorities and national courts can still find an infringement of competition rules in the same case, 
despite the fact that the antitrust investigation at the EU level has been closed by a commitment decision with no 
finding of an infringment. For discussion see J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 43, pp. 287-290. See also A. 
KLEES (2009), supra n. 122, p. 377, who mentions all three scenarios of ‘inappropriate’ commitments. 
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Alrosa, it is now clear that the Commission can accept more than it is sufficient to 
address its concerns expressed in the preliminary assessment. It still remains unclear 
whether it can accept less. The Alrosa ruling is not helpful in that respect. Even 
though the principle of proportionality obliges the Commission to make sure that the 
proposed commitments meet its concerns, it nevertheless enjoys wide discretion in 
making commitments binding or not.213 Scholars are also divided in that respect. 
Some support the view that commitments must completely remove all the 
Commission’s concerns,214 whereas others suggest that it is enough if commitments 
reduce the Commission’s concerns to such an extent that the case stops to be its 
enforcement priority.215 Regardless of whether the Commission should be allowed to 
accept less or not, sometimes it might simply lack bargaining power (see Georgiev’s 
example above)216 or information (given the absence of a fully-fledged investigation) 
to extract sufficient commitments. This might well be the case that a commitment case 
becomes a bargaining chip in another deal struck outside the realm of competition 
enforcement. In particular, if the Commission pursues other strategic interests, an 
undertaking might negotiate a less burdensome commitment package in exchange of a 
promise not related to the case, but otherwise attractive for the Commission.217 This is 
a rather extreme scenario, touching upon corruption or exercising political influence, 
but it helps to illustrate two valid arguments. First, competition rules are not applied in 
a vacuum. In a perfect world of competition enforcement the Commission should not 
be driven by other non-competition goals and also its decision-making should be 
immune to external pressure. In the real world this obviously happens, but certain 
procedural safeguards are meant to limit the scope for potential malfeasance. Article 9 
does not have these safeguards, leaving the Commission an opportunity to misuse the 
                                                           
213 C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 41, 67 and 94. 
214 E.g. D. WAELBROECK (2008), supra n. 38, p. 12-13. H. SCHWEITZER (2010), supra n. 48, pp. 24-26 of 
the working paper. 
215 E.g. R. WHISH (2006), supra n. 45, p. 569. This reasoning is based on the Automec II principle, supra n. 170, 
according to which the Commission is free to act on its priorities. 
216 Supra n. 174 and the accompanying text. 
217 A real-life example comes from the other side of the Atlantic, where antitrust settlements of the US DoJ have 
allegedly been an instrument to exercise political influence. The so-called ITT/Hartford controversy from the 
early 70s concerned allegations that one of the then biggest U.S. companies offered to sponsor the 1972 
Republican National Convention in exchange for a favourable antitrust deal with DoJ. According to G.S. 
GEORGIEV, supra n. 48, pp. 1009, this was the main trigger behind the adoption of the Tunney Act in 1974, 
which introduced more transparency to the settlement negotiations.  
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law in pursue of other policies.218 Second, negotiations over commitments involves 
two parties, but the commitment debate seems to downplay the undertaking’s ability 
to influence the Commission and the fact that it might also have a role in the final 
shape of the commitment package.219 
 
Sousa Ferro rightly points out that concerns about the potential mismatch between 
commitments and the (alleged) anticompetitive practice at issue was already present in 
the context of (informal) settlements, as the Commission could always exercise 
unwarranted pressure on companies to extract from them far-reaching promises.220 
These informal promises, however, were not enforceable, whereas the breach of a 
commitment allows the Commission to impose substantial fines and periodic 
penalties. Further, unlike promises made by undertakings in a settlement, 
commitments are made binding in a formal decision and thus might have some 
precedence value.221 Especially in areas where there is no other Article 7 decisions or 
the Courts’ case law to rely on, the Commission’s preliminary assessment summarised 
in the commitment decision might be indicative of what type of conduct (if indeed it 
occurred) might be considered anticompetitive. Thus, a commitment decision setting 
forth the Commission’s preliminary findings on market definition, dominance and 
practices raising concerns might influence business and competition community and 
might even lead to establishing new legal principles or rules,222 whereas accepted 
                                                           
218 E.-J. MESTMÄCKER, supra n. 122, p. 441. H. SCHWEITZER (2010), supra n. 48, p. 11 of the working 
paper. 
219 However, see L.F. PACE, European Antitrust Law. Prohibitions, Merger Control, Procedures, Edward 
Elgar, Northampton 2007, p. 237, on risks of regulatory capture. See also G.S. GEORGIEV, supra n. 48, pp. 
1009, H. SCHWEITZER (2010), supra n. 48, p. 11 of the working paper, and J. TEMPLE LANG (2009), supra 
n. 25, pp. 142-143. T. KOZIEŁ, supra n. 176, p. 75. 
220 M. SOUSA FERRO, supra n. 122, p. 458. His observation remains valid also with respect to the third 
scenario (2c). 
221 As argued by J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 45, p. 275. C.J. COOK, supra n. 122, p. 227. G.S. 
GEORGIEV, supra n. 48, p. 1028. S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 185. T. 
KOZIEŁ, supra n. 176, pp. 84-85 (in the context of commitment decisions under the Polish antitrust law), H. 
SCHWEITZER (2012), supra n. 48, p. 22 (online version). For an opposite view, see A. KLEES (2009), supra 
n. 122, p. 376. 
222 For instance, the Commission’s commitment decision in the Coca-cola case (Table 1) is recognised as a 
decision which clarifies the Commission’s stance on fidelity rebates. Some authors see it as an advantage and 
point out that commitment decisions, whereas they cannot establish decisive precedents (unlike infringement 
decisions) they might provide an important clarification for the companies on less straightforward market 
conduct in individual cases. See C.J. COOK, supra n. 122, p. 211 and 213. In the same vein S. RAB, D. 
MONNOYEUR and A SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 175. However, the majority view it as a risky 
development for the quality of competition law in general. See e.g. G.S. GEORGIEV, supra n. 48, p. 1028. H. 
 73
commitments might set new standards of the Commission’s intervention in a given 
sector. Not surprisingly, precedence-setting effects of commitment decisions are 
acknowledged and supported by the Commission.223 This problem is aptly captured by 
Van Bael who called the Commission’s settlement practice ‘an alternative body of 
jurisprudence, surrounded by a cloak of mystery.’224  
 
1.5.3. Research justification 
 
The above discussion illustrates various concerns raised in the debate on Article 9 that 
it might be used (or rather abused) by the Commission for regulatory purposes to the 
detriment of competition rules. At the same time, over the last decade the Commission 
has been openly speaking about harnessing competition rules in order to foster the 
liberalisation and integration of energy markets, and thus push forward its energy 
policy agenda. Without more ado, it launched the energy sector inquiry under 
competition rules and then followed up with a wave of commitment decisions in 
individual antitrust investigations against energy incumbents. This provides a 
substantial body of Article 9 cases which might be driven by energy policy objectives, 
i.e. liberalisation and integration of energy markets, rather than concerns about illegal 
(if indeed) past conduct.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
SCHWEITZER (2010), supra n. 48, p. 11 of the working paper. G. BRUZZONE and M. BOCCACCIO, supra 
n. 122, p. 99. D. WAELBROECK (2009), supra n. 17, p. 224. D. GERARD, supra n. 20, p. 465. H. 
SCHWEITZER (2012), supra n. 48, p. 22 (online version). F. WAGNER VON-PAPP, supra n. 25, p. 931 and 
966. L. ORTIZ BLANCO and A. LAMADRID DE PABLO, supra n. 11, p. 78. E. GIPPINI-FOURNIER, supra 
n. 33, p. 43. I.S. FORRESTER, supra n. 122, pp. 2 and 12 (working paper). See also C.I. NAGY, ‘Commitments 
as Surrogates of Civil Redress in Competition Law: the Hungarian Perspective’ (2012) 11 European 
Competition Law Review, 531-536, p. 533, on precedence value of commitments in the Hungarian competition 
law. 
223 European Commission, Antitrust Manual of Procedures, supra n. 43, chapter 16 on commitment decisions, 
para. 2.6: ‘Commitment decisions also serve to clarify the Commission's competition policy since a non-
confidential version of the decision is published. Other market participants can learn from the decision and the 
commitments what was considered by the Commission sufficient to remove the competition concerns.’ 
224 I. VAN BAEL, ‘Comments on the ECC Commission’s Antitrust Settlement Practice’ (1984) Swiss Review of 
International Competition Law Act, p. 67 (cited after D. WAELBROECK (2009), supra n. 17, p. 222). This 
quote comes from the 80s and Van Bael obviously referred to the Commission’s practice of informal 
settlements. However, given the greater precedence value of (more formal) commitment decisions coupled with 
the lack of procedural safeguards and judicial control over commitments, his concerns remain still valid. 
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The Commission’s antitrust intervention in the energy sector over the last years has 
offered an opportunity to find out whether the concerns about instrumental use of 
commitment decisions for regulatory goals are well grounded. Surprisingly, these 
concerns still remain largely at the theoretical level and only few authors tried to 
explore them in the context of the Commission’s energy policy and the objective to 
complete the internal energy market.225 The other debate which falls under the scope 
of this thesis and concerns on the role of competition policy in achieving the EU 
internal market for energy (and more specifically for electricity – see Figure  2), 
provides no Article 9 case studies either.226 These cases are worth analysing, all the 
more so because they do not seem to be just one-off intervention in the wake of the 
                                                           
225 To the author’s knowledge, there are no in-depth case studies of the Commission’s commitment decisions in 
the energy sector. Nevertheless, a number of authors referred to these cases or discussed them to some extent as 
an example of instrumentalisation of competition rules (especially pointing at far-reaching structural or 
behavioural commitments). See A. DE HAUTECLOCQUE and L. HANCHER, ‘The Svenska Kraftnät case: 
introduction of bidding zones in Sweden’ (2011) 13 Network Industries Quaterly 1, 20-22. K. KEHOE, 
‘Commitments as a Tool for Energy Sector Liberalisation’ (2011) MLex Magazine, July - September Issue, 42-
46, on E.ON (gas case) EdF and ENI. L. KJØLBYE, ‘Refilling the Pipeline’ (2011) MLex Magazine, July-
September Issue, 52-55, on RWE, ENI, GdF, E.ON (el. and gas cases). P. IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, supra n. 11, pp. 
296-301, on GdF and E.ON (el. case). KLEES (2009), supra n. 122, pp. 381-382, on E.ON (el. case). A. DE 
HAUTECLOCQUE, ‘Legal Uncertainty and Competition Policy in Deregulated Network Industries: The Case 
of Longterm Vertical Contracts in the EU Electricity Markets’ (2008) Larsen Working Paper, on Distrigaz. J. 
TEMPLE LANG, ‘The Use of Competition Law Powers for Regulatory Purposes’ (2007) Regulatory Policy 
Institute, Oxford, 2007, p. 7, on ENI. J. TAPIA and D. MANTZARI, ‘The Regulation/Competition Interaction’ 
forthcoming in D. GERADIN and I. LIANOS (eds.) Research Handbook on European Competition Law, 
Edward Elgar, Northhampton 2012 (ch. 15), available online as a working paper Regcom WP 01-12, pp. 26-29, 
on Distrigaz, GdF, SvK, ENI and E.ON (el.). See also U. SCHOLZ and S. PURPS, ‘The Application of EU 
Competition Law in the Energy Sector’ (2012) 3 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 1, 76-87, 
pp. 80-82, on Gazprom, Greek lignite and Deutsche Bahn. G. MONTI (2008), supra n. 11, pp. 139-140, on 
ENI/Gazprom settlement. P. WILLIS and P. HUGHES , ‘Structural Remedies in Article 82 Energy Cases’ 
(2008) 4 The Competition Law Review 2, 147-174, pp. 151-152, on Distrigaz. Substantially more has been 
written about instrumentalisation of competition rules in general. See J. TEMPLE LANG (2007), mentioned 
supra, this note, and J. TEMPLE LANG (2006), supra n. 32, pp. 317-318, for cases where the Commission acted 
in a regulatory manner and tried to achieve results which it has no power to achieve under competition rules, but 
which could have been done (if at all) only via regulatory means. See also G. MONTI (2008), supra n. 11, for 
analysis of issues raised in the Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica cases,  and P. IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, supra n. 11, 
for an analysis of the Microsoft and UEFA Champions League cases, pp. 289-296. Commitment cases are 
subject to less commentary, apart from the Alrosa case which was extensively discussed due to the involvement 
of the Courts (for a fully-fledged case study see F. CENGIZ, supra n. 122), and the Coca-cola case (see O. 
ARMENGOL and A. PASCUAL, supra n. 122). Some authors analysed the instrumental use of commitment 
decisions as a means of market regulation by national competition agencies (see, for instance, an Italian account 
of C.B. CALINI, ‘An “unusual use” of commitments: the investigation into Sky Italia’s dominance abuse’ 
(2011) European Competition Law Review 1, 50-52, or comments by T. KOZIEŁ, supra n. 176, p. 85, on the 
Polsat case. For an overview of national commitment practice see H. SCHWEITZER (2012), supra n. 48. 
226 Whereas merger control as a tool of energy liberalisation have been subject to extensive research (for a recent 
account see F. DE LA PEÑA FERNÁNDEZ-GARNELO, supra n. 68, and also A. CHRISTIANSEN, 
‘Regulation and EU merger control in the liberalised electricity sector’ in F. FICHERT, J. HAUCAP and K. 
ROMMEL (eds.) Competition Policy in Network Industries, 1st ed., Lit Verlag, Münster 2007), the role of 
Article 9-based competition enforcement in achieving the Commission’s energy policy goals has only been 
shortly discussed (see supra n. 225 for references).  
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energy sector inquiry. Judging from the Commission’s recent antitrust activity (7 open 
cases, most of which in 2012) and its last declarations,227 competition policy will not 
cease to play an important role in the implementation of the EU energy policy. Given 
that both the Commission and the undertakings are incentivised to close the case 
under Article 9, it is expected that commitment decisions will continue to be a 
common way of closing antitrust investigations in the energy markets. This thesis 
attempts to fill the gap in the existing research and take a closer look at these cases, 
which hopefully help drive the debate further.  
 
1.6. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis studies two commitment decisions in the electricity sector and asks what 
they have done for energy policy and what they have (not) done for competition 
policy.  
 
If one claims that competition rules are being instrumentalised, i.e. misused to achieve 
regulatory purposes then a silent question to ask is, first of all, what exactly those 
regulatory purposes are and whether competition rules can achieve them (or maybe 
already achieved)? Secondly, since ‘misuse’ has a negative connotation, another 
natural question that comes to mind is what the cost of the ‘misuse’ is.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to confront the ‘theories’ on Article 9 with its application in 
the electricity sector. More precisely, it takes the concerns from the commitment 
debate about the misuse of commitment decisions for regulatory purposes and then 
test their validity in the context of the Commission’s energy policy, where the 
‘regulatory purpose’, that is, the completion of the internal energy market, is well-
defined. As already suggested, this exercise has two dimensions, competition policy 
dimension and energy policy dimension, which results from the position of this 
research at the intersection of two scholarly debates (see Figure  2). The commitment 
debate is concerned about instrumentalisation mostly because it might negatively 
                                                           
227 Supra n. 103 and the accompanying text. 
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affect competition rules and the market place. The other debate focuses on the results 
of instrumentalisation from the energy policy’ perspective, asking only about the role 
of Article 9 in achieving the internal market for electricity. In sum, this thesis looks at 
the effects of the use of Article 9 both on the competition policy and the energy policy 
and boils down to one general question:  
 
Has Article 9 contributed to creating the EU internal market for electricity, and if so, at what cost? 
 
I do not follow one single method, but rather blend different research strategies 
commonly used in a law and economics framework, involving positive and normative 
analysis of legal rules (competition law and energy law) as well as market modelling 
(chapter 4). This is supported by a thorough review of the relevant legal and law and 
economics literature (esp. chapters 1-2) and some sector-specific economic literature 
(esp. chapters 3-5). The Commission’s antitrust enforcement in the electricity sector is 
more closely scrutinised by means of two in-depth case studies. The first case study is 
about the Commission’s intervention into the electricity wholesale markets in 
Germany (the E.ON case). The second case study relates to the Commission’s antitrust 
action against Svenska Kraftnät (SvK), the Swedish transmission system operator (the 
SvK case).228 A few interviews were held with the Commission’s case handlers and 
the companies’ in-house lawyers directly involved in Article 9 negotiations in these 
cases. Further interviews were carried out with policy officers at the Directorate-
General for Energy, responsible for legislative proposals on electricity-specific issues 
discussed in this thesis. These confidential discussions were helpful in that they gave 
some insights from behind the scenes of the two cases.   
 
Both the choice of electricity sector and selection of cases are not accidental and 
deserve a few words of explanation.  
 
                                                           
228 Cases are listed in Table 2. 
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1.6.1. Why electricity markets? 
 
A particularly high number of energy cases among commitment decisions (see Table 
1) explains why this research concerns energy markets, but does not explain its focus 
on electricity as opposed to gas, where the Commission’s antitrust intervention 
appears to be equally forceful.229 There are three main reasons why electricity sector 
might be more suitable for this research. First, the shift towards low-carbon economy 
makes the EU electricity reforms particularly urgent.230 As a result, the Commission’s 
electricity-specific policy appears more mature than its gas policy, and seems to meet 
with wider understanding and support of market players. The incentive to use 
competition policy for regulatory objectives might be stronger, if these objectives are 
clear and the Commission is more determined to pursue them.231 Secondly, whereas 
electricity is produced in the EU, gas is mostly imported. Upstream supply is largely 
controlled by external suppliers and remains outside the scope of EU regulation. In 
consequence, competition enforcement in the EU gas markets often has foreign affairs 
overtones complicating the assessment of gas cases.232 Lastly, the electricity markets 
possess some unique features233 which make their organisation rather complex and 
different from most other commodity markets. To the extent these electricity-specific 
features require adaptation of ‘general’ competition rules234 and thus increase the cost 
of competition enforcement the Commission might be more willing to resort to Article 
9 in electricity cases than in gas cases.235 For the same reason, the risk of incorrect 
                                                           
229 Out of 10 energy cases closed by a commitment decision so far, half is in the gas sector. See supra Table 2. 
230 Esp. the risks connected to the increasing share of intermittent electricity in the system.  
231 On the other hand, one could argue that slower results of the gas liberalisation and integration via regulatory 
means might actually prompt the Commission to intervene under competition rules instead. The second reason 
explains why this might not be the case.  
232 E.g. antitrust proceedings against Gazprom (COMP/39.816 – Upstream gas suppliers in Central and Eastern 
Europe). For a recent case study see N. SARTORI, ‘The European Commission vs. Gazprom: An Issue of Fair 
Competition or a Foreign Policy Quarrel?’ (2013) Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Working Paper 13/03, 
available at http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1303.pdf accessed 20.05.2013. See also K. TALUS, ‘Long-term 
gas agreements and security of supply – between law and politics’ (2007) 32 European Law Review 4, 535-548. 
233I.e. non-storability, demand fluctuations, instantaneous demand-supply equilibrium and grid dependency. 
234 For instance, whereas market shares are typically used to measure market power, they are not adequate to 
measure market power in electricity wholesale markets. Instead, electricity-specific indices should be employed 
(RSI – Residual Supply Index, PSI – Pivotal Supply Index). See infra, chapter 3, for discussion. 
235 So-called ‘exit strategy’, see supra n. 171 and the accompanying text. 
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anticompetitive assessment and devising disproportionate remedies might be higher in 
electricity cases than in gas cases.   
 
1.6.2. Why the E.ON and the SvK cases? 
 
The Commission’s antitrust intervention in the electricity sector spans over a period of 
six years, from 2006 to date, and boils down to five commitment decisions.236 The 
first commitment decisions have been adopted in 2008 and the last one in 2012. Three 
factors were taken into account when selecting the cases for the purpose of this 
research. 
 
Firstly, the selected case studies are sufficiently different from each other to allow for 
making more general observations with regard to the application of competition rules 
to the whole EU electricity sector. They concern different countries (Germany and 
Sweden) and different levels of electricity supply chain (generation and transmission). 
The two targeted undertakings have a different ownership structure and are subject to 
different regulatory regimes, in that E.ON is a private undertaking active in a 
deregulated market segment of electricity generation, whereas SvK is a state-owned 
legal monopoly and operates national transmission grid. Further, whereas the E.ON 
case relates to a market national in scope, the SvK case has a clear cross-border 
dimension.  
 
Secondly, the selected commitment decisions had to be adopted between July 2007, 
when the General Court quashed the Commission’s decision in the Alrosa case (see 
Table 1) and June 2010, when this ruling itself was quashed on appeal by the ECJ. 
Without going into detail of this court saga,237 suffice it to say that during that period 
                                                           
236 In other cases commitments have been offered, but the cases are still pending. Information based on the 
Commission’s case record publicly known at the time of writing this chapter (01.2013), see supra Table 2.  
237 The Alrosa case ensued from an agreement for the supply of rough diamonds between the first (De Beers) 
and the second (Alrosa) biggest diamond mining company in the world. According to the Commission, this 
agreement was in violation of Article 101 TFEU and the Commission launched an investigation against both 
producers (COMP/E-3/38.381 – De Beers). In addition, it launched an Article 102 TFEU investigation against 
De Beers for abuse of dominance (COMP/E-2/38.381 – De Beers). After the parties failed to offer joint 
commitments which would meet the Commission’s concerns under Article 101, De Beers offered individual 
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the Commission’s decision-making under Article 9 was to some extent determined by 
the General Court’s interpretation of Article 9. It has been observed that following this 
judgment the Commission started to draft its commitment decisions more carefully 
paying attention to the substance of the cases. In result, the 2007-2010 decisions 
(including the E.ON case and the SvK case) not only explain the theory of harm in a 
greater detail but also include a section discussing the proportionality of 
commitments.238 To sum it up, the Court’s restrictive interpretation made any 
potential instrumentalisation of commitment decisions more difficult, as the 
Commission was forced to conceal its energy policy objectives under a mask of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
commitments to close the second investigation into abuse of dominance. De Beers’ commitments were 
substantial, as it undertook to gradually reduce the amount of diamonds purchased from Alrosa, and from 2009 
onwards, to completely cease its business relationship with Alrosa. The Commission made these commitments 
binding upon De Beers in an Article 9 decision. Alrosa, directly affected by these commitments, filed an action 
for annulment of the Commission’s decision, arguing, among others, that De Beers’ commitments were 
disproportionate. In June 2007 the General Court upheld this appeal and annulled the Commission’s 
commitment decision (case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission [2007] ECR II-2601). More importantly, the 
General Court provided an interpretation of several key issues regarding Article 9 which would have a 
substantial impact on the Commission’s decision-making practice under Article 9. (1) Firstly, the General Court 
ruled that commitment decisions undergo a full judicial review, including the assessment whether commitments 
are proportionate (at paras. 107-111) (2) Secondly, to make this review possible, the Court obliged the 
Commission to make a sufficient economic assessment of the case. In the Court’s own words, the Commission 
had to ‘establish the reality of the competition concerns which justified its envisaging the adoption of a decision 
under [Articles 101-102 TFEU] and which allow it to require the undertaking concerned to comply with certain 
commitments. This presupposes an analysis of the market and an identification of the infringement envisaged 
which are less definitive than those which are required for the application of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 
1/2003, although they should be sufficient to allow a review of the appropriateness of the commitment.’ (at para. 
100, emphasis added) 3) Finally, the General Court ruled that commitments made binding by the Commission 
needed to be proportionate to its initial anticompetitive concerns and it was the Commission’s duty to assess this 
(at paras. 112 and 126). If less onerous measures exist (even if they were not proposed by the undertaking 
concerned) the Commission had to examine whether they are capable of addressing its concerns, before it adopts 
the more onerous solution (at paras. 92, 97 and 105). In sum, according to the General Court, the Commission’s 
duty to assess proportionality of commitments was analogous to its obligation under Article 7 to impose only 
proportionate remedies. This also implied that the Commission was not allowed to make binding an obligation 
that it could not have imposed in an infringement decision under Article 7 (at para. 101). This time it was the 
Commission to lodge an appeal with the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) which three years later set aside 
the General Court’s judgment putting an end to the Alrosa saga (see supra section 1.5.2.2 for some key findings 
of the Court). However, for three years, between July 2007 and June 2010, while the Commission’s appeal was 
pending before the ECJ, the General Court’s ruling provided the only statement of case law on Article 9 and 
affected to some degree the Commission’s decision-making practice. For a fully-fledged discussion of the 
Alrosa case and its implications for the Commission’s competition enforcement, see F. CENGIZ, supra n. 122. 
See also H. SCHWEITZER (2010), supra n. 48, pp. 14-18 of the working paper, analysing the EGC’s judgment 
which has been overturned on appeal by the ECJ.  
238 See F. WAGNER-VON PAPP, supra n. 25, pp. 942-943. The E.ON commitment decision of 28.11.2008 was 
one of the first decisions (after Distrigaz) adopted after the General Court’s ruling. The SvK case was closed on 
14.04.2010, i.e. two and a half months before the ECJ judgment, however already after the Advocate General’s 
(AG’s) Opinion proposing to set aside the General Court’s judgment and to recognise the Commission’s wide 
discretion in assessing the proportionality of commitments (Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 17.09.2009 in 
Case C-441/07 P, Alrosa, para. 72). The ECJ usually follows the AGs’ opinions, and this might have created 
some expectations on the part of the Commission as to the outcome of the appeal or at the very least created 
more legal uncertainty as to the scope of the Commission’s powers under Article 9. 
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competition concerns and argue that regulatory-like commitments are tailored to meet 
these concerns. Cases from that period are thus particularly interesting to look at.  
 
Thirdly, the two selected cases go hand in hand with key electricity reforms on the EU 
regulatory front. E.ON’s commitments were accepted in the run-up to the adoption of 
the 3rd Energy Package,239 whereas the SvK case was formally opened just after its 
adoption. The Commission’s regulatory objectives, once identified in the context of 
legislative measures, might be then easily spotted as ‘transplants’ within theories of 
anticompetitive harm. 
 
1.7. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
 
This section reveals what comes next and in which order. 
 
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapters 2 to 5 constitute the core of this research. 
They have all been published in journals as separate articles240 and are discussed 
below in a greater detail. Chapter 2 is theoretical and sets background for chapters 3 to 
5, which take a more applied tack. Chapter 3 studies the E.ON case, whereas the SvK 
case is central to chapters 4 and 5, both of which are co-authored with Bert Willems. 
Chapter 1 is intended to link the four core chapters together, explaining the coherence 
of the whole. It also ushers readers to the research topic, and to this aim it includes all 
the key elements of an introduction, i.e. problem definition, explanatory background, 
research objectives, questions, methodology, structure as well as it puts the thesis in a 
wider context of the current scholarly debates. Chapter 6 concludes. 
 
1.7.1. Chapter 2 
 
‘Energy Liberalisation: Excessive Pricing Dusted Off?’ constitutes the first of the four 
core chapters of this thesis and is meant to provide some theoretical context to the 
                                                           
239 Supra, section 1.2.3.3. 
240 Some of them have been reprinted here with minor alterations.  
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readers before moving to case-specific studies. Regulation 1/2003 equipped the 
Commission with a specific set of competition enforcement instruments. In this 
chapter I highlight the importance of (1) sector inquires, (2) commitment procedure 
and (3) the possibility to impose structural remedies in competition cases for 
achieving the internal market in the field of energy. The new antitrust enforcement 
toolbox enables the Commission to use competition policy in areas where it wants to 
increase competition in national energy markets (market liberalisation) and then 
integrate them into one European energy market (market integration).241 This will 
have a visible impact on the EU competition enforcement, changing both the way 
competition rules are applied as well as the rationale for their application. 
 
Potential impact of the new enforcement tools on competition policy is illustrated by 
an example of excessive pricing, problematic and often disputed anticompetitive 
behaviour. In principle, overpricing by a dominant firm is a form of direct exploitation 
of customers and should theoretically trigger an intervention on the part of the 
Commission under Article 102 TFEU. In practice, excessive pricing actions have 
always been considered controversial and not without practical problems, and thus 
launched by the Commission only in rare cases. However, since the adoption of 
Regulation 1/2003, the Commission has launched several antitrust investigations into 
price manipulation by energy incumbents, which might suggest that it assumes now a 
more pro-active approach to overpricing, a remarkable change of direction in the EU 
competition enforcement.  
 
I have decided to select excessive pricing among various other anticompetitive 
practices potentially taking place in the energy sector. This is a deliberate exercise for 
several reasons. Firstly, competition enforcement in the energy sector has been 
triggered for the most part by rising gas and electricity wholesale prices.242 Thus, price 
formation in the wholesale electricity markets is an important area of the 
Commission’s energy sector inquiry and many of its following antitrust investigations 
                                                           
241 Supra, section 1.2.3. 
242 European Commission, Inquiry pursuant to art. 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, supra n. 78, para. 2.  
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also concerned price manipulation. For this reason, my focus on excessive pricing is 
supposed to reflect one of the key areas of anticompetitive concern. Secondly, a more 
comprehensive discussion on excessive pricing prepares the readers for the E.ON case 
study on alleged price manipulation in the German wholesale market. Thirdly, by 
choosing excessive pricing I would like to emphasise that Regulation 1/2003 may 
facilitate an antitrust action regardless of the Commission’s anticompetitive concern, 
and even a rather cumbersome and sporadically used prohibition of excessive pricing 
can well serve as a legal basis for such action.  
 
In addition, there is a stylistic reason behind this choice. I set the three new 
instruments of competition enforcement against the common criticism that surrounds 
excessive pricing actions. This allows me to give this chapter a more interesting 
structure than a simple review of the three instruments, even though the latter one 
remains my main objective. 
 
The first well-known reason for abstaining from excessive pricing actions is that the 
antitrust intervention might be superfluous or even harmful for competition. This 
criticism does not hold for energy markets with high entry barriers and previous legal 
monopolies. In such a setting regulatory intervention appears necessary to correct 
market failures and involves no risk of chilling competition, given the already highly 
regulated environment.  
 
The second point of criticism relates to complex and time-consuming assessment 
which would prove that prices are above competitive levels and competition rules 
have been violated. Competition authorities might lack both time and expertise to 
carry out this exercise in each individual case. As we learn from the Commission’s 
practice in the energy sector, assessment problems can be overcome by closing 
excessive pricing cases under Article 9 instead of going for a full-fledged 
anticompetitive analysis with an attempt to find an abuse of a dominant position. 
Launching the energy sector inquiry was very helpful as well, as the Commission 
could substantiate its commitment decisions with more general findings pointing at 
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price manipulation, but without providing further evidence in individual cases. Sector 
inquiries are by far more complex and time-consuming than individual antitrust 
investigations. However, once the Commission decides to undertake one, data 
collected and assessed during such an industry-wide inquiry can subsequently support 
many individual antitrust investigations carried out in its aftermath. 
 
The third and last reason for caution in antitrust intervention into excessive pricing is 
that it usually boils down to price regulation and therefore goes beyond competition 
policy domain. As argued in this chapter, the risk of price regulation is now largely 
mitigated by Regulation 1/2003, which allows the Commission to order structural 
remedies or, in cases closed under Article 9, accept structural commitments. The 
current monopolistic or at best oligopolistic structure of many European energy 
markets calls for structural intervention and the Commission apparently favours 
structural remedies, given its ambitious energy liberalisation agenda. Any concerns 
regarding proportionality of structural solutions for excessive pricing abuses are 
dispelled by the use of commitment procedure. According to the EU case law, 
commitments undergo a weaker proportionality test than remedies imposed under 
Article 7 and the Commission can accept structural solutions which could not be 
imposed under a standard infringement procedure. 
 
In summary, this chapter highlights the importance of Regulation 1/2003, which 
makes competition enforcement an instrument of wider application. In particular, it 
puts forward an idea of using excessive pricing actions as a policy vehicle to foster 
liberalisation and integration of energy markets. However, it should be noted that 
excessive pricing cases are here just an example of competition enforcement in the 
energy sector. The Commission can as well intervene due to various reasons other 
than excessive pricing. The key message of this chapter is that Regulation 1/2003 
might encourage the Commission to come up with various anticompetitive concerns 
and enforce competition rules in the energy markets in order to pursue its other policy 
goals.  
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Last paragraphs sum the chapter up and raise questions as to whether the Commission 
actually takes advantage of the new instruments provided for in Regulation 1/2003 
and enforce competition law for its own energy policy agenda, in order to foster 
liberalisation and market integration. And if so, how would such instrumentalised 
competition enforcement look like and would it be effective? This bridges the 
theoretical discussion with the following, more applied, chapters, where I try to cast 
some light on the actual competition enforcement in the energy sector and its effects, 
in order to answer my research questions. 
 
1.7.2. Chapter 3 
 
High market concentration in the energy markets has been one of the major problems 
identified in the energy sector inquiry. This is to some extent reflected in the follow-
up antitrust actions where the Commission targeted uncompetitive market structure. 4 
out of 9 abuse of dominance cases were closed after the companies committed to 
divest substantial shares of their businesses.243 The main purpose of these actions was 
vertical and horizontal dismantling of dominant energy incumbents, in order to 
prevent discrimination and leave room for new market players.  
 
Chapter 3 entitled ‘Energy Liberalisation in an Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant too Far?’ 
introduces the first case study – the 2008 investigation in the German electricity 
wholesale market. The Commission investigated E.ON, one of the major German 
electricity incumbents, and accused it of abusing its dominant position on the German 
power exchange244 primarily by withholding capacity to raise electricity spot price. As 
a result of this case, E.ON divested 20% of its generation business. 
 
                                                           
243 German electricity wholesale market (Case COMP/39.388), German electricity balancing market (Case 
COMP/39.389), RWE gas foreclosure (Case COMP/39.402), ENI (Case COMP/39.315). See Table 2. 
244 The European Energy Exchange (EEX) based in Leipzig. 
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This E.ON case fits well with the subject matter of the theoretical chapter, as capacity 
withholding is a form of excessive pricing.245 Readers not familiar with capacity 
withholding will find necessary background information in the Annex to chapter 3. I 
explain there how capacity withholding works and what might drive a generator to 
engage in this business strategy. To this aim, I refer to the unilateral profit 
maximisation logic of a withholding generator developed by Joskow and Kahn (2002). 
Their simple equation demonstrates that the profitability of capacity withholding 
hinges upon several factors, the key of which are (1) the size of the power exchange 
and the size of the withholding generator trading on that power exchange, (2) timing 
of withholding and (3) an optimal asset mix in terms of fuel and technology, which 
would enable a generator to withhold its capacity at the most convenient moment and 
to gain its profit on the resulting price increase. 
  
Another clear link with the previous chapter is that chapter 3 also builds on the 
argumentation set forth therein. Namely, it assumes from the outset that fostering 
energy liberalisation by vigorous antitrust enforcement is not only legally possible, but 
also makes sense from teleological perspective. Both liberalisation policy and 
competition policy strive for more competitive energy markets. Further, at the time of 
the E.ON case progress on the EU regulatory front was slow. The EU debate over the 
3rd Energy Package seemed to come to a deadlock, as many countries with Germany 
in the forefront opposed to ownership unbundling provisions. Resorting to 
competition policy to foster liberalisation seemed both legitimate and necessary in 
these circumstances.  
 
However, the main purpose of antitrust enforcement is to put an end to an 
anticompetitive practice taking place in the market. Once this primary objective of 
antitrust enforcement gets blurred by liberalisation objectives, then we face two kinds 
of risk in commitment cases. First, competition rules might be employed in situations 
where there is no or little anticompetitive harm, but where liberalisation process does 
                                                           
245 A generator can raise the market price by offering less capacity to the market (manipulate its output), or 
simply by submitting an arbitrary high bid on a plant during peak time.  
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not deliver expected results and the Commission wants to change the unsatisfactory 
status quo by targeting dominant players. As a result, the Commission might inflate 
anticompetitive concerns to extract far-reaching structural commitments from an 
undertaking under investigation. Second, even if anticompetitive harm does take place 
and the Commission’s intervention under competition rules is legitimate, the incentive 
to foster market liberalisation might be stronger than the incentive to remedy actual 
anticompetitive concerns. In such cases, the Commission might opt for a commitment 
package which promotes market liberalisation, without necessarily addressing the 
anticompetitive harm at issue. I find that both kinds of risk materialise in the E.ON 
case and chapter 3 is an attempt to illustrate this. 
 
This chapter builds on two corresponding sections. The first, shorter section entitled 
‘Far-fetched concerns’ relates to inflated concerns which the Commission came up 
with in the E.ON case in order to strengthen its bargaining position and negotiate from 
E.ON substantial divestments. First of all, I find that the profitability of strategic 
capacity withholding is far from clear in real market setting, as it depends on many 
various factors. The Commission’s theory of harm does not convince me and I 
question whether E.ON could indeed engage in this practice. Further, I underline the 
difficulty of proving an abuse in that respect. Given that this investigation was closed 
by a commitment decision, the Commission was not required to find an infringement 
of competition rules, only to formulate its anticompetitive concerns in a preliminary 
assessment. Thus, I point out shortcomings of the Commission’s drive-by 
anticompetitive analysis. In particular, it seems striking that the Commission argued 
joint dominance to use Article 102 TFEU as a legal basis and supported it by a simple 
calculation of market shares. Moreover, the reliance on joint dominance led to further 
inconsistencies in the assessment of E.ON’s alleged capacity withholding. Further 
incoherence of the Commission’s arguments results from the reference to E.ON’s 
alleged exclusionary practices. These involved deterrence of investment in generation 
by third parties. In my view, by accusing E.ON of these additional exclusionary 
practices the Commission undermined its theory of harm based on capacity 
withholding. This relation between the two alleged abuses is discussed in more detail 
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at the end of the first section. However, the Commission might have a valid reason for 
including these exclusionary concerns in its assessment, because they will later help to 
justify E.ON’s substantial divestments.  
 
Inflated anticompetitive concerns allow the Commission to extract far-reaching 
commitments from targeted undertakings. These commitments reflect the 
Commission’s ‘real’ concerns about the slow liberalisation process, but not ‘formal’ 
anticompetitive concerns formulated against the undertaking, no matter whether they 
are true or not. The second section called ‘Far-reaching remedies’ attempts to 
demonstrate that E.ON’s divestments negotiated with the Commission might not 
eliminate anticompetitive concerns of strategic capacity withholding, the primary 
reason of the Commission’s intervention. Instead, they are a resultant of both the 
Commission’s and E.ON’s interests. In particular, they reflect the Commission’s 
objective to foster energy market liberalisation, as they make German electricity 
wholesale market generally more competitive.  
 
To better illustrate this, the second section begins with a short theoretical part which 
compares Article 9 (commitment procedure) with Article 7 (infringement procedure), 
especially with regard to the proportionality of commitments. This comparison points 
at the difference between Article 7 and Article 9 procedures in the application of 
proportionality test to remedies and commitments respectively, which explains why, 
in theory, the Commission can use commitment cases in order to pursue various other 
policy goals (e.g. liberalisation of energy markets) by extracting disproportionate 
commitments reflecting these goals.  
 
Chapter 3 becomes again more applied for the remaining part of the second section 
where I examine, in a two-step proportionality test, whether E.ON’s divestitures 
address the Commission’s ‘formal’ concerns of exploitative as well as exclusionary 
nature. Firstly, whether they effectively eliminate the risk of capacity withholding 
(alleged exploitation) and secondly, whether they prevent E.ON from deterring third 
parities’ investments in generation business (alleged exclusion).  
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In the first step of this test I discuss potential behavioural commitments. Some of them 
appear less onerous and equally effective to divestments in terms of mitigating the risk 
of capacity withholding (e.g. forward contracts commitments, VPPs). However, as I 
explain, they would not address concerns of exclusionary nature. This brings me to a 
conclusion that resorting to a structural solution seems justified, as there is no such 
behavioural remedy which could be less onerous for E.ON than divestments but at the 
same time equally effective in terms of addressing all the Commission’s concerns, 
both exploitative and exclusionary. In the second step of my proportionality test I ask 
whether the proposed divestments are appropriate and necessary to address these 
concerns.  
 
First I look at the proportionality of divestments in terms of eliminating the risk of 
capacity withholding. To this aim, I examine E.ON’s generation portfolio and the 
selection of divested assets in terms of fuel and technology. I observe that the 
Commission negotiated with E.ON an across-the-board divestiture, amounting to a 
capacity reduction in absolute terms (by 20%) but having no substantial impact on the 
generator’s portfolio structure. As mentioned above, the generator’s assets mix is one 
of the key factors in the profitability of capacity withholding. Given that the offered 
divestments left E.ON’s portfolio structure unchanged, it can be questioned whether 
they sufficiently mitigated the risk of engaging in such strategy. I support my view 
with economic literature, which suggests that the risk of capacity withholding would 
be most efficiently mitigated by a targeted divestment of high-cost generation. 
Ownership of high-cost, marginal plants confers on generators greater market power 
than a portfolio of base-load plants, simply because withholding high-cost capacity at 
times of peak demand becomes most profitable. 
 
The situation changes, once I factor in exclusionary concerns regarding E.ON’s 
deterrence of investments. In that respect, the Commission argued that an across-the-
board divestment is a proportional remedy as it gives market entrants access to various 
generation assets, also involving technologies with higher fix costs (base-load 
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generation) and thus less attractive for investors. Hence, these additional exclusionary 
concerns make E.ON’s divestments of base-load generation look proportional.  
 
Summarising, the E.ON case well illustrates the risks arising from the Commission’s 
antitrust enforcement in the energy sector. Firstly, the case appears ‘weak’ in that the 
Commission based its assessment on strained, not well-argued anticompetitive 
concerns and was not required by the commitment procedure to provide any evidence 
supporting them. There might be a valid reason for expressing serious, even if not 
well-founded, anticompetitive concerns as they might later justify substantial 
commitments. Secondly, E.ON’s across-the-board divestment is maybe not best suited 
to address the risk of capacity withholding. However, the Commission also accused 
E.ON of investment deterrence and this makes the commitment package look 
proportional, as it needs to address all anticompetitive concerns. Their proportionality 
aside, E.ON’s divestments were generally pro-competitive, as they reduced the firm’s 
market share. Moreover, having sold off different technologies, E.ON faces now more 
competition on each demand level. Evidently, the Commission targeted E.ON’s 
dominant position and tried to inject more competition in the German generation 
business. It was less concerned about remedying capacity withholding, the risk of 
which was supposed to be eliminated in the first place. 
 
1.7.3. Chapter 4 
 
Whereas the Commission’s action under competition rules in the E.ON case seems to 
be a natural consequence of opening generation and wholesale electricity markets to 
competition, the second case study illustrates an antitrust intervention in the electricity 
transmission segment, despite its regulated monopoly status. The SvK case, discussed 
in detail in chapters 4 and 5, shows that a legal (and natural) monopoly characteristics 
does not exclude electricity transmission services from the application of competition 
rules. This second case study is thus a step further in my analysis, showing the use of 
competition rules in a specific regulatory setting.  
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I have been working on this second case together with Bert Willems and our work is 
summarised in two papers. Chapter 4, corresponding to our first paper, analyses the 
SvK case from an economic perspective. Chapter 5 follows up with a legal discussion 
of this case and represents our second paper. Before reporting our results from the 
economic analysis, the next paragraphs provide necessary context and the main facts 
of the case.  
 
The Swedish electricity transmission grid is linked with the neighbouring countries 
through interconnectors. The SvK case concerns Sweden, Denmark and the Øresund 
interconnector between them. Electricity in Sweden is produced mostly in the North, 
where all cheap hydro power plants are located. Then it is transported to big 
consumption areas in the South and further, via the Øresund interconnector, to 
Denmark.  
 
Electricity transmission network can transport only a certain volume of electricity 
within the system security limits. This is referred to as transmission capacity of the 
network. Transmission network in Sweden lacks this capacity to carry all the cheap 
hydro power from the North to the South. There are several bottlenecks, where 
transmission congestion occurs. In order to avoid line overload leading to blackouts, 
SvK, the Swedish transmission system operator (TSO), has to relieve congestion in its 
network in a timely manner. This is referred to as congestion management, and the 
way SvK managed congestion within Sweden was the reason of the Commission’s 
antitrust intervention. Namely, SvK used to restrict export of electricity to Denmark. 
Export limits reduced the total amount of electricity flows over the Swedish network 
and thus relieved internal congestion. This type of congestion management is 
commonly known as congestion shifting. By limiting export, SvK mimics a situation, 
where congestion occurs at the border, at the same time relieving the ‘real’ congestion 
within Sweden. Put differently, it ‘shifts’ congestion from the internal bottlenecks to 
the country’s borders. Congestion management of this kind gave the consumers in 
South Sweden an opportunity to buy cheap hydro power from North Sweden. Danish 
consumers, on the other hand, were deprived of this cheap electricity. Denmark had to 
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use its more expensive thermal generation to meet the country’s demand. Higher and 
more volatile electricity prices in Denmark gave rise to protests and triggered the 
Commission’s intervention. 
 
Dansk Energi, a trade association of Danish energy companies, filed a complaint to 
the Commission, claiming that SvK’s congestion management is detrimental to 
competition and trade within the internal market. Following this complaint, the 
Commission launched an investigation against SvK, expressing its concerns that the 
TSO’s actions are in violation of competition rules. Since SvK has monopoly over 
electricity transmission services in Sweden, the Commission argued it abused its 
dominant position on the market by discriminating between cross-border and domestic 
electricity transmission services (nationality-based discrimination) and market 
partitioning. Following some negotiations with the Commission, SvK agreed to offer 
commitments under Article 9.  
 
As an interim remedy, it committed to relieve internal congestion through counter-
trading, and not limiting export to Denmark. Counter-trading is a type of congestion 
management, where the TSO makes deals with individual generators to change their 
production plans. SvK would simply have to pay some generators in South Sweden to 
increase their (expensive) production. At the same time, it would compensate some 
generators in the North to shut down their power plants. The cost of counter-trading 
would be passed on to the Swedish consumers in form of higher transmission tariffs. 
What results is a transfer of money from consumers to generators.  
 
After the initial period of increased counter-trading, SvK agreed to subdivide the 
Swedish market into several price zones, with diverging electricity prices in case 
congestion occurs between them. This market mechanism, called market splitting, 
puts an end to one uniform electricity price in Sweden. Prices in North Sweden would 
be lower than prices in South Sweden. Thus, by adjusting zonal prices and affecting 
zonal supply and demand, market splitting relieves congestion between the zones.   
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In this chapter we look at the SvK case from the efficiency perspective and ask 
whether the Commission’s anticompetitive allegations are indeed justified. Should 
limiting cross-border trade in order to relieve congestion inside the country’s 
transmission network really constitute an infringement of competition rules? After all, 
transmission capacity in Sweden is limited and not all demand in South Sweden and 
Denmark for cheap Northern energy can be met. In order to answer this question, we 
model SvK’s alleged abuse and its commitments which were supposed to remove it.  
 
Out model has a simple radial network with one bottleneck and covers three regions: 
North Sweden, South Sweden and Denmark. Electricity is produced in North Sweden 
and then transported to South Sweden and Denmark subject to a transmission 
constraint between North Sweden and South Sweden (k = 28 units). We ignore the 
fact that the networks are meshed and loopflows can occur. Also, we do not consider 
effects on other regions. Lastly, we assume that the electricity demand in South 
Sweden equals the Danish one. 
 
First off, we establish an efficient benchmark. Allocative efficiency requires that the 
network is used at full capacity to transport cheap hydro power from North Sweden to 
South Sweden and Denmark. Thus, North Sweden exports 28 units of electricity. 
Since South Sweden and Denmark have the same demand function, each region 
receives 50% of this electricity, that is, each consumes 14 units. Put differently, 
consumers in South Sweden and Denmark will have the same marginal valuation for 
electricity and the electricity prices in both regions will be the same.  
 
In a similar way we model four other scenarios. In the first scenario, SvK relieves 
bottleneck k by restricting trade with Denmark. This corresponds to the alleged abuse. 
In the second scenario, SvK does not limit export, but solves congestion only through 
counter-trading. In this way we model the interim remedy. Third scenario combines 
the two methods: SvK shifts only some congestion to the border with Denmark, the 
remaining congestion is then counter-traded. Finally, the fourth and last scenario 
illustrates market splitting, which is the final remedy. We have calculated total market 
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surplus under each scenario. According to our results, two scenarios result in the 
highest market surplus, which equals first best. 
 
We believe that market splitting is an efficient system, because it allows for using the 
Swedish network at full capacity. Congestion is relieved through adjusting zonal 
prices. Electricity prices in South Sweden and Denmark are equal and higher than the 
price in North Sweden, reflecting congestion on bottleneck k. In this way, consumers 
in South Sweden and Denmark have the same marginal valuation for electricity. This 
should give optimal long-term investment incentives to energy producers. However, 
our model also shows that the Commission’s argumentation, according to which 
market splitting would prevent congestion shifting, is not entirely correct.  Even if 
SvK implements market splitting, it can nevertheless reduce export, just to keep a 
uniform price within Sweden. Cross-border electricity exchange takes place subject to 
capacity declarations by the Swedish and the Danish network operator. Each of them 
declares how much electricity can be transmitted through interconnector within the 
system security limits and the lower of the two values applies. If SvK sets a low 
capacity value (in our model equal to 2 units), the price in South Sweden would drop 
and reach the North Sweden’s price level, resulting in one electricity price across the 
country. To the contrary, Danish consumers would have to pay higher prices, just as in 
the first, ‘abusive’ scenario. By this example, we show that market splitting does not 
prevent SvK from manipulating cross-border capacity declarations. It can still limit 
cross-border trade with Denmark, the very reason of the Commission’s antitrust 
intervention. Only monitoring SvK’s behaviour would ensure that cross-border 
capacity is not reduced.  
 
Interestingly, the combination scenario is also efficient. This shows that, in optimum, 
the Swedish network operator has to shift some (but not all) congestion to the border. 
The rest must be relieved through counter-trading. How much congestion exactly 
should be shifted to the border in the optimum? Just as in first best, electricity price in 
South Sweden and Denmark must be the same, so transmission capacity must be 
allocated in such a way to ensure that the consumers in South Sweden and Denmark 
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have the same marginal valuation for electricity. The other two scenarios, illustrating 
SvK’s abuse and the interim remedy, are suboptimal, because consumers in South 
Sweden and Denmark have different valuation for electricity. On the one hand, if SvK 
does not reduce export to Denmark, but relieves all congestion through counter-
trading, Danish consumers would purchase as much cheap hydro electricity from 
Sweden as they want, whereas consumers in South Sweden would only get a fraction 
of this electricity. As a result, consumers in South Sweden would value this electricity 
more than the Danish consumers. If, on the other hand, cross-border trade was 
severely restricted, consumers in South Sweden would have a lower valuation for 
electricity than the Danish consumers, who, due to export limits, would be deprived of 
it.  
 
Based on our modeling exercise, we draw the following conclusions regarding the 
SvK case. Firstly, we do not agree with the Commission that any congestion shifting is 
in violation of competition rules. From the efficiency perspective, SvK needs to shift 
some congestion to the border with Denmark. We thus call for a more economic 
approach in the assessment of congestion shifting. Secondly, for the same reason, we 
find that solving all internal congestion through counter-trading, without reducing 
export to Denmark, is not efficient, and the Commission’s argumentation regarding 
the interim remedy was not correct in that respect. Lastly, we agree with the 
Commission that market splitting is an efficient long-term market design. However, 
contrary to what has been argued in this case, it will not prevent SvK from reducing 
export. SvK can still limit cross-border capacity to keep one uniform price within 
Sweden. Thus, monitoring would be necessary to prevent further export reductions.  
 
In other words, we are pleased with the introduction of market splitting in Sweden, but 
less so with the Commission’s reasoning in the case itself. From the efficiency 
perspective, restricting trade at the Swedish-Danish border to relieve internal 
congestion should not violate competition rules, without a rigorous economic analysis. 
Cutting down on export can actually increase efficiency. Furthermore, introducing 
market splitting does not prevent SvK from restricting exports in the future. 
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1.7.4. Chapter 5  
 
Chapter 5 represents the second paper on the SvK case, also co-authored with Bert 
Willems. Building on our results from the first paper, we set the SvK case in a broader 
legal, political and regulatory context. Firstly, we examine how the Commission uses 
competition policy to put an end to Swedish export reductions. We find that the 
Commission’s primary objective was to foster energy market integration. Pursuing 
this goal had a substantial impact on the quality of the Commission’s anticompetitive 
assessment, in which internal market arguments replaced solid economic analysis. 
However, as we show in this chapter, despite weak economic foundations, the 
Commission’s intervention resulted in better congestion management by introducing 
market splitting in Sweden. Moreover, using competition rules seems to be the 
quickest way to market splitting. To support our view, we explore alternative 
instruments of market integration, one of political and the other one of regulatory 
nature, which could be potentially employed in this case and we find that they would 
not lead to market splitting in Sweden as quickly as by way of competition 
enforcement. To this aim, chapter 5 is subdivided into three sections, first of which 
focuses on the application of EU competition rules, and the two other sections deal 
with the two remaining tools – political debate about the introduction market splitting 
in Sweden and the EU regulation of congestion shifting.   
 
EU competition rules are determined by the Commission’s objectives. The SvK case is 
an example where promotion of market integration is clearly articulated in the 
Commission’s decision. Pursuing this objective comes at the cost of a robust, 
economic welfare-oriented assessment of SvK’s behaviour and the negotiated 
commitments. The Commission considers congestion shifting an outright obstacle to 
cross-border trade and seeks to remove it. Such view is one-dimensional as the 
Commission’s concerns are related to the well-functioning of the internal market, 
namely nationality-based discrimination and re-segmentation of the internal market. 
This recalls the Commission’s formalistic approach towards quantitative restrictions 
on export or other protectionist measures having such effect. Such market-partitioning 
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practices have always been considered per se abuses, with no possibility to justify 
them. Similarly, congestion shifting is seen by the Commission primarily as a 
restriction to cross-border trade, and SvK’s justifying arguments are not sufficiently 
taken into account.  
 
We consider two potential justification grounds for the SvK’s behaviour: efficiencies 
and public policy considerations. From an efficiency perspective, unlimited cross-
border trade might not always be welfare-increasing. In fact, SvK should limit export 
to Denmark to some extent to manage internal congestion optimally. However, the 
Commission’s focus on market integration does not leave room for a complete 
economic analysis of the case which would point out efficiencies connected to 
congestion shifting. Similarly, the Commission did not fully recognise the fact that 
SvK operates in a regulatory environment and its congestion management might be in 
line with public interest. Introducing different electricity prices across the country is 
never a popular solution from the government’s perspective. Despite SvK’s formal 
autonomy regarding congestion management, its decisions might have been 
influenced by the national policy of maintaining one electricity price in Sweden as 
well as various industry pressure groups.  
 
We observe that harnessing antitrust rules to foster market integration is facilitated by 
Article 9 commitment procedure, as opposed to standard infringement procedure 
under Article 7. We compare the two procedural routes and point out that commitment 
procedure, primarily designed to streamline some of the Commission’s less 
problematic antitrust investigations, might be misused to tackle difficult, borderline 
cases. Namely, certain procedural features of Article 9 enable the Commission to 
censure as ‘anticompetitive’ practices whose anticompetitive aspects are not at all that 
clear and finding an abuse of dominant position might be actually difficult, but for 
using these procedural shortcuts. In the SvK case, the Commission was only required 
to formulate its anticompetitive concerns about the Swedish congestion management, 
without actually finding an infringement of competition rules. Shifting attention from 
the anticompetitive analysis to the commitment package enabled the Commission to 
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deem SvK’s congestion shifting abusive under antitrust rules without a proper 
anticompetitive analysis of such practice and its effects, and to negotiate tailor-made 
remedies removing its primarily internal market (and not anticompetitive) concerns. 
 
Market splitting constitutes a serious intervention in the Swedish market design and 
the Swedish social policy domain, because Swedish consumers will face different 
electricity prices at certain hours, depending on their location. Given the intrusiveness 
of the Commission’s action, chapter 5 contains a short discussion about the 
proportionality of SvK’s commitments, which closes the section on EU competition 
rules. According to the recent case law on commitment decisions, the Commission can 
accept disproportionate commitments, provided they meet its concerns and are not 
manifestly disproportionate. In this chapter we test market splitting under the old, 
stricter proportionality test known from the standard infringement procedure, as well 
as under this new, relaxed proportionality test valid now for commitments. We find 
that market splitting would pass neither the old, nor the new version of proportionality 
test, because it does not address the Commission’s concerns formulated in the 
preliminary assessment, the only requirement that has remained unchanged. This 
means that even in the light of the recent case law on commitments, the Commission 
might have breached the principle of proportionality. 
 
The second section puts the SvK case in the context of a drawn-out political debate 
about splitting Sweden into smaller price zones. Our brief overview of policy 
developments at the regional (Nordic) and the national level demonstrates that the idea 
of introducing market splitting in Sweden is not new, but has been discussed for quite 
some time before the Commission opened the SvK case. Namely, the debate 
commenced as early as in 1993 and is marked by various policy reports issued by (or 
for) various Nordic and Swedish regulatory agencies, governmental bodies and 
stakeholders’ associations over almost two decades. These reports study the 
possibility of introducing market splitting in Sweden and discuss its socioeconomic 
effects on the Swedish and Nordic electricity market. After the 2005 price spikes in 
Denmark it became clear that the changes in the Swedish congestion management are 
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necessary and the debate on market splitting rekindled. However, in spite of Danish 
constant protests, there was still no concrete plan to introduce market splitting in the 
years to come. Against this backdrop, the Commission’s antitrust intervention appears 
very effective in introducing market splitting. In sum, we argue that the SvK case does 
not constitute a novel solution to relieve Swedish bottlenecks and its introduction has 
been long anticipated by market participants. Nordic debate on market splitting would 
eventually result in changes to the Swedish congestion management. However, we 
find that the SvK case played a crucial role in this debate and accelerated the 
introduction of price zones in Sweden.  
 
A clear advantage in taking action under competition rules over engaging in political 
persuasion lies primarily in the Commission’s ability to exercise its powers to order 
remedies and impose fines. However, since SvK case has been closed under Article 9, 
market splitting has not been simply imposed by the Commission, but offered by SvK, 
at most negotiated between SvK and the Commission. Since the exercise of authority 
by the Commission is less clear in a commitment case than in a typical antitrust case, 
we abstain in chapter 5 from pointing this out. Instead, we highlight bilateral nature of 
a commitment case as opposed to multi-level political discussions involving a number 
of stakeholders with oftentimes antagonistic interests. Even though the same 
stakeholders have right to express their views in the market test of commitments, the 
Commission has no obligation to follow them in its commitment decision. Again we 
observe the ease with which the Commission managed to discard arguments against 
market splitting in the market test of SvK’s commitments and point at the facilitating 
role of the commitment procedure in that respect. 
 
The third and last section of chapter 5 concerns EU regulation and its potential impact 
on congestion management policies of Member States. Firstly, we focus on those EU 
provisions relating to congestion shifting, which were in force at the time of the SvK 
case, and which still remains applicable. The EU sector-specific law does not directly 
regulate national congestion management, but only refers to cross-border 
arrangements. However, congestion shifting does fall under EU regulation on account 
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of its cross-border effects. In our view, SvK did not infringe these provisions because 
they allow congestion shifting for exceptional reasons. Given the lack of guidance 
from the Commission, these reasons can be broadly interpreted and used by TSOs to 
justify shifting congestion to the borders. Based on these provisions, the Commission 
would not be able to induce SvK to cease congestion shifting and increase counter-
trading, nor to split Sweden into price zones. The EU law only contains a vague 
requirement on the TSOs to develop more efficient, long-term congestion 
management solutions, and with no reference to any particular method. 
 
The new EU network code on congestion management, to be adopted by the 
Commission in 2013, might bring new restrictions with respect to congestion shifting. 
Hence, we also take a look at its preliminary version put forward by the TSOs in 
September 2012 and discuss potential impact of this code on national systems of 
congestion management. We find that the proposed provisions are going to bring 
some harmonisation of congestion management rules at the regional level, because 
they require the TSOs to take similar actions to relieve congestion. The code also aims 
to improve cross-border capacity calculation, so that it takes account of physical flows 
and is also regionally coordinated.  
 
However, despite the EU attempts to harmonise congestion management rules and 
improve TSOs’ cross-border capacity calculation, congestion shifting can still occur 
and the new regionally coordinated model proposed in the network code leaves some 
scope for that. Ultimately, the decision to shift or not to shift congestion to the border 
remains with each national TSO. At the same time, the network code introduces more 
transparency into national congestion management systems, as it foresees obligations 
on TSOs to report congestion and steps taken to relieve it. Instances of congestion 
shifting will become more observable which should have a deterring effect. Findings 
from these reports may also trigger changes in network topology, leading to more 
efficient congestion management in the future. 
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Chapter 5 concludes that the SvK case is not a ‘clean’ case, both in terms of EU 
competition enforcement as well as EU energy policy. On the one hand, the 
Commission’s focus on market integration and the lack of a robust economic analysis 
leaves mistaken guidance on anticompetitive nature of congestion shifting and its 
classification as abuse under Article 102 TFEU. On the other hand, the Commission’s 
assessment provides incorrect insights for efficient congestion management and does 
not help to develop a sound EU regulatory framework in that respect. However, we 
also show deficiency of political debate and the EU energy legislation to control 
SvK’s congestion shifting or introduce market splitting in Sweden. Against this 
backdrop, the Commission’s intervention under antitrust rules achieved something 
which would have not been achieved only through political or regulatory means, at 
least not in such a short time. At the same time we would like to emphasise that the 
EU competition rules were not applied here in a vacuum, and both the stakeholders’ 
awareness of the need to improve congestion management in Sweden as well as the 
EU attempts to regulate it facilitated the antitrust deal with SvK and the 
implementation of price zones. Similar antitrust actions against TSOs in other 
Member States would be more difficult to launch and are rather unlikely. The SvK 
case is and should remain a one-off intervention and should not replace a 
comprehensive approach towards congestion management, based on harmonisation of 
national systems and effective coordination between TSOs and power exchanges 
under stronger regulatory supervision.  
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2. ENERGY LIBERALISATION: EXCESSIVE PRICING 
ACTIONS DUSTED OFF?246 
 
2.1. ABSTRACT  
 
Whenever a competition authority engages in price regulation, it generates knee-jerk 
criticism from the legal and economic community. For this reason, excessive pricing 
actions, although theoretically possible under the EU competition law, remain the 
forgotten instrument of antitrust enforcement. However, the new antitrust enforcement 
regime created by the 2004 reform allows for an alternative use of excessive pricing 
actions in the energy sector, turning them into an instrument of energy liberalisation 
policy. The new enforcement toolbox (sector inquiries, commitment decisions and 
structural remedies) not only provides a framework for a rather unproblematic use of 
excessive pricing actions in the energy cases, but also assures that their application 
does not revert to regulation of energy prices, running counter to the energy 
liberalisation policy objective. The chapter deals with most commonly expressed 
arguments against excessive pricing actions and shows that they may not hold in view 
of the new enforcement possibilities. 
 
2.2. INTRODUCTION 
 
Direct exploitation of consumers in form of setting excessive prices by a dominant 
firm is prohibited under EU competition law. Literally, “directly or indirectly 
imposing unfair purchase or selling prices” takes the first place on the Article 102 
TFEU list of potential abuses of dominant position.247 In spite of an obvious 
consumers harm caused by unfairly high prices, Article 102 (a) actions against 
                                                           
246 First published in European Competition Law Review 9 (2011). I am grateful to Massimo Motta, Klaus 
Heine, Firat Cengiz and Andrew Gavil for their helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
247 In the following ‘Article 102 (a)’. The wording of the Treaty, emphasising consumers’ exploitation, indeed 
drew some legal scholars’ attention in the early days of the EU antitrust enforcement. A. JONES and B. 
SUFRIN, supra n. 61, pp. 270-272, cite in this respect a former ECJ judge, René Joliet, who back in the 70s 
argued that Article 102 should cover exploitative abuses only. The Commission’s decision practice has never 
reflected these views. 
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exploitative abuses have been so far seldom used by the Commission and are 
generally seen as an instrument of last resort in the competition law toolkit.248 
Excessive pricing actions provoke controversy and have been subject of many debates 
as to their usefulness and impact on the market. This criticism boils down to three 
main arguments: (i) the intervention might be harmful or at least superfluous, (ii) it is 
difficult to measure the price “excess” and (iii) price regulation is beyond the 
competences of a competition authority. These commonly expressed critical views 
may have been the reason for certain reluctance on the side of the Commission to 
embark on this line of action. 
 
However, under the new competition enforcement regime and in the light of the 
Commission’s energy liberalisation agenda, Article 102 (a), this rather inconvenient 
and controversial competition law tool, may turn into an instrument of energy 
liberalisation policy and as such may be (and actually has been) enforced in the energy 
sector in a rather trouble-free way. The new competition enforcement framework has 
been introduced by 2004 reform.249 The then adopted Regulation 1/2003 provides for 
three key enforcement mechanisms: (i) sector inquiries, (ii) commitment decisions and 
(iii) the power to impose structural remedies in antitrust actions, thereby greatly 
extending the Commission’s discretionary powers and enabling the transformation of 
Article 102 (a) into a liberalisation vehicle. As argued in the following paragraphs, 
this new antitrust enforcement toolbox employed in the context of energy 
liberalisation policy disqualifies the commonly expressed reasons for taking a hands-
off approach to overpricing.  
 
                                                           
248 The history of the EU competition enforcement with regard to exploitative abuses boils down to six cases. 
See General Motors Continental (Case IV/28.851) Commission Decision 75/75/EC [1975] OJ L 29/14. 
Chiquita (Case IV/26.699) Commission Decision 76/353/EEC [1976] OJ L 95/1. British Leyland (Case 
IV/30.615) Commission Decision 84/379/EEC [1984] OJ L 207/11. British Post / Deutsche Post (Case 
COMP/36.915) Commission Decision 2001/892/EC [2001] OJ L 331/40. Euromax v. IMAX (Case COMP/C-
2/37.761) Rejection Decision of 25.03.2004. Scandlines Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg (Case 
COMP/A.36.568/D3) Rejection Decision of 23.07.2004.  Sundbusserne v. Port of Helsingborg (Case 
COMP/A.36.570/D3) Rejection Decision of 23.07.2004 (both decisions were adopted with regard to the same 
case - high port charges of the port of Helsingborg). 
249 Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14.  
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Even though this chapter refers to excessive pricing actions in the energy sector only, 
the message it conveys is of a more general nature. The Commission may harness in 
this way any antitrust rules to foster liberalisation in the recently deregulated sectors, 
where introducing competition did not deliver anticipated benefits, due to the presence 
of still very rigid monopolistic structures. The focus here on otherwise uncommonly 
used excessive pricing actions is a deliberate attempt to show that even the most 
problematic and disputed competition law tool, which would hardly ever stand up in 
court once reached for under standard antitrust procedure, can easily be employed in 
the new laxer, more discretionary enforcement framework. The energy sector serves 
here as an example, where this experimental application of antitrust rules in pursue of 
wider liberalisation policy objectives actually takes place. 
 
2.3. THE PARADOX 
 
The activation of antitrust rules in the energy sector was triggered off by high energy 
prices. The steady rise in electricity and gas wholesale prices since 2003 seemed to be 
the most apparent sign that the energy liberalisation process does not produce the 
expected results.250 In particular, the sharp increase in electricity prices in 2005 and 
the subsequent complaints of many energy-intensive industrial consumers induced the 
Commission to launch the energy sector inquiry.251 Price formation on the electricity 
wholesale markets was one of the examined areas.252 The Commission’s inquiry 
confirmed the initial concerns that electricity prices go beyond the competitive levels 
and concluded that there is scope for price manipulation in the electricity wholesale 
markets. The inquiry then prompted a wave of antitrust investigations against the 
major electricity and gas incumbents.253 Most of these investigations were based on 
                                                           
250 According to the provisions of the 2nd Energy Package, full liberalisation of markets for electricity and gas 
has been introduced as from 1 July 2007, see Article 21 of Directive 2003/54/EC, supra n. 73. Article 23 of 
Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26.06.2003 concerning common rules 
for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC [2003] OJ L 176/57.  
251 Energy Sector Inquiry, supra n. 78 and accompanying text. 
252 Final Report, supra n. 78, paras. 368-448. 
253 See Table 2. 
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exclusionary abuses, but some of them involved allegations of exploitation.254 In none 
of these cases, however, price manipulations form a stand-alone basis to open the 
proceedings, which suggest that the Commission still acts cautiously, not to be 
accused of pursuing purely exploitative practices. 
 
Historically, energy prices in Europe were regulated. The objective of liberalisation 
was to abolish the former state-owned vertically integrated structures and to introduce 
competition (also price competition) in these segments which are not natural 
monopolies. And although regulated supply tariffs are still present in many countries 
as a transitory measure, the desired outcome of liberalisation process are freely 
negotiable energy prices.255  
 
In this context, an idea of using excessive pricing actions as a tool of energy market 
liberalisation appears paradoxical in nature. An intervention against excessive prices 
is clearly a form of price control, the very antithesis to the free market objective, and 
as such not only would not encourage market opening but even implies a step 
backwards in the liberalisation process. This paradox, stark at first sight, disappears 
with a more calibrated use of excessive pricing actions. The new laxer enforcement 
framework allows for a wide range of antitrust responses, more discretionary 
fashioning of remedies and their adaptation to goals of energy liberalisation policy. 
 
2.4. INVALIDATING THE CRITICISM 
 
There are three main reasons for a cautious application of Article 102 (a). This section 
deals with them consecutively and shows how the Commission can evade the criticism 
of its actions against exploitative abuses in the energy sector with the help of a 
broader set of enforcement tools. 
                                                           
254 E.g. German electricity wholesale market (Case COMP/39.388). The 3 ongoing investigations in CEZ & 
Others (Case COMP/39.727), French electricity wholesale market (Case COMP/39.442) and Upstream gas 
suppliers in Central and Eastern Europe (Gazprom) (Case COMP/39.816) also involve allegations of price 
manipulation (see MEMO/09/518 of 24.11.2009, MEMO/09/104 of 11.03.2009 and MEMO/11/641 of 
27.09.2011 and IP/12/937 of 04.09.2012). 
255 Final Report, supra n. 78, paras. 610-613. 
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2.4.1. Intervention might be superfluous or even harmful 
 
A common caveat considered in the literature on excessive pricing is that high prices 
invite new entry and the appearance of new competitors brings the prices down to a 
more competitive level. Not only is an antirust intervention superfluous in such cases 
but it also entails a risk of chilling competition in a dynamic perspective, when errors 
in antitrust enforcement lead to false convictions of firms reaping rewards of their past 
investments and innovation.256  
 
This argument, plausible in a market with low entry barriers, does not hold for the 
energy sector. Characterised by high legal (past monopolies) and economic 
(substantial sunk costs) entry barriers, electricity wholesale market is not self-
corrective. Its market features stand to the criteria developed by the economic and 
legal scholars to determine the industries where an excessive pricing action is well-
founded. The proposed tests differ in certain respects, but they all point to a particular 
market structure which disrupts the functioning of market forces in a permanent way. 
The common market features that are mentioned include substantial (near monopoly) 
dominant position257, high barriers to entry (and expansion)258, elements of legal 
monopoly (past or current)259 and the absence of an (effective) sector-regulator.260 
 
                                                           
256 M. MOTTA and A. DE STREEL, ‘Excessive pricing in Competition Law: Never say Never?’ in N. 
STRAND and A. FREDENBERG (eds.), The Pros and Cons of High Prices, Konkurrensverket (Swedish 
Competition Authority), Lenanders Grafiska AB, Stockholm 2007, p.20; D.S. EVANS and A.J. PADILLA, 
‘Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define Administrative Legal Rules’ (2005) 1 Journal of Competition 
Law and Economics 1, 97-122, pp. 113–115. 
257 D.S. EVANS and A.J. PADILLA, supra n. 256. R. O’DONOGHUE and A.J. PADILLA, The Law and 
Economics of Article 82 EC, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006. M. MOTTA and A. DE STREEL, supra n. 256, M. 
VAN DER WOUDE, ‘Unfair and excessive prices in the energy sector’ (2008) 2 European Review of Energy 
Markets 3, available at  http://www.eeinstitute.org/european-review-of-energy-market/erem6-article-van-der-
woude accessed 20.05.2013. 
258 D.S. EVANS and A.J. PADILLA, supra n. 256, R. O’DONOGHUE and A.J. PADILLA, supra n. 257, M. 
MOTTA and A. DE STREEL, supra n. 256, E. PAULIS, ‘Article 82 EC and exploitative conduct’ and L.-H. 
RÖLLER, ‘Exploitative Abuses’ as well as A. FLETCHER and A. JARDINE, ‘Towards an Appropriate Policy 
for Excessive Pricing’ in C.-D. EHLERMANN and M. MARQUIS (eds.), European Competition Annual 2007: 
A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC, Hart Publishing, 2007. 
259 D.S. EVANS and A.J. PADILLA, supra n. 256, L.-H. RÖLLER, supra n. 258, M. MOTTA and A. DE 
STREEL, supra n. 256, F. LÉVÊQUE, ‘Antitrust Enforcement in the Electricity and Gas Industries: Problems 
and Solutions for the EU’ (2006) 19 The Electricity Journal 5, 27-34. 
260 L.-H. RÖLLER, supra n. 258, M. MOTTA and A. DE STREEL, supra n. 256. 
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The Commission’s stance falls in line with the prevalent opinion of the economic and 
legal scholars. According to the Article 102 Guidance Paper, the Commission does not 
exclude the possibility of launching an excessive pricing action, yet underlies its 
extraordinary nature.261 Thus, it may decide to intervene against excessive prices in 
cases, where there are no competitive forces that could alone correct the abusive 
behaviour due to the presence of still very rigid monopolistic structures, for example 
in the energy sector.262 
 
This is not a new approach. It reflects the Commission’s former decision-making 
practice. The almost fifty-years-long enforcement in this area boils down to seven 
formal decisions.263 Six of them involved (past or present) legal monopoly in form of 
concessions264 or intellectual property rights.265  Several other excessive pricing cases 
were heard by the ECJ. Most of them have been referred under Article 267 TFEU for 
a preliminary ruling. Almost all of them involved particular circumstances or legal 
monopoly rights.266 In these premises, an excessive pricing action in the energy sector 
is in line  
 
 
                                                           
261 European Commission, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45, para. 7. 
262 P. LOWE, ‘How different is EU anti-trust? A route map for advisors — An overview of EU competition law 
and policy on commercial practices’, speech at ABA 2003 Fall Meeting, 16.10.2003, Brussels: ‘It is not in our 
power to change the Treaty. And, in my view, we should continue to prosecute such [excessive pricing] 
practices where the abuse is not self-correcting, namely in cases where entry barriers are high or even 
insuperable. It probably makes also sense to apply those provisions in recently liberalised sectors where existing 
dominant positions are not the result of previous superior performance.’ 
263 Supra n. 248. 
264 General Motors, British Leyland, British Post/Deutsche Post, Port of Helsingborg cases. See supra n. 248 for 
case references. 
265 Euromax/IMAX, supra n. 248 for case reference. 
266 Case 24/67, Parke Davis and Co. v. Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm [1968] ECR 55. 
Case 40/70, Sirena, S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l. and others [1971] ECR 69. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon [1971] 
ECR 487. Case 26/75, General Motors v. Commission [1975] ECR 1367. Case 27/76, United Brands v. 
Commission [1978] ECR 207. Case 298/83, CICCE [1985] ECR 1105. Case 30/87, Bodson v. Pompes Funèbres 
des Régions Libérées [1988] ECR 2479. Case 53/87, Renault [1988] ECR 6039. Case 395/87, Tournier 
(SACEM I) [1989] ECR 2521. Cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88, Francois Lucazeau and others v. Sacem and 
others (SACEM II) [1989] ECR 2811. Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed [1989] ECR 803. For a comprehensive 
overview of these cases see M. MOTTA and A. DE STREEL, ‘Excessive Pricing and Price Squeeze under EU 
Law’ in C.-D. EHLERMANN and I. ATANASIU (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an 
Abuse of a Dominant Position?, Hart Publishing, 2006. See also M. VAN DER WOUDE, supra n. 257. 
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2.4.2. Assessment problems  
 
Another drawback of Article 102 (a) enforcement lies in measuring the price “excess”. 
All methods used to assess the costs and profit margins involve complex calculations 
and require a thoroughgoing knowledge of the sector at issue. None of them is 
sufficiently accurate, yet simple enough, to provide a one-size-fits-all solution easily 
applied in all excessive pricing cases on a stand-alone basis.267  A competition 
authority is considered ill-equipped to carry out such a costly and time-consuming 
exercise in each individual case.268  
 
Two new enforcement tools may help the Commission to dodge the difficult question 
how high is “too high” in an excessive pricing case, namely (i) sector inquiry and (ii) 
commitment decisions.  
 
2.4.2.1. Sector inquiry opens the case… 
 
The 2004 antitrust reform enables the Commission to open sector-wide inquiries into 
these industries, in which competition appears not to work properly.269 Sector inquiry 
is a proactive fact-finding exercise allowing the Commission to gather necessary 
information on the problems of the sector in order to launch further antitrust 
investigations in individual cases. The legal basis of a sector inquiry expressly refers 
to the follow-up company-specific antitrust investigations. Pursuant to Article 17 of 
Regulation 1/2003, during the sector inquiry the Commission collects evidence ‘to 
give effect to Article [101] and [102] of the Treaty’.270 To that end, the Article vests in 
the Commission the same investigative powers it enjoys in the individual Article 101 
and 102 proceedings.271  
                                                           
267 In the same vein E. PIJNACKER HORDIJK, ‘Excessive Pricing Under EC Competition Law: An Update in 
the Light of “Dutch Developments”’ in B. HAWK (ed.), 2001 Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2002, pp. 
476–477, 495. D.S. EVANS and A.J. PADILLA, supra n. 256, pp. 100-103. M. MOTTA and A. DE STREEL, 
supra n. 256, p. 18. M. VAN DER WOUDE, supra n. 257, p. 7. 
268 M. MOTTA and A. DE STREEL, supra n. 256, p. 19. 
269 Sector inquiry is not a novel instrument in the EU competition enforcement. Supra n. 77. 
270 Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
271 Articles 18, 19, 20 and 22, read in conjunction with Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
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In these premises, it came as no surprise that the energy sector inquiry triggered off 
further company-specific antitrust investigations, also with regard to overpricing. 
From the very start the Commission was rather plain-spoken about its plans,272 
encouraged by its enforcement experience in the aftermath of the telecommunications 
sector inquiry. 273 Article 102 (a) proved to be an effective deterrent on telecoms 
operators when the Commission opened investigations into their pricing strategies. 
Motta and de Streel (2006) point out a number of excessive pricing cases in the 
telecoms sector which, instead of resulting in formal decisions, were closed following 
price decreases.274 According to Lévêque (2006)275 the function of Article 102 (a) in 
these cases was to increase the power of sector inquiry which in turn exerted a 
disciplining pressure on the telecoms operators. Similarly, in the light of problems 
with the third energy liberalisation package and strong political resistance to proposed 
reforms276, the Commission might have hoped to bypass the legislative process and 
achieve its policy objectives quicker, through the back door of antitrust enforcement, 
by direct negotiations with the energy incumbents.  
 
The energy sector inquiry found high price mark-ups in electricity wholesale markets. 
It thus delivered sufficient evidence to launch excessive pricing actions against the 
energy incumbents. However, one can cast doubt whether the collected information is 
robust enough to stand up in court in individual cases. The Commission’s prohibition 
decision in United Brands, the only case which did not involve any government-
                                                           
272 European Commission, Report on Competition Policy, 2005, para. 41: ‘The objective [of the inquiry] is to 
identify whether infringements of Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC are responsible for the apparent malfunctioning of 
the electricity and gas markets, in which case the Commission could undertake proactive corrective action. 
Based on the facts collected in the inquiry and consequent priorities for enforcement, the Competition DG will 
take up cases under Articles 81, 82 or 86 EC as soon as they emerge.’ 
273 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/telecommunications/archive/index.html accessed 20.05.2013. 
274 M. MOTTA and A. DE STREEL, supra n. 266, pp. 105-108. See also E. PIJNACKER HORDIJK, supra n. 
267, pp. 472-474, on settlements in telecommunications and air transport sector. 
275 F. LÉVÊQUE, supra n. 259, p. 33. 
276 Due to strong opposition of eight Member States (Germany and France, later joined by Austria, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Luxemburg, Latvia and Slovakia) to the introduction of ownership unbundling of energy production and 
distribution assets, the political compromise on the final shape of the 3rd Energy Liberalisation Package reached 
in summer 2009 was far less ambitious than the Commission expected: ownership unbundling is optional; the 
companies are allowed to opt for two less radical unbundling models, one of which has been proposed by the 
eight ‘blocking’ countries. See MEMO 09/622 of 22.04.2009 and press release 
http://www.euractiv.com/energy/eu-strikes-deal-energy-market-li-news-221555 accessed 20.05.2013. 
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granted exclusive rights, was quashed on appeal.277 According to the ECJ, the 
Commission failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of alleged excessive pricing.278 
The annulment of the United Brands decision, the flag Article 102 (a) case, surely had 
a bearing on the Commission’s subsequent enforcement of unfair pricing provisions, 
which since then were applied only in the legal monopoly context.279 Similarly, all 
three excessive pricing energy cases based on the sector inquiry results involve 
allegations of exclusionary conduct on the top of exploitation. Shifting the legal basis 
away from problematic ‘section (a)’ concerns may be a deliberate attempt of the 
Commission, simply not to run the risk of having its decisions overturned on appeal 
on the grounds that, as happened in the United Brands case, it failed to demonstrate 
sufficient evidence of abusive behaviour. In an individual antitrust investigation the 
Commission would have to go beyond the findings of the energy sector inquiry and 
provide evidence of strategic pricing behaviour of a specific generator against whom 
the case is brought.  
 
Some assessment problems might arise already at the stage of finding dominance. 
Particularly, oligopolistic structures (e.g. German electricity wholesale market) 
provide a difficult setting for abuse of dominance cases. In such cases, where market 
shares of the players do not exceed 30%, to be able at all to invoke Article 102, the 
Commission finds several generators jointly dominant.280 However, the concept of 
collective dominance may substantially complicate the assessment of the abuse, as the 
Commission needs to take account of collusive environment. Even if the Commission 
ventures into a more complex analysis of oligopolistic interaction, it still does not 
mean that the Courts will appreciate the effort. A simple theory of harm presented in a 
readily comprehensible manner may often be much more convincing in court than 
sophisticated game-theoretic models of collusion which do not provide 
straightforward answers. This might be also the reason why the Commission in its 
                                                           
277 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207. 
278 Ibid., para. 267. 
279 Only two cases concerned pure exploitation, namely excessive port fees. Both of them were rejected by the 
Commission. For a case study, see M. LAMALLE, L. LINDSTRÖM-ROSSI and A. CARLOS TEIXEIRA, 
‘Two important rejection decisions on excessive pricing in the port sector’ (2004) 3 Competition Policy 
Newsletter, Autumn Issue, 40-43. 
280 E.g. German electricity wholesale market (Case COMP/39.388). 
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decisions usually relies on crude market share calculation instead of using electricity 
specific indices (Residual Supply Index, Pivotal Supplier Indicator) to measure market 
power in the electricity wholesale markets, even if the former are widely considered 
inadequate for that purpose. Market shares can solely give a first proxy (negative test) 
of potential market power in generation markets and, what economic literature 
suggests should be accompanied by further electricity specific indices.281 These 
however, taking account of the specific features of the electricity generation, indicate 
price setters for each specific period of time. This specific market power, which is not 
constant over time, might not stand up to the traditional proof of dominance standard 
required by the Courts. 
 
The same limitations apply to the finding of an exploitative abuse. It is true that the 
legal framework developed by the Court allows the Commission for a high degree of 
arbitrariness in estimation of the price excess. According to the United Brands 
judgment, which sets the standards for the assessment of unfair pricing, the price is 
excessive when ‘it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product’.282 
The ECJ further proposes to apply the price-cost benchmark to measure the profit 
margin and thereby resulting price excess. Yet this method is in no way definitive and 
the Court eventually gives free rein as to the mode of practice in determining the price 
excess. In fact, a range of measuring techniques has been developed since the United 
Brands case.283 They all however involve complex sector-specific calculations and 
even if they exist in the economic literature, they may not be accepted by the Court in 
a specific case. 
 
                                                           
281 D. HARBORD and N. FABRA, Market Power in Electricity Markets: Do Electricity Markets Require 
Special Regulatory Rules?, Market Analysis Ltd, 2000, p. 66. D. PEREKHODSTEV, L.B. LAVE and S. 
BLUMSACK, ‘The Model of Pivotal Oligopoly Applied to Electricity Markets’ (2002) mimeo, Carnegie-
Mellon Electricity Industry Center, Working Paper CEIC 02-06, p. 14. F. WOLAK, ‘Diagnosing the California 
Energy Crisis’ (2003) 16 The Electricity Journal 7, August/September Issue, 11-35, p. 15. D. BIGGAR, 
‘Competition Issues in the Electricity Sector - Background Note’ (2005) 6 OECD Journal of Competition Law 
and Policy 4, 97-162, pp. 109–112. G. FEDERICO and X. VIVES (with collaboration of N. FABRA), 
Competition and Regulation in the Spanish Gas and Electricity Markets, Reports of the Public-Private Sector 
Research Centre 1, IESE Business School, University of Navarra, 2008, p. 12. 
282 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, para. 250. 
283 For an overview of the methods applied in excessive pricing cases see M. MOTTA and A. DE STREEL, 
supra n. 266. 
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2.4.2.2. …and commitment decision closes it… 
 
Application of a simplified procedure that, for one thing, does not require a high 
standard of proof, and for the other thing, diminishes the risk of appeal, can overcome 
the assessment difficulties with respect to finding of excessive pricing. This is 
achieved by a commitment decision.  
 
Article 9 of the EC Regulation 1/2003 provides for ‘formalised settlements’ of 
antitrust investigations, in which the commitments offered by the undertakings are 
made binding upon them in the so called commitment decision issued by the 
Commission.284 Prior to the entry into force of the EC Regulation 1/2003, the 
Commission settled sparse cases of abuse of dominant position in the energy markets 
in a similar way, only informally, when the undertakings offered sufficient 
commitments that met its anticompetitive concerns.285 However, these informal 
antitrust settlements were not enforceable. The 2004 reform formalised them thereby 
creating an attractive alternative to standard infringement proceedings under Article 7 
of the EC Regulation 1/2003.286 Commitment decision, unlike Article 7 decision, does 
not oblige the Commission to find an infringement, but solely to state that in the light 
of the offered commitments there are no longer grounds for further investigation.287 
This means that in the commitment procedure the Commission neither proves a 
dominant position nor an abuse. Instead, it expresses its anti-competitive concerns in a 
document called preliminary assessment, shorter and less detailed than a statement of 
objections prepared for the purposes of Article 7 decisions.288 Hence, the lowered 
standard of proof in commitment procedure would not require any further findings of 
excessive pricing abuse beyond those already established in the energy sector inquiry. 
 
                                                           
284 Supra, section 1.2.1. 
285 E.g. Marathon/Ruhrgas/GDF et alia (Case COMP/36.246), IP/04/573 of 30.04.2004, and Natural 
Gas/Endesa (Case COMP/37.542), IP/00/297 of 27.03.2000 (this case concerned also Article 101 abuses). Even 
now, despite the possibility of closing cases by commitment decisions, some cases are still settled informally. 
See, for instance, IP/04/1314 of 06.10.2004, IP/05/195 of 17.09.2005, IP/05/710 of 10.06.2005 (energy sector), 
IP/05/1033 of 03.08.2005, IP/06/139 of 09.12.2006, IP/08/22 of 09.01.2008. See also supra n. 55. 
286 Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
287 Recital 13 of of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
288 Article 27 (1) of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
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In addition to that, commitment procedure minimises the risk of appeal. Commitment 
decisions are formal decisions of the Commission and as such can be challenged 
before the European Courts, either by the undertaking concerned or by interested third 
parties. In practice, such an appeal is highly unlikely. Commitment decisions are 
convenient not only for the Commission, in terms of procedural efficiency, but also 
for the undertakings (e.g. avoiding fines, saving reputation costs of not being accused 
of infringement, resolving uncertainty about the outcome of the case and the legal 
duties, reducing the risk of the follow-on private damages actions before national 
courts).289 An undertaking prefers to offer even substantial commitments just to avoid 
further antitrust proceedings. It is thus hard to imagine that it would want to challenge 
the outcome of a voluntarily entered agreement.290 In the now six-year-long history of 
enforcement under Regulation 1/2003 two of the Commssion’s commitment decisions 
have been challenged, and not by the undertakings offering commitments but by third 
parties. Only one of them has been reviewed by the Courts291 and eventually upheld 
by the ECJ’s much-anticipated judgment in the Alrosa case, concerning the 
proportionality of commitments.292 In 2007 the General Court quashed the 
Commission’s decision in Alrosa/de Beers group case on the grounds that, among 
others, the accepted commitments were disproportionate to the alleged abuse. The 
Commission appealed to the ECJ which ultimately upheld its decision. Thereby, the 
Court acknowledged the Commission’s wide discretionary powers under Article 9, 
rendering an eventual third party appeal even less likely to succeed. This risk is 
further minimised by the market test phase, whereby the Commission publishes the 
proposed commitments and interested third parties have minimum one month to give 
their observations. The Commission can take third parties’ comments into 
consideration293 (but is not required to follow them) and ask the undertaking 
concerned to modify its commitments accordingly before finally approving them.294 
 
                                                           
289 See discussion, supra section 1.2.1.1. 
290 However, see supra n. 21 and 201.  
291 Two appeals in the REPSOL case have been rejected on procedural grounds, supra n. 21. 
292 Case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949. Supra n. 237 for a brief description of the case 
and the appeal. 
293 However, the Commission is not required to follow them. Supra section 1.5.2.2.  
294 See Article 27 (4) of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
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2.4.3. Price regulation 
 
Finally, the third generally accepted argument justifying a hands-off approach to 
overcharging is that price regulation goes beyond the competences of a competition 
authority.295 Indeed, in all excessive pricing cases the Commission ordered to bring 
the infringement to an end and imposed a fine, sometimes accompanied by less 
onerous behavioural remedies (e.g. periodical reporting requirement).296 Such 
measures seem to be designed to address the symptoms of an anti-competitive setting 
(high prices) but they do not eliminate the causes (anti-competitive market structure). 
In addition, behavioural remedies are usually very costly to implement as they boil 
down to constant monitoring of the firm’s pricing behaviour. Burdensome both for the 
undertaking and for the Commission they eventually amount to price regulation.  
 
2.4.3.1. …with a structural solution. 
 
The risk of price regulation through antitrust enforcement does not arise if the 
Commission takes account of a broader spectrum of antitrust responses under the new 
regulatory framework. The EC Regulation 1/2003 gives the Commission power to 
impose ‘any remedy, whether behavioural or structural, which is necessary to bring 
the infringement effectively to an end, having regard to the principle of 
proportionality.’297 As a rule, behavioural remedies are preferred in antitrust cases, 
since they are considered less intrusive in comparison to structural remedies.298 
However the specifics of the deregulated energy sector justify the use of structural 
remedies. To bring about changes in the market structure, the Commission clearly 
favours structural remedies in energy antitrust actions, whereas fines and behavioural 
                                                           
295 E. PIJNACKER HORDIJK, supra n. 267, with regard to the excessive pricing actions taken by the Dutch 
competition authority, NMa. 
296 See e.g. Chiquita, supra n. 248, Article 3 and 4 of the Commission decision. 
297 Recital 12 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
298 Recital 12 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14: ‘Structural remedies should only be imposed either where there 
is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more 
burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. Changes to the structure of an 
undertaking as it existed before the infringement was committed would only be proportionate where there is a 
substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement that derives from the very structure of the undertaking.’ 
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remedies are considered ill-suited to achieve the liberalisation goal.299 Thus, this is the 
energy liberalisation policy that assures excessive pricing actions will not amount to 
price regulation. In the current enforcement regime the Commission may reach out for 
excessive pricing actions and fine-tune them according to its policy targets, ultimately 
intervening in the market structure instead of controlling firms’ pricing practices. Not 
only does the legal framework allow for a structural response to excessive pricing. 
The ECJ Alrosa judgement clearly supports the Commission’s energy market 
liberalisation zeal. The Court recognised that the commitments provide a rapid 
solution resolving competition problems and the Commission should actually enjoy a 
wide margin of discretion with regard to the shape of the commitment package. 
Hence, if the Commission opts for a structural intervention as a remedy for 
overpricing, it is likely that the Courts do not object, not to trench upon the 
Commission’s discretion. 
 
2.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter points out a possibility to employ excessive pricing actions in the energy 
markets. Article 102 (a) was initially designed to protect the consumers from unfairly 
high prices, however, due to conceptual and practical problems, hardly ever served its 
purpose. There exist valid reasons for the Commission’s reluctance towards pursuing 
exploitative abuses. However, the 2004 antitrust reform significantly relaxed the 
enforcement standards and granted the Commission new discretionary powers. Under 
the new regime the Commission can and actually does use Article 102 (a) to achieve 
its liberalisation policy goals with respect to the energy sector. To start with, the 
findings of the sector inquiry point at excessive pricing in the energy sector which is 
sufficient to open company-specific antitrust investigations. Secondly, the new 
commitment procedure with a low standard of proof and a reduced risk of appeal 
ensures that an excessive pricing case can be closed a timely manner, with no 
additional costs of finding an exploitative abuse and eventual follow-up court 
proceedings. Finally, the new power to accept structural commitments in antitrust 
                                                           
299 N. KROES, supra n. 85.  
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actions allows for a smarter design of an antitrust response. The Commission can opt 
for a structural solution which fits well with its energy liberalisation plans and does 
not entail the risk of price regulation.  
 
In addition, the Alrosa judgment provides a twofold underpinning for an eventual use 
of excessive pricing actions as an instrument of energy liberalisation policy. First, it 
further discourages the interested parties from lodging an appeal against a 
commitment decision. Second, it confirms the Commission’s discretionary powers to 
negotiate and accept structural commitments as a remedy for purely exploitative 
abuses. 
 
High energy prices activated antitrust enforcement in the energy markets. Excessive 
pricing actions are a natural antitrust response but not as a direct intervention in the 
pricing strategies of energy incumbents but rather as a vehicle for introducing 
structural changes in the energy sector. Provided that the enhanced antitrust 
interventions on the market structure lead to more competitive market setting, the 
allegedly excessive prices should go down to a (more) competitive level. This would 
ultimately solve a problem which excessive pricing actions were originally meant to 
address. However, things are not that simple in the real world and an ex-ante 
assessment of the effectiveness of the accepted structural commitments, taking 
account of the long and short-term efficiency trade-offs, further blurred by non-
economic goals common in the energy sector, can be a highly complex exercise.300 
The Commission, in spite of having all the necessary tools and the Courts’ go-ahead 
to correct energy markets through antirust actions, might nevertheless fail to do so due 
to a sub-optimal shape of the commitment package or errors in their implementation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
300 L. HANCHER and A. DE HAUTECLOCQUE, ‘Manufacturing the EU Energy Markets: The Current 
Dynamics of Regulatory Practice’ (2010) 11 Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 3, 307-334, pp. 
326-328, analyse the difficulties of the assessment of the impact of antitrust remedies in the case of VVPs.  
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3. ENERGY LIBERALISATION IN AN ANTITRUST 
STRAITJACKET: A PLANT TOO FAR?301 
 
3.1. ABSTRACT  
 
The European Commission has launched a number of antitrust investigations against 
the major energy incumbents in the aftermath of the energy sector inquiry. Most of 
them have already been closed under Article 9 of the EC Regulation 1/2003 and the 
undertakings offered far-reaching, sometimes structural, commitments.This chapter 
studies the 2008 investigation into price manipulation in the German electricity 
wholesale market. In spite of no convincing evidence and flaws in the assessment, the 
Commission was able to negotiate from E.ON substantial capacity divestments. 
 
The Commission is straightforward about using antitrust rules to open up energy 
markets. Sector inquiries, commitment procedure, and structural remedies allow for a 
quick intervention and flexible problem-solving and bring about decisive changes in 
the energy market setting. However, harnessing antitrust for the purpose of energy 
liberalisation policy has an adverse impact on competition enforcement itself. First, it 
leads to a number of ‘weak’ cases, based on far-fetched arguments. Second, it results 
in remedies that are not tailored to the abuse at issue but are in line with a wider 
objective of energy market liberalisation and, as an outcome of negotiations, further 
swayed by the firm’s own interest in the ultimate shape of the commitment package. 
 
3.2. INTRODUCTION 
 
A wave of antitrust investigations has shaken the European energy sector in the recent 
years.302 In spite of being formally liberalised in 2007, energy markets remained in 
                                                           
301 First published in World Competition: Law and Economics Review 34, 3 (2011). Many thanks are due to 
Massimo Motta, Klaus Heine, Natalia Fabra, Jan Bouckaert, Pierre Larouche, Firat Cengiz, Bert Willems, Niels 
Philipsen, Killian Kehoe, and the participants of the seminars at Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), 
Tilburg University, and Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics (RILE), Erasmus University Rotterdam, for 
their insightful comments and discussions.The views expressed and all remaining errors are that of the author. 
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fact closed to competition.303 To get a better insight into the problem, the Commission 
opened a sector-wide inquiry which confirmed the concerns and identified several 
areas where competition issues are likely to arise.304 The sector inquiry was then 
followed by a number of individual antitrust investigations targeting energy 
incumbents in several Member States. Ten out of fifteen cases have already been 
closed and in eight of them companies offered far-reaching, sometimes structural, 
commitments, ushering in a new pattern of antitrust enforcement. In the light of the 
slow-paced energy liberalisation process this no-nonsense go-ahead application of 
competition rules comes as no surprise. Energy market reforms face strong 
governmental opposition in several countries,305 and this lack of political will holds up 
market opening via regulatory measures.306 The Commission may hope to achieve the 
same effects by reaching antitrust deals with energy incumbents, bypassing at the 
same time the difficult legislative process. 
 
Liberalisation and competition policy pursue effectively coinciding goals with respect 
to the European energy markets. Liberalisation removes monopolies and exclusive 
rights and fosters competitive forces up to a point where they, alone, can exercise 
disciplining pressure on the market players. 307 Competition policy ensures that these 
competitive forces are not disrupted, impacting either on the market structure or the 
firms’ conduct. Hence, competition policy plays crucial role in the liberalisation 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
302 Supra Table 2.  
303 N. KROES, supra n. 85. Full liberalisation of markets for electricity and gas has been introduced as from 
01.07.2007, see Article 21 of Directive 2003/54/EC, supra n. 73. Article 23 of Directive 2003/55/EC, supra n. 
250. 
304 Energy Sector Inquiry, supra n. 78. The underlying methodology and the outcomes of the inquiry are set out 
in the DG Competition report on energy sector inquiry (Final Report). The sector inquiry assessment is 
supported by an in-depth quantitative analysis of six European electricity markets (incl. Germany) carried out by 
external consultants at the request of the Commission. For the results see London Economics, Structure and 
performance of six wholesale electricity markets in 2003, 2004 and 2005, Study for the European Commission, 
DG Competition, February 2007 (LE Study) and Final Report, paras. 997-1020, for the summary.  
305 Germany and France, later joined by Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Luxemburg, Latvia and Slovakia formed a 
strong opposition towards the Commission’s proposal of ownership unbundling of energy production and 
distribution assets. 
306 Due to resistance of eight ‘blocking’ countries, the political compromise on the final shape of the 3rd Energy 
Package reached in 2009 was far less ambitious than initially expected: ownership unbundling is not mandatory; 
the companies are allowed to opt for two less radical unbundling models, one of which has been supported by 
the eight ‘blocking’ countries. See IP/09/622 of 22.04.2009. 
307 M. ARMSTRONG and D. SAPPINGTON, ‘Regulation, Competition, and Liberalisation’ (2006) 44 Journal 
of Economic Literature, 325-366, p. 359.  
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process. Seen from this angle, it seems there is nothing wrong in harnessing antitrust 
rules to accomplish the objective of energy liberalisation. Further, the 2004 reform 
introduced changes to antitrust enforcement substantially facilitating the application of 
antitrust rules in the energy sector. First of all, the new Regulation 1/2003 empowered 
the Commission to launch sector inquiries in markets where competition appears to be 
restricted or distorted.308 Secondly, Article 9 provided for a relatively simple and 
quick procedure for closing antitrust cases, where the remedy package is negotiated 
between the Commission and the investigated undertaking (the commitment 
procedure).309 Finally, pursuant to Article 7 and Recital 12, the Commission can 
impose structural remedies in antitrust cases.310 Hence, under the new antitrust 
enforcement regime, the Commission is well-equipped to intervene in the energy 
sector and negotiate structural solutions directly with the energy incumbents. 
 
Even though the idea of using antitrust policy to foster energy market liberalisation 
appears sound from a teleological and legal point of view, its application may raise 
concerns. The new pattern of antitrust enforcement marked by a widespread use of 
commitment procedure and increased intervention on the market structure has two 
serious implications.  
 
First, the Commission may come up with a number of serious anticompetitive 
allegations, simply in order to increase its bargaining power and negotiate far-reaching 
commitments. At the same time, Article 9 allows the Commission to close antitrust 
investigations with no finding of an infringement, significantly lowering the standard 
of proof. Since neither the dominant position, nor the abuse requires further evidence, 
the Commission’s preliminary concerns are not further investigated rendering the 
assessment far more perfunctory that it would be under a standard infringement 
procedure. Article 9 cases may be thus ‘weak’ cases, based on far-fetched allegations. 
 
                                                           
308 Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
309 Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
310 Article 7 and Recital 12 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
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Second, the commitments, often extensive structural measures, are not designed to 
address the antitrust concerns but are rather an outcome of negotiations and horse-
trading between, on the one hand, the Commission, concerned with the slow pace of 
the energy liberalisation process and, on the other hand, the firm, possibly having its 
own interest in the ultimate shape of the commitment package, which is not always 
obvious to observers.  
 
To illustrate these arguments, the following sections take a closer look at the E.ON 
case – an 2008 investigation under Article 102 TFEU mainly into price manipulation 
on the German wholesale electricity market.311 In this case, in spite of no convincing 
evidence and a questionable theory of harm, the Commission negotiated with E.ON 
far-reaching structural commitments.312 The commitments, requiring E.ON to sell 
20% of its generation capacity and hence substantially diminishing its market share, 
altered the structure of the German electricity wholesale market, yet did not 
necessarily address the concerns with respect to  E.ON’s abusive behaviour. 
 
This case study provides a twofold underpinning for the arguments of this chapter, 
which are based on insights provided by economic theory. First, it emphasises the 
weak points in the Commission’s cursory analysis of E.ON’s alleged anticompetitive 
behaviour. Second, it demonstrates that the commitments accepted in this case are not 
tailored to address the Commission’s concerns with regard to the alleged price 
manipulation. Instead, they are designed to accomplish wider policy objectives of 
energy market liberalisation and, on the top of that, they are swayed by E.ON’s own 
strategic interests. 
 
 
                                                           
311 German electricity wholesale market (Case COMP/39.388). 
312 The analysis of the E.ON case presented in this chapter is based on the publicly accessible case documents. 
However, one cannot exclude that the Commission might have been in possession of a ‘smoking gun’ evidence 
that induced E.ON to offer substantial commitments just to avoid a high fine in an alternative scenario under the 
Article 7 infringement procedure. Whatever was E.ON’s motivation to engage in Article 9 negotiations with the 
Commission, it is irrelevant for the hereby presented argumentation and can be left out of the scope of the paper. 
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3.3. FAR-FETCHED CONCERNS 
 
The commitment procedure provides for a quick and efficient closing of antitrust 
cases. Instead of launching a standard infringement procedure under Article 7 of the 
EC Regulation 1/2003 the Commission may close an antitrust case on the basis of a 
preliminary assessment and with no need to find an infringement of competition rules. 
Hence, in case of an (alleged) abuse of a dominant position, neither a dominant 
position nor an abuse needs to be demonstrated. Instead, pursuant to Article 9, if an 
undertaking offers commitments addressing the anticompetitive concerns expressed in 
the preliminary assessment, the Commission may issue a decision that makes those 
commitments binding on the undertaking. Such a commitment decision closes the 
case, stating that there are no longer grounds for the Commission to take action. 
 
The efficiency gains of the commitment procedure come at a cost however, given that 
no in-depth analysis of the case takes place. The fact that no infringement decision is 
made allows the Commission to focus its resources on the negotiations and their 
outcome whereas its preliminary anticompetitive concerns do not undergo any in-
depth economic analysis. The lack of this ‘reality check’ combined with the 
Commission’s fervour to open up the energy markets entails a risk of far-fetched 
competition assessment. Namely, in order to increase its bargaining power and to 
negotiate extensive commitments in line with its liberalisation plans, the Commission 
may deliberately extend the scope of the anticompetitive concerns in the preliminary 
assessment. Since commitments are supposed to meet the Commission’s concerns, the 
more substantial these concerns are, the more radical commitments the Commission 
may expect from the undertaking. This would not be possible under a standard 
infringement procedure, where any alleged abuse of a dominant position must be 
eventually found. The commitment procedure, enabling such easy proliferation of 
anticompetitive concerns which are not subsequently verified or further analysed, 
promotes ‘weak’, unconvincing cases. The E.ON case provides a good example to 
demonstrate that under Article 9 anticompetitive concerns may be stretched beyond 
their proper limits. 
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The German electricity wholesale market is broadly divided between four large 
electricity suppliers: E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW. In 2007 the Commission 
launched an antitrust investigation into this market on the basis that E.ON may have 
abused its dominant position for the most part by price manipulation through strategic 
capacity withholding.313 In that respect the preliminary assessment refers to the 
general findings of the energy sector inquiry.314 According to them, the German 
electricity wholesale prices include noticeable mark-ups over and above the 
competitive benchmark.315 Strategic withholding of capacity may be one of the 
reasons for high electricity prices.316 ‘Load factor’ calculations for German plants 
demonstrated significant discrepancies between the load factors of plants having 
similar marginal costs below the market price level, indicating that some plants did 
not operate at their full nameplate capacity at times when they were supposed to.317 
However, there might be several other plausible explanations for a lower capacity 
factor, i.e. equipment failure, routine maintenance, minimum operational and standstill 
times, cogeneration, emissions quota used up, transmission constraints limiting the 
economic dispatch or provision of control and reserve capacity. Further, whether a 
given generator is actually willing and able to behave strategically and reduce its 
capacity to manipulate the market price depends on many factors, like the size and 
structure of the market, technology mix employed, demand level, eventual capacity 
and transmission constraints, the amount of capacity covered by bilateral contracts and 
market architecture.318  
                                                           
313 See Annex to chapter 3, infra section 3.6. The case involves also deterrence of investment in generation by 
third parties. 
314 Final Report, supra n. 78, para. 427 and p. 150, Conclusions. 
315 LE Study, supra n. 304, Executive summary, p. 17. 
316 Final Report, supra n. 78, paras. 428-448. Suppliers can influence electricity prices in two ways, either by 
reducing output below  the competitive, price-taking level (physical withholding) or by raising the price above 
the marginal cost (economic or financial withholding). S. STOFT, Power System Economics: Designing 
Markets for Electricity, IEEE Press/Wiley Interscience, New York 2002, p. 454 (Glossary); D. KIRSCHEN and 
G. STRBAC, Fundamentals of Power System Economics, Wiley & Sons, Chichester (UK) 2004, p. 40. 
317 The term ‘load factor’ is somewhat misleading, since in the electrical engineering it represents the ratio 
between the average load and peak load (see e.g. S. STOFT, supra n. 316, p. 13). What is actually calculated 
here applies to the supply side and is the ratio between the actual generation of a plant over a period of time and 
its output if it had operated at its full nameplate capacity for the time considered. For details see Final Report, 
supra n. 78, paras. 439-446 and LE Study, supra n. 304, pp. 389-394. 
318 Based on the unilateral profit maximization logic of a withholding generator by P. JOSKOW and E. KAHN, 
‘A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California’s Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 
2000: The Final Word’ (2002) 23 The Energy Journal 4, 1-35. See infra section 3.6, n. 379 and accompanying 
text. 
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3.3.1. Dominance 
 
Article 102 TFEU deals with abuses of market power by dominant firms. 
Accordingly, in the first step the Commission focuses on E.ON’s alleged dominant 
position on the German electricity wholesale market. Already at this initial stage the 
Commission’s assessment raises questions. 
 
First, the analytical techniques used by the Commission for the assessment of 
dominant position are based solely on traditional concentration indices, despite the 
fact that these are widely considered inadequate for measuring market power in 
generation markets. Market shares can only give a first proxy (negative test) of 
potential market power in electricity wholesale markets and must be accompanied by 
further electricity specific indices.319 According to structural market concentration 
indices, E.ON in fact owned at that time a moderate (in the context of the energy 
sector) share in the German electricity wholesale market, holding 20-30% of 
generated capacity between 2002 and 2006.320  
 
Second, and because the calculation of E.ON’s market share did not point to a 
dominant position321, the Commission used a concept of collective dominance to be 
able at all to invoke Article 102 as the legal basis of the charge. Instead of using 
electricity specific indices to measure E.ON’s market power, which would have 
prolonged the investigation, the Commission preferred instead to state that ‘the 
German wholesale electricity market is collectively dominated by the three operators 
E.ON, RWE and Vattenfall Europe within the meaning of Article 82 [ Article 102 
                                                           
319 D. HARBORD and N. FABRA, supra n. 281, p. 66. D. PEREKHODSTEV, L.B. LAVE and S. 
BLUMSACK, supra n. 281, p. 14. F. WOLAK, supra n. 281, p. 15. D. BIGGAR, supra n. 281, pp. 109-112. B. 
WILLEMS and E. DE CORTE, ‘Market power mitigation by regulating contract portfolio risk’ (2008) Energy 
Policy 36, 3787-3796, p. 3788. G. FEDERICO, X. VIVES (with collaboration of N. FABRA), supra n. 281, p. 
12. 
320 See Commission Decision of 26.11.2008 in case German electricity wholesale market (Case COMP/39.388), 
Table 1 at p. 5. The accurate market share could not be disclosed due to confientiality requirements. 
321 The crucial range for establishing dominance is 40-50%: A. JONES and B. SUFRIN, supra n. 61, p. 399. 
Taking into consideration E.ON’s strong competitors (RWE: 20-30%; Vattenfall: 10-20%) it would be 
extremely difficult for the Commission to find E.ON individually dominant in this market. 
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TFEU ] of the Treaty.’322 The concept of joint (or collective) dominance has been 
developed by the European Courts to allow Article 102 application to abusive 
practices in an oligopolistic setting. According to the settled case law, economically 
independent firms may be found collectively dominant if they are ‘sufficiently linked 
between themselves to adopt the same line of action on the market’.323 Thus the 
Commission referred to the characteristics of the German wholesale electricity market 
(which involved high concentration, high entry barriers, a homogeneous product and 
transparency) and the existence of structural links between the generators (network of 
supply agreements) to justify the finding of collective dominance. When combined, 
the market share of the three firms stood at 67% (and at 77% in the German market 
for base-load generation only, namely, hydro, nuclear and lignite).324  
 
It is true that the characteristics of the electricity wholesale markets and the repetitive 
interaction of the generators makes these markets prone to collusive outcomes.325 The 
Commission was clearly right to take account of this possibility. However, 
particularly for that reason, it should have used other techniques to measure market 
power than simple market share calculation. Evidence of market power on the basis of 
electricity specific indices (PSI, RSI)326 which would indicate actual price-setters, 
would be particularly adequate to support any theory of collusion. It could even lead 
to finding each of the major generators individually dominant.327 
                                                           
322 Commission Decision, supra n. 320, p. 4. 
323 Case C-393/92, Almelo [1994] ECR I-1477, para. 42 (concerning the electricity market). Joined cases T-
191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v. Commission [2003] ECR II-3275, 
para. 595. For the overview of collective dominance cases see A. JONES and B. SUFRIN, supra n. 61, pp. 827-
841. 
324 Commission Decision, supra n. 320, Table 1 and para. 15, p. 5. 
325 D. NEWBERY, ‘Electricity Liberalisation in Britain: the Quest for a Satisfactory Wholesale Market Design’ 
(2005) The Energy Journal 26, Special Issue, 43-70, p. 57. B. WILLEMS and E. DE CORTE, supra n. 319, p. 
3787 (at note 3). G. FEDERICO, X. VIVES (with collaboration of N. FABRA), supra n. 281, p. 10. 
326 Supra n. 234. 
327 The German Competition Authority (Bundeskartellamt) came to such a conclusion in 2011 when presenting 
results from its own energy inquiry into the German electricity generation and wholesale markets, launched as a 
follow-up to the E.ON case. It found that at least three (and in 2007 even four) major German electricity 
generators were held dominant individually (and not collectively). The Bundeskartellamt carried out the so-
called pivotality analysis, based on RSI. The calculation showed that the electricity from the three major 
generators (E.ON, RWE and Vattenfall) was necessary to meet demand in a significant number of hours during 
the period analysed (2007-2008) and from four generators (also EnBW) in year 2007 only. See 
Bundeskartellamt, Sectoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung Stromgrosshandel Bericht gemäß § 32e Abs. 3 GWB 
(Sector Inquiry into Electricity Generation and Wholesale Markets, Report in accordance with Section 32e (3) 
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Last but not least, the Commission’s argumentation lacked coherence. After having 
quoted all the findings of the preliminary assessment with regard to the joint dominant 
position of all three generators, the Commission raised doubt as to whether Vattenfall 
could belong to the collectively dominant group, due to structural and cost differences 
reported in the market test, and the decisional practice of the German courts. This 
question was left open, since ‘under both alternatives E.ON would be considered part 
of the collective dominant position’.328 Yet throughout the decision only one 
alternative was considered, that is the joint dominance of the three generators. The 
Commission disregarded the fact that exclusion of one big player from the group 
changes the dynamics of the oligopolistic interaction. If the asymmetries between 
Vattenfall and the two remaining operators were indeed so apparent that it could not 
be part of the collectively dominant group, E.ON and RWE might not have pursued 
any common policy at all, either because it was less attractive in the first place or the 
collusion was unsustainable.  
 
Establishing collective dominance is often a very demanding exercise involving the 
application of models of oligopoly interaction. Considering that the commitment 
procedure does not require any infringement to be found, finding of dominance is also 
not necessary. For that reason, a simple market share calculation supported by the 
Commission’s arguments on the existence of collective dominance was sufficient to 
adopt a commitment decision in the E.ON case. 
 
3.3.2. Abuse 
 
Further inconsistencies emerge in the Commission’s assessment of the abuse. The 
logic behind a profitable capacity withdrawal suggests that it is a unilateral exercise of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of the German Act against Restraints of Competition – ARC, in German), 01.2011, pp. 96-114. Executive 
Summary available in English at  
www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/2011-05-05_SU_Strom_Executive_Summary_EN_final-
2.pdf accessed 20.05.2013. See also a recent survey made by U. SCHOLZ and S. PURPS, supra n. 225, p. 82. 
328 Commission Decision, supra n. 320, paras. 23-24. 
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market power, and that it not require collusion among generators.329 This does not 
mean, however, that several generators could not collude and reduce their capacities in 
concert in order to make one of them pivotal. As a result of strategic output reduction 
of its competitors, a pivotal generator may explore capacity constraints and bid above 
its marginal costs with no risk of being excluded from the dispatch. The higher 
market-clearing price would benefit all colluding generators.330  
 
Even though the Commission found E.ON, RWE (and potentially Vattenfall) jointly 
dominant in the German electricity wholesale market, it still argued that only E.ON 
pursued the strategy of capacity withdrawal. According to the settled case law, the 
concept of joint dominance does not require the undertakings to exercise market 
power collectively. It may well be a unilateral abuse as long as it is committed to 
protect the joint dominant position.331 However, according to the Commission’s 
finding in the preliminary assessment, E.ON, RWE (and potentially Vattenfall) could 
have pursued a common policy to raise prices given the structural links on production 
and the high degree of transparency allowing the operators to detect and counter 
possible deviations.332 To quote the Commission, ‘in terms of production, if an 
undertaking carrying out a withdrawal of capacity identifies that another one is 
increasing its production, given transparency the first undertaking could immediately 
react by doing the same. In terms of prices, the undertakings can immediately react to 
price offers on OTC markets and wage a price war’. This suggests that withdrawal 
appertained to the common policy adopted by the two (or potentially three) operators 
and should not be assessed as a unilateral exercise of market power. However, for the 
purposes of the commitment decision, the Commission did not have to go beyond the 
concerns expressed in the preliminary assessment. They in turn echoed the results of 
the sector inquiry and depicted E.ON’s capacity withdrawal as a unilateral profit 
                                                           
329 See Annex to chapter 3, infra section 3.6. P. JOSKOW and E. KAHN, supra n. 318, consider a case where 
only one generator withdraws capacity whereas all the other generators submit bids equal their marginal costs. 
The authors show that the rational capacity withdrawal is a unilateral exercise of market power and does not 
require collusion among generators.  
330 G.S. CRAWFORD, J. CRESPO and H. TAUCHEN, ‘Bidding Asymmetries in Multi-Unit Auctions: 
Implications of Bid Function Equilibria in the British Spot Market for Electricity’ (2007) 25 International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 6, 1233-1268, p. 1258, at note 48. 
331 Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar plc v. Commission [1999] ECR II-2969, para. 66.  
332 Commission Decision, supra n. 320, para. 20. 
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maximising strategy of a dominant generator.333 Hence, the only valid argument for 
the adoption of a common policy to raise prices by two (or potentially three) 
generators remains the advantage they take from the price increase. However, the 
price increase brings a windfall profit for all the generators in the market and as such 
cannot constitute a stand-alone ground for developing a theory of coordination with 
respect to the two (or potentially three) of them. 
 
Lastly, the very design of the European Energy Exchange (EEX)334 is such that the 
market players – even if they wanted to manipulate the market price – would not do it 
by limiting their output, but rather by excessive bids. The generators do not submit 
plant-specific bids. Plants are chosen only after the market clears. An energy regulator 
or competition authority cannot really observe whether the bids reflect the production 
costs of the chosen plant. Hence, a market-savvy generator would simply submit a 
higher bid to raise the market clearing price rather than trying to manipulate 
outages.335  The general conclusions of the energy sector are thus far from conclusive 
and need to be further investigated on a case-by-case basis.336 This however is not 
required in a commitment procedure.  
 
The E.ON case does not deal only with price/capacity manipulation. According to the 
Commission’s findings, E.ON abused its (collective) dominant position on the 
German electricity wholesale market through ‘withholding of capacity and deterrence 
of investment in generation by third parties’.337 The latter element of the charge points 
at an exclusionary strategy that only complements the exploitative behaviour and as 
such seems to be of secondary relevance. The Commission does not elaborate on this 
                                                           
333 Ibid., paras. 27-40. 
334 Germany’s energy exchange with seat in Leipzig. 
335 Thanks are due to Bert Willems for his insightful comments. 
336 Interestingly, in the German energy sector inquiry of 2011, supra n. 327, the Bundeskartellamt examined the 
actual power plant operation management of all the major electricity producers in 2007 and 2008 and found no 
evidence of abusive capacity withholding. According to the Bundeskartellamt, p. 19 (Executive Summary), 
‘abusive practices of this kind are extremely difficult to prove. To do so would require extensive data on the 
operations of each of the 340 electricity generating units over lengthy periods as well as the opportunity to more 
effectively check these company data and information on marginal costs, which are subject to frequent variation 
and include a large number of individual cost items. Also, the fact that the undertakings do not offer power plant 
capacity individually from each particular generating unit, but on the basis of complex stochastic optimisation 
from a pool of generating units also poses particular challenges.’  
337 Ibid., para. 1. 
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abuse in its decision. It takes solely four short paragraphs to explain that the short-
term capacity withdrawal might be complemented by ‘a medium and long-term 
strategy of deterring actual or potential competitors from entering the generation 
market and thereby limiting the market volume in electricity generation’.338 The 
exclusion consists of long-term electricity supply contracts and offering new 
competitors a participation in an E.ON power plant. According to the findings of the 
Commission, the deterrence of investments enabled E.ON to maintain the excessive 
price achieved by output reduction. 
 
Again, the Commission’s concerns with respect to E.ON’s exclusionary abuse build 
upon the findings of the sector inquiry. According to that, long-term power purchase 
agreements (PPAs) might reduce liquidity of the wholesale electricity markets, 
depending on the nature of such contracts.339 The Commission studies this effect in 
nine Member States, yet for some reason this analysis has not been done for 
Germany.340 This raises doubts as to the validity of the charge and suggests a 
deliberate attempt of the Commission to extend the scope of concerns to include the 
allegations of exclusionary nature. First of all, by multiplying its concerns in the 
preliminary assessment, the Commission may hope for far-reaching commitments.341 
Secondly, an exclusionary abuse shifts the legal basis to section (b) of Article 102 and 
in this way the Commission avoids criticism of pursuing purely exploitative ‘section 
(a)’ abuses.  
 
One more remark must be made with respect to the link between the exploitative and 
exclusionary abuses which the Commission listed in the E.ON case. According to the 
Commission, E.ON’s long-term supply contracts complemented the output limiting 
strategy, as they effectively reduced the liquidity of the German electricity wholesale 
                                                           
338 Ibid., paras. 41-44. 
339 The question is whether they are purely domestic, or import / export contracts. Domestic contracts and export 
contracts indeed reduce volumes of electricity traded on the wholesale market. Long-term import contracts, on 
the contrary, increase the liquidity of the domestic market. See also D. BIGGAR, supra n. 281, p. 115. 
340 Final Report, supra n. 78, paras. 467-473 and Figure 57 at p. 158. 
341 For example, as later explained (infra section 3.4.1), the Commission’s concerns with regard to foreclosure 
effects of E.ON’s long-term PPAs might justify the choice of structural remedies instead of simply accepting 
less onerous behavioural forward contract commitments.  
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market and enabled E.ON to maintain the higher price resulting from capacity 
withdrawal. It is true that the long-term electricity supply agreements dry out spot 
markets. However, at the same time, by limiting the volume that contributes to the 
price formation process, they actually mitigate the potential pricing abuse on these 
markets.342 If a big share of E.ON’s capacity is tied up by contracts (excluded from 
the electricity pool) its incentive and ability to reduce output in order to manipulate 
the price decreases, since less volume is traded in the pool and the higher price 
accounts only for the uncontracted capacities. Once the gain from the price increase 
does not offset E.ON’s output reduction, the strategic capacity withdrawal ceases to be 
profitable. The Commission did not mention in the decision the volume of E.ON’s 
generation sold under fixed-price supply contracts. Paradoxically, supporting the case 
with alleged foreclosure effects of long-term supply contracts, the Commission 
undermined the theory of a profitable capacity withdrawal. Since the decision was 
adopted under Article 9, further explanation of the Commission’s concerns in that 
regard was not required. 
 
3.4. FAR-REACHING REMEDIES 
 
The negotiated character of the commitment procedure entails an inherent risk of 
accepting commitments disproportionate or even unrelated to the (alleged) abuse they 
are supposed to eliminate in the first place. The remedies imposed by the Commission 
in an Article 7 infringement decision343, either behavioural or structural, must be 
‘proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement 
effectively to an end.’ Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, unlike Article 7, does not refer 
                                                           
342 P. JOSKOW and E. KAHN, supra n. 318, p. 24. S. BORENSTEIN, J. BUSHNELL and F. WOLAK, 
‘Measuring market inefficiencies in California’s restructured wholesale electricity market’ (2002) 92 American 
Economic Review 5, 1376-1405. D. NEWBERY, supra n. 325, p. 48. D. BIGGAR, supra n. 281, pp. 144-145. E. 
ARMINGTON, E. EMCH and K. HEYER, ‘The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2005–
2006’ (2006) 29 Review of Industrial Organization 4, 305-326, p. 320. F. WOLAK and S. MCRAE, ‘Merger 
Analysis in the Restructured Electricity Supply Industries: The Proposed PSEG and Exelon Merger’ in J. 
KWOKA and L. WHITE (eds.) The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition and Policy, OUP, Oxford 
2008, available online at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/POWER-08/Files/3a.pdf accessed 20.05.2013, pp. 16-18 
(online version). See also M.A. DE FRUTOS and N. FABRA, ‘How to Allocate Forward Contracts. The case of 
electricity markets’ (2009) Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Paper, for an analysis of pro-competitive 
allocation of forward contracts. 
343 Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
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expressly to proportionality. As a fundamental principle of EU law, however, the 
principle of proportionality applies to all measures adopted by the European 
institutions, including Article 9 commitments.344 Hence, as in the case with all EU 
measures, Article 9 commitments ‘must not exceed what is appropriate and necessary 
for attaining the objective pursued.’345 Evidently, the legal framework of the EC 
Regulation 1/2003 grants the Commission much more leeway as to the shape of 
accepted commitments than it enjoys when designing remedies in its infringement 
decisions. The proportionality test formulated in Article 7 demonstrates a clear direct 
link between the infringement (e.g. an abuse of dominant position through strategic 
capacity withholding) and the remedy imposed. The Commission can impose only 
such remedies which contribute to bringing the infringement to an end (abuse-remedy 
match). In contrast, an Article 9 application allows for an abuse-remedy mismatch. 
The principle of proportionality does not require the commitments to match the abuse 
but rather to be consistent with the objective pursued by the measure in question 
(resulting in an objective-remedy match). The wording of Article 9 provides further 
information as to the objective of commitments; they are offered by the undertakings 
‘to meet the concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary 
assessment.’ It is true that the concerns of the Commission expressed in the 
preliminary assessment do refer to the alleged abuse. However, these concerns can 
well be of a more general nature, for example referring to the lack of competition in 
the market or to several possible abuses. After all, the Commission’s assessment is, by 
its very nature, preliminary. Furthermore, it might well be case that the Commission 
adopts its preliminary assessment after having discussed the commitment package 
with the undertaking concerned.346 This would allow the Commission to extract 
                                                           
344 Recital 12 of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
345 Case 265/87, Schräder [1989] ECR 2237, para. 21; Case T-260/94, Air Inter v. Commission [1997] ECR II-
997, para. 144; case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission [2003] ECR II-4653, para. 201 [emphasis 
added].  
346 This happened in, for instance, the Coca-Cola case (Case COMP/39.116) where preliminary assessment was 
adopted after the Commission already ‘informally’ accepted a draft version of commitments. As soon as the 
preliminary assessment was released, Coca-Cola formally submitted the commitment package after merely four 
days. See supra n. 187 and accompanying text. Similarly, this period was suspiciously short in the GDF case 
(Case COMP/39.316) – two days, and in the E.ON gas foreclosure case (Case COMP/39.317) – two weeks 
(including Christmas break), which allows assuming that a draft version of commitments was negotiated with 
the Commission well in advance. In other cases, where the Commission released Preliminary Assessment (and 
not Statement of Objections), it took the undertakings one month on average to submit their commitments 
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excessive commitments in the bilateral negotiations and then formulate its 
anticompetitive concerns ex post, so that they correspond to the already negotiated 
draft version of commitments. 
 
The conclusion is that the legal framework grants the Commission more latitude when 
accepting commitments under Article 9 than when imposing remedies under Article 7. 
The link between the abuse and remedy in Article 7 decisions is straightforward and 
leaves no discretion for the Commission in the assessment of proportionality of the 
remedies imposed. On the other hand, the principle of proportionality applied to 
commitments under Article 9 makes an indirect link between the (alleged) abuse and 
the commitments and allows the Commission, by extending the scope of concerns, to 
pursue wider liberalisation goals through antitrust actions in individual cases (see 
Figure  3). 
 
Figure  3. The concept of proportionality under Article 7 and Article 9 of EC 
Regulation 1/2003 – comparison.  
 
Source: own illustration. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(German electricity wholesale market (Case COMP/39.388), German electricity balancing market (Case 
COMP/39.389) Swedish Interconnectors (Case COMP/39.351), RWE gas foreclosure (Case COMP/39.402), 
IBM (Case COMP/39.692), Cannes Agreement (Case COMP/36.681). 
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A more elastic concept of proportionality under Article 9 makes procedural sense. 
First of all, commitment cases, free of unnecessary red tape, are supposed to offer an 
attractive alternative to lengthy procedures under Article 7. In this respect requiring 
the Commission to carry out an extensive investigation into the proportionality of the 
offered commitments would run contrary to the very spirit and purpose of Article 9. 
Secondly, a commitment package is an outcome of negotiations, not a unilateral 
measure imposed by the Commission. Engaging into negotiations with the 
Commission and offering the commitments (voluntarily), the firm implicitly agrees on 
their final shape. Its active role in Article 9 proceedings means there is a questionable 
role for the principle of proportionality. In any event, a strict proportionality test under 
Article 9 would substantially complicate the negotiations, as the firms may often have 
their own (not always case-related) strategic interest in offering certain commitments 
in antitrust deals. In these cases, imposing a strict proportionality requirement on 
commitments would make Article 9 considerably less attractive for the firms. 
 
In spite of what the wording of the EC Regulation suggests, until very recently it was 
not clear whether there should be a difference in the application of the proportionality 
test to the remedies imposed in Article 7 cases and the application of the principle of 
proportionality to the commitments accepted under Article 9. Until recently, the 
Commission lacked supporting case law to provide precedent in commitment cases. 
However, in June 2010 the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) took a clear and 
conclusive stance on that matter, setting aside the General Court’s (the EGC) 
judgment in the Alrosa case.347 The ECJ recognised that the commitments provide a 
more rapid solution resolving competition problems than the remedies imposed under 
Article 7 and hence their assessment in the light of the proportionality rule differs 
                                                           
347 The question of proportionality of commitments emerges into the limelight in the context of the Alrosa saga. 
In 2007 the EGC quashed the Commission’s decision in the Alrosa/De Beers case, one of the two commitment 
decisions eventually on appeal, on the grounds that the accepted commitments were disproportionate to the 
alleged infringement. The EGC made clear that the proportionality test applied to the commitments does not 
differ from the assessment of remedies imposed in an infringement decision. The case was long time pending 
before the ECJ. The Advocate General’s Opinion issued in September 2009 proposed to set aside the EGC 
judgment. AG Kokott argued that the Commission should be granted ‘the same margin of assessment in the 
context of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 which it enjoys, according to case-law, in connection with the 
assessment of commitments in merger control’ (Opinion of AG Kokott, supra n. 238, para. 72). Finally, in June 
2010, the ECJ followed the AG’s Opinion and overruled the EGC judgment. See supra n. 237 for case 
references. 
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from the proportionality test applied in the infringement procedure. According to the 
Court, ‘[Article 9] does not require the Commission to make a finding of an 
infringement, its task being confined to examining, and possibly accepting, the 
commitments […] in the light of the problems identified by it in its preliminary 
assessment and having regard to the aims pursued. Application of the principle of 
proportionality by the Commission in the context of Article 9 […] is confined to 
verifying that the commitments in question address the concerns it expressed to the 
undertakings concerned and that they have not offered less onerous commitments that 
also address those concerns adequately.’348 By acknowledging this, the ECJ clearly 
gave the Commission a judicial ‘green light’ to implement the energy liberalisation 
policy through commitment cases.  
 
The E.ON investigation provides an interesting case study to find out whether the 
Commission takes advantage of a greater margin of assessment left to it under Article 
9 and negotiates commitments that are not designed to fit the abusive behaviour but 
are supposed to achieve wider policy objectives. In the light of the German 
government’s opposition towards the 3rd energy liberalisation package, especially in 
the context of ownership unbundling, one might speculate that the Commission will 
try to negotiate structural commitments from a German energy incumbent, having a 
clear energy liberalisation objective in mind. And indeed, to address the 
Commission’s concerns E.ON offered to sell off about one-fifth of its generation 
capacity.349 The attempt of this section is to examine, in a two-step proportionality 
test, whether the divestiture imposed in the E.ON case matched the alleged abuse 
(strategic capacity withdrawal) or not. A negative outcome of this test (abuse-remedy 
mismatch) would mean that the commitment procedure allows the Commission to 
accept remedies which it could not otherwise impose in an Article 7 infringement 
decision.  
 
                                                           
348 C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949, paras. 40-41. Emphasis added. 
349 European Commission, Report on Competition Policy, 2008, p. 50. Press Release IP/08/1774 of 26.11.2008. 
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3.4.1. Step 1: alternative behavioural commitments? 
 
According to the principle of proportionality, the Commission should not require 
divestment in circumstances in which a less onerous but equally effective behavioural 
remedy is available.350 Obviously, controlling E.ON’s bids and constant monitoring of 
its power plants to prevent eventual capacity withdrawal would be indeed burdensome 
both for the Commission and for the operator.351 Even though monitoring remedies 
are easily reversible, once sloppily implemented, they would remain ineffective. By 
contrast, forward contract commitments might effectively reduce E.ON’s incentives 
and the ability to use its capacities strategically. E.ON could offer to sell a sufficient 
amount of its generation under fixed-price contracts so that further capacity reduction 
in the pool would cease to be a profitable strategy to manipulate the market-clearing 
price.352 Such a remedy however would run contrary to the Commission’s concerns of 
exclusionary nature, as it would further decrease the volume of electricity traded in the 
pool. For the same reason capacity divestment commitments, i.e. virtual power plants 
(VPPs), could not be considered an effective remedy in the E.ON’s case where one of 
the alleged abuses lies in strategic deterrence of investment in generation, in particular 
by offering new entrants to participate in E.ON’s power plants. It is not clear whether 
a ‘virtual’ divestment is equally effective in terms of mitigating market power in the 
pool to a ‘physical’ one. However, it is clear that it will deter rather than foster 
investments in generation (at least in the short run).353 Therefore, it might not address 
the alleged exclusionary abuse. For this reason only it would not constitute an equally 
effective behavioural remedy to the divestiture of assets.354 It appears that by 
                                                           
350 Supra n. 345. 
351 The legal test in Article 7 suggests that the Commission cannot impose a structural remedy just because an 
equally effective behavioural remedy is more burdensome (in monetary terms but not only) for the Commission 
to implement. Recourse to structural remedies is only justified if an equally effective behavioural remedy is 
more burdensome for the undertaking at issue. In the same line A. TAJANA, ‘Structural Remedies and Abuse of 
Dominant Position’ (2005) Tilburg University, TILEC Discussion Paper DP 2005-033, p. 12.  
352 Supra n. 342 and accompanying text.  
353 They may, however, stimulate investments in generation indirectly (in the long term, as a part of the 
Commission’s two-stage strategy). See L. HANCHER and A. DE HAUTECLOCQUE, supra n. 300, p. 327. 
354 There are few economic studies attempting to measure the effectiveness of VPPs. F. BOISSELEAU and P. 
GIESBERTZ, ‘Assessing Regulatory Measures in Electricity Markets: The Case of VPP in the Netherlands’ 
(2006) 29th IAEE International Conference, 7.06-10.06 Potsdam, study the impact of VPPs on competition and 
liquidity in the Dutch electricity market. G. FEDERICO and A.L. LÓPEZ, ‘Divesting Power’ (2009) Public-
Private Sector Research Centre, IESE Business School – University of Navarra, Working Paper 812, study 
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extending the scope of its concerns to exclusionary abuses, the Commission precludes 
any potentially equally effective behavioural remedies, and justifies recourse to a 
structural solution. Accordingly, it states in its decision that there exists no equally 
effective behavioural remedy to an asset divestment to address its concerns for the 
German electricity wholesale market. Further, it argues that ‘a substantial risk of a 
lasting or repeated infringement by the alleged withholding of capacity […] derives 
from the very structure of the undertaking’ and that ‘withholding was possible due to 
the nature of E.ON’s electricity generation portfolio’.355 Clearly, these lines reflect the 
Commission’s plans to restructure the energy industry according to its liberalisation 
agenda. 
 
Assuming that a structural solution is justified in the light of the Commission’s 
preliminary assessment, that is, no equally effective behavioural remedy is available 
in the present case, it is still to be asked whether there is a less onerous but equally 
effective structural measure that would address the Commission’s anticompetitive 
concerns. 
 
3.4.2. Step 2: appropriate and necessary structural commitments? 
 
The following paragraphs take a closer look at E.ON’s generation portfolio and the 
selection of divested power plants in terms of fuel and technology. 
 
Table 3 below presents E.ON’s total generation capacity in the German wholesale 
electricity market short before the divestiture. The calculated percentage shows which 
technologies play a major part in E.ON’s generation portfolio.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
alternative market power mitigating measures and argue that an optimal divestiture of assets can be significantly 
more pro-competitive than the sale of capacities. According to their results, Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) can be 
at best as effective in bringing the prices down as divestiture of baseload generation of the same size, whereas 
divesting high-cost generation would mitigate market power more effectively. 
355 Commission Decision, supra n. 320, paras. 81-82. 
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Table 3. E.ON’s generation capacity by sources – Germany, 2007. 
ENERGY SOURCE  C
S
 (MW) C
S
/TC (%) 
hydro (incl. pump storage)* 3153 12% 
nuclear 8548 33% 
lignite coal 1314 5% 
hard coal 7466 28% 
gas 4219 16% 
oil 1145 4% 
others (wind, biomass et al.) 406 2% 
TOTAL CAPACITY 26251 100% 
CS – capacity by source 
TC – total capacity 
* Pumped storage hydroelectric power plants provide peak load power.  
 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of data from E.ON, Strategy and Key Figures, 2008, pp. 39-42. 
 
The first three technologies (hydro356, nuclear, lignite) represent E.ON’s base-load 
generation. Together they account for half of E.ON’s total capacity. Hard coal, the 
next cheapest fuel source along E.ON’s merit-order curve, amounts to 28% of its 
generation. The smallest, but still not negligible share of E.ON’s production covers 
peak demand (especially gas and oil – 20%). Thus, E.ON’s generation portfolio 
reflects a cross-section of technologies covering all demand levels with a substantial 
share of low-cost generation, nuclear in particular. According to the Commission’s 
preliminary assessment, E.ON had both the ‘incentive’ to withdraw capacity (because 
it had a substantial number of low-cost power plants) and the ‘availability’ to 
implement this strategy (because it had a number of higher-cost plants in the middle of 
the merit-order curve).357 Due to the lack of information on E.ON’s contract coverage, 
this analysis assumes that E.ON’s total capacity is traded in the electricity pool in 
which case E.ON’s incentive (and ability) for unilateral capacity withdrawal is the 
biggest (see  section 3.3.2). 
 
It ought to be examined whether the structural remedy imposed in the E.ON’s case 
was designed to address the alleged abuses. To this end, Table 4 lists the divested 
                                                           
356 E.ON’s hydroelectric business consists of conventional power plants (mostly run-of-river) providing constant 
supply of electricity and pumped-storage peak-load power plants. Due to the lack of data, this calculation does 
not differentiate between hydro base-load and hydro peak-load generation.  
357 Commission Decision, supra n. 320, paras. 40 and 82. 
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assets by fuel sources. The calculated percentage demonstrates what share of each 
technology has been divested.  
 
Table 4. E.ON’s divested capacity by sources – November 2008. 
DIVESTED ENERGY SOURCE CD
S
 (MW) CD
S
/C
S
 (%) 
hydro (run-of-river)  359,3 11% 
nuclear 1500 17% 
lignite coal 604,5 46% 
hard coal 1744,6 23% 
gas 491 11% 
oil 0   
hydro (pump-storage) 347 11% 
others (wind, biomass et al.) 0   
TOTAL CAPACITY DIVESTED 5046 19% 
CDS - capacity divested by source 
CS - capacity by source (see Table 3) 
 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of the Commission Decision, supra n. 320, Annex ‘Commitments to the 
European Commission’ (Schedule 1 and 3) and E.ON, Strategy and Key Figures, 2008, pp. 39-42. 
 
E.ON offered to divest a big share of its base-load generation. These divestitures 
include hydroelectric run-of-river power plants (approx. one-tenth of its total hydro 
generation358), nuclear (also nearly one-fifth) and lignite (almost half of its brown coal 
generation).359 Moreover, E.ON offered additional divestitures further up the merit 
order: disposal of 20% of its coal-based generation, one gas-fired power plant (approx. 
one-tenth of E.ON’s gas-fuelled business) and two pump-storage hydro power plants. 
The offered commitments prompt two general observations. First, the divestiture 
reduced E.ON’s capacity in absolute terms (by 20%). Second, it did not change its 
portfolio structure. Following the divestiture, the shares of the technology sources in 
E.ON’s total generation remained virtually unchanged. To demonstrate this,  
 
Table 5 reflects E.ON’s generation structure post-divestiture and juxtaposes it with its 
pre-divestiture production.  
 
                                                           
358 Incl. pump-storage, supra n. 356. In reality, divestiture of run-of-river plants accounted for a higher share of 
E.ON’s hydro base-load generation. 
359 However it must be borne in mind that the biggest share in E.ON’s base-load generation goes to nuclear 
technology, whereas lignite-fired power plants account only for 5% of E.ON’s total generation capacity.  
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Table 5. E.ON’s generation portfolio post- versus pre-divestiture. 
POST-DIVESTITURE PRE-DIVESTITURE 
ENERGY SOURCE  
C
S
 (MW) C
S
/TC (%) C
S
/TC (%) 
hydro (incl. pump storage)* 2446,7 12% 12% 
nuclear 7048 33% 33% 
lignite coal 709,5 3% 5% 
hard coal 5721,4 27% 28% 
gas 3728 18% 16% 
oil 1145 5% 4% 
others (wind, biomass et al.) 406 2% 2% 
TOTAL CAPACITY 21204,6 100% 100% 
CS – capacity by source  
TC – total capacity 
* Pumped storage hydroelectric power plants provide peak load power.  
 
 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of the Commission Decision, supra n. 320, Annex ‘Commitments to the 
European Commission’ (Schedule 1 and 3) and E.ON, Strategy and Key Figures, 2008, pp. 39-42. 
 
3.4.3. Commitments and exploitative concerns 
 
It has been discussed above that the profitability of capacity withholding to drive up 
prices depends on many factors.360 It appears from the reasoning in the E.ON decision 
that the Commission attached the greatest importance to the size and the structure of 
the generation portfolio, claiming that it created both the incentive and the possibility 
for E.ON to pursue the abusive strategy.361 The accepted divestiture indeed scaled the 
generator’s production portfolio down in terms of figures, but did not change its 
structure. In fact, each technology owned by E.ON accounts for the same proportion 
of its total production as it did pre-divestiture. 
 
Economic literature provides some guidelines as to the remedy design addressing the 
exercise of market power in electricity wholesale markets. To start with, it is widely 
accepted in the literature that the ownership of marginal generation confers greater 
market power than the ownership of base-load plants, even though both types of assets 
contribute to the presence of market power.362  
                                                           
360 Supra n. 318 and accompanying text. For a more detailed discussion, see infra section 3.6 (Annex). 
361 Commission Decision, supra n. 320, paras. 82 and 84. 
362 D. NEWBERY, supra n. 325, p. 68. D. BIGGAR, supra n. 281, pp. 116-117. M. ARELLANO and P. 
SERRA, ‘A model of market power in electricity industries subject to peak load pricing’ (2007) 35 Energy 
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It is in fact highly profitable to withhold capacities at periods of high demand (Figure  
4, blue braces). The merit order curve gets very steep, so even a small amount of 
capacities withheld results in a substantial price increase. At the time of low demand, 
on the contrary, a generator would have to create a serious outage to trigger off any 
price increase at all.  
Figure  4. Merit order curve for Germany, 2008. 
 
Source: S. VON ROON and M. HUCK, Merit Order des Kraftwerkparks, Forschungsstelle für 
Energiewirtschaft e. V., München 2010, p. 3 (Abbildung 3: Merit Order für das Jahr 2008, Kraftwerksausfälle 
berücksichtigt). Blue braces added. 
 
In line with this argument, some recent economic studies suggest that divestiture of 
high-cost (marginal) assets is more effective in mitigating market power than the 
divestment of base-load generation. Crawford, Crespo and Tauchen (2007) used the 
Bid Function Equilibria (BFE) approach to model the British electricity wholesale 
market. According to their results, divestiture of higher-cost generation was more 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Policy 10, 5130-5135. G. FEDERICO, X. VIVES (with collaboration of N. FABRA), supra n. 281, p. 13. G. 
FEDERICO and A.L. LÓPEZ, supra n. 354, p. 4. A. BANAL ESTAÑOL and A. RUPÉREZ MICOLA, 
‘Composition of Electricity Generation Portfolios, Pivotal Dynamics, and Market Prices’ (2009) 55 
Management Science 11, 1813-1831. 
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effective in bringing the prices down than divestiture of base-load generation.363 
Wolak and McRae (2008) came to the same conclusion when discussing the remedies 
imposed in a U.S. merger case between Exelon and PSEG (2005/06).364 The US 
DoJ365 ordered divestiture of assets with the lowest opportunity cost of withholding 
them from the market, that is, with marginal costs close to the market-clearing price. 
DoJ argued in this case that the remedy would effectively reduce the incentives of the 
merging firms to manipulate electricity wholesale prices. No divestiture of the parties’ 
numerous nuclear assets was required, since withholding them would be too costly. 
Wolak and McRae welcomed the remedy package in the Exelon/PSEG case and 
reasoned that the divestiture of high-cost generation, affecting the shape of the 
marginal cost function (rendering it flatter), diminished the incentives to exercise 
market power more effectively than selling off base-load plants.366 More recently, the 
paper by Federico and López (2009) produced similar results. The authors found that 
for sufficiently large divestments, a divestment of higher-cost capacity367 can be 
several times more effective in bringing the prices down than a divestment of base-
load generation of the same size. More specifically applicable to the E.ON case is a 
model of capacity withholding equilibrium designed by Lave and Perekhodtsev (2001) 
and applied to the California electricity market. According to their model, an eventual 
                                                           
363 G.S. CRAWFORD, J. CRESPO and H. TAUCHEN, supra n. 330, pp. 1257-1258: ‘This difference in results 
highlights the importance of the location of divested capacity in marginal cost order for the consequences of 
divestiture: when intermediate load generation is divested there is less inframarginal capacity and the foregone 
markup from pricing out units is higher. When base load is divested, there is less inframarginal capacity over 
which markups can accrue, but the forgone revenues from pricing out intermediate units remains little changed.’ 
364 United States v. Exelon Corporation and Public Services Enterprise Group, Inc. Wolak assisted the US DoJ 
in the competitive assessment of this merger. See also E. ARMINGTON, E. EMCH and K. HEYER, supra n. 
342, pp. 320-322, for a description of remedies. 
365 Supra n. 163 
366 F. WOLAK and S. MCRAE, supra n. 342, pp. 28-30. The authors use the residual demand analysis 
framework to study the impact of different technologies on wholesale prices. They demonstrate that the shape of 
the marginal cost curve of a generator affects its incentives to exercise unilateral market power.  
367 G. FEDERICO and A.L. LÓPEZ, supra n. 354, argue that an optimal divestment (resulting in the greatest 
price reduction) includes plants that become marginal post-divestment, that is, whose range of costs 
encompasses the post-divestment competitive price (implying that some but not all of the divested capacity 
produces in post-divestment equilibrium). Extending their model, in 2010 the authors used the data from the 
Italian electricity wholesale market to design a single divestment package capable of reducing market power 
across multiply demand levels; see G. FEDERICO and A.L. LÓPEZ, ‘Selecting Effective Divestments in 
Electricity Generation Markets’ (2011) 21 European Transactions on Electrical Power 6, 1914-1922 (first 
published online in 2010 as Working Paper 845, Public-Private Sector Research Centre, IESE Business School 
– University of Navarra). 
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divestiture of gas-fired price-setting generation might reduce withholding 
incentives.368                                                                                                                                             
 
The insights from the economic literature on the electricity markets suggest that a 
targeted divestiture reduces prices more effectively than an across-the-board 
divestiture. Disposal of high-cost generation flattens the individual merit order curve 
of a portfolio generator and thus reduces its incentive to use its assets strategically. It 
does not mean, however, that the remedy imposed on E.ON was not pro-competitive. 
In the electricity wholesale market, these are the assets with similar marginal costs 
that exercise competitive constraint at a given demand level. This competitive 
pressure is gone, once the assets belong to one and the same generator. Thus, it can 
raise the price with no risk of being undercut by competitors’ generation. A pivotal 
generator does not even have to strategically reduce its output to be able to raise the 
price. If, however, the assets with similar marginal costs belong to competing 
generators, the submitted bids are lower reflecting the attempts of the generators to 
undercut each other. In other words, E.ON’s across-the-board divestiture does 
mitigate market power in the German wholesale electricity market, as it assures that 
E.ON faces competition at each demand level, reducing its pivotalness.369 It does not, 
however, address the alleged strategy of unilateral capacity withdrawal directly, the 
risk of which the Commission wanted to eliminate in the first place.  
 
The Commission reaffirmed in its decision that ‘the commitments shall address 
specific concerns of an abuse expressed in the preliminary assessment and not the 
dominant position of the undertaking concerned’.370 Accordingly, with respect to the 
proportionality of remedy in the E.ON case, the Commission stated that the divestiture 
proposed by E.ON ‘removes the incentive to withdraw generation capacity profitably’ 
and that ‘the selection of power plants in terms of fuel and technology [...] was 
necessary and proportionate to meet the concerns on the wholesale market for 
                                                           
368 L.B. LAVE and D. PEREKHODSTEV, ‘Capacity Witholding Equilibrium in Wholesale Electricity Markets’ 
(2001) Carnegie-Mellon Electricity Industry Center, Working Paper CEIC 01-01, p. 19. 
369 E. ARMINGTON, E. EMCH and K. HEYER,, supra n. 342, p. 317. F. WOLAK and S. MCRAE, supra n. 
342, pp. 28-30. 
370 Commission Decision, supra n. 320, para. 60. 
 142 
electricity’.371 This would suggest that the amount of divested generation was 
sufficient to prevent further withdrawals of capacity. The Commission seems to have 
taken it for granted, since no calculation has been done to assess whether the capacity 
withdrawal was profitable for E.ON in the first place, nor whether it ceased to be 
profitable post-divestiture. Such exercise was not required in a preliminary assessment 
under Article 9. Assuming that it was profitable enough for E.ON to pursue the 
alleged strategy, it remains doubtful whether the divestiture of higher-cost generation 
effectively eliminated the risk of further withdrawal. The divested generation, aside of 
low-cost plants, included one-fifth of E.ON’s hard coal generation, one peak-load gas 
power station (one-tenth of E.ON’s gas generation) and two pump-storage hydro 
power plants. The disposal of hard coal- and gas-fired power plants lessens the 
volume of ‘generation to withdraw’ but does not remove it, since post-divestiture 
E.ON is left with the remaining 83% of its high-cost generation (hard coal, gas- and 
oil-fired generation together). Moreover, E.ON could have some interest in divesting 
certain uncompetitive or older assets. For example, hard coal power plants, which are 
heavily subsidised, are supposed to be closed by the end of 2018.372 In these 
circumstances it might have been convenient for E.ON to divest one-fifth of its loss-
making business in an antitrust deal. With regard to the pump-storage hydro assets, 
their divestment is clearly pro-competitive. A competitor owning such assets would be 
able to ‘store’ electricity and sell it on the market during peak demand periods 
mitigating E.ON’s market power. However, it is questionable whether these plants 
could play part of a profitable withdrawal strategy, since their production depends 
highly on changing weather conditions. Taking into consideration their specific 
function (balancing market, energy reserves), they do not provide capacities that could 
be withdrawn from the market. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
371 Ibid., paras. 80 and 84. 
372 European Council, Council Decision of 10.12.2010 on State aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal 
mines [2010] OJ L 336/24. 
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3.4.4. Commitments and exclusionary concerns 
 
The concerns of the Commission related also to E.ON’s deterrence of investment in 
the power generation business. In that respect the Commission argued that ‘the 
divestiture commitment is necessary and proportionate as it also addresses the 
concerns with regard to deterrence of investment’. Again, the literature on electricity 
markets would rather suggest that a disposal of high-cost generation would be more 
appropriate, since the divestment of price-setting capacity to competitors constrains 
the incumbent to a greater extent than the divestment of base-load generation. The 
entry of independent marginal generation can be much more pro-competitive than the 
entry of low-cost plants.373 However, as observed in the sector inquiry, the 
competitors actually do have access to peak-load generation. According to the 
findings, the investments in generation of the past few years focused on high-cost gas 
and wind technologies.374 Similarly, the Commission mentions in the decision that ‘in 
practice only more expensive gas-fired capacity was added to the market by the new 
entrants after 2001’.375 Base-load generation usually comes along with higher fixed 
costs and the new entrants find it more attractive to invest in peak generation. The 
Commission thus reasoned that ‘the divested plants will help actual and potential 
competitors to get access to new plants and plants with technologies that they do not 
possess. The acquisition of such generation capacity will allow the competitors to 
have a more balanced portfolio and more capacity to exert competitive pressure on the 
incumbents in the wholesale electricity market’.376 Assuring the competitors’ balanced 
portfolios justifies the divestiture of base-load generation characterised by higher 
economic barriers of entry and investment. Hence, the concerns of exclusionary nature 
                                                           
373 According to G. FEDERICO and A.L. LÓPEZ, supra n. 354, pp. 10-11, entry of price-setting plants can be 
significantly more effective in reducing prices than the entry of base-load plants: ‘Entry of this type [high cost 
capacity] shifts the residual demand function of the dominant firm in the same way as a divestment but does not 
affect its cost curve. Its impact on prices is therefore the same as obtained with a divestiture, as long as the 
dominant firm prices on its pre-divestment cost function (i.e. its costs do not increase relative to the pre-
divestment equilibrium). […] Preposition 1 therefore indicates that marginal (or price-setting) entry is more 
effective than baseload entry in constraining market prices, assuming the cost of the new capacity is determined 
by the same cost function as the dominant firm.’ 
374 Final Report, supra n. 78, para. 407.  
375 Commission Decision, supra n. 320, para. 39. 
376 Ibid., para. 85. 
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appear to be an excuse for the across-the-board divestiture, as only in that way the 
Commission is able to explain the disposal of E.ON’s base-load generation.  
 
To sum up, it is highly questionable whether a divestment of power plants 
representing a cross-section of E.ON’s generation portfolio is the best-suited remedy 
for a strategic capacity withdrawal. Nonetheless, the accumulation of anticompetitive 
concerns in the preliminary assessment, which went beyond the alleged capacity 
withdrawal abuse, allowed the Commission first to recourse to a structural solution 
disregarding alternative behavioural remedies and then to justify an across-the-board 
divestiture, reducing E.ON’s market share in absolute terms. The ultimate shape of the 
commitment package was thus a result of negotiations between the Commission, 
pursuing a goal of energy market liberalisation, and E.ON, acting in its own strategic 
interest.  
 
3.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The attempt of this chapter is to signal a risky development in the EU antitrust 
enforcement in the context of energy markets. Coming out with the sector inquiry 
report the Commission was plain-spoken about its plans to deploy competition rules 
as a vehicle for liberalising the energy sector.377 The follow-up antitrust actions have 
been tailored to give effect to these plans. The new antitrust enforcement framework 
with commitment procedure and structural remedies enabled the Commission a quick 
intervention, flexible problem-solving and allowed for decisive changes in the energy 
market setting.  
 
However these cases are not dealing with antitrust anymore. They constitute a new 
phenomenon, a peculiar ‘negotiated antitrust’, characterised by weak cases with 
extensive remedies. The Commission’s reasoning in the E.ON decision is far-fetched 
and lacks consistency. These flaws in argumentation result from the fact that the 
outcome of negotiations between the Commission and E.ON has to comply with the 
                                                           
377 See e.g. N. KROES, supra n. 85. 
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standard Article 102 framework, according to which the Commission needs to express 
its concerns as to the alleged dominant position and its abuse and the commitments it 
accepts must address these concerns. One should bear in mind that the E.ON decision 
was issued in the end of 2008, which is a year after the General Court quashed the 
Commission’s decision in the Alrosa case. At the time of the E.ON investigation, the 
Alrosa case was pending before the ECJ and the outcome was still far from clear.378 
Accordingly, the Commission formulated the E.ON decision with a great caution 
trying to comply with the principle of proportionality and to defend the accepted 
divestitures with additional exclusionary concerns, sometimes resorting to strained 
arguments.  
 
Harnessing antitrust enforcement to pursue liberalisation policy objectives ultimately 
causes harm to competition policy itself. Once governed by political choices of energy 
market liberalisation, antitrust rules, bent and stretched beyond their proper limits, slip 
out of their own systemic framework. Where does competition policy end and 
liberalisation policy begin? With the Courts’ hands-off approach to commitment 
decisions as demonstrated in the Alrosa case, drawing a line between competition 
policy and liberalisation policy ultimately remains with the Commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
378 AG Kokott’s favourable opinion, being the first positive signal from the ECJ, which could increase the 
Commission’s self-confidence in Article 9 proceedings, has been issued much later, in November 2009. 
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3.6. ANNEX 1 
 
Figure  5. Price formation on a short-term competitive electricity market – schematic 
representation. 
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Figure  5 illustrates price formation on a competitive short term electricity market 
with no generation capacity constraints. It demonstrates the basic features of power 
markets. First of all, the elasticity of demand for electricity is very low. In fact, it 
comes clo ∆ Q se to zero in the short run. Hence, to keep things simple, it is depicted 
as a vertical line at the value of the load forecast for the given time period. Apart from 
that, demand is volatile over time, raising and falling in daily, weekly and seasonally 
patterns. Since electricity cannot be stored at a reasonable cost, its supply must be 
flexible enough to respond to the constant changes in demand. This means that some 
power plants operate on a constant basis, serving as base-load generation, whereas 
additional power plants will only go on stream in peak hours.  
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Electricity can be generated using different production technology. The variety of 
power generation methods creates substantial discrepancies in production costs. For 
this reason it is efficient to use the low cost power plants (hydro, nuclear, renewable 
power) on a permanent basis, covering the base load demand as much as possible. By 
contrast, high cost plants are brought into production only during the peak hours and 
subsequently deactivated as soon as demand falls (so called ‘peak plants’). Following 
this logic, Figure  5 presents the aggregated supply curve in form of a ‘merit order’ 
curve which ranks plants with respect to their production costs (and the technology 
they use accordingly). The market price is determined by the crossing point of the 
supply and demand curves, which equals the level of short run marginal cost (SRMC) 
of the plant generating the last unit of electricity required to meet demand. In case 
there is an increase in demand (demand curve shifts to the right) the next most 
efficient power plant is called to generate and the price rises to the level of its SRMC. 
Consequently, the price decided by the SRMC of the last plant called to generate 
determines not only the revenues of the marginal generator but also the revenues of all 
the electricity producers owning plants on the left hand side of the merit order curve. 
As can be seen from the chart, the further away to the left the plant is ranked, that is, 
the lower variable costs it has, the higher is its mark up.  
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Figure  6. The effect of capacity withdrawal on price formation in a competitive 
short-term electricity market (schematic representation). 
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An increase in demand raises the market price. Just as decrease in supply. An 
electricity generator, withdrawing its plant from the market or running it below its full 
nameplate capacity, creates a shortage in supply which must be filled up with 
additional units of power provided by the plant standing just behind the marginal plant 
in the merit order, called to generate as a second-best. In this way, as illustrated by 
Figure  6, the new plant becomes the marginal one and its marginal costs from now on 
determine the market price. It goes without saying that the new plant coming on 
stream does not have to belong to the withdrawing generator. All generators get the 
higher market price for the volume of electricity they supply, irrespective of who 
owns the price-setting capacity.  Although the new market equilibrium increases the 
revenues of all producing generators, not all of them would actually opt for output 
limitation in order to enjoy a higher price. The strategy of capacity withdrawal implies 
a trade off between the planned, therefore certain, output reduction and the expected, 
therefore uncertain, increase in price. A generator finds it profitable to withdraw 
capacity only if the expected mark-up earned from the price increase exceeds the loss 
linked to the fall in output. Joskow and Kahn (2002)379 formulate unilateral profit 
maximisation logic of a withholding generator as follows:  
  
∆ Profit    =    [ (Q  – ∆ Q) * ∆ P]     –     (∆ Q  * P)    +    ∆ c, where 
 
Q –  generator’s capacity sold through the pool 
∆ Q – capacity withdrawn 
P – price level without withdrawal 
∆ P – price increase due to withdrawal 
∆ c – (avoided) operating cost of producing ∆ Q 
 
From the equation it appears that the profitability of capacity withdrawal for a 
generator depends on several key factors.  
 
                                                           
379 Supra n. 318. 
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(i) First of all, one must consider the generator’s market share in the market [Q]. 
Generators controlling capacity that is small relative to the size of the market have no 
incentive to limit their output as such withdrawal would be unlikely to materially 
affect the market price. A generator must account for a significant proportion of total 
industry generation to allow for a withdrawal that brings about a price increase [Q 
with respect to ∆ Q]. Further, the bigger the generator is, the greater is its incentive to 
withhold, as the mark-up over its remaining production will more than offset the loss 
in output. Relating to this, one must remember that Q stands not for the generator’s 
total capacity, but the one sold on the power exchange. If a big share of the 
generator’s total capacity is sold under contracts (therefore already excluded from the 
pool), the remaining output that can be strategically used by the generator is already 
limited. In such a case the incentive and the ability to make further withdrawals 
decreases accordingly. 
 
(ii) Secondly, the incentive to withdraw increases with the price rise [∆ P]. A 
generator would not withhold capacity at any time (at any demand level), but rather in 
the periods of high demand, when even a small withdrawal results in a substantial 
price increase. In the periods of low demand, a withdrawal of the same size would 
result in a modest price increase, due to the flatter slope of the industry’s merit order 
curve. Just for the record, the new market-clearing price is determined by the marginal 
costs of the next generating unit called on stream. It does not matter whether this unit 
belongs to the withholding generator or to one of its competitors as even in the latter 
case the generator is able to forecast the price increase with high accuracy. In peak 
hours due to capacity or transmission constraints the new marginal generator might be 
pivotal and set a market-clearing price above its marginal costs, as there will be no 
other capacities available on the market. Although capacity withdrawal is a unilateral 
exercise of market power, generators may well collude and reduce their capacities in 
concert in order to make one of them pivotal, able to explore the capacity constraints.  
 
(iii) Third, since low-cost generation enjoys the highest price mark-up [(Q  – ∆ Q) * ∆ 
P], the profitability of capacity withdrawal hinges on the generator’s asset portfolio, 
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which must include a sufficient number of low-cost plants. At the same time, having 
only base-load-oriented portfolio is not enough, since withdrawing low-cost 
generation would appear too costly. The optimal candidate portfolio for a profitable 
withdrawal should also include ‘plants to withdraw’, which are more expensive in 
operation [higher ∆ c] and have lower shutdown opportunity costs [∆ Q * P] than the 
base-load units. These higher-cost plants are not necessary peak plants, since these 
already operate in a limited period of time. Rather they can be characterised as high-
cost inframarginal generation, to limit the cost of withdrawal but at the same time to 
be sure the strategy actually affects the market price. According to the Commission 
officials writing in a personal capacity, the optimal asset portfolio for limiting output 
strategy should, on the one hand, provide incentive to withdraw (a sufficient number 
of base-load generation units), on the other hand, guarantee the availability to 
withdraw (higher-cost plants in the middle of the merit-order curve).380 This grouping 
of generation assets into ‘incentive assets’ and ‘ability assets’ helps to understand the 
logic behind the capacity withdrawal but it should not be used in the individual cases, 
as it oversimplifies the picture and might lead to errors in the assessment. Some 
plants, especially those in the middle of the merit order curve, might be categorised as 
‘incentive assets’ or ‘ability assets’, depending on the generator and the load level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
380 P. CHAUVE, M. GODFRIED, K. KOVÁCS, G. LANGUS, K. NAGY and S. SIEBERT, ‘The E.ON 
electricity cases: an antitrust decision with structural remedies’ (2009) Competition Policy Newsletter 1, 51-54, 
pp. 51-52 
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3.7. ANNEX 2 
 
As discussed in section 1.2.3.2, competition authorities and energy regulators in a 
number of Member States have become increasingly active in the energy sector. 
Competition enforcement at the national level reflects the Commission’s priorities, 
that is, its objective of creating an integrated and competitive EU energy market. 
NCAs launch sector inquiries and follow up with antitrust cases, NRAs conduct their 
own investigations, and all these actions still focus on competition problems identified 
by the Commission six years ago in its sector inquiry. To illustrate this trend, the 
following paragraphs discuss six investigations into market manipulation carried out 
by NCAs in Spain, Denmark, Germany, the UK, Italy and Belgium. Four of them, 
launched shortly after the Commission’s sector inquiry and the E.ON case, focus 
directly on the problem of capacity withholding.381 
 
3.7.1. Spain 
 
The Spanish investigation into market manipulation dates back to November 2001, 
when the Spain’s energy regulator observed unusually high electricity prices in the 
day-ahead electricity market during a very short period of 3 days. Its report, submitted 
to the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (CNC), the Spanish Competition 
Authority, triggered a two-year-long antitrust investigation into generators’ bidding 
strategies. Finally, in 2004, the CNC found that the three major generators (Endesa, 
Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa) abused their dominant position on the Spanish market for 
technical restrictions382 and imposed on them a fine of nearly 3 million EUR (901 519 
EUR per firm).383 According to the CNC, the three firms exploited a weakness in the 
market design. Namely, they deliberately submitted excessively high bids in the day-
ahead market in order to be excluded from the daily merit order, and to be later called 
                                                           
381 Country examples discussed here serve only to illustrate the trend, but do not constitute a complete list of 
NCAs/NRAs investigations into market power abuses on electricity wholesale markets.  
382 This is just another name for a balancing market, where the network operator (in this case REE) has to deal 
with transmission congestion occurring in the system, and the resulting shortage of energy supply in some areas 
and excess of energy supply in other areas. 
383 Case 522/02, Empresas Eléctricas, CNC decision of 07.07.2004 
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to produce in the market for technical restrictions at (allegedly excessive) prices, 
which they submitted in their day-ahead bids.384 According to the CNC, generators 
were able to foresee the risk of supply shortage in their respective georgraphical areas 
based on available market information. Following an appeal by Unión Fenosa and 
long court proceedings, the CNC’s 2004 decision was eventually set aside by the 
Spain’s Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo – TS). The Supreme Court found in its 
ruling from 2012 that generators did not infringe competition rules during the three 
days in November 2001 because their behaviour was too sporadic and too limited in 
time to be considered an abuse of a dominant position. The Court also criticised the 
cost calculation method on the basis of which the CNC established that prices were 
excessive. According to the Court, in a liberalised market generators can choose 
whether to generate or not, and their price bids do not always have to correspond to 
their costs. Further, the CNC failed to take into account the uncertainty faced by 
generators as to whether or not their bids are eventually selected by the network 
operator to address technical restrictions.385 Finally, the Court disapproved that the 
CNC relied on the NRA’s reports, as they could not provide sufficent evidence to 
establish an abuse of a dominant position.  
 
The Unión Fenosa judgment is certainly a landmark case as it puts in question the 
CNC’s decision-making practice regarding the market for technical restrictions. Some 
decisions adopted by the CNC between 2006 and 2008 are based on similar theories of 
harm. This period of increased competition enforcement in the Spanish electricity 
wholesale market coincides with the Commission’s sector inquiry. More recently, the 
CNC investigated nine Spanish electricity generators for similar practices during the 
2004-2008 period, i.e. alleged withholding of capacity from the day-ahead market in 
                                                           
384 Due to transmission constraints, some areas in Spain might face electricity shortage during certain hours. In 
such cases, REE buys additional electricity from generators located in the areas with energy shortage, but which 
have been exluded from the daily merit-order (because their electricity was too expensive). REE pays them the 
price they initially submitted in their day-ahead bids. For more details on this case and the Spanish electricity 
market design see a case note by J. GARCIA-NIETO and H. AJOUC, ‘Spanish Supreme Court quashes 
Decision fining major energy companies for abusing their dominant position in the Spanish electricity market 
for technical restrictions (Unión Fenosa)’ (2010) online article, e-Competitions, no. 30709, 03.2010, available at 
http://www.whitecase.com/articles-03292010-3 accessed 20.05.2013. 
385 Case ST S 351/2010, Unión Fenosa, TS judgment of 27.01.2012, available at 
http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/doAction?action=contentpdf&databasematch=TS&reference=5048316&link
s=&optimize=20100225&publicinterface=true accessed 20.05.2013. 
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expectation to sell their electricity to the network operator at higher prices in periods 
of transmission constraint.386 Eventually, the CNC abandoned this investigation in 
September 2011, probably in expectation of the Supreme Court’s ruling.  
 
3.7.2. Denmark 
 
In 2005 and 2007 the Danish Competition Authority (hereinafter ‘the Authority’) 
targeted Elsam, the country’ electricity generator, for submitting excessive price bids 
in Nord Pool. In both cases the Authority found that Elsam abused its dominant 
position by adopting a bidding strategy which resulted in excessive prices in Western 
Denmark. To determine whether Elsam’s prices were excessive, the Authority applied 
a rather rigid interpretation of the United Brands’s test, which still remains the main 
case-law reference for the application of Article 102 TFEU to unfair prices.387 The test 
determines in two stages whether the price charged by an undertaking reasonably 
relates to the economic value of the product sold. In the first stage, the Authority 
established that Elsam’s prices exceeded the cost actually incurred.388 In the second 
stage, it compared Elsam’s prices from the the period under investigation with prices 
submitted during other periods.  
 
In the 2005 case, the Authority found that Elsam’s prices were ‘unfair’ in 900 hours 
between July 2003 and December 2004, and that Elsam’s abuse resulted in losses of 
approx. 187 million DKK (approx. 25 million EUR). As a remedy, the Authority 
imposed a price cap on Elsam’s bids in Nord Pool.389 Elsam filed an appeal against 
this decision and in 2006 the Danish court removed the price cap, but nevertheless 
confirmed that Elsam abused its dominant position by charging excessive prices. 
 
                                                           
386 Case S/0104/08, Electricas. The investigation, opened in October 2009, involved Iberdrola, Endesa, Gas 
Natural, Hidrocantabrico, E.On, Electrabel, Aceca, Elcogas and Nueva Generadora del Sur.  
387 Supra n. 277, par. 252. 
388 Average total cost (ATC) plus a markup.  
389 Danish Competition Authority, ‘Elsam A/S abuse of dominant position by charging unfair prices’, press 
release 3/1120-0204-0150/ISA/LKF/CS, available at http://www.kfst.dk/en/competition/decisions/decisions-
2008-and-earlier/national-decisions-2005/konkurrenceraadets-moede-den-30-november-2005/elsam-as-abuse-
of-dominant-position-by-charging-unfair-prices/ accessed 20.05.2013. 
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In the 2007 case, the Authority followed the same methodology as in the first case and 
found that Elsam’s prices were ‘unfair’ in 1.484 hours between January 2005 and 
December 2006. This, according to the Authority, inflicted a loss of 111 million DKK 
(approx. 15 million EUR).390 This time no price cap was imposed, but it was 
announced that Elsam’s future pricing will be discussed with the Authority.  
 
In 2010 the Authority once again investigated high electricity prices in Nord Pool, but 
this time found no infringement of competition rules. The investigation was triggered 
by a complaint and concerned bidding behaviour of Energy E2 A/S in Eastern 
Denmark during a period between July 2003 and December 2005.391 The Authority 
applied the same economic framework known from the Elsam cases. This time, 
however, the United Brands test came out inconclusive, and was then supported by an 
analysis, hour-by-hour, of the E2’s bid curves and their relation to production cost. 
Given that E2 presented objective, cost-related reasons for its bidding strategy, even 
during hours of extreme profit, the Authority concluded that the generator did not 
abuse its dominant position. 
 
3.7.3. Germany 
 
A year after the Commission’s decision in the E.ON case, the Bundeskartellamt (the 
German Federal Cartel Office – FCO) opened two sector inquiries in the German gas 
and electricity markets. In the context of electricity, the FCO investigated similar 
practices to those alleged by the Commission in the E.ON case, that is, whether high 
electricity prices at EEX could have resulted from withholding strategies and 
collusion between the major power generators – E.ON, RWE, EnBW and 
                                                           
390 Danish Competiton Authority, ‘Elsam’, press release 4/0120-0204-0038/ISA/MOL, available at 
http://www.kfst.dk/en/competition/decisions/decisions-2008-and-earlier/national-decisions-
2007/konkurrenceraadets-moede-den-20-juni-2007/elsam/ accessed 20.05.2013. 
391 Danish Competition Authority, ‘Energy E2 did not impose excessive pricing’, press release of 22.12.2010, 
available at http://www.kfst.dk/en/competition/decisions/decisions-2008-and-earlier/afgoerelser-2010/energy-
e2-did-not-impose-excessive-prices/   accessed 20.05.2013. 
 156 
Vattenfall.392 The FCO examined the operation of power plants of the four major 
electricity producers in years 2007-2008. It developed for this a special algorithm in 
order to detect patterns of capacity withholding in the generators’ day-ahead bids. 
Finally, in 2011, the FCO published a comprehensive report from its inquiry but found 
no evidence of abusive practices. Even thought the analysis of day-ahead bids 
suggested that a small share of capacities was not put in operation at times when it 
was profitable, the FCO noted that there are other plausible reasons behind withheld 
capacities, for instance, trading in other markets. The report concluded that capacity 
withholding is ‘extremely difficult to prove’ and, given the amount and complexity of 
data involved, finding an infringement of competition rules in that respect would be 
particularly challenging.393 The report emphasised the importance of continuous 
market monitoring in order to prevent more sophisticated withholding strategies being 
deployed.  
 
The German federal law has been adapted in 2012 in order to set up a market 
transparency office (Markttransparenzstelle) within the Bundeskartellamt.394 The 
Office, in operation since January 2013, has as its task to continuously monitor 
electricity, gas and fuel markets and in particular, to ensure that price formation in 
electricity and gas at the wholesale level is transparent and competitve. To this aim, 
the Office is integrated in the new EU market surveillance scheme created under the 
EU Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT),395 
and closely cooperates with the Bundesnetzagentur, the Federal Network Agency. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
392 GASSMANN M., ‘Angriff auf Stromkonzerne’ (2009) online article, Financial Times Deutschland, 
Düsseldorf, 16.04.2009 http://www.ftd.de/unternehmen/handel-dienstleister/:erste-sektoruntersuchung-angriff-
auf-stromkonzerne/501402.html accessed 20.05.2013 
393 Supra n. 336 and 327. 
394 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (BMWi), ‘Minister Rösler: Market transparency office 
strengthens competition on fuel and energy markets’ press release of 02.05.2012, available at  
http://www.bmwi.de/EN/Press/press-releases,did=490210.html accessed 20.05.2013.  
395 See Article 7 of REMIT, supra n. 102. For more information on REMIT, see infra text accompanying n. 424. 
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3.7.4. The UK 
 
The GB wholesale electricity market is dominated by six market players, including 
two companies, SP (Scottish Power, owned by Spain’s Iberdrola) and SSE (Scottish 
and Southern Energy).396 In April 2008, the UK Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
(Ofgem) opened an antitrust investigation against the two Scottish generators.397 The 
case was based on a formal complaint alleging that SP and SEE abused their dominant 
position in electricity wholesale market by expoiting their market power arising from 
transmission constraints between England/Wales and Scotland during a four-week 
period in 2007. The generators allegedly withheld their power plants when the market 
was tight, in order to later use these plants to supply balancing power to the network 
operator (National Grid) at excessively high prices.398 Finally, in January 2009, the 
case was suspended.399 Even though Ofgem had serious concerns regarding the 
behaviour of the Scottish generators, it found that its powers under the Competition 
Act 1998 are not sufficient to capture the problem of capacity withholding / excessive 
bidding, as it is too difficult to prove an infringement of competition rules.400 
Nevertheless, this case demonstrated a regulatory loophole, which needs to be 
addressed. Ofgem decided to take a different route to deal with this problem, namely, 
to modify generators’ licences.401 
                                                           
396 The remaining big market players are EDF Energy, E.ON UK, Centrica and RWE. 
397 Ofgem conducts investigations into the conduct of companies active in the gas and electicity sector for (1) 
licence breach, (2) Competition Act infringements, and (3) breach of consumer protection law. Under the UK 
Competition Act 1998 Ofgem can impose financial penalties of up to 10% of the company’s turnover for an 
infringement of competition rules.  
398 Ofgem, ‘Ofgem launches Competition Act investigation into Scottish Power Limited and Scottish and 
Southern Energy plc’, press release R/12 of 8.04.2008, available at 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/PressRel/Documents1/Ofgem%2012.pdf accessed 20.05.2013. 
399 Ofgem, ‘Ofgem closes Competition Act 1998 case against Scottish Power and Scottish and Southern Energy 
– Information Note’, press release R/4 of 20.01.2009, available at 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/PressRel/Documents1/ofgem4-190109.pdf accessed 16.05.2008. 
400 Ofgem argued that it would be too difficult to identify the market in which a company could be found 
dominant, as the concept of dominance does not capture a situation where a generator has a substantial market 
power during very short periods of time when the market is tight or where there are local transmission 
constraints. 
401 In order to be able to generate energy, run transmission/distribution networks or supply energy to customers, 
companies have to be licenced by Ofgem. A licence includes a list of obligations that a company needs to fulfil 
(licence conditions). Generally, these conditions should guarantee a reliable energy supply to final customers. 
Ofgem monitors energy companies to ensure they comply with their licences and can open an investigation if it 
alleges that a company breaches any of the licence conditions. Ofgem’s licencing powers include issuing 
enforcement orders to make companies comply with their licences and imposing penalties of up to 10% of the 
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Licence modification requires primary legislation. To trigger this process, Ofgem first 
published a consultation document on the problem of market power in the GB 
electricity wholesale market.402 The document argued there that the existing market 
structure, coupled with transmission constraints makes the GB electricity wholesale 
market particularly prone to exploitation of market power. It was estimated that out of 
238 million GBP of transmission constraint costs in years 2008-2009, up to 125 
million could have potentially resulted from the misuse of market power.403 To tackle 
the problem, the Office proposed to impose a new condition in generators’ licences, 
limiting their ability to manipulate markets when transmission bottlenecks occur.404 405 
Such a new licence condition strengthens Ofgem’s ex-post investigatory powers and 
allow it to impose fines and/or sanctions also in cases of market power abuses 
specified under this condition.406  
 
Ofgem’s suggestions were incorporated in the new Energy Act 2010. The so-called 
Transmission Constraint Licence Condition (TCLC), which is in force since the end of 
2012, allows Ofgem to use its existing licensing powers to monitor and act on two 
types of conduct which are specified therein, covering instances of capacity 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
company’s turnover. In some cases Ofgem also accepts commitments from the investigated companies to take 
steps to ensure compliance with the licence.  
402 Ofgem, Addressing Market Power Concerns in the Electricity Wholesale Sector—Initial Policy Proposals 
(2009) Consultation Document, Ref. 30/09, 30.03.2009, available at 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/WhlMkts/CompandEff/Documents1/Market%20Power%20Concerns-
%20Initial%20Policy%20Proposals.pdf accessed 20.05.2013. 
403 Ibid., paras. 1.14 and 1.15. 
404 Supra n. 401. 
405 Ofgem proposed several alternative policy approaches to deal with the problem of undue exploitation of 
market power, but introducing a licence condition was its preferred solution. (1) The first proposal related to 
changes to existing market arrangements and included, for instance, alignment of the incentives of the System 
Operator (SO) and Transmission Owners (TOs) as to minimising the frequency of transmission constraints. The 
Office recognised the limitations of this approach, as it would mostly target market power issues in relation to 
transmission constraints. (2) The second proposal concerned changes to existing assets and/or ownership of 
assets, like divestments of power plants. Also in this case, according to Ofgem, sale of assets does not 
sufficiently address all relevant market power concerns. (3) The third proposal was to develop specific 
mechanisms for addressing market power issues. This could be an ex-post control mechanism (licence condition 
suggested by Ofgem), or, for instance, some sort of ex-ante screening mechanism to identify regions and time 
periods where market power was likely to occur, and where price caps could be introduced.  
406 TCLC aims to cover two types of conduct: (1) excessive bidding in the balancing market in the event of a 
transmission constraint, when the options available to National Grid during this periods; (2) potential market 
manipulation by generators (by e.g. by taking uneconomic dispatch/withhold decisions in expectation of 
charging higher prices to correct the situation through the balancing mechanism) which creates or exacerbates a 
transmission constraint.  
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withholding and excessive bidding at times of transmission constraint.407 Ofgem has 
powers to impose a fine up to 10% of the generator’s turnover for the breach of this 
condition.408 TCLC expires after 5 years, but can be extended by 2 years upon review.  
 
3.7.5. Italy 
 
Italian day-ahead electricity market is split into 22 price zones, and Sicily, badly 
interconnected with mainland Italy, forms one of them. For the most of hours, 
electricity wholesale prices are set by the local generators, making Sicily an ‘electric 
island’. Enel Produzione (EP) and Edipower, a group of power plants managed by a 
tolling agreement between four companies,409 enjoy there significant market power. 
 
The Italian Regulatory Agency for Electricity and Gas (AEEG) observed that between 
November 2008 and January 2009 electricity wholesale price in Sicily were 
significantly higher than in the rest of the country, and this could not be explained by 
structural factors such as equipment failure or routine maintenance. AEEG’s report, 
published in 2009, drew attention of the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM), 
which then launched two separate antitrust investigations, one against Enel and EP for 
an abuse of a dominant position, and the other one against Edipower’s shareholders 
and their parent companies, for collusion.410 AGCM alleged that Enel withheld 
generation capacity from the day-ahead market in order to create supply shortage and 
raise the clearing price to the detriment of all Italian consumers.411 Edipower ‘toller’ 
                                                           
407 For an interesting comment, see P. WILLIS, ‘DECC announces decision on Transmission Constraint Licence 
Condition’ (2012) online article, Bird and Bird Energy News, 06.2012, available at  
http://www.twobirds.com/English/News/Documents/Transmission_Constraint_Licence_Condition.htm accessed 
20.05.2013. 
408 Ofgem’s decision can be appealed to the Competition Appeal Tribunal, which has to review it on the merits.  
409 Edipower’s shareholders include Edison Trading (50%), A2A Trading (20%), Alpiq Energia Italia (20%) and 
Iride Mercato (10%). The shareholder companies (tollers) pay a fee and supply pro-rate the fuel necessary to 
produce electricity. The volumes produced by Edipower’s power plants are taken and sold by the tollers to the 
final clients. In that way, industrial risks of the producer remain with Edipower, and market risks deriving from 
the fuel procurement and the sale of electricity are the responsibility of the toller companies.  
410 AGCM, ‘Electricity market: Enel, Edison and other companies from the sector under investigation’, press 
release of 02.02.2010, available at  
http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/1873-electricity-market-enel-edison-and-other-companies-
from-the-sector-under-investigation.html accessed 20.05.2013. 
411 Despite market splitting in Italy, final consumers still face a single electricity price (PUN), which is 
calculated from the weighted average of all zonal sale prices. See infra n. 528.  
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companies were accussed of coordinating their supply strategies in order to exploit the 
pivotal position of the Sicily-based power plant of San Filippo del Mela at times of 
peak demand, and to keep high prices both on the day-ahead market and on the 
balancing market.  
 
Both cases were closed when the investigated companies offered commitments.412 
Enel introduced a bid cap of 190 EUR/MWh for years 2011-2013, until the new 
interconnection with mainland is developed. Edipower’s tollers agreed to exclude the 
San Filipo del Mela plant from the tolling agreement, entrusting its management 
solely to Edipower and thereby reducing the risk of coordinated practices. Moreover, 
Edipower agreed to run this power plant under a special regulatory regime for plants 
which are considered indispensable by the TSO. This basically allows the latter to take 
key decisions on plant management.413  
 
3.7.6. Belgium 
 
In 2009 CREG, the Belgian energy regulator issued a study on price formation at 
Belpex, the Belgian power exchange, pointing out abnormal price spikes in 2007 and 
the beginning of 2008. CREG suspected price manipulation by Electrabel and 
submitted its study to the Belgian Competition Authority (hereinafter ‘the Authority’). 
In September 2009 the Authority carried out dawn raids on the premises of Electrabel 
and several other companies active in the wholesale electricity market in search of 
evidence of price manipulation in form of capacity withholding and excessive bidding 
                                                           
412 AGCM, decisions no. 21960 and 21962 of 22.12.2010, Enel – Dinamiche formazioni prezzi mercato energia 
electrica in Sicilia / Tolling Edipower, available at http://www.agcm.it/concorrenza/intese-e-abusi.html accessed 
20.05.2013. 
413 AGCM, ‘I721 – A423 – Edipower Tolling and Enel – Dynamics in the Setting of Electricity Market Prices in 
Sicily (Closure of Investigation)’, press release of 10.01.2011, available at 
http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/1924-i721-a423-edipower-tolling-and-enel-dynamics-in-the-
setting-of-electricity-market-prices-in-sicily-closure-of-investigation.html accessed 20.05.2013. See also a case 
study by F. SALERNO, ‘Debate on “market vs. regulation”: insights from selected national competition law 
cases’ in J.-M. GLACHANT, N. AHNER and A. DE HAUTECLOCQUE (eds.), EU Energy Law & Policy 
Yearbook 2012. The Priorities of the European Commission – Vol. V, 3rd ed., Claeys & Casteels, Deventer 2013, 
pp. 169-171. 
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and/or capacity manipulation.414 CREG actively participated in this follow-up 
investigation. In February 2013, the Authority formally accused Electrabel of an abuse 
of a dominant position by, among others, withholding capacity on the Belgian market 
for generation, wholesale and trading of electricity from 2007 to 2010.415 According to 
its estimations, Electrabel’s capacity withholding might have costed Belgian 
customers between 33 and 49 million EUR. The case is currently examined by the 
Authority’s decision-making panel where Electrabel has a possibility to exercise its 
defence rights.416 Given the difficulty in finding evidence of capacity withholding, the 
Belgian case against Electrabel is followed with much interest by the competition 
community.417   
 
3.7.7. Discussion 
 
Price formation in electricity wholesale markets and possible market manipulation has 
recently received much more scrutiny at the Member State level than anytime before. 
The activation of national competition enforcement in this area is, to a certain extent, 
encouraged by the findings of the Commission’s sector inquiry and the E.ON case. It 
is interesting that earlier national cases (prior to the Commission’s sector inquiry and 
the E.ON case) refer to excessive bidding or market manipulation in general terms. 
Concerns about withholding strategies appeared only after the Commission’s sector 
                                                           
414 Conseil de la concurrence, ‘Perquisitions au sein d’entreprises actives dans le secteur de la vente en gros 
d’electricite en Belgique’, press release of 22.09.2009, available at 
http://economie.fgov.be/fr/binaries/Communiqu%C3%A9%20de%20presse%20Autorit%C3%A9%20belge%20
de%20la%20concurrence%2022%2009%2009_tcm326-74612.pdf accessed 20.05.2013.  
415 Conseil de la concurrence, ‘The College of Competition Prosecutors of the Belgian Competition Council 
found that Electrabel (GDF Suez) abused its dominant position on the Belgian market for generation, wholesale 
and trading of electricity as well as on the Belgian market for supply of tertiary reserve services’, press release 
of 07.02.2013, available at  http://economie.fgov.be/en/binaries/20130207_Pressrelease_F_tcm327-211835.pdf 
accessed 20.05.2013. 
416 At the time of writing this section (05.2013).  
417 See, for instance, P. WILLIS, ‘Belgian competition authority prosecutor accuses Electrabel of abuse of 
dominance’ (2013) online article, Bird & Bird, 13.02.2013, available at 
http://www.twobirds.com/english/news/articles/pages/belgian_competition_accuses_electrabel_abuse_dominan
ce0213.aspx accessed 20.05.2013; S. BERRA, ‘Belgium threatens Electrabel with abuse fine’ (2013) online 
article, Global Competition Review, 11.02.2013, available at 
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/33039/belgium-threatens-electrabel-abuse-fine/ accessed 
20.05.2013.  
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inquiry and the E.ON case. These national cases share certain characteristics, which 
puts them in stark constrast to the E.ON case. 
 
The first difference lies in the level of case complexity and thoroughness. The 
Commission’s theory of harm in the E.ON case is general and not very clear, 
combining simple logic behind a profitable unilateral withholding418 with allegations 
of coordinated behaviour. The relevant market is broad in scope, defined as the 
German wholesale market for electricity. The Commission’s allegations stem from the 
sector inquiry, which found that some German plants operated less frequently than 
they would in a perfectly competitive world. Nevertheless, the sector inquiry reached 
no conclusive findings as to whether strategic withholding indeed took place.  
 
In contrast to that, investigations at the national level are much more thoroughgoing 
and complex. Theories of harm are based on more sophisticated withholding strategies 
which take account of specific characteristics of these markets (transmission 
constraints, regulatory arrangements in place). As a result, markets are defined 
narrowly, both in terms of products and the geographical scope (e.g. market for 
technical restrictions, Sicily, Eastern Denmark). Lastly, NCAs often analyse vast 
amounts of data on plant operation and price bids, and develop complex econometric 
methods and models to find evidence of market manipulation. 
 
The second difference concerns the outcome of the case. The Commission’s energy 
cases are usually closed under Article 9 without concluding on the existence of a 
market abuse. To the contrary, NCAs rather abandon investigations, when they cannot 
prove an infringement of competition rules (Germany,419 the UK, Denmark, Spain), or 
pursue the investigation until they actually find one (Denmark, Spain). Only Enel 
offered voluntarily commitments.420  
 
                                                           
418 Supra section 3.6. 
419 Given negative results from the Bundeskartellamt’s sector inquiry, no individual antitrust investigations 
followed. 
420 But see the Italian case, where Enel offered commitments. 
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The third difference relates to remedies. At the EU level, the Commission extracts far-
reaching divestments, changing the structure and competitive dynamics of national 
markets. NCAs’ cases of market manipulation, on the other hand, result in high fines 
(Spain) and/or behavioural remedies of regulatory nature, mostly temporary price caps 
(Denmark, Italy, Spain), but also other forms of price control (the 2005 Elsam case) or 
special regulatory restrictions on plant management (the Edipower case).  In none of 
these cases generators were required to divest assets.  
 
These three common characteristics of national investigations reflect increasing 
involvement of NRAs in competition cases. Antitrust proceedings in Spain, Italy, the 
UK421 and Belgium were triggered by NRAs’ investigations and conducted in close 
cooperation with the latter. NCAs’ allegations built on NRAs’ data and findings. The 
NCAs and NRAs exchange information on a regular basis and often undertake joint 
initiatives. For instance, since 2011 the German FCO and the Bundesnetzagentur carry 
out joint market monitoring in electricity wholesale markets. This involves 
cooperation in data collection and joint reporting activities.422 Similarly, the Italian 
AGCM has recently signed a protocol of cooperation with AEEG which provides for 
an exchange of information and findings from market investigations and taking up 
joint initiatives in market surveillance.423 Cooperation with NRAs, either case-specific 
or more general, provides competition authorities with sector-specific expertise 
allowing them to undertake more and more complex investigations on technical 
issues, as well as to impose behavioural remedies requiring continuous regulatory 
supervision.  
 
                                                           
421 Ofgem is the UK regulator for energy with competition law powers.  
422 See, for instance, Bundeskartellamt, ‘Joint Energy Monitoring 2013 of the Bundeskartellamt and the 
Bundesnetzagentur – Data survey’, press release available at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/News/2013_04_22_Joint_Energy_Monitoring_2013.php accessed 
20.05.2013. The first joint Monitoring Report was issued in 2012 and documents developments in the German 
energy markets in 2011. 
423 AGCM, ‘Antitrust e Autorità per l’energia insieme per tutelare il funzionamento dei mercati e i consumatori’, 
press release of 17.09.2012, available at  
 http://www.agcm.it/stampa/news/6193-antitrust-e-autorita-per-lenergia-firmato-protocollo-di-intesa-per-
rafforzare-la-collaborazione.html accessed 20.05.2013. 
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Much of the stimulus for NCA/NRA cooperation, especially in market surveillance, 
has been provided by REMIT.424 The E.ON case exposed difficulties in addressing 
market manipulation by ad-hoc antitrust actions, and made a strong case for a more 
systematic market monitoring and alternative enforcement instruments. REMIT came 
into force in December 2011 and introduced an explicit prohibition of market 
manipulation, attempted market manipulation and insider trading.425 Member States 
are now required under REMIT to endow their NRAs with sufficient investigatory and 
prosecutorial powers to act upon these prohibitions,426 and may also establish joint 
NCAs/NRAs market monitoring.427 Further, NRAs are obliged under REMIT to 
inform national competition authorities in their respective countries in case they 
suspect breaches of competition rules on wholesale energy markets.428 NRAs, together 
with NCAs may establish appropriate forms of cooperation in carrying out market 
investigations and enforcing REMIT.429  
 
NRAs actively participated in NCAs’ antitrust interventions in the electricity sector 
also before REMIT came into force and this might have been triggered by the lack of 
guidance at the EU level on how to address market manipulation under competition 
rules. Namely, the Commission’s sector inquiry signaled that market manipulation 
might occur, but has not provided any clear guidance on how to deal with it. Nor had 
the Commission’s decision in the E.ON case. Quite on the contrary, the E.ON 
commitment decision might have left a sense of ambiguity which activated 
NCAs/NRAs in this area. This is because the Commission formulated specific 
concerns about E.ON’s capacity withholding in its preliminary assessment, but 
eventually left the issue open. The E.ON decision only means that in the light of the 
commitments, ‘there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission’. It is not 
clear whether this means that E.ON’s divestments eliminated all risks of alleged 
abusive behaviour, or whether they only reduced the Commission’s concerns to such 
                                                           
424 REMIT, supra n. 102. 
425 Articles 3 and 5 of REMIT, supra n. 102. 
426 By 29.06.2013. Ibid., Article 13. 
427 Ibid., Article 7. 
428 Ibid., Article 16 (3) (d). 
429 Ibid., Article 16 (1). 
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an extent that the case is no longer a priority in the EU competition enforcement.430 
The wording of Article 9, according to which commitment decisions are without 
prejudice to the powers of NCAs and national courts to make a finding of an 
infringement and decide upon a case, seems to support the latter interpretation. In 
other words, the E.ON case might have invited the Bundeskartellamt to launch its own 
sector inquiry in the wake of the Commission’s intervention. More generally, 
‘incomplete’ commitment cases might provide a plank for NCAs/NRAs’ actions.  
 
Two further observations can be drawn from these national cases. Firstly, this lack of 
clear guidance at the EU level in dealing with market manipulation resulted in a range 
of national approaches and very different outcomes. The German sector inquiry 
exposed difficulties in finding evidence of capacity withholding and no individual 
cases followed. Similar problems made Ofgem close the case against the Scottish 
generators. The Danish Authority found only limited evidence of excessive pricing in 
the recent E2 case, insufficient to prove infringement.431 In contrast, investigations in 
Spain and Denmark resulted in decisions finding an infringement and imposing fines 
or price controls. The Italian AGCM accepted commitments of a similar type. These 
inconsistencies in application of competition law to market manipulation across 
Member States diminish legal certainty and trust of the industry in competition 
intervention.  
 
Secondly, these cases demonstrate that Article 102 does not provide a suitable legal 
framework to capture capacity withholding and/or excessive bidding strategies and 
NCAs face serious difficulties in applying national competition rules to these types of 
abuses. In half of the cases reported here432 NCAs failed to prove competition law 
infringements. The Bundeskartellamt could not find any evidence of withholding and 
decided not to follow this route at all. In few other cases NCAs either gave it up after 
costly and time-consuming investigations (the UK, Spain) or their decisions were 
                                                           
430 See supra text accompanying n. 214-215. 
431 E2’s prices were not corresponding to its costs in only 0.25% of hours during the period under investigation. 
432 Spain (the 2009 investigation), Germany, the UK. 
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quashed by national courts (Spain,433 Denmark434). In particular, the Electricas case 
against practically all Spanish generators suggests that making improvements in the 
regulatory framework might be more effective in reducing the risk of market 
manipulation rather than launching ad-hoc antitrust investigations against individual 
generators, which, if successful, result in a serious regulatory intervention in form of 
price controls. However, correcting the market design requires legislative changes and 
might take some time. In the meantime, alternative enforcement tools are now 
provided under REMIT. Acting on market abuses prohibited by REMIT does not 
require an establishment of competition law infringement, that is, neither a dominant 
position nor an abuse needs to be proved.  
 
In sum, given the deficiencies of the competition law framework in dealing with 
market manipulation and the possibility to prosecure these types of abuses under 
REMIT, NCAs/NRAs might soon move away from antitrust investigations towards 
these new enforcement tools. Introduction of TCLC in the UK, creation of the market 
transparency office within the German FCO, and the AGCM/AEEG cooperation 
protocol are indicative of this trend.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
433 The TS found that there was no dominance, because the generators’ behaviour was too sporadic and limited 
in time. The Unión Fenosa ruling suggests that generators with market power over very short periods of time (3 
days) would not be considered dominant under Spanish competition rules. 
434 The Danish court did not approve behavioural remedies imposed in the 2005 Elsam case and removed the 
price cap.  
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4. MARKET INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AT 
CONFLICT? COMMITMENTS IN THE SWEDISH 
INTERCONNECTORS CASE435 
 
Co-authored with Bert Willems 
 
4.1. ABSTRACT  
 
According to the European Commission, Svenska Kraftnät, the Swedish network 
operator, might have violated competition rules by limiting cross-border transmission 
capacity to relieve congestion within Sweden. Eventually, the case was settled under 
Article 9 and Svenska Kraftnät offered commitments to address the Commission’s 
concerns. As an interim remedy, it committed to reduce transmission flow of 
electricity on internal network bottlenecks primarily by introducing national measures 
and by not reducing interconnection capacity. As a final remedy, Svenska Kraftnät 
agreed to split the Swedish market into multiple price zones. Congestion within 
Sweden would then be solved by adjusting the prices of those zones.  
 
We analyse the economic effects of the alleged abuse and the remedy package. We 
make three observations. Firstly, it might be socially optimal to reduce cross-border 
capacity in response to internal congestion. Hence, without an in-depth economic 
analysis the Commission risked preventing efficient behaviour. Secondly, the interim 
remedy of handling internal congestion primarily by national measures is not socially 
optimal, and it cannot be ruled out that it reduces overall welfare. Thirdly, even 
though splitting the market into price zones may improve allocative efficiency within 
Sweden, it does not prevent Svenska Kraftnät from potential manipulation of cross-
border transmission capacity. 
                                                           
435 First published in World Competition: Law and Economics Review 36, 1 (2013). The authors thank Leigh 
Hancher, Alexander Morell, Massimo Motta, Björn ter Bruggen, Paul Giesbertz, Martin Godfried and Killian 
Kehoe for their insightful comments. Małgorzata Sadowska gratefully acknowledges the hospitality and support 
of TILEC, where part of this research was carried out. The authors are responsible for any remaining mistakes. 
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4.2. INTRODUCTION 
 
Congestion often occurs in the Swedish electricity network. It is mainly caused by the 
lack of network capacity to transport cheap energy from hydropower plants in North 
Sweden to high consumption areas in South Sweden and, via the Øresund 
interconnector,436 to Eastern Denmark.437 Svenska Kraftnät (SvK), the Swedish 
electricity network operator, identifies several transmission bottlenecks in the Swedish 
grid, where demand for transmission capacity exceeds network capacity.438 SvK used 
to solve this internal congestion by limiting export to the neighbouring countries, 
especially to Denmark on the Øresund interconnector. Export limits reduced demand 
for cheap hydropower from North Sweden and therefore relieved congestion in the 
Swedish grid. 
 
We analyse a competition law case brought by the European Commission against SvK 
for a potential abuse of a dominant position on the electricity transmission market in 
Sweden (Article 102 TFEU).439 According to the Commission, SvK might have 
violated competition rules by limiting cross-border transmission capacity in order to 
relieve internal congestion in the Swedish network. In other words, it ‘shifted’ 
congestion from the internal bottlenecks to the interconnectors. The case arose from a 
complaint filed by Dansk Energi (DaE), a trade association for Danish energy 
companies. DaE alleged that SvK’s recurring export limitations on the Øresund-
                                                           
436 By ‘interconnector’ we mean a transmission line which crosses or spans a border between Member States 
and which connects the national transmission systems of the Member States, as set out in Article 2(1) of 
Regulation 714/2009, supra n. 91. 
437 Denmark is divided into two separate price areas (DK1 for Western Denmark and DK2 for Eastern Denmark) 
because there is no direct electric connection between the two country’s regions. Whenever we refer to Denmark 
in chapters 4-5, we mean Eastern Denmark only. 
438 There are four transmission bottlenecks in the Swedish grid, where demand for electricity transmission 
frequently exceeds the physical capacity of the network. Three of them (called ‘cuts’: cut 1, cut 2 and cut 4) 
occur due to the excessive flow of electricity from the North to the South of Sweden. The fourth bottleneck, the 
west-coast corridor, results from increased transport of electricity from Denmark and the rest of Europe to the 
western coast of Sweden and further up to Norway. On the characteristics of the Swedish electricity market see 
e.g. NordREG, Congestion Management in the Nordic Region. A common regulatory opinion on congestion 
management, Report 2/2007, pp. 16-18.  
439 Commission Decision of 14.04.2010 in case Swedish Interconnectors (Case COMP/39.351). 
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connection caused economic losses to Danish consumers.440 Deprived of hydropower 
imports from Sweden, Denmark was forced to use its more expensive thermal power 
plants to meet its demand. Recourse to thermal generation resulted in higher day-
ahead prices and price volatility. The Danish allegations were supported by an 
empirical study of Copenhagen Economics, estimating losses for Danish consumers 
from SvK’s capacity shifting and the simultaneous gains for Swedish consumers, due 
to lower electricity day-ahead prices in Sweden.441 DaE claimed that SvK’s actions 
were detrimental to competition and trade within the internal market, and violated EU 
competition rules.442 
 
In 2009, following negotiations with the Commission, SvK offered a set of 
commitments. Firstly, as an interim remedy, SvK committed to reduce congestion on 
internal bottlenecks primarily by counter-trading. This is a type of congestion 
management where the network operator makes deals with individual generators to 
eliminate congestion. It pays generators in export-constrained areas to reduce 
production, and pays generators in import-constrained areas to increase production. 
Secondly, SvK agreed to split the Swedish market into multiple price zones by 
November 2011, so-called market splitting.443 Congestion between zones is now 
solved by adjusting zonal prices, affecting zonal supply and demand within Sweden, 
                                                           
440 DaE’s complaint concerned only the Øresund interconnector. However, the Commission broadened the scope 
of its investigation, including all interconnectors managed by SvK. Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 
38-40.  
441 See Copenhagen Economics, The economic consequences of capacity limitations on the Øresund connection, 
Report commissioned by Energinet.dk (the Danish network operator), Copenhagen 2006.  From 10.2000 till 
06.2006, losses for consumers in East Denmark were estimated to be 725 million DKK (ca. 100 million EUR) 
and gains for consumers in Sweden between 215 and 265 million DKK (29 to 36 million EUR).  
442 DaE challenged the SvK’s policy on several legal bases, namely the internal market rules on free movement 
of goods (Articles 34 and 35 TFEU), the provisions of the 2nd Energy Package (Regulation 1228/2003, supra n. 
73, Directive 2003/54/EC, supra n. 73) and finally, also the EU competition rules (Article 102 TFEU). See 
Dansk Energi, Complaint concerning Svenska Kraftnät's regulation of transmission capacity on 
‘Øresundsforbindelsen’, Kromann Reumert, Document Ref. ERB/jol/169978/535450-5, 20.07.2006, available at 
http://www.danskenergi.dk/Aktuelt/Indblik/Svenska_Kraftnaet.aspx accessed 20.05.2013. 
443 According to the initial commitments offered to the Commission, the exact number of price zones and their 
configuration was supposed to be kept flexible, depending on the flow patterns in the Swedish electricity 
network. In the end, SvK decided to split the market into four price zones. Market splitting does not apply to the 
west-coast corridor, due to the lack of sufficient suitable generation resources for setting a separate market price 
in that area. For the same technical reasons counter-trading cannot be performed there. Instead, SvK undertook 
to reinforce the west-coast corridor by building and operating a new 400kV transmission line by the end of 
11.2011. See Commission Decision, supra n. 439, par. 48. 
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and not by reducing interconnector capacities.444 Market splitting has been used, for 
instance, in the Norwegian energy market. 
 
We analyse the economic effects of SvK’s behaviour, in the situation that existed 
before the investigation, and then in the context of the interim and final remedies 
respectively. These effects are illustrated on the basis of a simplified market model 
which represents the main features of the Swedish and the Danish electricity markets. 
We make three observations. Firstly, shifting some congestion to the borders might 
make economic sense. Without an in-depth economic analysis, the Commission risks 
going after socially optimal behaviour. Secondly, the interim remedy of solving 
internal congestion primarily by counter-trading, and not by shifting congestion to the 
border, is not socially optimal either, and it cannot be ruled out that it reduces overall 
welfare. Thirdly, even though market splitting may improve allocative efficiency 
within Sweden, it does not prevent potential manipulation of cross-border 
transmission capacity by SvK.  
 
This chapter is written with a legal and policy audience in mind. It explains the main 
lessons of an economic analysis of the case to non-economists and lacks therefore 
some of the modelling rigor of a pure economic paper. We chose to present our results 
graphically, give numerical illustrations and limit the use of analytical expressions to 
situations where they could provide some additional insights. In chapter 5 we take a 
closer look at some of the legal aspects of this case. 
 
4.3. MODEL 
 
4.3.1. Set-up 
 
We use a simplified market model to illustrate the economic effects of congestion in 
the Swedish grid. See Figure  7. This model explains the main economic insights, but 
                                                           
444 In cases where internal congestion occurs within a price zone, SvK committed not to reduce capacity on the 
interconnectors but to carry out counter-trading within these zones to relieve it. 
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is not intended to reflect the market in detail.445 The numbers were chosen for 
illustrative purpose. To ensure that calculations can be checked without relying on 
numerical simulations, this section provides some equations for readers that are 
familiar with economic models, although we hope that they are not necessary to 
understand the main arguments set forth in this chapter. 
 
Figure  7. Set-up of the model. 
 
k=28
Sweden
20
40
40
40
40
40
Denmark
 
Source: own illustration. 446 
 
Cheap hydroelectricity is produced in North Sweden and transported to South Sweden 
and further to Denmark via an interconnector, but transportation is limited by a 
transmission constraint within Sweden. North Sweden, South Sweden and Denmark 
are indicated with the letters N, S and D. We assume that production cost in North 
                                                           
445 The model has a simple radial network with one bottleneck, covering three regions. It neglects the fact that 
networks are meshed and that electricity flows distribute themselves on the network over multiple parallel paths 
depending on technical characteristics of the transmission lines (so called ‘loop flows’). We do not consider the 
effects on other neighbouring regions (e.g. Norway). Also, we do not investigate the case of several bottlenecks 
within Sweden.  
446 All figures and tables in chapter 4 are our own. 
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Sweden ( )NC q  and the utility functions in South Sweden and Denmark, ( )SU q  and 
( )DU q  can be represented by quadratic functions. The resulting competitive demand 
for energy in South Sweden and Denmark is represented by demand functions DS (p) 
and DD (p), while supply in North Sweden is given by SN (p).
447 The physical 
transmission limit is k. Table 6 provides the data of our numerical illustration.448  
 
Table 6. Data for the numerical illustration. 
 
PARAMETERS DESCRIPTION 
CN(q) = 
2
4
q  Total production cost in North Sweden (N) 
SN (p) = 2p Supply in North Sweden (N) 
US(q) = UD(q)=
2
2
40 qq -  Utility in South Sweden (S) and Denmark (D) 
DS (p) = DD (p) = 40 – p Demand in South Sweden (S) and Denmark (D) 
k = 28 
Physical transmission limit between North Sweden (N)      
and South Sweden (S) 
 
4.3.2. First-best 
 
Before analysing any scenario, we use an efficient outcome as a benchmark. In order 
to find it, we maximise total surplus449, which is equal to the utility of South Swedish 
                                                           
447 The demand function in South Sweden and Denmark should be thought of as net demand, i.e. for a given 
price level how much would the region import to satisfy demand, given local production at that price level. 
Similarly, supply in North Sweden should be considered as net supply. Note that electricity producers and 
consumers are price takers, hence we assume that there is no market power in the generation market.  
448 The demand function and the utility function are linked such that ( ) '( )D p q U q p= ⇔ = , in other words, the 
demand function is the inverse of the marginal utility function. Similarly, the supply function is the inverse of 
the marginal cost function.  
449 Total surplus is a measure of the society’s economic well-being. It is equal to the amount consumer are 
willing to pay for electricity that they receive minus the total production cost for producing this electricity. It can 
also be expressed as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and TSO surplus. Consumer surplus is the 
amount a consumer is willing to pay for electricity minus the amount the consumer actually pays for it. Producer 
surplus is the amount a generator is paid for electricity minus his production costs. In other words, consumer 
surplus is a benefit that consumers receive from participating in the electricity market and producer surplus is a 
benefit that generators receive from selling their electricity. TSO surplus is equal to amount the TSO is paid for 
transporting electricity, as we assume in our model that there are no transportation costs in the short run. See 
also N.G. MANKIW, Principles of Economics, 2nd ed., South-Western College Publishing, Boston (MA) 2000, 
p. 152. 
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and Danish consumers minus the production cost of North Swedish producers, subject 
to the transmission constraint. Hence, the following optimisation problem has to be 
solved:  
 
,
max ( ) ( ) ( )
. . ( )
S D
S S D D N S Dq q
S D
U q U q C q q
s t q q k l
+ - +
+ Ł
 
 
The first order conditions of this optimisation problem are the following equalities: 
 
 '( ) '( ) '( )S D NU q U q C q l= = +  
 
with l being the Lagrange multiplier of the transmission constraints.450 This equation 
shows that in order to achieve efficient allocation, the marginal utility of energy in 
South Sweden should be equal to the marginal utility in Denmark. As consumers in S 
and D have the same marginal utility for energy, reallocation of cheap energy from 
North Sweden between those two regions cannot improve total surplus. The allocation 
is thus Pareto optimal.451 If cheap energy in the North is abundant and transmission 
capacity is relatively small, then the transmission constraint will be binding and the 
Lagrange multiplier will be positive: 0l > . The positive multiplier reflects the 
scarcity of transmission capacity, which makes the marginal utility of consumption in 
S and D larger than the marginal cost of production in N. If transmission capacity is 
abundant, and cheap production capacity is limited, then the Lagrange multiplier is 
zero, and the marginal utility in S and D should be equal to the marginal production 
cost in N. 
 
With the parameters of our model (see Table 6), cheap energy in North Sweden is 
abundant, and the transmission line is used at full capacity to export cheap energy 
                                                           
450 The first order conditions are a set of mathematically necessary conditions for an optimum. They roughly 
impose that around the optimum the objective function is flat. Lagrange multipliers are used to describe the first 
order conditions of maximum of a function subject to constraints. The Lagrange multiplier has an economic 
interpretation as it represents the marginal surplus that would be created by relaxing the constraint. It is 
therefore often also called the shadow price of a constraint.  
451 In a Pareto optimal allocation, no one can be made better off without making at least one individual worse 
off.  
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from North Sweden to South Sweden and Denmark, i.e. 28S Dq q k+ = = . This 
cheap energy should then be allocated efficiently between South Sweden and 
Denmark. This requires that '( ) 40 '( ) 40S s S D D DU q q U q q= - = = - , which 
simplifies to S Dq q= . This is intuitive. As consumers in S and D have the same 
utility function, they should both receive 50% of the energy which can be transported 
from the North. North Sweden exports 28 units, and South Sweden and Denmark each 
consume 14 units (Figure  8). Under the efficient allocation, the marginal utility for 
electricity in South Sweden and Denmark ( '(14) '(14)S DU U= ) is 26 and the marginal 
cost of production in North Sweden '(28)NC  is 14. The difference between the 
marginal valuation for energy in S and D, and the marginal production cost in N, is the 
scarcity price of transmission, i.e. the Lagrange multiplier ( 26 14 12l = - = ).  
 
Figure  8. First-best outcome: Marginal valuation and marginal costs are presented 
inside the squares. Each square represents a region. Energy flows are represented by 
arrows.  
 
       
14
26
26
k=28
14
14
28
 
 
Figure  9 shows the total surplus obtained in the market in the first-best situation. 
Consumers in South Sweden and Denmark enjoy the benefit of consuming electricity, 
while there is a cost of producing electricity in North Sweden. Utility in South 
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Sweden is illustrated by the green area in the middle graph of Figure  9. This area is 
equal to (14) 462
S
U = . Danish utility is identical (right graph). The red triangle shows 
production costs in North Sweden, which are equal to (28) 196
N
C = . Total surplus in the 
first-best amounts to 728.   
 
Note that in the first best outcome we determine a Pareto optimal allocation of 
transmission capacity and energy. We do not specify how the total surplus is divided 
between the different actors in the model, or the mechanism that was used to achieve 
this outcome. In particular we do not assume a specific pricing structure.  
 
Figure  9. First-best: gross consumer surplus and production costs. 
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4.3.3. Scenarios 
 
SvK’s key task as a Transmission System Operator (TSO) is the transmission of 
power on the national grid and to ensure that the system remains balanced, i.e. that 
electricity production and consumption for Sweden match at all times.452 To avoid line 
overload, SvK needs to relieve congestion on bottlenecks. There are at least three 
methods of congestion management commonly used by network operators: 1) market 
                                                           
452  So called ‘overall system reliability’, The Swedish Electricity Act, SFS 1997:857, 20.11.1997, Article 8(1). 
See also http://www.svk.se/Start/English/About-us/ accessed 20.05.2012. 
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splitting, 2) congestion shifting and 3) counter-trading.453 These methods can, and in 
practice often are, combined.  
 
First of all, in the day-ahead market,454 a network operator can split the market into 
two different price areas with the bottleneck as a ‘border’ between them. Thus, the 
day-ahead price is set for each area separately, in order to influence demand and 
supply curves, and consequently ensure that transmission remains within the limits of 
the physical capability of the bottleneck. This price is higher than the system price455 
on one side of the bottleneck, in the import-constrained area (deficit area), and lower 
on the other side of the bottleneck, in the export-constrained area (surplus area). Thus, 
the flows of electricity between the two areas are adjusted. This market-clearing 
mechanism eliminates congestion.456 Transmission of electricity from the surplus area 
to the deficit area generates extra revenue, equal to price difference between the two 
zones multiplied by the volume of electricity transmitted between these zones. This 
revenue, called congestion rents, goes to the network operator. Under the current EU 
regime, it can only be used for guaranteeing capacity, building infrastructure or 
lowering the network tariff.457 When no congestion occurs between the two zones, 
they will have the same price458 and no congestion rent arises. 
                                                           
453 Investment in the network (new transmission lines) would increase its physical transmission capability and 
hence, relieve congestion in the long run. In the short run, another method to deal with congestion is to perform 
an intended power outage in area of high consumption (rolling blackout or load shedding). Since this method 
leaves some customers without electricity, it should be considered a measure of last resort. In fact, TSOs allow 
for load shedding only in emergency situations to avoid total system blackout. See Nordic Competition 
Authorities, Capacity for Competition. Investing for an Efficient Nordic Electricity Market,  Report 1/2007, pp. 
35-37. 
454 Elspot, the main platform for trading electricity in the Nordic region, is organised as a day-ahead auction. 
Elspot is the market for electricity to be delivered the following day, or, to be more specific, the auction for 
electricity 24 hours in advance of actual delivery in a given time in any day. Power generators offer electricity 
on this auction based on their ability to produce energy for a specific period on the following day. 
455 The electricity reference price for all the Nordic region (the system price) is calculated based on all the 
supply and demand bids for electricity that will be delivered the following day disregarding transmission 
network constraints between or within the Nordic countries. If there is no congestion, electricity prices in all the 
Nordic countries equal the system price. If, however, congestion occurs on the network, the Nordic region 
subdivides into separate price areas (price zones), whereby some countries constitute one price area each and 
other countries (Denmark, Norway and from 11.2011 – also Sweden) are further subdivided into smaller price 
zones. 
456 Elspot market closes (in other words, ‘clears’) after all the day-ahead supply and demand bids have been 
collected and the system price (market-clearing price) is set at a level, at which quantity of electricity supplied 
equals the quantity of electricity demanded. Energy firms do not only trade in the centralised power market 
Elspot, but can also trade bilaterally within a price zone.  
457 As required by Article 16(6) of Regulation 714/2009, supra n. 91. This provision was already in force at the 
time of the case (see Article 6(6) of Regulation 1228/2003, supra n. 73) In line with this regulation, SvK, 
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Secondly, still in the day-ahead market, a network operator can reduce trading 
capacities with other price zones; in our case with neighbouring countries. By 
declaring lower cross-border capacities, it limits export out of the country and reduces 
demand for transmission capacity within the country. However, it creates congestion 
at the national borders. In other words, it ‘shifts’ internal congestion to 
interconnectors. Cross-border congestion splits the regional market into different price 
zones along national borders, but preserves a single price within a country. Given that 
the interconnector is now congested and the prices in the two interconnected countries 
differ, any cross-border transmission of electricity between these countries generates 
congestion rents as well. These cross-border congestion rents are shared between the 
network operators of the two interconnected countries. 
 
Finally, a network operator can manage congestion by influencing production levels 
of market players on both sides of the bottleneck once the day-ahead market has 
closed, that is, by counter-trading in real-time.459 This is done by, for instance, buying 
expensive electricity from generators on the deficit side of the bottleneck and selling it 
at a loss on the surplus side. The generators in the import-constrained area are thus 
paid to generate more than they initially committed to in the day-ahead market. On the 
other side of the bottleneck, in the export-constrained area, generators are paid to 
generate less. Therefore the generation system is re-dispatched, but the electricity 
price, at which consumers bought electricity in the day-ahead market, remains 
unchanged and is equal for all customers on both sides of the bottleneck.460 Only the 
re-dispatched volumes are priced differently. As the TSO buys expensive energy and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
together with other Nordic TSOs, decided to use congestion rents for investments to strengthen the grid and 
interconnectors. This also refers to congestion rents collected from internal bottlenecks, once market splitting is 
implemented. See Energy Markets Inspectorate, The Swedish electricity and natural gas markets 2010, Report 
No. EI R2011:09, CM Gruppen, Bromma 2011, p. 20. 
458 It must be noted that ‘bidding zones’ is a more precise term than ‘price zones’, as sometimes prices are the 
same across all zones, even if market splitting is in place. Such situations occur when there is no congestion in 
the network. However, for simplicity, we use the term ‘price zone’ throughout this chapter.  
459 Electricity is mainly traded on the day-ahead market. However, in case imbalances occur after the day-ahead 
market clears, the TSO can buy or sell electricity in real-time, that is, close to delivery time, to bring the market 
back in balance. This is known as the regulating market, where the network operator collects upward and 
downward regulating bids from the balance providers (flexible generators). Since 1999 there is an additional 
market in Sweden (Elbas) which operates after day-ahead market.  
460 In practice, a very small number of large industrial consumers might also be able to reduce or increase 
demand in real-time. In that case, those consumers will also receive some extra revenue.  
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sells it cheaply, counter-trading is costly for the TSO. This cost is then passed on to 
the Swedish grid users through a higher transmission network tariff. Counter-trading 
creates extra revenue for generators. In surplus regions they get paid to produce less. 
In deficit areas they receive a higher price to produce additional amounts. The net 
effect is a transfer from consumers to generators. It must be noted that TSO not only 
incurs costs due to counter-trading, but also has no congestion rents, as neither the 
internal transmission lines nor the interconnectors are congested in the day-ahead 
market. In this chapter we look at four scenarios resulting from the SvK case. Each 
scenario involves an application of one or more of the above mentioned congestion 
management methods. First, we consider a scenario of counter-trading with full 
congestion shifting (1st scenario), which corresponds to SvK’s alleged abuse. Then we 
turn to the analysis of commitments. In the context of the interim remedy, we compare 
two cases: counter-trading without congestion shifting (2nd scenario) and counter-
trading with partial congestion shifting (3rd scenario). With regard to the final remedy, 
we study the impact of market splitting (4th scenario). The scenarios are summarised 
in Table 7. In the next section we present each scenario separately and explain how 
those scenarios are linked with the case. Each scenario makes particular assumptions 
about the behaviour of SvK, i.e. it specifies the actions SvK would take. We discuss 
whether such actions are consistent with the likely objectives of SvK in section 4.4.5, 
where we also talk about the regulatory context.  
 
Table 7. Four scenarios. 
 
1. CT with full 
CS 
2. CT without 
CS 
3. CT with some 
CS 
4. Market 
Splitting 
Congestion management  
used within Sweden 
CT is in place, 
but not used 
CT is used CT is used market splitting 
Available capacity between 
Sweden and Denmark in the 
day-ahead market 
2 units unlimited 14 units unlimited 
Link with the case alleged abuse 
interim remedy 
as implemented 
optimal interim 
remedy 
final remedy 
Note: CT – counter-trading. CS – congestion shifting. 
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4.4. RESULTS 
 
4.4.1. Counter-trading with full congestion shifting (alleged abuse) 
 
Sweden used to be a single price area in the Nordic power market.461 Since the 
country was not subdivided into separate price zones, SvK dealt with internal 
congestion using the two remaining congestion methods: 1) shifting congestion to the 
borders and 2) counter-trading. However, SvK relied mainly on the first method. 
Capacity limits for the Øresund interconnector were set both by SvK as well as the 
Danish network operator. If the numbers were different from each other, the lower 
capacity applied. Declared capacity limitations were made public before the day-
ahead market closed. Where capacity reduction at the borders was insufficient to 
eliminate all internal congestion, SvK counter-traded in real-time between the 
southern areas of high energy consumption, and the northern areas with a surplus of 
generation.462 SvK argued in the case that counter-trading should not be (and, in fact, 
was not) employed excessively, for the following reasons. Firstly, SvK claimed that it 
is not always technically feasible. It depends on the availability of suitable generating 
units in a given hour and in a given location.463 464 Secondly, according to SvK, 
counter-trading conceals locational signals from market players.465 Lastly, SvK 
complained that the cost of counter-trading is borne only by the Swedish grid users 
                                                           
461 According to SvK, market splitting has not been yet introduced in Sweden due to the lack of sufficient 
liquidity and competition both in the day-ahead market as well as in intraday and balancing markets (real-time). 
See the explanations of SvK’s Director General, Mikael Odenberg, to the Commission in a letter of 22.05.2008, 
Case No 39351 – Øresund interconnector, 356/2006/MA30, available at 
http://www.svk.se/Global/02_Press_Info/Pdf/remissvar/080522_KOM.pdf accessed 20.05.2013. However, the 
introduction of market splitting has been much debated in the Swedish and in the Nordic market in the recent 
years and the Commission’s antitrust intervention played an important role in this debate. We elaborate on this 
in chapter 5. 
462 Energy Markets Inspectorate, The Swedish electricity and natural gas markets 2009, Report No. EI 
R2010:12, Åtta45, Eskilstuna 2010, p. 14. See also Svenska Kraftnät, Swedish Interconnectors – COMP CASE 
NO 39351: Background explanations submitted by Svenska Kraftnät regarding the offered commitments for this 
case, 356/2006/MA30, 01.10.2009, available at  
http://www.svk.se/Global/02_Press_Info/091001_Background_document.pdf accessed 20.05.2013, p. 10, 12 
and 24.  
463 Suitable generation units are referred to as regulating resources, which are generation units that can increase 
or decrease production or consumption of electricity at short notice, and which can therefore be used for 
regulation. See Svenska Kraftnät, Background explanations, supra n. 462, p. 5. 
464 Svenska Kraftnät, Background explanations, supra n. 462, p. 27.  
465 See letter of M. Odenberg, supra n. 461. 
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(via a higher network tariff), and not, for instance, Danish grid users, who also benefit 
from it.466 467 
 
However, faced with Swedish export restrictions, Denmark needed to increase its 
domestic production, having recourse to more expensive thermal generation. 
Therefore, SvK’s actions may have contributed to higher and more volatile electricity 
prices in Denmark. 
 
In this section we analyse congestion shifting, which is designed to relieve all internal 
congestion and to remove the need for counter-trading.468 How would such a 
congestion shift affect prices, and total welfare, in our simplified model? In this 
scenario, illustrated by Figure  10, transmission capacity is fully used to transport 
cheap electricity from North Sweden, ( )NC p k= . North Sweden produces as much 
electricity as the physical transmission allows (28 units). At this production level, the 
price in North Sweden is 14 (see Figure  10). Since, in the final outcome, there must 
be a uniform price within the country, the price in South Sweden must also equal 14. 
At this price level, South Sweden imports (14) 26SD =  units from North Sweden. 
                                                           
466 See Svenska Kraftnät, The Complaint from Dansk Energi regarding the effects on the Danish electricity 
market of Svenska Kraftnät’s congestion management methods, Document Ref. SvK200 v 1 0 2006-07-24, 
13.11.2006. 
 http://www.svk.se/global/01_om_oss/pdf/nattjanst/svar_danskarna2006.pdf accessed 20.05.2013, pp. 8-9. 
467 We do not believe that giving locational signals is a clear argument in favour of congestion shifting in 
comparison with counter-trading. If the network operator counter-trades, some generators in South Sweden will 
be paid a high price to relieve congestion. This should give them an investment incentive. In case the network 
operator shifts congestion to the borders, those generators face a low and country-wide uniform price and will 
not invest in additional capacity. However, for North Sweden the results are opposite. In case of counter-trading, 
generators can benefit from high energy prices, even if transmission capacity is unavailable to transport energy. 
So we might see too many investments. In case of congestion shifting, prices will be lower in North Sweden. 
468 SvK claims to have carried out counter-trading to some extent. See Svenska Kraftnät, Background 
explanations, supra n. 462, p. 24. This is a common practice in the Nordic market. The Nordic network 
operators use counter-trading to handle temporary and non-structural bottlenecks within their price areas. 
Sweden experiences recurrent bottlenecks of a structural nature. In such cases, day-ahead methods like market 
splitting and congestion shifting often eliminate the need for counter-trading in real-time. See Nordic 
Competition Authorities, Capacity for Competition, supra n. 453, p. 35 and 37. Accordingly, the model does not 
take account of instances, where some counter-trading takes place. Rather it reflects an extreme case where the 
network operator shifts all congestion to the border and hence, no counter-trading needs to be carried out. This 
reflects also the Commission’s preliminary assessment: Between 01.2002 and 04.2008, SvK used to relieve the 
congestion in the grid by reducing export capacity on several interconnectors, thereby reducing the cost of 
counter-trading and keeping low day-ahead prices in Sweden. The initial complaint of the DaE concerned only 
the Øresund interconnector. However, the Commission broadened the scope of its investigation, including all 
interconnectors managed by SvK. Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 38-40. 
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This leaves only 2 units of transmission capacity that can be used for transporting 
cheap energy from North Sweden to Denmark ( (14) 2Sk D− = ) Thus, the Swedish 
network operator declares that only 2 units of capacity are available at the border with 
Denmark. In the day-ahead market, Danish consumers import 2 units from Sweden, 
and the price in Denmark is 38 ( (2) 38DD = ). Given the production level in North 
Sweden (28 units), there is no congestion within the country, and the network operator 
does not need to counter-trade.  
 
Figure  10. Counter-trading with full congestion shifting: regional prices, import and 
export quantities (left: day-ahead market, right: counter-trading). 
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Figure  11 presents surpluses in each of the three regions.469 These results are 
summarised in the first column of Table 8, which serves as a reference for all 
scenarios. The upper half of the table presents producer surplus in North Sweden, 
consumer surplus in South Sweden and Denmark, and the surplus of the network 
operator. Note that we only look at the effect of price levels on consumer surplus and 
producer surplus. Congestion shifting might affect price volatility, which, if firms are 
risk averse, will reduce overall welfare. As a matter of fact, Danish energy traders 
claimed to have incurred losses due to unexpected price swings, which increased the 
                                                           
469 Producer surplus in North Sweden is ½ × 14 × 28 = 196. Consumer surplus in South Sweden equals ½ × 26 × 
26 = 338 and in Denmark ½ × 2 × 2 = 2. The network operator receives congestion rents on the interconnector 
equal to the price difference times the quantity transported: (38 – 14) × 2 = 48. 
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cost of insuring against price uncertainty.470 This is neglected in our simple 
presentation. We only illustrate that, due to import restrictions, prices in Denmark are 
high, and consumer surplus is low. In addition, somewhat counter-intuitively, Danish 
energy producers also complained about congestion shifting, because the actions of 
the Swedish TSO decreased market transparency.471  
 
In order to better understand the possible incentives of the actors, the second part of 
Table 8 presents total surplus of all Swedish network users (aggregated), consumer 
surplus of the Danes and the revenue of each network operator. We assume that cross-
border congestion rents are shared equally between the Swedish and the Danish TSOs, 
while the congestion rents from the internal bottleneck go to the Swedish network 
operator only.472 Similarly, the cost of counter-trading is allocated to the Swedish 
TSO. We neglect the fact that, in the long run, the Swedish network operator will pass 
on higher costs to the grid users by increasing transmission tariffs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
470 Copenhagen Economics estimates that the (within-day) volatility of prices in eastern Denmark has been 
150% larger in congested hours compared to non-congested hours. See Copenhagen Economics, supra n. 441, 
pp. 55-61. 
471 One could rather expect that Danish energy producers benefit from the Swedish exports limits as they receive 
a higher day-ahead price for their electricity in Denmark. See DaE’s complaint, supra n. 442, p. 1. 
472 In practice, Nord Pool Spot collects all congestion rents (also generated by the internal bottlenecks) and re-
distributes them among the TSOs. Under the new regime (in force since 2012) congestion rents from an 
interconnector are shared equally between the two TSOs affected, that is, co-owners of the interconnector. 
Congestion rents from internal bottlenecks in Norway and Sweden are paid to Statnett and SvK, respectively. 
The old rules on congestion rent-sharing were more complex, but in principle they do not go against our 
assumptions. According to a common agreement between the Nordic TSOs for years 2006-2011, the system of 
cost-sharing was based on two formulas. Under the first formula, bottleneck income was divided between all 
Nordic TSOs according to their expected investment costs related to five prioritised grid investments. Under the 
second formula, bottleneck income was shared equally between two affected TSOs. Both formulas were applied 
during the contract period, with a stepwise changeover from formula 1 to formula 2. More details can be found 
at http://www.nordpoolspot.com accessed 20.05.2013. 
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Table 8. Numerical results for 4 scenarios. Note that total surplus in first-best is 728. 
 
 1. CT with full CS 2. CT without CS 3. CT with some CS 4. MS 
PS North Sweden 196 436 340 196 
CS South Sweden 338 272 274 98 
CS Denmark 2 200 98 98 
Revenue Swedish 
+ Danish TSO 
48 -216 16 336 
     
Sweden (CS + PS) 534 708 614 294 
Swedish TSO 24 - 216 - 40 336 
Sweden TOTAL 558 492 574 630 
Denmark CS 2 200 98 98 
Danish TSO 24 0 56 0 
Denmark TOTAL 26 200 154 98 
     
TOTAL 
SURPLUS  
TSO, consumers 
and producers 
584 692 728 728 
Efficiency? Inefficient Inefficient Efficient Efficient 
Note: CT – counter-trading; CS – consumer surplus; MS – market splitting; PS – producer surplus 
 
 
Figure  11. Counter-trading with full congestion shifting: producer surplus and 
consumer surplus. 
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It becomes clear that this scenario is not optimal, once we juxtapose it with the first-
best (compare Figure  8 with Figure  10, and Figure  9 with Figure  11). The level of 
total market surplus in the first-best scenario is equal to 728, while the surplus here is 
only 584. Even though the transmission line between North Sweden and South 
Sweden is used at full capacity, transferred electricity is not allocated efficiently 
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between South Sweden and Denmark. Congestion at the border with Denmark results 
in an inefficient use of resources, as Denmark has to use more expensive domestic 
generation to meet the country’s electricity demand. Danish consumption is smaller 
than in the first-best scenario, and the electricity price in Denmark is high. Contrary to 
this, Swedish consumers benefit from a relatively low price. The Swedish network 
operator receives congestion rents at the border and does not have to counter-trade, 
which reduces its costs.473 In the long run, Swedish grid users will pay a low network 
tariff. Nevertheless, the network is used inefficiently. The source of the inefficiency is 
that consumers in South Sweden do not internalise the negative consequences of 
reducing the available transmission capacity for Danish consumers, if they consume 
more. Hence, their consumption creates a negative externality.474  
 
4.4.2. Counter-trading without congestion shifting (the interim remedy as 
implemented) 
 
Since full congestion shifting resulted in an inefficient outcome, we will now consider 
the other extreme: counter-trading without congestion shifting. This scenario 
corresponds to the interim remedy offered by SvK to the Commission. Between April 
2010 and November 2011, that is, in the period preceding the introduction of market 
splitting, SvK committed to reduce transmission flow on internal bottlenecks 
primarily by counter-trading, subject to availability of regulating resources.475 In 
practice, in the day-ahead market, whenever SvK anticipated internal congestion in 
the grid, it was first supposed to calculate the corresponding amount for cross-border 
reduction necessary to relieve it. Then, instead of shifting congestion to the borders, 
SvK committed to counter-trade, using regulating resources located both in Sweden, 
                                                           
473 Note that congestion shifting gives considerable revenues also to the Danish network operator, as capacity at 
the border is relatively scarce. 
474 A negative externality is a negative side effect of the consumption of a product on a third party. Negative 
externalities are common in an environmental context (pollution). When economic agents do not take into 
account the negative externality of their consumption of a product, the level of consumption of this product will 
be larger than the social optimum. In order to achieve a socially efficient outcome, those agents need to 
internalise the externality, so that they take into account the effect of their actions on third parties. This could be 
done for instance by imposing a tax on the good (‘the polluter pays principle’) or by the creation of clear 
property rights.  
475 Note 463 above. 
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as well as in neighbouring countries. Cross-border capacity reduction was allowed 
only in case no suitable generation was available for counter-trading. In this section, 
we analyse the scenario in which there are sufficient regulating resources on the one 
hand and no congestion shifting on the other, as preferred by the Commission. In 
practice, however, these factors may not always be in place.476  
 
Figure  12 depicts this scenario. In the day-ahead market there is only one clearing 
price for Sweden and Denmark, as there is no congestion in the network. As supply 
equals total demand, ( ) ( ) ( )S DD p D p S p+ = , the uniform day-ahead price is equal to 
20.477 South Sweden and Denmark each imports 20 units of energy, and North 
Sweden produces 40 units of energy. However, the transfer of 40 units to the southern 
areas is physically unfeasible, as total transmission capacity between North and South 
Sweden is only 28k =  units. In order to deal with congestion, the network operator 
needs to rely on counter-trading in real-time. It buys 12 units of energy in South 
Sweden and sells it in North Sweden at a loss (Figure  12, right graph). The price of 
counter-traded energy in South Sweden will be higher as energy becomes scarcer, and 
lower in North Sweden as energy becomes more abundant.478 
 
 
                                                           
476 Even though SvK committed to deal with internal congestion primarily through counter-trading, it made a 
reservation that there may still remain an amount of reduction on interconnectors. See Commission Decision, 
supra n. 439, par. 49. The model, however, assumes that all internal congestion is relieved through counter-
trading within Sweden and capacity reductions do not occur at the borders. In practice, throughout the interim 
phase, SvK did shift congestion to the borders, whereas counter-trading could not be carried out, most often due 
to unavailability of suitable regulating resources in a given area. See Svenska Kraftnät, Swedish Interconnectors 
– COMP Case No 39.351, Monitoring Reports, 1-7, 2009/481, available at 
http://www.svk.se/Start/English/Energy-Market/Electricity/Bakgrund/ accessed 20.05.2013. 
477 For this discussion we assume that generators in South Sweden are myopic when they offer energy in the 
day-ahead market. They could realise that the value of energy in the counter-trading market is 32, and they 
should therefore be unwilling to sell their volumes in the day-ahead market at a price of 20. We also assume that 
generators in North Sweden do not behave strategically. They could pretend to have an even lower cost and 
produce more than 40 units, as in the counter-trading market they would be compensated for reducing their 
production.  
478 Note that demand function ( )
S
D p  in South Sweden presents net demand, i.e. local demand minus local 
production at a certain price level. Hence, if the network operator buys energy in South Sweden, this could mean 
in practice that some consumers forgo consumption, or equivalently, that local production has increased.  
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Figure  12. Counter-trading without congestion shifting: regional prices, import and 
export quantities (left: day-ahead market, right: counter-trading. 
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In South Sweden demand needs to be reduced from 20 units to 8. In order to do so, the 
network operator offers a price p to all consumers who are willing to resell their 
energy. This price should be such that the marginal consumer is just willing to resell 
its energy, hence ( ) 8SD p = , and the price 32p = . At this price, consumers sell 12 
units of energy to the network operator. Those consumers, who bought energy at a 
price of 20 and then resell it to the network operator at a price of 32, make a resale 
profit which is indicated by the orange square in the bottom middle graph of Figure  
13. After counter-trading has taken place, consumers in South Sweden with a 
valuation larger than 32 will consume 8 units. They bought this energy at a day-ahead 
price of 20, and their consumer surplus is indicated by the trapezoid in the blue dotted 
line.479  
 
In North Sweden the network operator sells 12 units of energy at a price of 14. Instead 
of producing energy themselves, some generators shut down production and buy the 
energy from the TSO. In this way, they save on production costs. Those producers buy 
12 units of energy from the network operator at a price of 14, but already have sold 
these units at a price of 20. Thus, they make a profit which is indicated by the orange 
                                                           
479 Total consumer surplus equals 272, and is the sum of resale profit (12 × (32 – 20) = 144) and net consumer 
surplus (½ × 8 × 8 + 12 × 8 = 128). 
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rectangle in the bottom left graph of Figure  13. Total production in North Sweden is 
reduced to 28 units. Producers have sold this energy at a price of 20 in the day-ahead 
market. Their surplus from producing energy is equal to the surface of the trapezoid 
with the blue dotted line. Total producer surplus in North Sweden is the sum of 
production surplus and trading surplus.480  
 
However, the network operator makes a loss, as it buys 12 units of energy in South 
Sweden at a price of 32 and sells them in North Sweden at a price of 14. On the top of 
that, it does not receive any rents from the cross-border trade with Denmark, since the 
interconnector is not congested. Consumer surplus of the Danes is not affected by the 
Swedish counter-trading and remains equal to the green triangle in the bottom right 
figure. The calculations for the second scenario are summed up in Table 8, second 
column.481 
                                                           
480 Total producers surplus (436) is the sum of trading surplus (12 × (20 – 14) = 72) and net producers surplus 
(½ × 14 × 28 + 6 × 28 = 364). 
481 Danish consumer surplus is equal to ½ × 20 × 20 = 200, and the counter-trading losses for the network 
operator are equal to 12 × (32 – 14) = 216. 
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Figure  13. Counter-trading without congestion shifting: producer surplus and 
consumer surplus. 
  
40
20
20
q
40
20
40
20
20
q
40
40
828
14
20
40
p
q
p
q
p
q
p
North South Denmark
40
20
20
q
40
40
North South Denmark
40
20
20
32
DAY AHEAD MARKET
COUNTER TRADING
 
 
In this scenario, Danish consumers benefit from a low energy price (20). Also 
consumers in South Sweden can buy electricity at a relatively low price (20), and 
some of them are subsidised for reducing their consumption. Energy exporters in 
North Sweden receive a relatively high price (20) for their production, while some 
firms are subsidised in order not to produce. The network operator incurs a loss as 
counter-trading is costly. In practice, the losses of the network operator are passed on 
to network users through higher network tariffs. As we are unable to identify the 
incidence of this higher network tariffs, we assume that the cost of counter trading is 
borne by the network operator. 
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However, relieving internal congestion solely through counter-trading does not result 
in an efficient outcome. Even though the interconnector between Denmark and 
Sweden is not congested, the price in Denmark is lower than the counter-trading price 
in South Sweden. In our simple simulation exercise, the total market surplus under 
this scenario (692) is higher than in the case of full congestion shifting described 
above (584). But it does not necessarily mean that this will always be the case. Overall 
welfare may also be reduced.482 The basic efficiency problem is the opposite of the 
previous scenario. If the network operator does not shift congestion to the border, 
Danish consumers will not internalise the fact that they create congestion within 
Sweden, and will therefore consume too much energy. 
 
4.4.3. Counter-trading with partial congestion shifting (the optimal interim remedy) 
 
Neither of the two extremes (congestion shifting vs. counter-trading) is socially 
optimal. However, these two congestion methods, once combined, may result in an 
efficient allocation. In this section, we present an optimal interim remedy that the 
Commission did not go for.  
 
For the desirable outcome to take place, the Swedish network operator has to shift 
some internal congestion to the border with Denmark. As Figure  14 demonstrates, in 
the efficient scenario, the TSO declares that only 14 units of capacity are available at 
the border with Denmark, i.e. the same amount as Denmark would import in the first 
best scenario (Figure  8). Any other level of available capacity (k ≠ 14) would reduce 
total welfare. If the network operator declared a smaller capacity (k<14), the price in 
Denmark would be higher than the counter-trading price in South Sweden, which 
would be inefficient. If it declared more available capacities (k>14), then the price in 
Denmark would be lower than the counter-trading price in South Sweden, which 
would be inefficient as well.  
 
                                                           
482 This will vary depending on, for instance, the precise shape of the demand functions in South Sweden and 
Denmark, and the relative size of the markets.  
 190 
Once the Swedish TSO declares k = 14, Denmark imports 14 units from Sweden, and 
the day-ahead price in Denmark is 26, as (26) 14DD = . In the day-ahead market, it is 
assumed that there is no congestion within Sweden, and therefore there is a uniform 
energy price in Sweden. The day-ahead price is found by equaling supply and 
demand, while taking into account that demand by Danish consumers is equal to the 
available cross-border capacity ( ) ( ) 14( Danish Demand)N SS p D p= + = . This results 
in a Swedish day-ahead price of p=18. With this price, total production in North 
Sweden is (18) 36S =  and demand in South Sweden is (18) 22SD = .  See Figure  14, left 
graph. 
 
Figure  14. Counter-trading with partial congestion shifting: regional prices, import 
and export quantities (left: day-ahead market, right: counter-trading). 
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South Sweden and Denmark together import 36 units from North Sweden, that is, 8 
units above the transmission limit. In order to deal with this congestion, the network 
operator again resorts to counter-trading. It buys 8 units of energy in South Sweden 
and sells it in North Sweden at a loss (Figure  14, right graph). Counter-trading prices 
differ within Sweden: in the South they go up and in the North they go down. Some 
consumers in South Sweden, who bought energy at a price of 18 in the day-ahead 
market, agree to resell it at a price of 26 in counter-trading. They make a trading 
profit, equal to the orange rectangle in the bottom middle graph of Figure  15. The 
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surplus of consumers from consuming energy in South Sweden is equal to the 
trapezoid in the blue dotted line. Total consumer surplus is the sum of both areas.483 
 
Some generators in North Sweden shut down their power plants and buy 8 units of 
electricity from the network operator at a price of 14. Since they have already sold 
these units at a day-ahead price of 18, they make a profit, indicated by an orange 
rectangle in the bottom left graph of Figure  15. The producer surplus from producing 
electricity in North Sweden is equal to the trapezoid in the blue dotted lined. Total 
surplus is the sum of both areas.484 
 
The network operator buys 8 units of energy in South Sweden at a price of 26 and 
sells them in North Sweden at a loss for a price of 14. However, it earns congestion 
rents in the day-ahead market from the cross-border trade with Denmark. It gets the 
price difference for each capacity unit that it exports. Counter-trading costs are born 
completely by the Swedish network operator, while the cross-border congestion 
revenues are shared equally between the Danish and the Swedish TSO. Consumer 
surplus in Denmark remains the same as in the day-ahead market, and is equal to the 
green rectangle in the bottom right figure.485  
 
As the transmission line is used at full capacity and the South Swedish and Danish 
consumers consume identical amounts, this outcome is efficient. The total market 
surplus is therefore equal to the one in the first-best allocation. Table 8, third column, 
presents the results for this scenario.  
 
                                                           
483 Total consumer surplus (274) is the sum of trading surplus (8 × (26 – 18)) and net consumer surplus (½ × 14 
× 14 + 8 × 14). 
484 Under the same assumptions. See note 477 above. Total surplus in North Sweden (340) is the sum of trading 
surplus (8 × (18 – 14)) and net producer surplus (½ × 14 × 28 + 4 × 28). 
485 Overall, the network operator makes a surplus of 16, which is the sum of cross-border congestion rents (14 × 
(26 – 18)) minus counter-trading losses (12 × (26 – 14)). Danish consumer surplus is ½ × 14 × 14 = 98. 
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Figure  15. Counter-trading with partial congestion shifting: producer surplus and 
consumer surplus. 
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This result shows that a combination of congestion shifting and counter-trading does 
not necessarily lead to inefficient use of network resources. In order to obtain an 
efficient outcome, the Swedish network operator has to shift part of its internal 
congestion to the border with Denmark. By reducing available cross-border capacity, 
the Swedish TSO can ensure that the Danes internalise the cost of congestion they 
create inside Sweden. In order to know how much congestion the network operator 
should shift to the border to achieve the social optimum, it needs to invest in 
collecting information on the demand functions in South Sweden and in Denmark. 
The network operator should therefore only declare available capacity, once it has 
collected information about the demand levels in the market.  
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Note that the efficient outcome implies that Swedish and Danish consumers have non-
discriminatory access to the transmission capacity. The counter-trading price in S is 
26, which is equal to the day-ahead price in D. However, Swedish network users pay a 
price of 18 which is lower than the Danish price 26. This is the consequence of the 
Swedish policy of having a uniform price. Hence, this outcome might suggest 
discrimination between Danish and Swedish consumers. However, in order to achieve 
a uniform price, the Swedish network operator incurs counter-trading losses, which it 
recovers in the long run from the Swedish network users by charging them higher 
transmission tariffs. Hence overall, consumers in South Sweden are not necessarily 
better off than their Danish counterparts.  
 
4.4.4. Market splitting (final remedy) 
 
Our fourth and last scenario is market splitting, the final remedy accepted by the 
Commission in the SvK case. As a result of negotiations with the Commission, SvK 
agreed to subdivide the Swedish electricity market into several price zones, and to 
manage domestic congestion without limiting trading capacity on interconnectors. 
This new market system, according to which Sweden was split into four price areas, 
was introduced in November 2011.486 In cases where internal congestion occurs 
within a price zone, SvK committed not to reduce capacity on the interconnectors, but 
to carry out counter-trading within these zones to relieve it. 
 
Market splitting results in an efficient allocation, in the same way that the optimal 
combination of congestion shifting and counter-trading does. Whenever there is 
congestion on the line between North Sweden and South Sweden, the network 
operator splits the market into two price areas, as presented in Figure  16. As a result, 
there is a uniform price of 26 in South Sweden and Denmark, while the price in North 
Sweden is 14. North Sweden exports a surplus of 28 units, which is imported in South 
Sweden (14 units) and Denmark (14 units). 
                                                           
486 The four price areas from north to south are SE1 (Luleå), SE2 (Sundsvall), SE3 (Stockholm) and SE4 
(Malmö). 
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Figure  16. Market splitting: regional prices, import and export quantities. 
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Producer surplus in North Sweden and consumer surplus in South Sweden and 
Denmark is given by green triangles in Figure  17. The network operator receives 
congestion rents on the transmission line equal to the price difference times the 
quantity transported. As those rents are internal to the Swedish network, they accrue 
fully to the Swedish network operator and not to the Danish one. The allocation of 
transmission capacity is efficient and total market surplus is equal to the first best 
outcome (728).487  The last column in Table 8 shows these results. 
                                                           
487 The total market surplus (728) is the sum of producer surplus (½ × 14 × 28), South Swedish and Danish 
consumer surplus (both equal to ½ × 14 × 14) and internal congestion revenue for the TSO ((26 – 14) × 28). 
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Figure  17. Market splitting: producer surplus and consumer surplus. 
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The Swedish TSO agreed to split the market into price zones, so that it no longer 
needs to reduce capacity on the interconnectors to other countries or any other line.488 
However, it may still do it, even if the new system of price zones is in place. In this 
section, we show that market splitting does not prevent the Swedish network operator 
from capacity manipulation at the border with Denmark. Figure  18 shows day-ahead 
prices in case the Swedish network operator sets available capacity at the 
interconnector with Denmark equal to 1.99.489 In equilibrium,490 congestion occurs 
only at the border with Denmark, and not on the transmission line between North and 
South Sweden. The price in South Sweden drops to 14 and evens up with the price in 
North Sweden. In turn, the price rises to 38 in Denmark. In this way, the Swedish 
network operator can achieve the same price levels as in our first ‘abusive’ scenario. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
488 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 79-80. 
489 If the network operator sets the quantity exactly equal to 2 units, then two constraints are binding at the same 
time: the internal constraint of 28 units and the cross-border constraint of 2 units. In that case, prices within 
Sweden are not uniquely defined. By setting a cross-border capacity just below 2 (in our example equal to 1.99), 
the network operator can guarantee that the internal constraint within Sweden is not binding, and that there is 
one unique price for Sweden.  
490 Market is in equilibrium, when supply of electricity equals the quantity demanded. 
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Figure  18. Market splitting with strategic congestion: regional prices, import and 
export quantities. 
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Splitting the Swedish market into separate price zones does not make it impossible for 
the Swedish network operator to manipulate the available cross-border capacity. 
Hence, a change in the market architecture alone is insufficient to prevent SvK from 
congestion shifting in the future. Monitoring of the Swedish TSO’s behaviour remains 
necessary. But while separate price zones do not effectively prevent congestion 
shifting, they do improve market transparency, making it easier for the regulators and 
market participants to determine whether available capacity is set at the right level. In 
this way, congestion shifting can be easier to detect.  
 
4.4.5. Comparison of 4 scenarios 
 
Table 8 collects results from all the four scenarios, and enables a cross-scenario 
comparison of regional and total market surplus. Overall, scenarios 3 and 4 are 
efficient and therefore maximise total market surplus, while inefficient allocation of 
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network capacity in scenarios 1 and 2 leads to welfare losses and a reduction of total 
market surplus.491  
 
Danish customers lose out on congestion shifting, because cross-border capacity 
reductions increase high-cost domestic energy production in Denmark, and lead to 
high day-ahead prices. This might explain why SvK’s behaviour raised protests in 
Denmark. Danish consumer surplus is the highest when the interconnector is used to 
the largest extent, that is, when no congestion shifting takes place. Hence, the most 
advantageous scenario for Danish consumers is clearly full counter-trading. However, 
in situations where the interconnector is congested, the Danish TSO may earn some 
additional congestion rents. The current regulatory regime requires that these 
congestion rents are paid back, in the long run, to the network users through grid 
investments or lower transmission tariffs.492 
 
Producers in North Sweden benefit from counter-trading. If the network operator does 
not shift congestion to the borders, some producers in North Sweden receive the 
highest price for their energy (p = 20). In addition, other producers in North Sweden 
are subsidised for not producing (counter-trading). Consumers in South Sweden, on 
the other hand, benefit from congestion shifting to the Danish border, as this keeps 
their price low. Market splitting increases their price. Taken together, Swedish grid 
users are better off when SvK performs counter-trading (scenario 2, interim remedy as 
implemented) or a mix of counter-trading and congestion shifting (scenario 3, optimal 
interim remedy) rather than shifting all congestion to the borders (scenario 1, alleged 
abuse). If it was up to the Swedish grid users, market splitting would not be chosen in 
the short term. This might be reflected in their initial strong opposition against the 
                                                           
491 Counter-trading and market splitting might have different welfare aspects in a richer model than the one we 
use here. For example, it is well-known that counter-trading gives inefficient long-term signals for generation 
investment and can lead to strategic behaviour by generators. However, these long term issues and problems are 
not captured by our simple model.  
492 Note that we do not formally model how the costs and benefits of the TSO are allocated. In practice, the EU 
regulation forbids cross-border congestion rents to be transferred as dividend to shareholders. Congestion 
income can only be used for guaranteeing capacity, building infrastructure or lowering the network tariff. Supra 
n. 457. 
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introduction of price areas in Sweden.493 However, once we compare total surpluses 
for Sweden in each scenario, it is clear that market splitting results in the highest 
market surplus, because it is efficient and keeps all congestion revenues within 
Sweden.494 
 
In the long term, Swedish grid users pay not only direct energy and congestion costs 
through their transmission tariffs, but also the counter-trading costs that the TSO 
incurs. These tariffs are likely to be lower under market splitting as the TSO has an 
additional source of income, the congestion rents. Given current regulation, these rents 
will be used to improve the TSO’s network operations, so that, ultimately, they will be 
returned to the network users.495 Hence, in the long run, the Swedish grid users should 
prefer the scenario that gives the highest surplus to Sweden, which is market splitting, 
and not optimal congestion shifting. In the aggregate, patient forward-looking network 
users should not oppose market splitting.  
 
The Swedish network operator’s revenue is maximised under market splitting, as it 
receives congestion rents on the internal bottleneck.496 If SvK shifts all internal 
congestion to the borders, it also receives some congestion revenues from the cross-
border bottleneck. However, we assume that they are shared with the Danish TSO.497 
Further, due to low capacity of the cross-border interconnector (2 units are available 
on the market), these revenues are relatively small. On the plus side is the fact that 
SvK does not bear the cost of counter-trading. Thus, it appears that the Swedish 
network operator would clearly favour market splitting if its objective would be to 
maximise its own revenue. If market splitting would be impossible to implement, a 
profit-maximising network operator would prefer to shift all congestion to the border, 
as this reduces the cost of counter-trading.  
 
                                                           
493 See, for instance, Svenska Kraftnät, Annual Report 2010, Director General’s Statement, p. 5. We discuss this 
at length in chapter 5. 
494 Under the current congestion rent-sharing regime. Supra n. 472. 
495 Supra n. 492.  
496 Supra section 4.4.4. 
497 Supra n. 472. 
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Having said that, we cannot just assume that SvK is merely trying to maximise its 
own profits and ignore the regulatory environment in which it operates. Looking at the 
regulation is necessary to understand SvK’s incentives. It is a state-owned public 
utility that faces several complex incentive structures. As with all European TSOs, 
SvK is subject to economic regulation, which typically tries to align the TSO’s 
incentives with the social optimum, i.e. to limit the network operator’s profits, while 
simultaneously ensuring an efficient operation and investment in the network.498 In 
order to prevent network operators from intentionally declaring low transmission 
capacities as a way to earn congestion rents, those rents are earmarked for grid 
reinforcement or to lower transmission tariffs and cannot be used to generate 
additional profits for shareholders.499 Thus, there is no obvious direct link between 
SvK’s profits and the amount of congestion in the network.  
 
If the Swedish regulator was able to align SvK’s incentives with total market surplus, 
then, according to our model, SvK would still opt for market splitting, just as if it was 
an unregulated profit-maximising firm. Market splitting leads to an efficient allocation 
of network capacities and maximises total surplus. It keeps congestion revenue in 
Sweden, and on top of that, it might also provide more detailed information as to 
where congestion occurs and how severe it is. With this information SvK could target 
and direct its investments more efficiently.  
 
There might be many reasons, why SvK delayed the introduction of market splitting 
for such a long time. SvK’s objectives are stipulated in the Instruction from the 
Swedish Government, the national regulation governing SvK.500 One of those 
objectives is promotion of competition in the Swedish wholesale and retail electricity 
markets.501 Maintaining one price in Sweden reflects this goal, as it simplifies life for 
                                                           
498 See, for instance, NordREG, Regulation of the Nordic TSOs – with focus on Market Efficiency and 
Harmonisation, Report 7/2007, pp. 13-14.  
499 Article 16(6) of Regulation 714/2009, supra n. 91.  
500 Government Ordinance with Instruction for Svenska Kraftnät 2007:1119 (Förordning med instruktion för 
Affärsverket svenska kraftnät), 29.11.2007. 
501 In our model we assume that energy markets are perfectly competitive, that is, we do not take into account 
market power effects. However, we believe that obtaining a uniform price by means of, for instance, counter-
trading will not always be pro-competitive. It leads to strategic bidding for counter-trading payments in export-
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retail competitors. For instance, retailers can offer a single product to all Swedish 
consumers and they do not face the risk of regional price differences when they 
procure energy from producers. Moreover, SvK mentioned that there were serious 
concerns that the introduction of market splitting would have adverse effect on South 
Sweden, as it would create a sub-market with insufficient competition.502 Lastly, as 
already mentioned, Swedish stakeholders, headed by the trade association 
Swedenergy, were initially rather skeptical towards market splitting. They might have 
influenced Swedish regulators and government agencies to keep the status quo, and as 
a regulated state-owned company, SvK might have been interested in pleasing its sole 
shareholder and regulator, the Swedish state. 
 
There might be further reasons why SvK prefers to shift congestion to the borders, 
instead of counter-trading. The Instruction from the Swedish Government names cost-
efficiency as one of the SvK’s objectives, which suggests that SvK ought to avoid 
costly counter-trading as an option. Furthermore, the cost of counter-trading is passed 
on to the Swedish grid users through transmission tariffs.503 By avoiding counter-
trading SvK would keep these tariffs low for the Swedish consumers, which is an 
obvious preference of the Swedish government. Lastly, from the security of supply’s 
perspective, congestion shifting might be seen as a safer method to deal with 
congestion than counter-trading. Congestion shifting reduces flows over the Swedish 
network in the day-ahead market, whereas counter-trading is carried out in real-time 
and relies on regulating resources, which are not always at hand. Thus, where these 
regulating resources are not sufficiently available, counter-trading raises the risk of 
black-outs.504 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
constrained areas and higher day-ahead bids in import-constrained areas, as forward-looking firms take into 
account the opportunity cost of the counter-trading market. See also J. DIJK and B. WILLEMS, ‘The effect of 
counter-trading on competition in electricity markets’ (2011) 39 Energy Policy 3, 1764-1773. Obtaining a 
uniform price with congestion shifting might somewhat improve competition between North and South Sweden, 
but likely reduces competition between Sweden and Denmark. See also the recent report of Energy Markets 
Inspectorate, which finds no evidence that retail competition decreased in the first months after introducing 
market splitting in Sweden. See Energy Markets Inspectorate, Elområden i Sverige. Analys av utvecklingen och 
konsekvenserna på marknaden, Report No. EI R2012:06, CM Gruppen, Bromma 2012. In Swedish only. 
502 See Svenska Kraftnät, The Complaint from Dansk Energi, supra n. 466, p. 4. 
503 The Swedish Electricity Act, supra n. 452, stipulates that tariffs must be cost-reflective. 
504 We could also speculate about the objectives of managers at SvK. They could, for instance, try to maximise 
total European surplus, and would like to collaborate with their peers, the managers of TSOs. They might also 
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4.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We now contrast the results of our economic analysis with the Commission’s 
anticompetitive concerns expressed in its antitrust investigation against SvK.505  
 
According to the Commission, SvK’s congestion shifting results in de facto 
discrimination between Swedish customers and foreign customers that import 
electricity from Sweden. Once congestion occurred in the Swedish grid, SvK 
discriminated between domestic and cross-border transmission services. In order to 
relieve internal bottlenecks, it first satisfied domestic demand and then reduced 
transmission of electricity intended for export.  
 
In our view, the Commission’s initial anticompetitive assessment, which points at 
discrimination between domestic and cross-border transmission services, goes in the 
right direction. Discrimination based on transmission services can be given a sound 
economic interpretation. Local trade (from North Sweden to South Sweden) and 
international trade (from North Sweden to Denmark) would be treated in a non-
discriminatory manner if the price in Denmark and the counter-trading price in South 
Sweden were equal. This would lead to an efficient allocation of all transmission 
capacity. Note that the counter-trading price in South Sweden is typically higher than 
the price consumers pay in South Sweden. In order to determine whether 
discrimination took place, the Commission should study the prices that arose in the 
day-ahead market and in the counter-trading market. A correct focus on discrimination 
can thus improve social welfare. However, this economic interpretation is not taken by 
the Commission in its reasoning. Instead, the Commission notices price differences 
between Sweden and Denmark in the day-ahead market and argues that SvK’s 
practices resulted in a segmentation of markets between Member States, with a lower 
electricity price in Sweden and a higher price abroad.506 Against this backdrop, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
want to maximise the turnover of the company, to receive a private benefit of managing larger projects and 
having better job opportunities in the future.  
505 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, para. 27 and paras. 42-44. 
506 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, para. 41. 
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Commission recalls the European Court of Justice’s case law, according to which 
discrimination between the customers based on residence constitutes an abuse of a 
dominant position in violation of Article 102 TFEU.507 It refers also to Article 18 
TFEU, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of nationality. In other words, the 
Commission seems to define discrimination based on differences in day-ahead prices 
in Sweden and in Denmark. We show that under efficient congestion shifting (3rd 
scenario, optimal interim remedy, see Figure  14), energy prices for consumers in 
Sweden and Denmark will be different.508 Hence, if the Commission’s goal was 
economic efficiency, it should not define discrimination between domestic and cross-
border transmission services based on differences in day-ahead prices, but should take 
both day-ahead and counter-trading prices into account. 
 
In the commitment decision, the Commission does not directly mention economic 
efficiency as its objective, and relies mainly on market integration rhetoric. According 
to the Commission, SvK’s behaviour thwarts the benefits of the single market in 
electricity, and goes against the objective of European integration.509 Interestingly, the 
Commission even explicitly refers to Treaty provisions outside the area of competition 
policy, in particular the rules governing free movement of goods. It cites Article 35 
TFEU, which forbids quantitative restrictions on exports and measures having 
equivalent effect.510   
 
Invoking Article 35 TFEU seems to suggest that SvK’s conduct is abusive just by the 
mere fact that restricts exports. Apparently, in the Commission’s view, behaviour of a 
dominant undertaking impeding cross-border trade should be prohibited under Article 
102 TFEU, just as state protectionist measures are prohibited under Article 35 
                                                           
507 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, at note 39. The European Courts apply Article 102 to discriminatory 
practices and the Commission invoked this line of cases to back the SvK decision. All these cases concern 
practices that are, in the first place, harmful to the internal market. Some legal scholars consider them a third 
category of Article 102 abuses, next to exploitative and anti-competitive abuses. See, for instance, R. WHISH 
(2005), supra n. 16, p. 195 and 679. A. JONES and B. SUFRIN, supra n. 61, p. 520. 
508 As we mentioned before, consumers in South Sweden might face higher network tariffs in the long-run to 
finance the implicit subsidy that is paid by the network operator while counter-trading. 
509 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 27 and 44. 
510 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, para. 43. 
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TFEU.511 In this chapter we show that forbidding all congestion shifting can only be 
justified if the Commission’s main objective is market integration, and not economic 
efficiency.512 Efficiency requires that some cross-border capacity is reduced. To the 
contrary, the Commission’s interpretation of discrimination, based on electricity day-
ahead prices comparison, seems to imply that international consumers should get 
priority access to national bottlenecks as compared to national consumers. The 
Commission’s approach seems to favour reverse discrimination, and may have a 
negative effect on competition in the internal market just as any other kind of 
discriminatory treatment. 
 
The interim remedy accepted by the Commission, which requires SvK to solve 
internal bottleneck problems primarily by counter-trading and thus maximise 
utilisation of cross-border links, might have resulted from this flawed argumentation, 
according to which international (in this case Danish) consumers should obtain 
priority access to transmission on congested lines within Sweden. In the counter-
trading scenario, which represents the implemented remedy, the Danes do not 
internalise congestion they create within Sweden, which leads to inefficiencies. The 
ill-designed interim remedy (from an economic efficiency viewpoint) might have been 
avoided, if the Commission formulated its anticompetitive concerns in the preliminary 
assessment in a different way. Congestion shifting as such should not constitute an 
alleged abuse in the SvK case. Rather, the fact that the amount of shifting was 
suboptimal should raise anticompetitive concerns. The Commission, by relying in its 
argumentation on internal market rules (Article 35 TFEU), created the false 
                                                           
511 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, para. 43: ‘Moreover, Article 35 TFEU expressly prohibits quantitative 
restrictions on exports and all measures having equivalent effect. It is thus clear that a Member State would not 
be entitled to restrict exports of electricity so as to reserve such electricity for domestic consumption. Similarly, 
a dominant undertaking cannot seek to achieve the same objective through its conduct on the market without 
falling foul of Union competition rules. Practices that do so are generally considered to have as their object the 
restriction of competition.’ Note that this prohibition is addressed to the Member States, not the individual 
undertakings. However, the Commission drew a parallel here in terms of objectives. That is, given that Member 
States are not allowed to restrict cross-border trade under Article 35 TFEU, also a dominant undertaking, which 
seeks to achieve the same objective through its market behaviour, should not escape competition rules. We 
discuss this point in more detail in chapter 5. 
512 It is not the first time in the history of the EU competition enforcement that the single market imperative 
takes precedence over efficiency considerations. M. MOTTA, supra n. 61, p. 23. R. WHISH (2005), supra n. 16, 
p. 21. G. MONTI (2007), supra n. 72, p. 40. J. BAQUERO CRUZ, Between Competition and Free Movement. 
The Economic Constitutional Law of the European Community, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2002, pp. 98-100.  
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impression that complete elimination of congestion shifting would be an efficient 
solution, because it would maximise cross-border flows and thus best serve the 
overriding goal of market integration. 
 
However, the negative effect resulting from the imperfect interim remedy (efficiency 
loss) might not have been that substantial in the end. First of all, counter-trading has 
been applied only over a short period of time, between April 2010 and November 
2011. Secondly, the interim remedy has not even achieved the Commission’s goals. 
As SvK reported, this remedy turned out to be rather ineffective. At times when 
congestion occurred within the network and SvK tried to counter-trade according to 
the interim procedure, it either did not increase cross-border capacities,513 or the 
increase was insignificant.514 The most common reason for not performing counter-
trading was the lack of suitable generation in a given area, that is, with short enough 
start-up times.515 Note also that in our simulation the second scenario, representing the 
interim remedy as implemented, is more efficient than the first ‘abusive’ scenario, 
where all congestion is shifted to the border. Hence, our simulation model suggests 
that the interim remedy could have actually improved total surplus.  
 
Our analysis shows that the final remedy, market splitting, is an optimal market 
design, as it can address internal congestion efficiently. Nevertheless, even though 
market splitting results in an efficient allocation of declared capacity, it does not 
address the anticompetitive concerns regarding SvK’s (alleged) abuse. SvK can still 
manipulate declared cross-border capacities in order to maintain a single low price 
within Sweden. Further monitoring is necessary to ensure that cross-border capacity is 
not unduly limited.516  
 
                                                           
513 Svenska Kraftnät, Monitoring Reports, supra n. 476: Report No. 2 of 13.07.2010, pp. 18-22, Report No. 3 of 
14.10.2011, pp. 19-22 and Report No. 6 of 14.07.2011, pp. 15-17. 
514 Svenska Kraftnät, Monitoring Reports, supra n. 476: Report No. 4 of 12.01.2011, pp. 19-21, Report No. 5 of 
13.04.2011, pp. 17-21 and Report No. 7 of 12.10.2011, pp. 16-19. 
515 Usually area 4, south to CUT 4, where the congestion often occurred. See Reports No. 2, 3 and 6, supra n. 
513. 
516 In the same line CONSENTEC and Frontier Economics, Analysis of Cross-Border Congestion Management 
Methods for the EU Internal Electricity Market, a study commissioned by the European Commission, Final 
Report, 2004, Executive Summary, p. 88. 
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We believe that our economic analysis is not only relevant for the Swedish 
interconnector case, but also for the ongoing discussion on the regulation of cross-
border capacity allocation and congestion management (CACM).517 Current 
regulations forbid congestion shifting unless it is justified for reasons of operational 
security, cost-effectiveness, and minimisation of negative impacts on the internal 
electricity market.518 In practice, network operators are not transparent in how they 
determine cross-border transmission capacities, where they often implicitly give 
priority to national consumers519, and are likely to shift too much congestion to 
borders. 520 Our case study shows that some congestion shifting is efficient, and 
discusses exactly how much congestion should be shifted. Determination of optimal 
congestion shifting requires an economic analysis on top of a physical and engineering 
description of the electricity network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
517 Congestion Management Guidelines 770/2006/EC (CM Guidelines) appended to Regulation 714/2009, supra 
n. 91. See also ACER, Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management for 
Electricty (CACM FG), FG-2011-E-002, 29.07.2011. On the basis of the CACM FG, the European Network for 
TSOs for Electricity (ENTSO-E) is currently developing the Network Code on Capacity Allocation and 
Congestion Management for Electricity (CACM network code), which then needs to be applied by the TSOs. 
The CACM network code is currently being revised by ACER. 
518 Point 1.7 of CM Guidelines, supra n. 517. 
519 See ERGEG, Draft Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management for 
Electricity. Initial Impact Assessment, Ref:E10-ENM-20-04, 2010, p. 37. In practice, TSOs first determine the 
network flows nationally, using historical data and neglecting cross-border trade (base-line scenario). They then 
determine how much capacity is available on the network for cross-border trade. In this way, national 
transactions are given priority.  
520 Congestion shifting is still a common practice among TSOs in Europe. See ERGEG, Draft Framework 
Guidelines, supra n. 519, p. 35 and 42. Energy Markets Inspectorate, Price Formation and Competition in the 
Swedish Electricity Market, Main findings of ER 2006:13, EMIR 2006:02, non-authorised translation, 
Eskilstuna 2006, p. 15. G. SQUICCIARINI, G. CERVIGNI, D. PEREKHODTSEV and C. POLETTI, ‘The 
integration of the European electricity markets at a turning point: from the regional model to the Third 
Legislative Package’ (2010) European University Institute, RSCAS Working Paper 2010/56, p. 2. 
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5. POWER MARKETS SHAPED BY ANTITRUST521 
 
Co-authored with Bert Willems 
 
5.1. ABSTRACT  
 
In November 2011 Sweden abolished the uniform national electricity price and 
introduced separate price zones. This was the result of an antitrust deal between the 
Commission and the Swedish network operator, which was accused of discriminating 
between domestic and export electricity transmission services and segmenting the 
internal market. Based on this case, we show how the Commission uses competition 
law enforcement to foster market integration in the energy sector. We find that, even 
though the Commission’s action under competition rules was contrived and lacked 
economic depth, the commitment package provides an economically sound, long-term 
solution to network access and congestion management in Sweden. Such a quick and 
far-reaching change of Swedish congestion management could not have been achieved 
by Swedish policymakers or enforcement of the EU sector-specific regulation. 
 
5.2. INTRODUCTION  
 
Electricity transmission networks can transport only a certain volume of electricity 
within the system security limits. This is referred to as the transmission capacity of the 
network. In Sweden, the national power grid lacks capacity to transmit cheap hydro 
electricity from the northern part of Sweden to the southern areas where there is high 
energy usage. In order to keep electricity flows within the system security limits, 
Svenska Kraftnät (SvK), the Swedish network operator, needs to take actions to 
relieve congestion on the internal bottlenecks.522 Congestion management can be 
                                                           
521 First published in European Competition Journal 9, 1 (2013). The authors thank Leigh Hancher, Alexander 
Morell, Massimo Motta, Lars Kjølbye, Peter Willis, Matti Supponen, Edouard Leduc, Paul Giesbertz, Bjørn ter 
Bruggen and Killian Kehoe for their insightful comments. Małgorzata Sadowska gratefully acknowledges the 
hospitality and support of TILEC, where part of this research was carried out. The authors are responsible for 
any remaining mistakes. 
522 Supra n. 438.  
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defined as actions taken by a network operator to avoid or relieve transmission 
congestion. In November 2011, the Swedish electricity market was split into separate 
price areas, which is one of the possible actions to relieve congestion in the Swedish 
transmission network (so-called market splitting). Interestingly, in spite of an almost 
decade-long, multi-level debate on handling congestion in the Nordic market, the 
change in the Swedish market design came neither from the Swedish government, nor 
from the Swedish or Nordic regulatory bodies. Nor was it prompted by the EU 
regulations, promoting efficient and transparent congestion management. Instead, it 
was an outcome of an antitrust investigation launched by the European Commission 
(the Commission) against the Swedish network operator. Seen from this perspective, 
EU competition rules can be considered a complementary tool to achieve wider policy 
objectives,523 in addition to political debate and regulation. In this chapter, we look at 
the consequences of using competition rules to solve the problem of the Swedish 
transmission congestion, and more broadly, to promote EU market integration, against 
the backdrop of other two tools – political debate and regulation.  
 
First of all, we observe that the commitment procedure greatly facilitates the use of 
competition enforcement to achieve a primarily internal market objective, that is, to 
foster cross-border trade in electricity. However, in promoting inter-State trade at all 
costs, the Commission seems to lose sight of a wider economic and regulatory context 
of congestion management.  
 
Secondly, this case not only intensifies the Nordic debate on market splitting, but also 
accelerates the introduction of price zones in Sweden. Lastly, the remedies offered by 
SvK go beyond what could have been achieved by merely applying the EU sector 
specific regulation. While existing EU law regulates cross-border congestion 
management, without prescribing any specific congestion management method to deal 
                                                           
523 EU competition policy is driven by many, sometimes clashing, objectives such as economic welfare, 
promoting market integration, economic freedom, fairness and other public policy considerations. For a 
comprehensive debate on the EU competition policy objectives, see e.g. M. MOTTA, supra n. 61, pp. 17-30. A. 
JONES and B. SUFRIN, supra n. 61, pp. 3-18. R. WHISH (2005), supra n. 16, pp. 17-23.  
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with internal congestion, the Commission, by means of competition enforcement, 
actually pushed through market splitting.  
 
Overall, even though the Commission’s action under competition rules is contrived 
and lacks economic depth, the final commitment to split the market into separate price 
zones provides an economically sound, long-run solution to Swedish congestion. We 
conclude that neither a political debate nor regulation would have changed the 
Swedish congestion management as quickly and to such an extent as an ad-hoc 
antitrust case. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.3 we introduce the reader to the 
existing methods of congestion management. This is followed by a brief description of 
the main facts of the SvK case. Then, in section 5.4, we take a closer look at the 
antitrust investigation itself, particularly at the choice of the legal basis and the 
procedure. We explain how the Commission employs competition rules to promote 
market integration and what impact may it have on the outcome of the case. We turn 
to the other tools in section 5.5, where we discuss the Nordic debate on market 
splitting, and in section 5.6, we cover the EU sector-specific regulation of congestion 
management. Section 5.7 draws certain conclusions. 
 
5.3. THE CASE AND ITS CONTEXT 
 
Network operators handle transmission congestion on their national power grids 
generally in three ways, that is, by 1) market splitting, 2) congestion shifting and 3) 
counter-trading.524 These three common congestion management methods can be 
combined. 
 
Firstly, in the day-ahead market525, a network operator can split the market at the 
network bottleneck point and create one price zone (price area) on each side of the 
                                                           
524 Supra n. 453. 
525 Supra n. 454. 
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bottleneck. Once the day-ahead market closes, day-ahead prices differ in both areas.526 
The area of abundant electricity supply (surplus area) gets a lower electricity price 
than the area on the other side of the bottleneck (deficit area), where electricity is 
expensive. In this way, congestion between the two zones is resolved by adjusting 
zonal prices, influencing zonal supply and demand. Zonal day-ahead price differences 
vary over time, depending on the local electricity demand and supply conditions. At 
times without congestion, prices in both areas even up, so that there is only one 
common day-ahead price for all the market.527 Until recently, only Italy, Denmark, 
Norway and the UK had multiple price zones to deal with national congestion.528 Most 
European countries constitute single price areas, that is, the country’s borders coincide 
with those of a price zone.529 
 
Secondly, still in the day-ahead market, the network operator can reduce trading 
capacities with neighbouring countries. For instance, it can reduce export from a 
deficit area within a country, as this will reduce demand for transmission capacity on 
the national transmission network. In our case, reduced export of electricity from 
South Sweden to Denmark would relieve congestion on the internal bottlenecks within 
Sweden. This practice, however, creates congestion at interconnectors, that is, cross-
border transmission lines.530 In other words, the network operator “shifts” internal 
congestion to the borders (congestion shifting). This mechanism divides the market 
                                                           
526 Day-ahead market closes (or ‘clears’) after all the day-ahead supply and demand bids have been collected 
and a common day-ahead electricity price has been calculated for all the market on the basis of all supply and 
demand bids. This price is called market-clearing price (or ‘system price’). If, due to congestion, market is split 
into price zones, market-clearing price is set for each zone separately, based on the supply and demand bids in 
that zone only. 
527 Note that two adjacent price zones might have identical prices if the line connecting the zones is not 
congested. Therefore, price zones are sometimes also called ‘bidding zones’ which reflects more accurately the 
situation where prices are equal.  
528 Denmark has 2 price areas since there is no direct electricity connection between Denmark West and 
Denmark East. Norway splits into 2 to 4 price areas, depending on the need. Italian day-ahead market is zonal 
too, structured in 22 zones. However, while generators are paid at zonal prices, final consumers still face a 
single electricity price, which is an average of all zonal sale prices weighted by the zonal consumptions (so-
called ‘prezzo unico nazionale’, PUN). As of November 2011, Sweden has introduced four price zones as a 
result of the Swedish Interconnectors case.  
529 There are 3 cases where price zones extend across national borders: Germany forms one price zone together 
with Austria, the Czech Republic with Slovakia, and the whole island of Ireland also forms one price zone. 
530 Supra n. 436. 
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into separate price zones along national borders in order to maintain a single price 
within a country. 
 
Thirdly, this time in real-time,531 the network operator can affect production and 
consumption patterns of market participants on both sides of the congested line by 
taking actions on the so-called balancing market, that is, by counter-trading. It makes 
deals with individual generators and large energy consumers. For instance, it pays 
generators on the surplus side of the bottleneck to reduce their production. At the 
same time, generators on the other side of the bottleneck, in the deficit area, are paid 
to generate more. Alternatively, the network operator can also pay industry consumers 
to change their consumption patterns. The generation system is re-dispatched532, but 
the electricity price that consumers face does not change. They pay a uniform price 
within a country, no matter on which side of the bottleneck they consume electricity. 
Prices are only different for the counter-traded volumes. The cost of re-dispatching is 
born by the TSO. In Sweden, it is then passed on to the grid users through the 
transmission network tariff. 
 
From the early days of the Swedish electricity market liberalisation in 1996, keeping 
one single electricity price within the country was seen as a tool to promote (national) 
competition and market liquidity.533 The single price policy excluded market splitting 
as a method of congestion management. Instead, SvK used to solve internal 
congestion using the two remaining methods, whereby it mainly shifted congestion to 
the borders and resorted to counter-trading sporadically, only if congestion shifting 
alone was not sufficient to relieve internal bottlenecks.534 SvK’s congestion 
                                                           
531 Most electricity in the Nordic region is traded on the day-ahead market. However, in case imbalances occur 
after the day-ahead market closes, the TSO can buy or sell electricity in real-time, that is, close to delivery time, 
to bring the market back in balance. This is called regulating market, where TSO collects upward and downward 
regulating bids from the balance providers (flexible generators). Since 1999 there is an additional market in 
Sweden (Elbas) which operates after day-ahead market.  
532 The dispatch is a set of start-up, shutdown and production decisions of all individual generating plants in 
order to meet total demand. The dispatch is submitted to the network operator after the closure of the day-ahead 
market. When the production decisions are changed in real-time, then the system is re-dispatched.  
533 See section 5.4.4.3 below. 
534 According to SvK, counter-trading could not be relied upon all the time, as it required flexibility in 
generation and some areas lacked such suitable power plants to adjust production levels at a later stage. On the 
top of that, the Swedish TSO argued that counter-trading was not a suitable method to deal with congestion 
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management based on recurring export reductions triggered protests in the 
neighbouring countries, in particular in Denmark.535 In 2006, Dansk Energi (DaE), a 
trade association for Danish energy companies, filed a complaint to the Commission, 
claiming that SvK’s capacity reductions at the Øresund interconnector, the line 
between Sweden and Denmark, caused economic losses to Danish consumers. SvK 
restricted export of cheap hydro power and Denmark needed to dispatch its own more 
expensive thermal generation units instead. Electricity day-ahead prices in Denmark 
increased and became more volatile. In support of its case, the trade association cited 
an empirical study of Copenhagen Economics. The consultants estimated the loss for 
the Danes from SvK’s cross-border capacity reductions and gains for the Swedes 
resulting from the lower domestic prices.536 According to DaE, the Swedish 
congestion shifting was detrimental to competition and trade within the internal 
market and violated EU competition rules.537 The complaint was backed by EBL, the 
Norwegian Electricity Industry Association, due to effects of SvK’s likewise 
reduction of interconnector capacity at the Swedish-Norwegian border. 
 
In April 2009, the Commission opened proceedings against SvK for an abuse of a 
dominant position on the electricity transmission market in Sweden (Article 102 
TFEU).538 According to the Commission, SvK might have violated competition rules 
by limiting cross-border transmission capacity in order to relieve internal congestion 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
because its cost was borne by the Swedish grid users, and not by those who benefit from counter-trading, for 
instance Denmark. For these reasons, counter-trading was considered a complementary method in the Swedish 
congestion management. SvK used it merely to correct the flow of electricity, so that it does not exceed security 
limits, rather than to deal with internal congestion (for instance, when there was still some internal congestion 
which could not be entirely relieved by capacity reductions at the borders or, in case of unexpected outages or 
forecast errors, to guarantee capacities declared before the market clearing). Svenska Kraftnät, Background 
explanations, supra n. 462, p. 24 and 27. See also Energy Markets Inspectorate (2010), supra n. 462, p. 14, and 
Energy Markets Inspectorate (2011), supra n. 457, p. 18. 
535 Complaints came also from Norway. See the letter from the Norwegian Electricity Industry Association to 
the Commission of 27.10.2006, Congestion management – Dansk Energi’s complaint regarding Swedish TSO 
practice, Document Ref. 05/078, 742/HOW/SL. 
536 According to their estimations, Danish consumers suffered a loss of DKK 725 million (EUR 97.3 million) 
arising from higher spot prices (the cost of price volatility has not been quantified). The gain (avoided costs) 
passed on to Swedish consumers was DKK 215-265 million (EUR 29-35 million). See Copenhagen Economics, 
supra n. 441. 
537 Supra n. 442. 
538 Swedish Interconnectors (Case COMP/39.351). See Commission Decision, supra n. 439. 
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in the Swedish network.539 A few months later in September, as a result of 
negotiations with the Commission, SvK voluntarily offered a set of commitments. 
Most importantly, SvK agreed to split the Swedish market into four price zones by 
November 2011.540 SvK committed to solve internal congestion by adjusting zonal 
prices, affecting zonal supply and demand within Sweden, and not by shifting 
congestion to the borders. In cases, where internal congestion occurs within a price 
zone, SvK offered not to reduce capacity on the interconnectors, but carry out counter-
trading within these zones to relieve it. Secondly, as an interim remedy, before the 
system of separate price areas becomes operative (within 18 months), SvK agreed to 
reduce the transmission flow on internal bottlenecks primarily by counter-trading, and 
not, as far as possible, by shifting it to the national borders.541  
 
5.4. INTERNAL MARKET OBJECTIVE REACHED WITH COMPETITION 
POLICY 
 
In this section we argue that the SvK case is marked with two conflicting goals of EU 
competition policy: promotion of market integration (which we label “internal market 
objective”) and improving economic welfare (the “market efficiency objective”).542 
On the one hand, the market integration objective implies that any obstacle to cross-
border trade should be removed. On the other hand, the market efficiency objective 
requires that congestion should be solved efficiently, so that it does not deteriorate 
economic welfare. This means that cross-border trade should be increased only if 
social benefits of such a policy outweigh social costs.  
 
                                                           
539 DaE’s complaint concerned only the Øresund interconnector. However, the Commission broadened the scope 
of its investigation, including all interconnectors managed by SvK. Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 
38-40. 
540 Initially, it was agreed with the Commission that the exact number of price zones and their configuration was 
flexible, depending on the flow patterns in the Swedish electricity network. SvK decided to introduce four new 
zones. 
541 Market splitting does not apply to the west-coast corridor, due to the lack of sufficient suitable generation 
resources for setting a market price in that area. For the same technical reasons counter-trading cannot be 
performed there. Instead, SvK undertook to reinforce the west-coast corridor by building and operating a new 
400kV transmission line by the end of 11.2011. See Commission Decision, supra n. 439, para. 48. 
542 We would not like to enter into a discussion of the possible goals of the EU competition policy, nor subscribe 
to any of them. See supra n. 523. 
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In our view, the Commission does not distinguish between these two conflicting goals 
in the SvK case. Its arguments are mainly based on internal market rhetoric and 
neglect a substantial economic analysis. The focus on the internal market objective 
rules out, from the outset, any possible objective justification of SvK’s approach to 
congestion management before the Commission’s investigation. We deal with these 
issues in detail in sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 and follow up with a discussion on 
proportionality of SvK’s commitments in section 5.4.5. However, before doing this, 
we make the reader familiar with the political climate and legal concerns, which the 
Commission might have faced when launching this case (5.4.1), and the specific 
procedure it opted for (5.4.2). 
 
5.4.1. Political climate and legal concerns likely delayed the case 
 
The Commission opened antitrust proceedings against SvK almost three years after 
the Danish complaint. This might reflect the initial reluctance of the Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) to take up this case.543 We can only 
speculate on the political and legal reasons for this delay. 
 
5.4.1.1. Political climate 
 
One of the main objectives of the Commission in 2006-2008 was to push for further 
unbundling of the transmission network operators. This was a core element of the 
Commission’s legislative proposal for internal gas and electricity markets (the 3rd 
Energy Package).544 The Commission argued that a complete separation of 
transmission business would eliminate all anticompetitive concerns regarding the 
                                                           
543 DaE submitted its complaint on SvK’s congestion management in July 2006. A competition case was opened 
in April 2009. The Commission’s inaction is not unusual but it stands in stark contrast to the principle of good 
administration. According to the case law, the Commission must adopt a decision regarding the action it intends 
to take within a reasonable time (Judgment of the Court of 18.03.1997 in case C-282/95 P, Guérin Automobiles 
v. Commission [1997] ECR I-1503, para. 37). For instance, an indicative time limit for informing the complaint 
of the Commission’s proposed action is four months. See Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by 
the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 27.04.2004, OJ C101/65, paras. 60-63. 
544 Supra, section 1.2.3.3. The package consists of two Directives and three Regulations. Electricity markets are 
regulated by Directive 2009/72/EC, supra n. 90, and Regulation 714/2009, supra n. 91. Corresponding acts have 
been adopted with regard to gas markets. In addition, the Package includes Regulation 713/2009, supra n. 92, 
establishing ACER. The package was adopted in July 2009 and is applicable since 2011. 
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transmission segment. In line with the Commission’s unbundling policy, DG COMP 
mostly took on cases against vertically integrated companies, which owned both 
transmission and supply businesses.545 Launching a competition case against SvK, an 
already unbundled network operator, would not necessarily be consistent with the 
Commission’s rhetoric set out during the adoption of the 3rd Energy Package. Once 
the 3rd Package was adopted in spring 2009, the Commission immediately went ahead 
to open formal proceedings against SvK.546 In fact, the Commission clearly saw an 
opportunity in the case to send a clear message to newly unbundled network operators 
to respect common market goals when managing congestion on their national grids.547 
 
Moreover, there might have been concerns that this case would bring competition law 
into the realm of energy policy and sector-specific regulation, since SvK is a state-
owned and regulated public utility. This might have signalled a substantial erosion of 
the competencies of the Swedish state. However, if such concerns ever did exist, then 
they lost importance in 2008, when the European Courts ruled in two important 
Article 102 cases. Both cases concerned regulated sectors, telecommunications and 
pharmaceuticals. In the first case, the General Court upheld a fine imposed by the 
Commission on Deutsche Telekom (DT) for margin squeeze. The German case was 
widely contested because the Commission intervened under competition rules even 
though the DT’s pricing policy was permitted by the national regulator.548 The second 
                                                           
545 See cases German electricity balancing market (Case COMP/39.389), RWE gas foreclosure (Case 
COMP/39.402), GDF Suez gas foreclosure (Case COMP/39.316), E.ON gas foreclosure (Case COMP/39.317) 
and ENI (Case COMP/39.315). See also A. DE HAUTECLOCQUE, F. MARTY and J. PILLOT, ‘The Essential 
Facilities Doctrine in European Competition Policy: The Case of Energy Sector’, in J.-M. GLACHANT, D. 
FINON and A. DE HAUTECLOQUE (eds.), Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets: A New 
Perspective, Edward Elgar, Northampton 2011, 259-293. 
546 The 3rd Energy Package received a formal approval from the European Parliament in April 2009 (see 
IP/09/622 of 22.04.2009). In the same month the Commission formally launched investigation in the SvK case. 
547 P. CHAUVE, E. GLOWICKA, M. GODFRIED, E. LEDUC, S. SIEBERT, ‘Swedish Interconnector case. 
Improving electricity cross-border trade’ (2010) Competition Policy Newsletter 2, 3-5, p. 3 and 5 in fine. See 
also comments of Commissioner Joaquín Almunia, press release IP/10/425 of 14.04. 2011. Using cross-border 
capacity limitations to relieve internal bottlenecks is a common practice of all national TSOs, even to a much 
larger degree than SvK. See, for instance, Copenhagen Economics, supra n. 441. 
548 Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477, paras. 85-89. Deutsche Telekom’s 
appeal to the ECJ was dismissed in 2010. The ECJ upheld the General Court’s judgment and confirmed that 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU do not apply to undertakings in cases when the national regulatory framework 
requires them to engage in an anti-competitive conduct or when it eliminates any possibility for the undertakings 
to comply with competition rules. However, if national legislation merely encourages or makes it easier for 
undertakings to act autonomously in an abusive manner, but leaves open the possibility of complying with 
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case, known as Syfait II case, concerned a Greek subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) took the stance that GSK’s refusal to 
supply with the clear intention to restrict export from Greece violated Article 102 
TFEU. The Court found no objective considerations that could justify this behaviour, 
and ignored the fact that both prices and distribution of pharmaceuticals are subject to 
extensive regulation in all Member States.549 Taken together, in 2008 the Courts not 
only gave a clear nod for the Commission’s antitrust activity in the regulated markets 
(DT case, Syfait II case), but also endorsed the Commission’s pursuing of an internal 
market objective through competition rules (Syfait II case). 
 
The fact that Sweden took over the EU presidency in 2009 might have contributed to 
the quick implementation of the case as well. It is believed that Sweden did not want 
the case lingering around much longer, as it could undermine the success of its 
presidency. Lastly, given the already vigorous EU antitrust  enforcement in the energy 
sector, the case seemed to fit well with Commissioner Kroes’ priorities.   
 
5.4.1.2. Legal concerns 
 
The SvK case could have been tackled under competition rules, internal market rules 
or sector-specific energy rules. Depending on that, the case could have been allocated 
either to DG COMP, DG MARKT or DG ENER.550 The Commission’s inaction at the 
outset might reflect the indecision as to which DG should take this case. As for DG 
COMP, it might have been unclear whether Article 102 TFEU could constitute a 
correct legal basis to deal with this case. The Swedish network operator is an integral 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
competition rules, this does not absolve them from responsibility under Article 101 and 102 TFEU. See case C-
280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2010] ECR I-9555, paras. 80-82. 
549 This case was a follow-up to Syfait I case, where AG Jacobs considered in his opinion that GSK’s refusal to 
supply can be objectively justified given, among others, ‘the pervasive regulation of price and distribution in the 
European pharmaceuticals sector.’ Despite that, the Court in 2008 found no justification to GSK’s 
anticompetitive practices. The outcome of this case was hotly debated. See joined cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, 
Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE and Others v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE (Syfait II) [2008] ECR I-7139. Opinion of AG 
Jacobs delivered on 28.10.2004 in case C-53/03, Syfait and Others v. GlaxoSmithKline plc. 
550 DG COMP – Directorate General for Competition; DG MARKT – The Internal Market and Services 
Directorate-General; DG ENER – The Directorate-General for Energy. As a matter of fact, DaE complained 
both to DG ENER and DG COMP, arguing that SvK’s practices violated internal market rules as well as 
competition rules. Given the possibility of various legal routes, discussions on case allocation might have 
involved DG COMP, DG ENER and DG MARKT. 
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part of the public administration and has no legal personality on its own. It therefore 
remains under the state’s control to some extent. Such close links with the state raise a 
question of liability: should SvK be responsible for the choice of congestion 
management method (and be subject to competition rules) or should it be the Swedish 
state (which failed to comply with the EU law)? Apart of an action under competition 
rules, the Commission could have also started proceedings against Sweden under 
Article 258 TFEU for failing to comply with the EU law (action for non-
compliance).551 The Treaty offers a range of provisions which could serve here as a 
legal basis for the Commission’s action through DG MARKT. These could be the 
internal market provisions on free movement of goods (Article 35 TFEU), the 
principle of non-discrimination (Article 18 TFEU), or even antitrust rules (Article 4(3) 
TFEU in combination with Article 102 TFEU). Action for non-compliance can also be 
based on secondary, sector-specific EU regulation, which would allocate the case to 
DG ENER. Cross-border trade in electricity was at that time regulated in a directly 
applicable legislative act – Regulation 1228/2003.552 Rules on congestion 
management were appended to the regulation, taking the form of binding 
guidelines.553 In fact, the Commission (2007) was plainspoken about its plans to start 
infringement procedures against Member States for not complying with the internal 
market rules on congestion management.554 The first wave of infringement 
proceedings started almost in parallel to the SvK investigation and focused on the lack 
of transparent access to interconnectors in all Member States.555 The Commission 
closed proceedings in six cases within one year, but the remaining 19 Member States 
(incl. Sweden) have been again requested in 2010 to comply with the EU internal 
                                                           
551 Supra section 1.2.3.4. 
552 Supra n. 73. Now it is regulated in Regulation 714/2009, supra n. 91, which repealed Regulation 1228/2003. 
553 Guidelines on the Management and Allocation of Available Transfer Capacity on Interconnectors between 
National Systems, annexed to Regulation 1228/2003, supra n. 73, and now replaced by Congestion Management 
Guidelines 770/2006/EC (CM Guidelines), supra n. 517. These were binding guidelines adopted by the 
Commission on the basis of Article 8 of Regulation 1228/2003, supra n. 73. 
554 See European Commission, Report on the experience gained in the application of the Regulation (EC) No 
1228/2003: Regulation on Cross-border Exchanges in Electricity, Communication from the Commission, 
COM(2007) 250 final, Brussels, 15.05.2007, p. 5. 
555 MEMO/09/296 and 297 of 25.06.2009. Malta and Cyprus were out of scope of the Commission’s 
proceedings, as they are electrically not connected with other Member States. 
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market rules, also in the area of congestion management.556 Alternatively, the 
Commission could have adopted an Article 106 (1) TFEU decision (in combination 
with Article 102 TFEU) for maintaining in force measures which allow or facilitate 
congestion shifting by SvK. The Commission relied on a combined application of 
Article 106 in 2008, when it took an action in the energy sector against Greece.557 
Since the Greek case also involved an abuse of a dominant position (Article 106 (1) 
TFEU read in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU) the assessment of SvK’s behaviour 
under antitrust rules would seem to be less of an experiment. 
 
However, after investigating the case, the Commission established that SvK acts 
independently from the Swedish state in the area of congestion management.558 SvK 
itself underlined its decisional autonomy as a completely unbundled TSO.559 Nor did 
it ever argue that its conduct was required by state regulation.560 In sum, SvK’s 
statements endorsed the Commission’s approach. This eventually might have 
excluded an action against Sweden under Article 258 TFEU, or an eventual Article 
106 (1) decision, and might have prompted the Commission to fall back on antitrust 
rules as a legal basis. 
                                                           
556 The Commission opened infringement procedures against Sweden for non-transposition of the 2nd Package 
in June 2009, only two months after launching the SvK investigation. Allegations against the Swedish 
government included, among other concerns, SvK’s congestion management which is not in line with 
Regulation 1228/2003, supra n. 73, at that time in force. Sweden had no intraday congestion management 
mechanism at all interconnections and no common coordinated congestion management method (see IP/09/1035 
of 25.06.2009 and IP/10/836 and MEMO/10/275 of 24.06.2010). The Commission pointed out that it was for 
the Swedish energy regulator to take necessary steps to enforce compliance with EU law, in particular to 
introduce a system of penalties for EU energy law violations. This infringement case against Sweden has been 
running in parallel to negotiations with SvK and is still pending at the time of writing this chapter (01.2013). 
See Commission Staff Working Document, supra n. 96, Part IV. The two Swedish cases on congestion 
management opened on the basis of different Treaty provisions demonstrate the Commission’s pragmatism in 
using various procedural routes to achieve a desirable market outcome. 
557 Greek lignite (Case COMP/B-1/38.700). The Greek case also involved a public undertaking vested with legal 
monopoly for access to lignite exploration. The Commission used Article 102 in conjunction with Article 106(3) 
TFEU to induce Greece to remove the existing barriers to the lignite market and lignite-fueled electricity 
production. Supra, Table 2. 
558 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, para. 22. 
559 Svenska Kraftnät, Background explanations, supra n. 462, pp. 6-7. 
560 So-called ‘regulated conduct defence’. This concept describes a specific type of defence, which excludes the 
intervention under competition rules in cases when an abuse of dominance by an undertaking is required by 
national legislation and the undertaking in question has no discretion to act differently. The mere existence of 
regulation which encourages or facilitates abusive conduct does not exempt from the application of competition 
rules, but in some cases can be considered a mitigating circumstance. See case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG 
v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477, paras. 85-89 and 311. A. DE STREEL, ‘Background Paper’ (2011), 
Competition Policy Roundtable on Regulated Conduct Defence, OECD, DAF/COMP(2011)3. See also 
submission from the European Union. 
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5.4.2. Commitment procedure simplifies the case 
 
In contrast to these initial obstacles, formal proceedings against SvK, once opened, 
advanced quite quickly and the Commission closed the case within one year. As in 
most of its previous antitrust actions in the energy sector, the Commission decided to 
close the case under the commitment procedure, set forth in Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003.561 This is a simplified procedure by which the Commission formulates its 
concerns about an alleged breach of antitrust rules in a document called preliminary 
assessment. The investigation is much quicker than one done under the standard 
infringement procedure (Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003). However, this administrative 
efficiency comes at the expense of analytical depth. For the purpose of a commitment 
decision, the Commission is not required to find an infringement of competition rules. 
Neither a dominant position, nor its abuse needs to be established. In turn, much more 
attention is paid to the remedies. The undertaking in question offers a package of 
remedies (i.e. commitments) to address the Commission’s concerns formulated in the 
preliminary assessment. If the Commission considers them sufficient to remedy the 
anticompetitive behaviour, it makes them binding upon the undertaking in a 
commitment decision and closes the case without concluding on whether there was (or 
still is) a breach of competition rules. Instead, it concludes that there are no longer 
grounds for its action. In practice, the final commitment package is the outcome of 
negotiations between the Commission and the undertaking.  
 
We observe that commitment procedure greatly facilitate the use of competition rules 
as an EU energy policy tool. The Commission pursues policies of economic 
liberalisation and integration of markets, which often interfere with national 
protectionism or interests of local industrial lobby groups. Where political 
negotiations collapse due to irreconcilable national or industrial aims, direct 
negotiations with firms under competition rules allow the Commission to achieve its 
policy goals while keeping national governments and interest groups out of the 
picture. The loose concept of concerns in Article 9 allows the Commission to extend 
                                                           
561 Supra n. 14. For cases, see Table 2. 
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the scope of competition policy to catch practices, which may hamper European 
integration, but where antitrust aspects may not always be that obvious. Moreover, 
because an infringement of competition rules does not need to be established in a 
commitment decision, the Commission does not really need to come up with a robust 
theory of anticompetitive harm based on sound economic principles.562 It appears that, 
in the process of modernisation of EU competition rules, where a more economic 
approach displaces formalism and requires an effect-based assessment of 
anticompetitive behaviour, commitment procedure provides an escape hatch, where 
the Commission can drop economic welfare standards and pursue other policy 
objectives. In the following sections, using the SvK case as an example, we explain 
how the Commission employs competition rules to promote market integration, and 
ignores possible efficiencies of SvK’s actions as well as the regulatory context of 
electricity transmission services. 
 
5.4.3. Promotion of market integration as a key objective in the SvK case 
 
According to the Commission, SvK may have abused its dominant position on the 
market for electricity transmission in Sweden, and thus infringed Article 102 TFEU, 
by limiting export capacity on the interconnectors in order to relieve congestion on the 
national grid. To breach Article 102 TFEU, SvK would have to meet the following 
five cumulative conditions set forth therein: it would have to be (1) an undertaking (2) 
which abuses its (3) dominant position (4) held within the internal market or a 
substantial part of it, and (5) this behaviour would have to affect inter-State trade.563 
For the purpose of adopting a commitment decision, a breach of Article 102 TFEU 
does not need to be established, which allows the Commission to only briefly discuss 
the five-step infringement test.  
 
                                                           
562 Commitment decisions might also have clear advantages for the firms involved. They will be able to avoid a 
lengthy and costly process, they might avoid paying a fine, and legally their abuse has not been established, so 
subsequent private claims are less likely to follow. See discussion, supra section 1.2.1.1. 
563 A. JONES and B. SUFRIN, supra n. 61, p. 261.  
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As already mentioned,564 it was debatable whether SvK could be considered an 
undertaking for the purpose of Article 102 TFEU (the first element). The classification 
of SvK as an undertaking in the meaning of EU competition rules is of key importance 
as it determines whether Article 102 TFEU can be applied here in the first place. The 
Commission establishes in the decision that SvK is subject to competition laws. The 
discussion concerning criteria (3), (4) and (5) seems to be more of a formality. Finding 
a dominant position within a substantial part of the internal market (3 and 4) is in any 
case evident, as SvK enjoys a legal monopoly for the transmission services in 
Sweden.565 Similarly, since the case concerns cross-border trade in energy, the inter-
State effect (5) is beyond dispute.566 
 
The core of the Commission’s assessment is the (alleged) abuse itself (2). The 
Commission develops a theory of harm which intertwines anticompetitive concerns 
(discrimination) with an internal market interest. Firstly, one source of anticompetitive 
concern is that SvK’s practices led to de facto discrimination between different 
network users. SvK discriminated on the basis of nationality, since at times of 
congestion it only refused to satisfy external demand, whereas transmission of 
electricity reserved for national consumption has never been limited in order to relieve 
internal bottlenecks. The Commission explicitly refers to the general principle of non-
discrimination enshrined in the Treaty,567 and recalls that nationality-based 
discrimination can constitute an abuse of a dominant position in violation of Article 
102 TFEU. In fact, the European Courts used to apply Article 102 TFEU to 
discriminatory practices in the past and the Commission invokes this line of cases to 
back the SvK decision.568 
                                                           
564 Supra, section 5.4.1.2. 
565 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 24-26. 
566 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, para. 46. 
567 Article 18 TFEU. 
568 Case C-82/01, Aéroports de Paris v. Commission [2002] ECR I-9297, case C-163/99, Portuguese Republic v. 
Commission [2001] ECR I-2613, case T-139/98, AAMS v. Commission [2001] ECR II-3413, case C-18/93, 
Corsica Ferries Italia [1994] ECR I-1783, case 7/82, GVL v. Commission [1983] ECR 483 and case 27/76, 
United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207. See Commission Decision, supra n. 439, at note 39, All these 
cases are concerned with practices that were either directly or indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of 
nationality and, more importantly, they were seen as harmful to the internal market. Some legal scholars 
consider them a third category of Article 102 abuses, next to exploitative and anti-competitive abuses. See, for 
instance, R. WHISH (2005), supra n. 16, p. 195 and 679. A. JONES and B. SUFRIN, supra n. 61, p. 520. 
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Secondly, and this is where the internal market rules come into picture, the 
Commission reasons that SvK’s practices contributed to a re-segmentation of the 
European market along national borders, with artificially low prices in Sweden and 
higher prices abroad. Hence, the non-Swedish customers could not fully benefit from 
the internal market.569 SvK’s policy constituted an obstacle to trade within the internal 
market. The Commission recalls that Article 35 TFEU prohibits quantitative 
restrictions on exports and measures having equivalent effect.570 It refers to the ECJ 
case law dating all the way back to the 1966 Consten and Grundig judgment571 and 
draws an analogy between SvK’s conduct and state measures restricting cross-border 
trade. According to the Commission, since export restrictions are prohibited under the 
Treaty, so should be a unilateral conduct of a dominant undertaking with the same 
objective of restricting cross-border trade.572 
 
The Commission’s theory of harm heavily relies on the general prohibition of 
nationality-based discrimination and Article 35 TFEU. These are provisions 
contextually beyond the scope of competition policy,573 but the Commission has 
invoked them directly or indirectly in competition cases whenever it sought to protect 
the internal market or promote further market integration.574 The case law recalled by 
the Commission considers market-partitioning practices as per se abuses, because they 
                                                           
569 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 27 and 42-44. 
570 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, para. 43. 
571 Joined cases 56/64 and 58/64, Établissements Consten and Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 299, paras. 
342-343.  
572 The Consten and Grundig case was decided in the early days of the European integration. At that time, the 
Commission’s antitrust enforcement, supported by the Courts, was particularly driven by common market 
considerations.  
573 Considering the context of the provisions, neither Article 18 TFEU nor Article 35 TFEU is listed under the 
chapter on competition rules (Title VII, Chapter 1). However, the link between Article 18 TFEU and Article 102 
TFEU is comprehensible, given the wording of Article 102, which names discriminatory practices as a potential 
abuse of a dominant position (Article 102(2)(c) TFEU).  There is no such textual link, however, between Article 
102 TFEU and Article 35 TFEU, apart from the fact that a breach of Article 102 TFEU requires a cross-border 
effect. 
574 For competition cases involving discrimination based on nationality, see supra n. 568. For competition cases 
involving export bans and conduct hindering cross-border trade, see e.g. joined cases 56/64 and 58/64, 
Établissements Consten and Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 299, case 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma v. 
Commission [1970] ECR 661, case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, case 226/84, British 
Leyland v. Commission [1986] ECR 3263, case T-62/98, Volkswagen v. Commission [2000] ECR II-2707, case 
T-139/98, AAMS v. Commission [2001] ECR-II 3413. 
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frustrate “the most fundamental objections of the Union”575, and because they have 
the same objective as protectionist measures by Member States, which are captured by 
internal market rules. The Commission does not depart from this argumentation in the 
SvK case. Its approach remains very formalistic. First, it emphasises discriminatory 
nature of SvK’s practices, based solely on price comparisons in the day-ahead market. 
As discussed in chapter 4, this approach lacks economic foundations. Then, it refers to 
the Consten and Grundig reasoning and concludes that ‘practices, [which aim at 
restricting exports of electricity so as to reserve such electricity for domestic 
consumption], are generally considered to have as their object the restriction of 
competition’. Put differently, the Commission seems to apply in the SvK case a per se 
rule, according to which congestion shifting by SvK is abusive as such and cannot be 
justified on economic welfare standards. 
 
5.4.4. Neglecting Objective Justification 
 
In this section we discuss whether SvK’s congestion shifting could be justified on 
legitimate grounds, a question which, in our assessment, did not receive sufficient 
attention by the Commission. The Commission considers SvK’s action an impediment 
to cross-border trade, and this implies that congestion shifting is abusive per se. 
However, we are convinced that a more relaxed procedural framework of Article 9 
could have given room for objective justifications (5.4.4.1) such as the ones put 
forward by SvK: that the action was justified based on efficiency improvements 
(5.4.4.2) and the public interest (5.4.4.3). 
 
5.4.4.1. Objective justification and commitment procedure 
 
The reasoning set out in the preliminary assessment suggests that if the Commission 
was in fact required by the procedure to find an infringement of Article 102 TFEU 
(which is not required in a commitment procedure), then it would consider SvK’s 
                                                           
575 Joined cases 56/64 and 58/64, Établissements Consten and Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 299, para. 
340. 
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practice as a per se abuse. That is, congestion shifting would be presumed unlawful, 
without allowing evidence to the contrary, by way of justification.  
 
In theory, there are no per se abuses under Article 102 TFEU.576 As is often reiterated 
by the ECJ, anticompetitive practices of a dominant undertaking are abusive unless 
they are objectively justified.577 The notion of objective justification developed by the 
Courts is far from clear, as neither the Commission, nor the ECJ has been consistent in 
its interpretation.578 However, the right of a dominant undertaking to defend itself 
against allegations of abuse on the basis of objective justification is not questioned.579 
Objective justification is thus a defence under competition rules and, as acknowledged 
by the Courts and the Commission, it captures practices pursuing legitimate public 
interest objectives as well as those producing efficiency gains.580 
 
A standard infringement procedure under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 requires the 
Commission to investigate the case thoroughly and to adopt a statement of objections, 
which triggers clear procedural rights for the undertaking to defend its conduct against 
the objections raised therein.581 In other words, once the Commission finds an abuse, 
the burden of proof shifts to the undertaking, which can try to justify its practices.   
                                                           
576 There is, though, a line of case law where the Courts seem to consider certain practices per se abusive 
(exclusive supply obligations, loyalty rebates and predatory pricing). However, in more recent cases the Courts 
have become less strict and allow objective justification also with regard to these practices. See Opinion of AG 
Colomer delivered on 01.04.2008 in joined cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE and Others v. 
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE (Syfait II), paras. 56-61. 
577 See e.g. case 40-70, Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l. and others [1971] ECR 69, para. 17. This is the first case in 
which ECJ refers to objective justification. See also case 311/84, Centre belge d'études de marché - 
Télémarketing  v. CLT and IPB [1985] ECR 3261, paras. 26-27.  
578 The concept of ‘objective justification’ lacks a complete theoretical framework causing a lot of confusion as 
to what could constitute objective justification under Article 102. For the purpose of this case study it is not 
necessary to enter into this debate. For an extensive discussion see E. ROUSSEVA, ‘The Concept of “Objective 
Justification” of an Abuse of a Dominant Position: Can it help to Modernise the Analysis under Article 82 EC?’ 
(2006) 2 The Competition Law Review 2, 27-72. 
579 E. ROUSSEVA, supra n. 578, p. 27. 
580 See A. JONES and B. SUFRIN, supra n. 61, p. 282. R. WHISH (2005), supra n. 16, 207.  
581 The Commission adopts statement of objections with a view to adopting a prohibition decision. See 
Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16, para. 82: ‘The Statement of Objections sets out the 
preliminary position of the Commission regarding the alleged infringement of Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU, 
after its in-depth investigation. Its purpose is to inform the parties concerned of the objections raised against 
them with a view to enabling them to exercise their rights of defence in writing and orally (at the hearing). It 
thus constitutes an essential procedural safeguard which ensures that the right to be heard is observed. The 
parties concerned will be provided with all the information they need to defend themselves effectively and to 
comment on the allegations made against them.’ 
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However, the SvK case was closed by a commitment decision. The Commission does 
not issue a statement of objections under Article 9, but only formulates its concerns in 
a preliminary assessment. The purpose and content of those documents differ. A 
preliminary assessment serves an undertaking subject to proceedings as a basis to 
formulate appropriate commitments, and not to exercise its right of defence. For this 
purpose, it merely includes the Commission’s anticompetitive concerns, and not 
formal objections.582 A statement of objections is a more substantial document, which 
not only fulfils the requirements of a preliminary assessment, but goes well beyond 
that.583  
 
Comparing the two procedural routes (Article 9 commitment procedure and Article 7 
infringement procedure) we believe there is a risk that the objective justification 
defence is not sufficiently taken into account in the commitment procedure. Formally, 
the commitment procedure does not give the undertaking any procedural right to rebut 
the concerns of the Commission, and the dialectic debate is replaced by bargaining 
over commitments, which might make it more difficult for an undertaking to argue in 
defence of its actions, and easier for the Commission to disregard them.  
 
This is also apparent from the publicly available case documents, where SvK argues in 
favour of its congestion management methods both in reply to the DaE’s complaint, as 
well as during the negotiations with the Commission.584 Its argumentation is based on 
both efficiency considerations and public interest objectives (as discussed in sections 
5.4.4.2 and 5.4.4.3 below). The Commission, however, does not take note of this 
argumentation and only remarks in its decision that SvK did not provide sufficient 
evidence to objectively justify its conduct.585 Hence, the administrative efficiency 
feature of the commitment procedure appears to absolve the Commission from taking 
a closer look at the possible reasons for the allegedly abusive conduct.  
 
                                                           
582 Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16, paras. 121-122. 
583 Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16, paras. 82 and 123. See discussion, supra section 1.5.2.2. 
584 Svenska Kraftnät, The complaint from Dansk Energi, supra n. 466, p. 4 and 9. Svenska Kraftnät, Background 
explanations, supra n. 462, p. 11. See also letter of M. Odenberg, supra n. 461. 
585 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, para. 45. 
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It is difficult to predict whether the Swedish TSO would have been more successful in 
justifying its actions under a standard infringement procedure. Objective justification 
under Article 102 TFEU is rarely accepted in practice, both by the Commission and 
the Courts.586 And even though the Regulation 1/2003 and the Commission’s notice 
on best practices587 are silent as to the possibility of using objective justification in the 
context of Article 9, this does not mean that an undertaking cannot justify its allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct on objective grounds to strengthen its bargaining position in 
the negotiations.588 Thus, having this indirect role in the negotiations, objective 
justification can still influence the outcome of the case.589  
 
In what follows, we discuss the two arguments used by SvK to defend its congestion 
management. We believe that the Commission failed to analyse these arguments on 
their merits. However, we do not want to enquire into whether or not it makes sense 
for the Commission to assume a more pro-active approach in commitment cases.590 
Rather, we would like to point out that an electricity network is a complex techno-
economic system, where a lot of trade-offs need to be made almost on a continuous 
basis. A better analysis of this system, and its regulation, could have lead to an 
enhanced definition of the abuse, and as a result, would have given more guidance for 
network operators and sector-specific regulators.  
 
5.4.4.2. Objective justification based on efficiencies 
 
SvK maintained that it shifted congestion to the border and preferred not to rely on 
counter-trading as its cost would be absorbed by the Swedish grid users, and not by 
                                                           
586 A. JONES and B. SUFRIN, supra n. 61, p. 282. R. WHISH (2005), supra n. 16, pp. 207-208. E. 
ROUSSEVA, supra n. 578, p. 35. On the top of that, in order to be justified, the conduct must be proportionate. 
The application of the proportionality test further limits the scope of this defence. 
587 Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16. 
588 According to some commentators, bilateral negotiations give undertakings an opportunity to explain their 
conduct to the Commission. See e.g. S. RAB, D. MONNOYEUR and A. SUKHTANKAR, supra n. 26, p. 175. 
589 Moreover, the absence of an in-depth analysis of the case might potentially weaken the bargaining position of 
the Commission, as it cannot provide any strong evidence in support of its anticompetitive allegations. 
590 On the one hand, the Commission enjoys a greater margin of discretion in the commitment negotiations and 
could theoretically investigate the reasons behind anticompetitive behaviour on its own initiative. On the other 
hand, a time-consuming investigation might write off the commonly cited benefit of a commitment decision – 
its administrative efficiency. Nevertheless, the Commission’s formalistic approach in the SvK case has been 
pointed out by commentators. See e.g. A. DE HAUTECLOCQUE and L. HANCHER, supra n. 225, pp. 20-22.  
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those, who benefit from it (i.e. Denmark). SvK argued that it proposed the Danish 
TSO to share the financial burden of increased counter-trading on several occasions, 
but its offers were declined.591 
 
This argument makes some economic sense. Danish consumption creates a negative 
externality:592 it reduces availability of transmission capacity within Sweden. The 
same applies to the Swedish consumers. If SvK shifts too much of its internal 
congestion to the border to increase Swedish consumption, it has a negative impact on 
the Danes, reducing cross-border capacity and thus increasing the cost of energy 
consumption in Denmark. In chapter 4 we show that SvK can achieve efficient 
allocation by shifting some internal congestion to the border and counter-trading the 
rest. The optimal amount of congestion shifting depends on the demand levels in 
Sweden and in Denmark. In social optimum, the electricity day-ahead price in 
Denmark should be equal to the counter-trading price in South Sweden. Paying this 
price for their energy consumption, Danish consumers would internalise the cost of 
congestion they create within Sweden. Still, this does not mean that Denmark should 
pay a share of the Swedish counter-trading costs, a principle that SvK puts forward. 
This is because counter-trading costs are not related to the social cost of congestion.593 
As a result of counter-trading, consumers in South Sweden and producers in North 
Sweden receive implicit subsidies. Consumers in the south pay a lower day-ahead 
price than when congestion is priced directly in the day-ahead market, as in the case of 
market splitting. Similarly, producers in the north receive a higher day-ahead price. 
Those subsidies consist mainly of transfers from the Swedish network operator to the 
Swedish network users, and are therefore not a measure of the social cost of 
                                                           
591 Svenska Kraftnät, The complaint from Dansk Energi, supra n. 466, p. 4. 
592 A negative externality is a negative side effect of the consumption of a product on a third party. This concept 
is common in an environmental context (pollution). When economic agents do not take into account the 
negative externality of their consumption of a product, the level of consumption of this product will be larger 
than the social optimum. In order to achieve a socially efficient outcome, those agents need to internalise the 
externality, so that they take into account the effect of their actions on third parties. This could be done for 
instance by imposing a tax on the good (‘the polluter pays principle’) or by the creation of clear property rights.  
593 The social cost of congestion is equal to the forgone benefit of energy trades from North to South Sweden, 
which could not take place because of exports from Sweden to Denmark. Hence, the social cost of congestion 
does not show up in the accounts of SvK, as it refers to a hypothetical alternative usage of the transmission line. 
There is no direct relation between those forgone benefits and the counter-trading costs. 
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congestion, which the Danes would have to pay in order to internalise their negative 
externality. 
 
In summary, we show that SvK could have had an efficiency objective in mind, when 
it shifted some of the internal congestion to the border with Denmark. The 
Commission’s cursory assessment of SvK’s behaviour does not consider this 
possibility. Instead, the Commission compares day-ahead prices in Denmark and 
Sweden and concludes that SvK’s practices are discriminatory and lead to market-
partitioning. It has been argued in the previous chapter that the difference in day-
ahead prices should not be taken as an indicator for discriminatory behaviour. One 
would rather need to compare the marginal counter-trading cost in South Sweden with 
the day-ahead price in Denmark.594 A more economic approach to the concept of 
discrimination would not lead to an outright prohibition of congestion shifting in the 
first place, and would have given SvK the opportunity to justify its actions on 
efficiency grounds.  
 
5.4.4.3. Objective justification based on public interest595 
 
SvK argued that maintaining a common electricity market with a common price was 
advantageous for Sweden. There were genuine concerns, that splitting the market into 
smaller price zones would have a negative impact on Sweden, by reducing the 
liquidity in the wholesale market and hindering retail competition.596 
 
As a state-run central administrative authority SvK must act in accordance with the 
Instruction from the Swedish Government.597 This document, issued on a yearly basis, 
stipulates SvK’s guiding principles and also specifies special tasks. According to the 
                                                           
594 For a detailed discussion, see supra section 4.5. 
595 Due to conceptual confusion surrounding the notion of objective justification we chose to label the 
arguments set forth in this section as ‘public interest objectives’, thereby avoiding concepts such as ‘objective 
necessity’ or ‘regulatory conduct defence’.  
596 Retailing is the final segment of electricity value chain, that is, the supply of electricity to end-customers. 
Retail competition exists if end-customers have a possibility to choose their electricity supplier between 
competing electricity suppliers. 
597 Supra n. 500. See also NordREG, Regulation of the Nordic TSOs – with focus on Market Efficiency and 
Harmonisation, Report  No. 7/2007, p. 12. 
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Instruction, SvK should promote competition in the Swedish wholesale and retail 
electricity markets.598 In the light of this objective, keeping a single price might have 
been in line with the Instruction, as it is claimed to make forward and day-ahead 
markets more liquid and promote retail competition. Interestingly, Swedish 
government itself commissioned SvK to investigate the possibility of market splitting 
in Sweden as early as in 1993. SvK claims that similar studies, also delegated by the 
Swedish government, have been performed over the years and all of them pointed to 
the risk of weakening competition and reducing liquidity in the sub-markets.599 On the 
top of that, the Swedish stakeholders, headed by the industry association, Swedenergy, 
were from the outset fairly negative about market splitting. As SvK reports, this 
scepticism did not end with the implementation of the commitment package and 
criticism can still be heard.600  
 
The question arises as to whether SvK was sufficiently autonomous in setting its 
congestion management system, for instance, whether it could introduce market 
splitting independently from the Swedish government.601 As a public utility, SvK does 
enjoy decisional autonomy regarding transmission services it provides – it makes 
decisions and issues regulations.602 Further, congestion management procedures are 
not specifically regulated in any legislative act.603 The Electricity Act sets out criteria 
on network operation, but these are very general, and include, for instance, the 
obligation to transmit electricity on reasonable conditions and of good quality.604 This 
all demonstrates that SvK has discretion as to whether to keep Sweden as one Elspot 
                                                           
598 Article 3 of Government Ordinance, supra n. 500. See also Svenska Kraftnät, Background explanations, 
supra n. 462, p. 6. 
599 See the letter of M. Odenberg, supra n. 461. Finally, in 2008, the Swedish government instructed SvK to start 
a process of subdividing Sweden into smaller price zones by means of regulation. See Commission Decision, 
supra n. 439, para. 65. See also discussion infra section 5.5. 
600 Svenska Kraftnät, Annual Report 2010, supra n. 493, p. 5. In defiance of these objections, Energy Markets 
Inspectorate has recently reported that retail competition has not been affected in the first few months after the 
implementation of market splitting. See Energy Markets Inspectorate (2012), supra n. 501. 
601 According to the ruling of the General Court in the DT case, the mere existence of regulation which 
encourages or facilitates abusive conduct does not exempt a dominant firm from the application of competition 
rules, but in some cases can be considered a mitigating circumstance. See Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG 
v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477, paras. 85-89 and 311. 
602 NordREG, supra n. 597, p. 17. 
603 NordREG, A Common Definition of the System Operators’ Core Activities, Report 4/2006, p. 35, Appendix 
1. 
604 The Swedish Electricity Act, supra n. 452, chapter 3. 
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area or to further subdivide it.605 However, it appears that keeping one price within 
Sweden has always been a part of a wider socio-geographic policy. Seen from that 
angle, supply of electricity at a uniform electricity price within Sweden can therefore 
be considered a ‘service of general economic interest’ in a broader socioeconomic 
sense.606 Against this backdrop, SvK’s decisional autonomy to introduce market 
splitting might have been de facto limited by the national policy of maintaining a 
common price in Sweden, widely supported by the Swedish market.  
 
5.4.5. Proportionality of the final remedy 
 
The introduction of market splitting abolishes the single uniform electricity price 
which is valid for all the Swedish customers. In other words, it imposes a social policy 
on Sweden, something which normally remains within the State’s own decision 
making powers. Given this far-reaching intervention in the Sweden’s social policy 
domain, we would like to address the question whether the Commission went beyond 
its discretionary powers, by extracting disproportionate commitments. 
 
First of all, we should note that the Commission enjoys a broad margin of assessment 
regarding the proportionality of commitments. According to the recent ECJ judgment 
in the Alrosa case, the principle of proportionality, as a general principle of EU law, 
applies to commitment decisions, but to a limited extent.607 Had the principle of 
                                                           
605 Note that the very fact that SvK offered market splitting as a commitment to the Commission in a bilateral 
antitrust deal proves this point. 
606 We do not refer to any specific legal definition of services of general economic interest (SGEI) under the 
Swedish national regulation. The concept of SGEI is not defined by the EU law. In the EU practice, SGEI are 
economic activities that would not be produced by market forces alone or at least not in the form of an 
affordable service available indiscriminately to all (see MEMO/11/929 of 20.12.2011). The concept of SGEI 
depends on Member States, which impose public service obligations on private or public undertakings (service 
providers) and define the conditions under which these obligations are carried out. Hence, it would be up for the 
Swedish state to decide that providing electricity at a uniform price within Sweden is considered a service of 
general economic interest. 
607 The principle of proportionality is a criterion for lawfulness of all measures adopted by the EU institutions 
and requires that these measures cannot exceed what is appropriate and necessary for attaining the objective 
pursued, and that where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the 
least onerous and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued. See e.g. case 
15/83R, Denkavit Nederland [1984] ECR 2171, para. 25, case C-331/88, Fedesa and others [1990] ECR I-4023, 
para. 13, case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v. Commission [2003] ECR II-4653, para. 201, case C-180/00, 
Netherlands v. Commission [2005] ECR I-6603, para. 103. 
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proportionality fully applied, the Commission would have to (a) test whether the 
accepted commitments address its concerns formulated in the preliminary assessment, 
and, (b) consider alternative, less restrictive, measures (if they exist and are known to 
the Commission) and choose those, provided they also address its concerns.608 
According to the Alrosa judgment, in a commitment procedure the second test should 
be replaced by two weaker requirements. First, (b’) the accepted commitments must 
be the least restrictive (for the undertaking concerned) of all the commitments that 
were offered by the undertaking and must address the Commission’s concerns.609 
Second, (b’’) the accepted commitments must not go manifestly beyond what is 
necessary to address its concerns.610 Consequently, in a case where an undertaking 
offers only one set of commitments,611 test (b’) is trivially satisfied and the 
Commission only needs to assess whether (a) it meets its concerns and (b’’) is not 
manifestly disproportionate.612 
 
The Commission made SvK’s commitments binding in April 2010, that is, while the 
Alrosa case was still pending before the ECJ. This period was marked by uncertainty 
as to the content of the proportionality test applicable to Article 9 commitments.613 
Given the lack of clear standards, the Commission came up with an almost four-page-
                                                           
608 In 2007, the General Court required such a full proportionality test of commitments in the Alrosa case, but its 
judgment has been subsequently overruled by the ECJ on appeal. See case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission 
[2007] ECR II-02601, paras. 112-158. 
609 Case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-05949, paras. 41 and 61. 
610 Case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-05949, para. 42: ‘Judicial review for its part relates 
solely to whether the Commission’s assessment is manifestly incorrect.’. 
611 Publicly available case documents do not suggest that SvK offered alternative solutions to market splitting 
(e.g. increased counter-trading) so we assume this was not the case. However, given that negotiations with the 
Commission are not public, we cannot take it for granted. 
612 In that way the Commission can accept commitments under Article 9 which may go beyond the remedies it 
can impose in a standard infringement procedure under Article 7, in which case the principle of proportionality 
is fully applicable. See also Commission notice on best practices, supra n. 16, para. 115, which, referring to the 
Alrosa judgment, expressly states that the commitments can go beyond what the Commission could impose in a 
standard infringement procedure.   
613 The Courts were sending out contradictory signals. On the one hand, the General Court stated in 2007 in the 
same case that the principle of proportionality applies to commitment procedure just as it applies to the 
infringement procedure. That is, the Commission is required to test whether the proposed commitments are 
proportionate to the alleged infringement and necessary to meet the Commission’s concerns formulated in the 
preliminary assessment. See case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission [2007] ECR II-02601. On the other hand, 
Advocate General Kokott emphasised the voluntary nature of commitments, and argued for more discretion on 
the part of the Commission in the assessment of proportionality in commitment cases. Her opinion from 
September 2009 was a strong signal that the ECJ might overturn the General Court’s judgment on appeal and 
grant the Commission wide latitude in the assessment of commitments. See Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 
17.09.2009 in case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa [2010] ECR I-05949. 
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long fully-fledged discussion on the proportionality of SvK’s commitments, which 
provides an insight in how the proportionality of the commitments would have been 
tested, if it were required by law. Regarding the first test (a) the Commission states 
that SvK will no longer need to reduce capacity on the interconnectors, once market 
splitting is introduced. The Commission argues that this sufficiently addresses 
concerns formulated in the preliminary assessment. Regarding the second test (b), the 
Commission finds that there is no other remedy which would be equally effective in 
meeting its concerns.614 Resulting price differences do not represent, in view of the 
Commission, a disproportionate burden for third parties. In this regard, the foreseeable 
price increase in some areas in Sweden is ‘an unavoidable consequence of the 
commitment which brings the alleged discrimination between Swedish and non-
Swedish customers to an end.’ Overall, the Commission concludes that the 
commitments ‘are sufficient to address the concerns identified [...] in its preliminary 
assessment without being disproportionate.’ 
 
With regard to the first test, we find that market splitting does not sufficiently address 
the Commission’s concerns. It is true that SvK does not need to limit export to solve 
internal congestion. However, it can still do it in order to keep the prices in the new 
price areas at the same level. Indeed, we show in chapter 4 that despite market 
splitting, SvK can still shift congestion out of purely strategic reasons (in order to 
achieve price uniformity). Therefore market splitting alone, without sufficient 
monitoring, is not sufficient to address the Commission’s concerns. This means that, 
even in the light of the Alrosa judgment, the Commission might have breached the 
principle of proportionality, in the sense that the accepted commitments (market 
splitting) might not address its concerns set out in the preliminary assessment. 615 
 
As far as the second test (b) is concerned, the proportionality of market splitting 
depends on what the Commission wants to achieve in this case, that is, (A) market 
                                                           
614 The Commission briefly discusses network investments as an alternative, but concludes that they cannot 
constitute an equally effective remedy due to long lead times and uncertainty as to their outcome. 
615 Market splitting would also be considered a disproportionate remedy in a standard infringement procedure 
under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 (full proportionality test) since it would still not pass test (a), that is, it 
could not be considered an effective means to bring the infringement to an end. 
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integration or (B) economic efficiency. The preliminary assessment suggests that the 
Commission’s objective is (A), as its concerns relate mostly to limiting cross-border 
capacities impeding market integration and not to inefficient congestion management, 
which would have been primary concern in variant (B). Had the Commission 
considered an efficiency standard (B) in its assessment, then market splitting would 
not have been a proportionate remedy, as a less onerous remedy was at hand. Again 
we refer here to chapter 4 in saying that efficient allocation can well be obtained by a 
combination of counter-trading and partial congestion shifting. For SvK, this might be 
a less onerous remedy with no implementation costs, which is equally effective to 
meet the Commission’s concerns regarding inefficient congestion management. 
However, it seems that the Commission does not seek an efficient outcome, but 
simply wants to eliminate congestion shifting and thus increase cross-border flows to 
enhance market integration (objective (A)). If this is the case, then market splitting is 
more adequate to address the Commission’s concerns regarding cross-border trade 
than any other method which involves cross-border capacity reductions.  
 
5.5. SVK’S COMMITMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE NORDIC DEBATE 
 
In this section we discuss the political context of the SvK case. The idea of introducing 
market splitting in Sweden is not new. The Swedish government commissioned SvK 
to investigate the possibility of subdividing Sweden into smaller price zones as early 
as 1993. At that time it was suggested to put market splitting on hold, due to the lack 
of sufficient competition and liquidity in the Swedish electricity market.616 The 
movement was rather in the opposite direction, towards integration and the creation of 
bigger markets. This led to the establishment of Nord Pool in 1996, a joint 
Scandinavian power exchange, with a day-ahead auction for electricity as the main 
trading platform (Elspot). At the outset of Nordic integration, cross-border exchanges 
were limited. As national grids had sufficient transmission capacity to handle 
domestic flows, congestion within the Nordic countries was not an issue and countries 
could therefore be defined as single price zones. However, further integration within 
                                                           
616 See the letter of M. Odenberg, supra n. 461. 
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the Nordic market and with the European continent increased demand for transmission 
capacity on cross-border lines. Liquid and transparent market allowed well-informed 
market players to trade electricity across the borders. International transit flows 
increased the stress on national grids and congestion within the price zones (individual 
countries) occurred more frequently.617 As national congestion was managed by 
reducing cross-border capacity further Nordic integration was obstructed. As a result, 
national congestion management systems started to be widely discussed between the 
Nordic countries. The Swedish market splitting debate naturally moved to the regional 
level. In 2002, Nordel, a platform for cooperation between the Nordic transmission 
system operators,618 suggested further subdivision of the Nordic market into price 
areas and, among others, splitting Sweden into three zones. At that time, the Swedish 
power industry voiced its opposition against Nordel’s proposal. 
 
The problem of cross-border congestion at the Swedish-Danish border became 
particularly acute after November 2005 when Danish day-ahead prices often peaked to 
extremely high levels. The Danish TSO ascribed these price spikes to the SvK’s 
congestion management.619 In the same year the Swedish Energy Agency reported that 
SvK and the other Nordic TSOs were extensively limiting cross-border capacities to 
relieve internal congestion within their control areas.620 Following this report and the 
Danish complaints, the Swedish government commissioned the Energy Markets 
Inspectorate (EMI) to explore alternative congestion management methods, in 
particular market splitting in Sweden and the effects on competition in the Swedish 
and the Nordic electricity markets. EMI (2006) suggested splitting the market along 
cut 2,621 with a sufficient transitory period for the retail market to adjust, but not along 
cut 4 since it would substantially weaken competition in the area south of cut 4. EMI 
proposed an increased use of counter-trading for cut 4 instead, whose cost would be 
                                                           
617 Imports come mostly from Norway and Finland. Exports are directed to Eastern and the Western Denmark, 
Germany, Poland and back to Norway and Finland, but to their Southern parts. 
618 In 2009 Nordel was wound up and its tasks taken over by the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). 
619 Energinet.dk, Report on price formation in November 2005 in Eastern Denmark, 14.02.2006, annexed to 
DaE’s complaint. 
620 Swedish Energy Agency, Hantering av begränsningar i det svenska överföringssystemet för el :ett nordiskt 
perspektiv, Report No. ER 2005:11, in Swedish only. 
621 Supra n. 520. 
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shared between the Swedish and the Danish TSOs. The sharing arrangement was 
motivated by the fact that the Danish customers would profit from increased counter-
trading on cut 4, because SvK would not limit cross-border capacity anymore. 
However, the Danish TSO was reluctant to solve the problem bilaterally. Instead, 
Dansk Energi, the Danish association of energy companies, reported SvK to the 
European Commission for shifting congestion to the Danish border. DaE complained 
that SvK’s conduct was harmful to Danish consumers. These allegations were based 
on an empirical study of Copenhagen Economics, which quantified the economic 
losses due to SvK’s congestion shifting.622 DaE claimed that SvK’s practices were 
detrimental to competition and trade within the internal market and violated EU 
competition rules.623 The Norwegian Electricity Industry Association (EBL) supported 
the Danish complaint. The threat of a case being taken to the European Commission 
intensified the market splitting debate in Sweden. In 2007, EMI issued a joint report 
on market splitting in Sweden, in cooperation with SvK and the Swedish power 
industry, the so-called POMPE report.624 The Swedish organisations considered a new 
price border within the Nordic market between the hydro power region in the North 
and thermal power in the South. The proposed border would not only split the 
Swedish market along cut 2, but also subdivide Finland and Norway into new price 
areas. With respect to Sweden, the POMPE report found that the price border along 
cut 2 would result in a more efficient utilisation of resources, without harming 
wholesale competition but with adverse effects on Swedish retail competition on a 
national basis.  
 
The discussion shifted to the Nordic level again with a series of reports. A report 
prepared for the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM’s 2007 report) highlighted the 
                                                           
622 Copenhagen Economics, supra n. 441. 
623 Supra n. 442. 
624 The Energy Markets Inspectorate, SvK, Swedenergy and the Confederation of Swedish Enerprise, Price 
Areas in the Electricity Market, EMIR 2007:02, 2007, so-called POMPE Report, available in Swedish at  
http://ei.se/Documents/Publikationer/rapporter_och_pm/Rapporter%202007/Prisomraden_pa_elmarknaden_po
mpe_gemensam_rapport_fran_energimarknadsinspektionen_svenska_kraftnat_svensk_energi_svenskt_naringsli
v_emir_2007_02.pdf accessed 20.05.2013. 
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need for new price areas, independent of the national borders.625 A second report 
(NCM’s 2008 report) emphasised the inefficiencies of congestion shifting, and 
showed that increasing the number of prices areas from seven to eleven would 
improve socioeconomic benefits, and it recommended further market splitting.626 The 
Nordic Energy Regulators (NordREG, 2/2007) reported that Congestion shifting 
constituted a common and frequent congestion management practice among all Nordic 
TSOs, not only the Swedish one,627 and saw this as a ground to change the Nordic 
price areas.628 The Nordic Competition Authorities (2007) analysed the 
competitiveness of the Nordic electricity market,629 but with respect to the Swedish 
congestion problems, they mainly referred to the results of the POMPE report.630 
Following those reports, the Nordic Council of Ministers asked the national TSOs in 
2010 to investigate the introduction of new price areas, and the Swedish government 
commissioned SvK to start a process to create several price zones in Sweden.631 This 
process involved consultations with the Energy Market Inspectorate, the Competition 
Authority, Nord Pool Spot and dialogues with market participants, including 
generators, traders, distribution network operators and industrial consumers.632 This 
                                                           
625 Ea Energy Analyses and COWI, Steps for improved congestion management and cost allocation for transit, 
Report for the Nordic Council of Ministers, TemaNord 2007:537, April 2007, available at 
http://www.norden.org/da/publikationer/publikationer/2007-537 accessed 20.05.2013, p. 17. 
626 Ea Energy Analyses, Hagman Energy and COWI, Congestion Management in the Nordic Market – 
evaluation of different market models. Final Report for the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), May 2008. 
From an economic point of view, nodal pricing, which can be considered an extreme case of market splitting (as 
opposed to a single price area) is an optimal congestion management method, as it ideally reflects the technical 
aspects of the transmission network. However, in this report, the consultants analyse further market splitting 
along all bottlenecks based on a model simplified to 11 price areas due to the availability of data. For details, see 
Final Report, p. 21. 
627 For instance, during dry years, when electricity flows from the Southern Finland to the North, Fingrid 
reduces export capacity to Sweden, to relieve internal congestion on cut P1 (part of the congestion is eliminated 
by counter-trading, if feasible). To the contrary, import from Sweden is limited during wet years, when the 
surplus of electricity in the North of Finland flows to the South, again creating congestion on cut P1, this time in 
the opposite direction. Similarly, Stattnet reduces export capacities towards Sweden to protect Oslo with its high 
level of consumption during cold winter days, at the same time reducing Sweden’s security of supply (so-called 
‘Hasle-trappen’ or ‘Hasle stairway’). See NordREG, Congestion Management in the Nordic Region supra n. 
438, pp. 15-16 and 25. Organisation of the Nordic TSOs (Nordel), Nordic Grid Master Plan 2008, March 2008, 
p. 28. See also Stattnet’s website at http://www.statnett.no/en/The-power-system/The-power-situation/Handling-
of-bottlenecks-and-use-of-Elspot-areas/ accessed 20.05.2013. See also The Swedish Energy Agency, Hantering 
av begränsningar i det svenska överföringssystemet för el:ett nordiskt perspektiv, 2005:11, in Swedish only. 
628 NordREG (2007), supra n. 438, p. 13. 
629 Nordic Competition Authorities (2007), supra n. 453. 
630 Nordic Competition Authorities (2007), supra n. 453, pp. 38-39. 
631 Annual Government Regulation Document for Svenska Kraftnät of 2009 (Regleringsbrev för affärsverket 
svenska Kraftnät för 2009), in Swedish only. 
632 See Svenska Kraftnät, Background explanations, supra n. 462, p. 13. 
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time, there was no outright opposition from the Swedish industry. However, 
Svedenergy, the flagship organisation of Swedish power suppliers, suggested waiting 
with market splitting until the planned investments in the Nordic grid would be 
finalised.633 Grid reinforcement would, according to Svedenergy, limit the need to 
introduce multiple price areas.634 At the same time, however, this would postpone 
market splitting until 2013 at the earliest. 
 
It appears that the Nordic debate on market splitting would sooner or later have led to 
a subdivision of the Swedish market into smaller price areas. However, the antitrust 
intervention by the European Commission not only intensified the ongoing 
discussions, but also most probably accelerated the introduction of price zones in 
Sweden by several years. Evidently, the progress in the market splitting debate was 
and would have remained slow, partly because other long-term solutions to internal 
congestion were pursued in parallel to the debate on market splitting (e.g. Nordel’s 
project of grid enforcement), and partly because many stakeholders tried to press their 
own clashing interests. Clearly, it was easier to introduce market splitting via an 
antitrust deal. The bilateral character of Article 9 negotiations enabled the 
Commission to discuss commitments directly with SvK, excluding interest groups’ 
interventions. Of course, any potential opponents to market splitting were given the 
option to express their concerns about the proposed commitments within a month 
following their official publication.635 This phase, called market testing, is an 
obligatory part of the investigation in which the Commission consults the market 
regarding the impact of the proposed commitments. Any feedback received from the 
interested third parties has to be taken into consideration by the Commission before 
rendering the commitments binding upon the undertaking. If the opposing views 
expressed by the market participants convince the Commission, it may ask the 
undertaking in question to modify the commitments accordingly. However, it may 
also find that the observations received in the market test are not serious enough to 
                                                           
633 The so-called ‘Pakken’, a package of five already decided investments in the Nordic grid, included in the 
Nordel’s 2004 investment plan.  
634 See Svedenergy, The Electricity Year 2008, p. 8. 
635 Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 14. 
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reconsider the commitments. In such a case, the Commission quotes the opposing 
views of stakeholders gathered in the consultation, argues why it maintains its 
position, and accepts the commitments in their initial shape. And this is what 
happened in the SvK case.  
 
Firstly, some stakeholders questioned the adequacy of market splitting as a remedy to 
tackle internal congestion, arguing for counter-trading and grid investments instead. In 
response to that, the Commission asserted that market splitting is a sufficient and 
proportionate remedy to solve the problems identified in the preliminary 
assessment.636  
 
Secondly, the stakeholders feared that market splitting would increase concentration 
in the Swedish wholesale, retail and balancing markets and, as far as South Sweden is 
concerned, it would lead to higher prices.637 In this respect, market participants shared 
the concerns of the Swedish TSO.638 However, in view of the Commission, market 
splitting does not increase concentration, but merely reveals the fact that the market is 
already concentrated. The Commission quotes the NCM’s 2008 report, which 
recommends splitting the Nordic market into smaller price zones.639 It also refers to 
Norway, where retail market remained competitive despite subdivision of the country 
into Elspot areas. Regarding retail markets, it states that the costs and risks which 
market splitting poses to retailers (and thus deters entry in retail markets) can be 
diminished by entering into contracts for differences (CfD)640 and, in the longer run, 
by investing in new generation. Regarding wholesale and balancing markets and 
higher electricity prices in South Sweden, the Commission points out that market 
splitting will decrease market power and lead to price convergence between South 
Sweden and North Sweden over time, as it sends correct investments signals to the 
                                                           
636 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 51-52. 
637 In the aftermath of market splitting prices in the southern areas of Sweden have indeed increased. As 
reported in November 2011, particularly affected were electricity consumers in the southern Götaland. See press 
release  ‘Elbolag kritiskt till nya elprisområden’ available at 
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=4795027 accessed 20.05.2013, in Swedish only. 
638 Svenska Kraftnät, The complaint from Dansk Energi, supra n. 466, p. 4. 
639 Nordic Competition Authorities (2007), supra n. 453. 
640 CfD is a derivative whose reference price is the difference of the system price and a certain area price. CfD 
are used for hedging against any price differential between the system price and a specific Elspot area price.  
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market. In answer to the fears of energy-intensive consumers that higher prices in 
South Sweden might have a negative impact on their competitiveness, the 
Commission points out that market splitting creates a level playing field for all 
industrial consumers in the EU, as price zones reflects the true market conditions. 
Also, it assures that the Swedish national regulation empowers EMI to monitor 
electricity prices.641 
 
Thirdly, some stakeholders proposed to postpone the implementation of the remedy 
package until 2013, claiming that an early introduction of price zones puts some of the 
current financial and long-term supply contracts at risk, as they would change their 
value. Other stakeholders opted for a longer delay (up to 5 years), until their fixed-
price long-term supply contracts with final customers would expire. The Commission 
rebuts this argumentation, saying that market players in electricity sector are exposed 
to all kinds of risks and market splitting is just one example of these. It points out that 
in the light of the market splitting debate stakeholders were aware of an upcoming 
general change of regulation and the financial risks connected with entering into long-
term contracts.642  
 
Lastly, some stakeholders were concerned that market splitting might have a negative 
effect on investments in renewables. Namely, some investment projects in North 
Sweden, where the largest potential for green energy is located, might appear 
unprofitable once the energy prices go down in that area. As a result, Sweden would 
not achieve the 2020 national overall target for the 49% share of green energy in gross 
final consumption.643 This set of arguments was also rejected. The Commission noted 
that new investments in renewable generation in the North cannot contribute to a 
larger share of renewables in final consumption for 2020, because energy is mostly 
                                                           
641 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 53-59. 
642 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 60-69. 
643 Annex 1 of Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23.04.2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 
2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140/16. 
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consumed in the South and, due to congestion in the grid, more green energy would 
not be transported there anyway.644 
 
Taken together, even though many stakeholders opposed the introduction of the price 
zones and came up with various arguments against market splitting in response to the 
Commission’s market test, none of them succeeded in stopping or even delaying the 
implementation of the commitments.645 It therefore comes as no surprise that the 
SvK’s decision to introduce price zones triggered protests in Sweden and has been 
challenged under Swedish national law.646 
 
5.6. EUROPEAN RULES ON CONGESTION MANAGEMENT 
 
This section takes a closer look at the EU sector-specific regulation as a tool to 
integrate electricity markets, next to competition rules and political pressure. First, we 
briefly describe the existing EU rules on cross-border congestion management in 
relation with congestion shifting (5.6.1), and then show that SvK’s cross-border 
capacity reductions do not violate EU law (5.6.2). Large legislative developments in 
the area of cross-border congestion management are forthcoming, as explained in 
5.6.3. Although transparency and allocative efficiency of cross-border capacity will 
improve as a result, market splitting will not be imposed on Member States. We close 
this section with a summary of the effects of the EU regulation on congestion shifting 
(5.6.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
644 Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 70-72.  
645 However, on the SvK’s request, the Commission agreed for a four-month delay in the implementation of 
market splitting. See Commission Decision, supra n. 439, paras. 60-75. 
646 Appeal by Värnamo Elnät, press release ‘Beslut om elprisområdena kan gå till domstol’, in Swedish only, 
available at http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=5086389 accessed 20.05.2013.  
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5.6.1. Existing EU Rules on Congestion Shifting 
 
EU laws regarding congestion management on cross-border lines have been under 
constant development for more than a decade.647 For the purpose of our case study we 
focus on the regulatory regime that existed from 2006 until 2009. At that time DaE’s 
complaint was pending before the Commission, and handling it under EU sector-
specific regulation might have been under consideration. As the provisions on 
congestion shifting in EU law have not fundamentally changed by the adoption of the 
3rd Energy Package in 2009, our analysis also reflects the current situation.  
 
It is important to note from the outset that EU law regulates cross-border congestion 
management only, namely congestion arising on interconnectors between the 
countries. Relieving congestion on internal transmission lines is subject to national 
rules on congestion management. Notwithstanding their limited scope, the EU rules 
impose restrictions on congestion shifting648 since it affects cross-border transmission 
capacities. 
 
In 2006 cross-border congestion management was regulated by provisions of the 2nd 
Energy Package.649 Directive 2003/54/EC650 stipulated that TSOs are responsible for 
ensuring a secure, reliable and efficient electricity system. Further, when managing 
energy flows in their networks, TSOs should take cross-border trade into account.651 
                                                           
647 The initiative to create an EU regulatory framework for congestion management on cross border lines started 
with the 2nd and 3rd meeting of Florence Forum of October 1998 and May 1999. Established in 1998, the 
Florence Forum is a platform to discuss the creation and development of the internal electricity market and to 
monitor the market integration process. Participants include governments of the Member States, national 
regulators, the Commission and, most importantly, market participants: TSOs, traders, consumers, grid users 
and power exchanges. See Everis and Mercados EMI, From Regional Markets to a Single European Market, 
Study commissioned by the European Commission, Final Report, 2010, p. 16.  See also CONSENTEC and 
Frontier Economics, supra n. 516, Executive Summary. Detailed information on the Florence Forum can be 
found at  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/electricity/forum_electricity_florence_en.htm accessed 20.05.2013. 
648 For instance, already in 2007 the Commission threatened to start infringement procedures against Member 
States for non-compliance with the provisions of the 2nd Energy Package regulating cross-border congestion 
management, at that time in force See supra n. 554 and accompanying text. 
649 A legislative package for an internal gas and electricity market in the EU, replaced in 2009 with the 3rd 
Energy Package. 
650 Directive 2003/54/EC, supra n. 73. 
651 Article 9 (c) of Directive 2003/54/EC, supra n. 73. 
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Regulation 1228/2003652, which is directly applicable in all Member States, spelled 
out common rules on cross-border congestion management, according to which non-
discriminatory market based methods are preferred. They applied to congestion 
management on interconnectors, however not within the countries. Nevertheless, 
Regulation 1228/2003 required all TSOs to give maximum interconnector capacity to 
the market, within the system security limits.653 The first version of Congestion 
Management Guidelines (CM Guidelines) annexed to the Regulation, while not 
imposing any specific (again, cross-border only) congestion management method on 
the TSOs, gave some indication of favoured mechanisms. Namely, they stated that 
‘the possible merits of […] market splitting […] for solving “permanent congestion” 
and counter-trading for solving “temporary congestion” shall be immediately explored 
as more enduring approach to congestion management.’654 Thus, both market splitting 
as well as counter-trading were explicitly mentioned in the CM Guidelines as the 
methods in preference for dealing with cross-border congestion. The CM Guidelines 
were amended by the end of 2006, which was shortly after DaE submitted its 
complaint to the Commission.655 The new version of these Guidelines explicitly stated 
in paragraph 1.7 that ‘TSOs shall not limit interconnection capacity in order to solve 
congestion inside their own control area’, save for the reasons of (a) operational 
security, (b) cost-effectiveness, and (c) minimisation of negative impacts on the 
internal electricity market.656 If the TSO shifts internal congestion to the borders for 
any of these reasons, it needs to describe such instances and make it available in a 
transparent way to all the system users. Finally, according to this new version of the 
CM Guidelines, these exceptional cross-border capacity reductions were just a 
stopgap measure, and should not have been considered a permanent solution to 
congestion problems. They were allowed temporarily, until a long-term remedy was to 
                                                           
652 Regulation 1228/2003, supra n. 73. 
653 See Article 6 of Regulation 1228/2003, supra n. 73. 
654 CM Guidelines, supra n. 553, Principles governing methods for congestion management, par. 3. 
655 The Commission was empowered by the 2nd Energy Package to amend the CM Guidelines in order to ensure 
that congestion management methods in use are compatible with internal market objectives. Given the 
unsatisfactory results of the 2005 energy sector inquiry, the Commission amended the CM Guidelines already in 
2006. Commission Decision of 09.11.2006 amending the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, 2006/770/EC [2006] OJ L 312/59, 
and Article 8(4) of Regulation 1228/2003. 
656 Ibid., para 1.7. Introduction of these exceptional grounds was strongly supported by Germany. 
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be found. The Guidelines did not impose any deadlines to introduce long-term 
mechanisms to tackle congestion problems, but they required TSOs to develop plans 
for achieving such long-term solutions and to present them on a transparent basis to all 
system users.657  
 
The start of formal antitrust proceedings in the SvK case coincided with the adoption 
of the 3rd Energy Package in 2009. The old Regulation 1228/2003 is now replaced 
with Regulation 714/2009658, however paragraph 1.7 of CM Guidelines on congestion 
shifting has been adopted in the 3rd Energy Package as it stands and thus still remains 
applicable.659  
 
5.6.2. Existing EU rules on congestion shifting – what do they mean for the TSOs? 
 
The previous section described the EU law on cross-border congestion management in 
relation to congestion shifting. In this section we argue that SvK’s practice of 
congestion shifting did not violate EU law. Under the existing EU regulatory regime, 
the national TSOs have some leeway as to the way they deal with internal congestion. 
Cross-border capacity reductions are allowed as a method of last resort, provided that 
network operators are transparent about them and can justify them on one of the three 
grounds set out in the CM Guidelines, that is, (a) operational security, (b) cost-
effectiveness, and (c) minimisation of negative impacts on the internal electricity 
market. All three criteria are sufficiently broad to explain various instances of 
congestion shifting.660 
 
Operational security (a) is defined by the CM Guidelines as ‘keeping the transmission 
system within agreed security limits.’661 The system security reason, in particular, is a 
plausible justification, if counter-trading is not possible, for instance, due to the lack 
                                                           
657 Ibid., para 1.7. 
658 Regulation 714/2009, supra n. 91. 
659 CM Guidelines, annexed to Regulation 714/2009, supra n. 91,  para 1.7. 
660 As we explain further below, we do not consider market splitting an alternative to congestion shifting when 
analysing the three justification grounds (a-c) in the CM Guidelines. 
661 CM Guidelines, supra n. 659, at note 1. 
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of suitable regulating resources. In order to avoid blackouts, a network operator might 
prefer to reduce the excessive flows in the grid already in the day-ahead market, by 
shifting congestion to the borders, instead of running the risk of failing to perform 
necessary counter-trading in real-time. From the operational security’s perspective 
congestion shifting could be thus considered a safer method than counter-trading.  
 
Justifying congestion shifting on the grounds of cost-effectiveness (b) is also possible. 
However, the concept of cost-effectiveness is not further explained, which somewhat 
complicates the assessment. The CM Guidelines are silent as to what cost should be 
considered in order to justify congestion shifting. Should it be cost for the society as a 
whole or the cost for the network operator only? In chapter 4 we look at congestion 
shifting from an economic welfare perspective and we find that a combination of 
congestion shifting and counter-trading may be socially optimal. In that case, shifting 
some congestion to the border reduces social cost in comparison to the other two 
methods (counter-trading alone or congestion shifting alone). Hence we show that a 
network operator can justify some congestion shifting on the grounds of (social) cost-
effectiveness. If, on the other hand, we consider cost-effectiveness in a narrow sense, 
that is, as a cost for the TSO, the assessment is somewhat different. Since counter-
trading is costly, the more congestion the network operator shifts to the border, the 
more cost-effective his congestion management is.662 Thus, with a narrowly defined 
concept of cost-effectiveness the network operator can justify not only some limited 
socially optimal amount of congestion shifting, but all its congestion shifting. In other 
words, depending on how the concept of costs is understood under the CM 
Guidelines, TSOs can justify either some or all of their congestion shifting on the 
grounds of cost-effectiveness.  
 
Minimisation of negative impacts on the internal electricity market (c) is the third and 
last justification ground. Just as in the previous case, the Guidelines do not provide 
further explanation of this rather broad precondition. This allows for various 
                                                           
662 Note, however, that even though counter-trading is costly for TSOs, those costs consist mainly of transfers to 
generators, and are therefore not true social costs. Counter-trading might give generators wrong long-term 
investment incentives, but those social costs are very hard to identify.  
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interpretations, making it a catch-all criterion. Read in conjunction with (a) and (b), it 
allows for balancing the market integration objective with considerations of efficiency 
and operational security. Namely, various negative impacts of congestion shifting on 
internal market in a broad sense (for instance, reducing market liquidity, transparency, 
and competition in some areas, increasing uncertainty or market power), are weighed 
against efficiency losses and higher blackout risks connected to the increased reliance 
on counter-trading. Under such an interpretation of the Guidelines, the TSO could still 
shift some congestion to the borders and nevertheless comply with the Guidelines, 
provided it can demonstrate that the amount of congestion shifting is optimal and, at 
the same time, its negative effects on the neighbouring zones are reduced by the use of 
counter-trading. 
 
Having said that, we would like to remark that congestion shifting would be more 
difficult to justify (and this refers to all three justification grounds equally) if market 
splitting was considered an alternative option for the TSO, next to counter-trading and 
congestion shifting. For instance, operational security (a) can well be achieved by 
splitting the market into price zones, as it also eliminates risks connected to counter-
trading, just as congestion shifting does. Regarding the second justification ground 
(b), it would be more difficult to accept cost-saving reasons of congestion shifting if 
market splitting was an option for the TSO, regardless of what definition of costs we 
assume, whether that is social costs, or the costs to the TSO. In the previous chapter 
we show that market splitting is not only socially optimal, but it also brings higher 
revenues to the TSO than the case of shifting all of its congestion to the borders. 
Therefore, as long as market splitting is possible, it is as effective as congestion 
shifting in terms of minimising social cost, and is more effective than congestion 
shifting in terms of minimising costs to the TSO. Similar considerations regarding 
advantages of market splitting as a method minimising negative impacts on the 
internal market (c) apply. 
 
However, in our opinion, market splitting cannot provide a short-run viable alternative 
to congestion shifting and counter-trading in the light of paragraph 1.7 of the CM 
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Guidelines. Market splitting constitutes a substantial change in national market design. 
It requires adaptation of market routines, IT systems and also national regulation, not 
to mention a certain degree of political endorsement. Implementation of market 
splitting takes time, therefore this solution cannot be taken into consideration when 
determining, under this provision, whether separate instances of congestion shifting 
are justified on the above listed grounds (a, b and c). The imprecise wording of CM 
Guidelines allows for such an interpretation. It has been mentioned in section 5.6.1 
that instances of congestion shifting shall be tolerated only until a long-term solution 
to internal congestion is found. The provision leaves it to the network operators to 
develop the methodology and projects of a long-term solution, without giving further 
guidelines in that respect. Market splitting, which took SvK a year and a half to 
implement, can be considered a long-term (or at least medium-term) solution, which 
cannot be considered a readily available option for the network operator in case 
internal congestion occurs. For this reason we do not take market splitting into 
account, when discussing the three preconditions.663   
 
Summarising this section, we conclude the following. First, current EU sector-specific 
regulation allows national TSOs to shift internal congestion to the borders. Even 
though the CM Guidelines generally do not permit congestion shifting, they formulate 
three justifications for doing so, which are broad and vague enough to justify much of 
current practice by many European network operators. This also the opinion of 
NordREG who stated in 2007 that congestion shifting is not as such prohibited by the 
EU law. It suggested that the Nordic TSOs can still ensure compliance with the 2006 
CM Guidelines while shifting congestion to the borders, by describing transparently 
the reasons for cross-border capacity reductions and their effects.664 Second, the 
Commission would not have been able to impose market splitting in Sweden based on 
existing EU rules. Since the CM Guidelines regulate cross-border congestion 
                                                           
663 Also investments in grid reinforcements, which can take years of planning and building, can reduce the need 
for congestion management and congestion shifting in the long run. For instance, NordREG’s Compliance 
Report 8/2007 names the Nordel’s five prioritised investments in the Nordic grid, supra n. 633, as long-term 
solutions to internal congestion in the meaning of the CM Guidelines. See NordREG, Congestion Management 
Guidelines, Compliance Report 8/2007, p. 10. However, we do not believe that network reinforcements will 
fully eliminate the need for congestion management.  
664 NordREG’s Compliance Report 8/2007, supra n. 663, p. 5. 
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management only, they do not impose any specific method for relieving internal 
congestion on national lines. If the network operator cannot relieve internal congestion 
without cross-border capacity reductions, the only requirement imposed by the EU 
law is to develop alternative methods to deal with such congestion in the long run and 
to present them transparently to the system users. Nevertheless, it is for TSOs to 
choose a long-term method and its introduction date.  
 
5.6.3. The new CACM network code and its impact on congestion shifting 
 
The EU regulation of cross-border congestion management does not stop with the 
adoption of the 3rd Energy Package. Regulation 713/2009 of the 3rd Package creates 
the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) with focus on cross-
border issues and the internal energy market.665 Regulation 714/2009 of the 3rd 
Package establishes ENTSO-E, the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity, and mandates it to develop a cross-border capacity allocation 
and congestion management (CACM) network code.666 The ENTSO-E’s final 
proposal for the CACM network code has been submitted to ACER for evaluation in 
September 2012,667 and is expected to enter into force in 2014 following the adoption 
by the Commission.668  The CACM network code will take form of a binding EU 
Regulation, amending the CM Guidelines where necessary. It will be directly 
applicable in all Member States, without the requirement of transposition into national 
law. As with all other network codes developed by ENTSO-E, the CACM network 
code has to be in line with Framework Guidelines adopted by ACER in 2011.669 670 
                                                           
665 Regulation 713/2009, supra n. 92. 
666 The EU network codes define ‘obligations or requirements for entities that operate, plan or use the European 
electricity transmission system.’ See ENTSO-E, Network Codes Development Process, 17.02.2012, p. 4. 
667 At the time this chapter was submitted for publication, the CACM network code, in version submitted by 
ENTSO-E, was evaluated by ACER. In this chapter we refer to the ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, 
Network Code on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management, which can be found at 
https://www.entsoe.eu/resources/network-codes/capacity-allocation-and-congestion-management/ accessed 
20.05.2013. 
668 The EU network codes will be adopted by the Commission in a comitology process, according to the 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny (RPS). Article 6 (11) read in conjunction with Article 23 (2) of Regulation 
713/2009, supra n. 92. See ENTSO-E Annual Work Programme 2012-2013 (version of 28.11.2012), 
downloadable from https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/key-documents/ accessed 20.05.2013, p. 6. 
669 ACER, Framework Guidelines, supra n. 517. ACER’s Framework Guidelines were actually drafted by the 
European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), a body gathering the heads of all national energy 
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Those Framework Guidelines are themselves not legally binding, but they specify 
general requirements that the CACM network code should satisfy. As the CACM 
network code implements ACER’s Framework Guidelines and will become binding 
law, we focus our discussion on the code and not on the Framework Guidelines. 
 
Regulation 714/2009 provides that the CACM network code regulates cross-border 
and market integration issues, and should not replace national network codes which 
do not affect cross-border exchange.671 This wording suggests that the new network 
code should not interfere with regulation of congestion management at national level. 
In particular, it should not state whether a country should be split in smaller price 
zones or use counter-trading. However, any national arrangement which reduces 
export capacities to relieve internal congestion affects cross-border trade, and as such 
might be subject to the CACM network code. The CACM network code states that 
‘[t]ransmission system operators will use a common set of remedial actions [672] to deal 
with both internal and cross zonal congestions’ and that they ‘will coordinate the use 
of remedial actions in capacity calculation to facilitate more efficient capacity 
allocation.’673 The code thus foresees application of similar congestion management 
methods both for internal and cross-border lines at least at a regional level. This can 
include, for instance, counter-trading actions within zones, across zones or across 
countries; or internationally coordinated use of circuit breakers and switches to better 
address transmission constraints; or changes in network topology.674 Establishing such 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regulatory bodies and advising the Commission on energy market issues (supra n. 519). In 2011 ERGEG was 
dissolved and its tasks (also development of the Framework Guidelines) were taken over by ACER.  
670 As the third package provides for, the CACM network code has to be in line with the Framework Guidelines. 
Article 6 (6) of Regulation 714/2009, supra n. 91. 
671 Recital 7 and Article 8 (7) of Regulation 714/2009, supra n. 91. 
672 Remedial actions are defined as measures to relieve physical congestions. Article 2 of the CACM network 
code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667. 
673 Recital 22 of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667. 
674 Article 2 (2) of the CACM network code explicitly defines remedial actions which are not fully controlled by 
the TSO in charge of a control area in which congestion takes place as Cross Control Area Remedial Actions. 
This implies that remedial actions include actions to relieve internal congestion which are currently performed 
internally by the relevant TSOs. All TSOs within one Capacity Calculation Region shall coordinate regarding 
the use of remedial actions for capacity calculation and their real-time application (Recital 22 and Article 30 (6) 
of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667). Further, each Coordinated 
Capacity Calculator (set at the regional level) shall optimise cross-border capacities using available remedial 
actions (Article 34 (6) of the CACM network code ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667). 
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a common set of remedial actions will require harmonisation of national and regional 
congestion management rules.  
 
Moreover, the CACM network code is going to change how cross-border capacity is 
determined. Currently, transmission capacity available for trade between two 
countries is determined bilaterally for each interconnector by the neighbouring TSOs. 
This means that each of the two TSOs sets a forecasted capacity value for that 
interconnector given operational security constraints of their respective networks. The 
lower of the two values is  then accepted as the transfer capacity available for trade to 
the market. This capacity is called the Net Transfer Capacity (NTC). The CACM 
network code foresees that capacity calculations shall be done in a coordinated way at 
least on a regional level and will be flow-based, although the implementation of those 
changes might take some years.675 The advantage of regional flow-based capacity 
calculation is that it takes the physical characteristics of the network into account  and 
therefore uses transmission capacity more efficiently.676 It will also prevent 
discrimination between capacities allocated to different interconnectors.677  
 
                                                           
675 See Article 24 of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667. Whereas 
the CACM network code strongly recommends the flow-based (FB) capacity calculation and allocation method, 
the use of NTC is still permitted, especially for non-meshed networks (e.g. the Nordic market) and in cases 
where the FB method does not (1) ensure system security, (2) lead to an increase in social welfare (3) provide 
market participants with sufficient time to adopt their processes. Further, the FB method has not been in 
operation yet and it requires more experiments with real data before its implemented. See ENTSO-E, Network 
code on Capacity Allocation & Congestion Management Supporting Document, A consultation document to 
support the assessment of the draft network code, Supporting Document, available at 
https://www.entsoe.eu/events/cacm-nc/ accessed 20.05.2013, pp. 19-20. 
676 Electricity flows through the transmission network according to the laws of physics, along the lines of least 
resistance between its source and destination, just like water flows through a network of canals. By assigning a 
certain transfer capacity to one interconnector (NTC) in order to enable a cross-border transaction, the network 
operator ignores the physics, because in reality the contracted electricity flows along many parallel 
interconnectors to reach the point of destination abroad. These ‘unscheduled’ flows are taken into account in a 
flow-based capacity calculation resulting in a more efficient use of interconnectors.  
677 This can be explained easily with an example. Suppose that country A can export to countries B and C. For 
the reasons of system security total exports (that is the sum of exports to countries B and C) must not exceed a 
fixed transmission capacity K, which is determined by the physical constraints of the network.  In the NTC 
approach, the network operator in country A would have to divide total export capacity over the cross-border 
lines in an ad-hoc way, by setting one NTC value for exports from A to B and one from A to C. In the flow-
based approach, the network operator does not set a specific capacity value at each border, but gives all the 
information on the physical constraint to the power exchanges. Those exchanges will then simultaneously 
operate all regional price zones, ensuring efficient use of the network. Access to the transmission capacity will 
not be ad-hoc, but based on competitive pressure.  
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However, the regional flow-based capacity calculation method does not inhibit TSOs 
from discriminating between national and cross-border flows, and congestion shifting 
can still take place during the calculation of flow-based transmission capacities at the 
regional level. Regional capacity calculation will be based on data provided by the 
network operators. For their part, network operators will still need to make 
assumptions about energy flows that pass over their respective networks without 
international trade678 and under a number of contingencies,679 before determining how 
much transmission capacity is left for international trade. This method implicitly gives 
national flows priority over cross-border flows, and assumes that network operators 
will rely on counter-trading only to a limited extent. If this was the approach assumed 
in Sweden, it might have led to full congestion shifting in violation of Article 102 
TFEU. Hence, depending on the actual implementation of the CACM network code, 
congestion shifting may still be possible.680 
 
Moreover, congestion shifting can take place not only during the calculation of flow-
based transmission capacities, but also later, during the so-called validation phase. 
Namely, once the flow-based capacities are determined in a coordinated way for a 
region, they still need to be validated for each border by both neighbouring TSOs. 
                                                           
678 Note that even if there is no international trade between price zones, flows in one price region might be 
influenced by loop flows caused by regional imbalances in other price zones. Those loop flows will not create 
net imports or exports in a price zone, but will affect individual transmission lines.  
679 Contingencies might include a failure of a single or multiple transmission lines, a sudden breakdown of a 
large power plant, or overloading of a transformator. Network operators often use an N-1 (or N-2) rule, which 
means that the network needs to remain stable even if one of its N components (or two components) breaks 
down. 
680 We see two reasons why the network operators could still shift congestion in the new model of regional 
capacity calculation set up by the upcoming CACM network code. (1) According to Article 30 (4) of the CACM 
network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667, in order to determine the available 
network capacity, network operators should try to maximise the available capacity by foreseeing non-costly 
remedial actions, (such as changes in network topology), but should not take into account costly remedial 
actions (such as counter-trading). Hence the capacity that is made available for cross-border capacity is 
calculated in such a way that there is no need to rely on counter-trading to eliminate congestion. As shown in 
chapter 4, this is actually identical to the alleged abuse of SvK. (2) In the flow-based regional capacity 
calculation model electricity system will be represented with one node for each price zone, and the network 
operator needs to specify the so-called Generation Shift Keys, that is, how much an increase in electricity 
production in its price zone will affect the flows on each of the lines in the regional model (Article 29 of the 
CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667). However, in reality, not all 
generation plants are located in the same location within the price zone, and the impact of a production increase 
on congestion will depend on the precise location of production. The network operator therefore needs to make 
assumptions on the typical location of generation within its network. For the Swedish network, SvK is likely to 
assume that cheap hydro power plants in the North are operating at full capacity, and therefore put a lot of 
weight on those production levels, leaving less capacity for cross-border trade.  
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During the validation process, TSOs can correct the capacities for reasons of system 
security.681 The CACM network code seems to be stricter than the CM Guidelines as 
it allows for cross-border capacity reduction only for reasons of system security, while 
the CM Guidelines allow for congestion shifting not only for security reasons, but also 
for cost-effectiveness and minimising negative impacts on the internal electricity 
market.682  
 
While some provisions of the CACM network code leave scope to TSOs to shift 
congestion, other provisions impose reporting obligations, which might make 
congestion shifting more transparent and easier to detect. Firstly, TSOs need to report 
all reductions of cross-border capacities during the validation process, and to justify 
those reductions.683 Secondly, they need to list the location and frequency of 
congestion in their system, and provide a technical analysis of the existing price 
zones.684 In their reports, TSOs may recommend changes in the price zone 
configuration. On that basis national energy regulators can launch a review of existing 
price zones, and split, merge, or adjust their borders, taking into consideration internal 
bottlenecks and loopflows in a meshed network.685 686 This can lead to more efficient 
delineation of price zones in the long run.  
 
In summary, the new CACM network code is likely to affect existing methods of 
relieving internal congestion. In particular, establishing a region-wide set of remedial 
actions necessitates harmonisation of national arrangements. Despite that, congestion 
shifting will still be possible during the coordinated capacity calculation process. First, 
a flow-based capacity calculation method primarily addresses discrimination between 
different cross-border flows, but still implicitly gives national flows priority over 
                                                           
681 Article 31 of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667. 
682 Article 31 (3) of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667. The code 
defines system security as “the ability of the power system to withstand unexpected disturbances or 
contingencies” (Article 2 (2)), while the CM Guidelines refer to operational security. We assume here that those 
concepts are identical. 
683 Article 31 (5) of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667. 
684 Article 40 of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667. 
685 With loopflows, zone borders do not necessarily need to be at the congested transmission lines. 
686 A review of price zone configuration can also be launched upon recommendation of ACER. See Article 37 
(1) of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27.09.2012, supra n. 667. 
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cross-border flows. Second, TSOs can still shift congestion during the capacity 
validation phase, even though deviating from flow-based capacities is made more 
difficult (i.e. it can be done for system security reasons only). Nevertheless, additional 
reporting provisions improve transparency and trigger procedures which might 
mitigate the problem of congestion shifting in the long run, by introducing changes in 
network topology.  
 
5.6.4. Limits of the EU regulation 
 
Under the existing EU regulatory regime SvK would not be required to introduce 
market splitting in Sweden or to cease congestion shifting and increase counter-
trading. The EU law regulates cross-border congestion management, whereas TSOs 
are free to choose their own methods to solve problems with internal congestion. Even 
though the EU law generally prohibits congestion shifting, because it reduces cross-
border transmission capacities in favour of national network users, it leaves a wide 
scope of exception to this prohibition, allowing TSOs to shift congestion when needed 
and justify it on grounds of (a) operational security, (b) cost-effectiveness, and (c) 
minimisation of negative impacts on the internal electricity market. The upcoming 
CACM network code attempts to harmonise congestion management at regional level, 
but still leaves scope for congestion shifting, even though deviating from flow-based 
capacities will be limited to (a) operational security only. 
 
Given our discussion on the EU regulation of congestion management, we conclude 
that the commitments offered by SvK went beyond what the Commission could 
achieve on the EU regulatory front. While the EU regulation in force can only 
promote efficient management of internal congestion, without imposing on TSOs any 
specific congestion management method, the Commission, by means of competition 
enforcement, actually pushed through market splitting in Sweden. The same could be 
said with regard to the interim remedy. SvK committed to relieve internal congestion 
primarily through counter-trading and not to shift congestion to the borders, as long as 
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it found available regulating resources.687 A regulatory equivalent of this remedy 
would amount to an outright ban on congestion shifting, whereas the EU regulation 
allows for broad exemptions so network operators can continue their current 
congestion management methods.  
 
The existing EU regulation appears to have reached its limits in terms of controlling 
congestion shifting. The deficiency of the legal framework derives to some extent 
from the Union’s limited competence to regulate energy markets. The current CM 
Guidelines regulate cross-border congestion management only, whereas congestion 
management on national electricity lines does not underlie the provisions of the EU 
Regulations, but remains in the Member State’s sphere of competence and is regulated 
in national network codes. As a result, transmission networks are governed by an 
unwieldy dual legal regime.  
 
We believe that further regulation based on this artificial separation of the 
transmission network into cross-border and national lines will prove to be a futile 
exercise, given the physical complexity of transmission systems. In a meshed network, 
any national transaction will also affect electricity flows over cross-border 
transmission lines, and by the same token, any international transaction will affect 
electricity flows over national transmission lines. Technically, it is thus impossible to 
separate national lines from interconnectors. Treating them as legally independent 
problems only frustrates progress in congestion management.688   
 
In our opinion, it would not make sense for the Commission to outright prohibit or 
limit congestion shifting under the EU regulation. Instead, we would suggest that the 
Commission, through or in cooperation with ACER, national energy regulators and 
                                                           
687 In fact, SvK argued in the case that it would not be possible to completely eliminate congestion shifting and 
rely on counter-trading, due to lack of sufficient regulating resources. See Commission Decision, supra n. 439, 
para. 49. In practice, SvK did shift congestion to the borders in the interim phase, whereas counter-trading could 
not be carried out, most often due to unavailability of suitable regulating resources in a given area. See Svenska 
Kraftnät, Monitoring Reports, supra n. 476. This does not change the fact, however, that the interim procedure, 
giving priority to counter-trading, was aiming at complete elimination of congestion shifting.  
688 Fortunately, this problem is well-understood by the stakeholders and some aspects are voluntarily 
harmonised at the regional level. For instance, even though EU law regulates the use of cross-border congestion 
rents, Nord Pool applies this provision also to congestion rents collected from internal bottlenecks. 
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TSOs, tackles market design head-on, using a more economics-based approach. 
International transmission capacity should be determined by balancing the costs of 
counter-trading against the benefits of cross-border trade. A large number of price 
zones should be introduced in order to limit the cost of counter-trading and ensure 
correct locational price signals.689 Once an efficient market design is in place, the 
legal discussion of congestion shifting will fade away. The upcoming CACM network 
code, taking a more comprehensive approach to congestion management, is somewhat 
promising in that respect. We hope that the new provisions will not ignore the 
organisation of internal congestion management schemes, consider the possibility of 
more price zones, allow for cross-border counter-trading, and integrate internal and 
cross-border congestion management. 
 
5.7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter illustrates how the Commission uses competition rules in the SvK case to 
foster electricity market integration in the Nordic countries. We analyse this case 
against the backdrop of political debate on market splitting that was ongoing in the 
Nordic countries, particularly in Sweden, and the existing EU regulation on cross-
border congestion management.  
 
We find that the Commission employed Article 102 TFEU in a rather contrived 
manner by considering national congestion management an EU internal market 
problem and therefore also a competition law problem. Namely, it argued that SvK 
hampered cross-border trade and discriminated on the basis of nationality, thus 
violating competition rules. Whereas the Commission’s anticompetitive analysis 
focused on internal market issues, important aspects of SvK’s alleged abuse could 
have been objectively justified. For example, there could have been possible 
efficiency benefits of shifting congestion and maintaining a single electricity price in 
                                                           
689 In order for network users to receive the right signals for their consumption, production and investments 
decisions, prices should reflect the cost of electricity and therefore be differentiated according to location. Prices 
should be lower in Nord Sweden where cheap hydro production is available and higher in Stockholm, because 
both setting up generation plants in South Sweden as well as building transmission lines to transport cheap 
hydro power from Nord Sweden is costly.  
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public interest. But these possible objective justifications were left off the table by the 
Commission.  
 
Dealing with the SvK case under commitment procedure made it easier for the 
Commission to put market integration arguments under the umbrella of Article 102 
TFEU and to use competition policy to reach its objective of an integrated electricity 
market. The standard of proof is much lower in the commitment procedure. The 
Commission is not required to find an abuse, but merely to formulate its 
anticompetitive concerns. And there exist no formal procedures which would take 
objective justification into consideration. Even though market participants have an 
opportunity to share their views on commitments in the market test, this phase is quick 
and their concerns can be too easily dismissed by the Commission.  
 
The Commission’s focus on fostering market integration through competition policy 
might backfire, as its assessment lacks solid economic underpinnings, and does not 
provide correct insights as to how congestion problems should be solved. 
Furthermore, it does not contribute to the development of a sound EU regulatory 
framework for congestion management. Had the Commission instead used an 
efficiency standard in its anticompetitive analysis, it would have resulted in a more 
nuanced assessment as to whether SvK abused its dominant position by shifting 
congestion. A thorough economic analysis of the case would have provided more 
lessons for congestion management in other regions in Europe and contributed to the 
development of the EU network codes.690 
 
As a result of this case, SvK changed its congestion management by introducing 
market splitting in Sweden. Market splitting is a transparent and efficient way to deal 
with congestion, which, unlike counter-trading, gives optimal, long-term investment 
incentives to generators and brings the network operator additional revenue to finance 
future grid investments. Therefore, we believe that market splitting provides an 
economically sound solution to Swedish congestion in the long run. However, market 
                                                           
690 Supra n. 676. 
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splitting alone does not prevent future potential abuses, as SvK could still manipulate 
capacity declarations in order to relieve internal congestion. In any case, market 
splitting brings more transparency to the market, and thus simplifies detection of 
congestion shifting. 
 
Judging from the SvK case, competition enforcement appears to be a convenient 
energy policy tool for the Commission in situations where there is no significant 
progress on the EU regulatory front and where national interests and industry groups 
successfully defend existing market arrangements. The Commission’s antitrust action 
against SvK changed the Swedish congestion management system in a surprisingly 
fast and unproblematic manner. Neither Swedish policy makers, nor the existing EU 
regulation could have achieved the same result as quickly and effectively. However, 
we do not believe that the Commission is likely to use similar antitrust actions against 
other network operators, and will, for the time being, allow ACER, national energy 
regulators and ENTSO-E to harmonise congestion management regimes at the EU 
level by issuing further regulatory measures based on the 3rd Energy Package in the 
form of guidelines and the EU network codes.  
 
It was relatively easy to introduce market splitting in Sweden, as local political 
support for market splitting was growing, preparatory steps of splitting the Swedish 
market were ongoing, and the market players had a decade-long experience with 
market splitting in Elspot, the Nordic day-ahead electricity market. This might be hard 
to repeat elsewhere, given that governments are generally hostile towards market 
splitting, and market participants are inexperienced with respect to new methods of 
congestion management. An efficient solution to a complex techno-economic problem 
such as congestion management is certainly not going to come from competition 
policy alone, but also through changes on the regulatory front. Efficient EU network 
codes need to be put in place and enforced, and capacity declarations need to be 
monitored by the national energy regulators. The problem of congestion shifting is 
probably only going to be solved once cross-border and internal congestion are treated 
identically, and sufficiently small price zones are introduced. This will require close 
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coordination between power exchanges and network operators, and clear guidance 
from sector-specific regulation, both at the EU and national levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 258 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 259 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis is a collection of essays on the instrumental use of commitment decisions 
for the completion of the internal electricity market. Each core chapter can be viewed 
in isolation and closes with a concluding section on the specific issues raised therein. 
Instead, to sum up the thesis as a whole, this last chapter attempts to address the 
question that has been posed in the introduction, namely: 
 
Has Article 9 contributed to creating the EU internal market for electricity, and if so, at what cost? 
 
As suggested at the outset,691 this question has two dimensions, which is reflected by 
the following sections.  
 
6.1. ENERGY POLICY DIMENSION 
 
Chapter 1 explains that the completion of the EU internal market for electricity hinges 
upon two intertwined processes, i.e. opening markets to competition (market 
liberalisation)692 and facilitating cross-border trade which takes competition to a 
supranational level (market integration).693 These two processes can be considered 
goals per se and, as argued throughout this thesis, the Commission pursues them in 
the E.ON and the SvK cases.694 
 
6.1.1. Regulatory objectives pursued by the Commission 
 
Chapter 3 attempts to show that the Commission’s objective in the E.ON case is 
market liberalisation, i.e. opening the German electricity wholesale market to more 
competition. There is no reference to market liberalisation in the text of the 
Commission’s decision. Instead, the Commission came up with a rather far-fetched 
                                                           
691 Supra, section 1.6. 
692 Market liberalisation in the broad sense. Supra n. 65. 
693 Supra, section 1.2.3 
694 Further referred to as the ‘selected cases’ or the ‘analysed cases’. 
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theory of harm based on capacity withholding. However, as explained in chapter 3, 
divestitures offered by E.ON had as their aim making the structure of the wholesale 
market more competitive rather than addressing the Commission’s specific 
anticompetitive concerns.  
 
Chapter 5 argues instead that the SvK case had a clear market integration dimension 
which is already reflected in the wording of the commitment decision. In that sense 
this decision differs from the one adopted in the E.ON case, where the Commission 
does not explicitly refers to any potential regulatory objective which could drive its 
action. The reason for this difference is simple. Both market liberalisation and market 
integration are energy policy objectives, but only market integration is also considered 
a competition policy objective. It is thus safe for the Commission to invoke it under 
competition rules, whereas referring to market liberalisation would be a signal of 
instrumentalisation. Also, the two decisions were adopted in different periods of time. 
The E.ON decision was one of the first Article 9 decisions following the General 
Court’s ruling in Alrosa, and the Commission might have been concerned to provide a 
legally ‘clean’ theory of anticompetitive harm, free of arguments imported from its 
other policies. This might have been less important for the Commission in the SvK 
case, as the opinion of Advocate-General Kokott proposing to set aside the General 
Court’s ruling might have suggested that restrictions imposed on the Commission 
when accepting commitments would soon be relaxed. Apart from this clear reference 
to market integration in the Commission’s SvK decision, this objective was mirrored 
by the commitment package. In particular, the SvK’s interim commitment to cease 
congestion shifting and increase counter-trading would maximise cross-border trade at 
the expense of efficiency.  
 
Summarising, both cases are examples of an instrumental use of commitment 
decisions to foster primarily regulatory objectives, liberalisation and integration of 
electricity markets. However, whereas instrumentalisation in the SvK is apparent, 
because the decision is mostly based on the market integration rationale (explicit 
instrumentalisation), the E.ON case illustrates de facto instrumentalisation, where 
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the Commission’s action under competition rules has a primarily regulatory purpose, 
but is hidden behind purely competition-based reasoning (implicit 
instrumentalisation). As a result, the Commission’s preliminary assessment is on its 
face conform with competition framework in both cases, because the Commission 
either does not suggest it uses competition rules for regulatory objectives, or, if it 
suggests, a regulatory objective is also considered a competition objective. 
 
6.1.2. Overcoming the limits of sector-specific regulation 
 
The selected cases show that the Commission might want to use competition rules for 
regulatory purposes whenever achieving the desired result through sector-specific 
regulation is not possible, or when it considers that competition enforcement would 
bring this result quicker.  
 
The relationship between the Commission’s antitrust intervention and the EU 
regulation is to some extent similar in the analysed cases, allowing for the following 
observations. (1) First, the anticompetitive concerns raised by the Commission in 
these cases were either not addressed by the existing sector-specific regulation, or the 
provisions were ineffective. (2) Second, the accepted commitments went beyond what 
the Commission could achieve by regulatory measures. (3) Third, the Commission’s 
intervention in these cases to some extent activated regulation in those areas, i.e. 
contributed to the adoption of new provisions or development of the existing ones.  
 
German electricity wholesale market was deregulated already in 1998 as a result of 
the 1st Energy Package695 but markets remained highly concentrated, with the four 
major generators (so-called ‘big Four’) controlling most of the capacity.696 Whereas 
the energy reforms abolished regional monopolies and created minimum conditions 
                                                           
695 For transposition of the 1st Energy Package into German legislation, see Bundesgesetzblatt (German Federal 
Law Gazette), BGBl. 1998 I, p. 730. 
696 In 2008 E.ON and RWE owned about 60% of domestic generation capacity, whereas E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall 
and EnBW controlled about 80%. 
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for entry in generation segment,697 little could be done about the oligopolistic market 
structure. Consequently, new entry did not happen. In that respect, the Commission’s 
antitrust intervention was an attempt to ‘correct’ the structure of the German market. 
Forcing E.ON to divest 20% of its generation capacity was something which could not 
have been legitimately achieved by adopting sector-specific regulation. Also, risks of 
potential manipulation in the electricity wholesale trading were still not addressed by 
the EU law at that time, because the European power exchanges were considered not 
liquid enough to have a true cross-border dimension, and thus were of little EU 
interest.698 The Commission argued in the E.ON decision that market manipulation on 
the German power exchange would have affected also interconnected markets, which 
signalled that regulating this area is in the EU interest.699 Soon after, the Commission 
came up with the REMIT proposal, regulating trade in energy markets and preventing 
insider trading and market manipulation.700 
 
By the same token, SvK’s commitment to split the Swedish market into price zones 
went beyond what the Commission could achieve by enforcing sector-specific 
regulation. Even though the EU law regulates cross-border congestion management it 
does not impose any specific congestion management method to deal with internal 
congestion. Congestion shifting is generally not allowed, but in reality cannot be 
complied with. The scope of exemption which reflects this reality makes the provision 
superfluous. As suggested in chapter 5, the upcoming CACM network code takes a 
different regulatory approach in that respect. Namely, it might reduce the need for 
congestion shifting in the future, insofar as it leads to more efficient congestion 
management and cross-border capacity allocation. The Danish complaint signaled that 
national congestion management has a clear cross-border impact and needs attention 
at the EU level. Thus, the SvK case might have been a trigger for further regulation. 
 
                                                           
697 For instance, by requiring Member States to set up licensing and tendering procedures for new generation. 
698 See U. SCHOLZ and S. PURPS, supra n. 225, p. 78. 
699 European Commission, Impact Assessment – Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on energy market integrity and transparency, Commission Staff 
Working Document SEC(2010) 1510 final, Brussels 08.12.2010, pp. 9-10. 
700 Regulation 1227/2011 (REMIT), supra n. 102. 
 263 
6.1.3. Overcoming political opposition 
 
The selected cases show that the Commission might also want to resort to competition 
rules to overcome political opposition of Member States or interests of industry 
stakeholders. 
 
The E.ON case received a lot of media attention in Germany, not so much because of 
extensive capacity divestitures, but because E.ON also committed to sell off its 
electricity transmission network.701 The network divestiture came as a surprise to the 
German government which was in fierce opposition to the Commission’s legislative 
proposal of ownership unbundling included in the 3rd Energy Package. While the 
Commission’s initial proposal has been diluted in the final text adopted by the 
Council,702 the E.ON’s commitments have been hailed as the Commission’s political 
victory over the German government.703 Two other energy giants, Vattenfall and 
RWE, followed suit and also divested their networks, maybe in expectation that, 
sooner or later, ownership unbundling becomes a regulatory standard.704 The E.ON 
case demonstrates how the Commission has managed to short-circuit political 
opposition to ownership unbundling by bilateral negotiations with E.ON to the same 
effect. 
 
In the Swedish case, the Commission’s deal with SvK to introduce market splitting 
has to be viewed in the context of a long and difficult political discussion on whether 
Sweden should remain one-price zone or not. As we argue in chapter 5, the SvK case 
played a crucial role in this debate and accelerated the introduction of price zones in 
Sweden. The Commission’s antitrust intervention brought quicker results, mostly 
because Swedish industry stakeholders opposed to market splitting, successfully 
                                                           
701 The network divestiture commitment has been offered by E.ON to close another antitrust investigation, 
running in parallel to the investigation analysed in this thesis, the German Electricity Balancing Market case 
(Case COMP/39.389). Both cases have been closed with the same commitment decision.  
702 Supra, section 1.2.3.3. 
703 Supra nn. 305-306. 
704 For Vattenfall’s divestiture, see press release ‘Swedish energy firm Vattenfall sells German power grid’ 
available at http://www.dw.de/swedish-energy-firm-vattenfall-sells-german-power-grid/a-5348498 accessed 
20.05.2013. RWE divested its gas transmission network in a commitment case (COMP/39.402 – RWE gas 
foreclosure). 
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blocking regulatory initiatives at the national and Nordic levels, were ignored in 
Article 9 negotiations.  
 
6.1.4. The Commission’s bigger toolbox for regulatory purposes 
 
Article 9 commitment decisions in the electricity sector can be viewed as one of the 
Commission’s energy policy tools, next to adopting sector-specific regulation and 
exercising political pressure against governments and energy industry stakeholders. 
The Commission resorts to competition rules when the two other instruments do not 
deliver desired results. However, the Commission’s antitrust actions should not be 
considered an alternative but rather a complementary (or supportive) tool in 
implementing its energy policy, very closely interlinked with the two other 
instruments. To the extent Article 9 accelerates sector-specific regulation and 
overcomes political deadlocks, it contributes to the Commission’s plans to complete 
the EU internal market for electricity.  
 
However, the instrumental use of Article 9 raises some serious concerns at the case 
level, which can be viewed as a cost of instrumentalisation. From the energy policy 
perspective, a commitment decision boils down to an intervention in the electricity 
market, which can have 1) policy consequences, 2) market consequences. 
 
(1) From the policy’ point of view, the Commission’s antitrust intervention is a 
problem-solving exercise, regardless of whether the problem is of competition or 
regulatory nature. In complex electricity markets, and assuming that the Commission 
does not fully investigate the case but instead pursues regulatory objectives, there is a 
high risk that it either gets the problem wrong, the solution, or both. Since the 
Commission’s reasoning is set forth in a binding decision, there is a risk that the 
Commission’s methodology in assessing the problem and the proposed solution in 
form of commitments provides incorrect insights for energy policy or sets regulatory 
standards in that specific area. 
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This risk is well-illustrated by the SvK case, where the market integration objective 
affects the Commission’s assessment of congestion shifting to such an extent that it is 
considered per se abusive. The Commission’s analysis not only does not contribute in 
any way to the development of an economically sound regulatory approach to 
congestion management, but also, what is worse, it provides faulty intuition which 
might be then adapted by sector-specific regulation.705 The assessment of capacity 
withholding in the E.ON case also demonstrates shortcomings, because, as argued in 
chapter 3, the Commission tried to proliferate its anticompetitive concerns to increase 
its bargaining power and extract far-reaching commitments, rather than to come up 
with a robust theory of harm with sound economic underpinnings.  
 
(2) At the market level, the consequence of the Commission’s action is a specific 
commitment package which is supposed to address the market problem (assuming 
there is one) or achieve other related regulatory objectives. Commitments can have a 
substantial impact on the market, altering the behaviour of market players or bringing 
substantial changes to the market structure. As explained in chapter 1, there is a risk 
that commitment packages might not always address the problem identified by the 
Commission and, what is worse, might even have a negative impact on the 
functioning of the market.706  
 
The selected cases are illustrative in that respect too. The across-the-board divestiture 
offered by E.ON was not best tailored to remove concerns about the alleged capacity 
withholding, but was supposed to ‘correct’ the less competitive market structure. By 
the same token, market splitting does not solve congestion shifting without sufficient 
monitoring of SvK’s behaviour, however it has a positive impact on the market 
because it improves the Swedish congestion management. This is not the case of the 
SvK’s interim commitments to cease congestion shifting and rely solely on counter-
trading, as it is not an optimal way of solving internal congestion.  
                                                           
705 In both analysed cases the Commission’s antitrust action triggered to some extent the subsequent legislative 
proposals, so they might well build on the Commission’s methodology developed in these cases. See e.g. 
European Commission, Impact Assessment, supra n. 699, pp. 9-10, referring to the Commission’s decision in the 
E.ON case.  
706 Infra, section 1.5.2.1. 
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6.2. COMPETITION POLICY DIMENSION 
 
The concerns about the instrumental use of commitment decisions have been 
structured in Chapter 1 around three potential suboptimal outcomes, two of which are 
deviations from the optimal standard of intervention (scenarios (1a): suboptimal case 
selection and prioritisation, and (1b): suboptimal antitrust response) and one relates to 
the pro-Article 9 bias in the Commission’s antitrust enforcement toolbox (2). 
 
6.2.1. Suboptimal case selection and prioritisation (1a) 
 
It has been argued in the commitment debate that the option to close cases under 
Article 9 lowers the Commission’s enforcement costs which might impact its case 
selection and prioritisation. Namely, the Commission might want to intervene in cases 
where an infringement of competition rules is minor or difficult to prove. It is also 
argued that instrumentalisation might further distort the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities, because, once regulatory objectives come into picture, the Commission 
might put a greater weight on the potential gains from intervention.  
 
Chapter 3 argues that it would be very difficult to prove an abuse of capacity 
withholding. Even if E.ON indeed engaged in this type of price manipulation, either 
on its own or in collusion with other market players, there is a high chance that the 
Commission would not find any evidence.707 The same holds for congestion shifting, 
classified as abusive in the SvK case. Whereas instances of limiting cross-border 
capacity are observable, the reasons behind them are known only to the network 
operators (or more specifically, to the engineers in the control room) making 
congestion shifting impossible to detect. The SvK case is specific in that respect 
because the Swedish network operator was very open about its congestion 
management, so it would not be challenge for the Commission to ‘prove’ an abuse. 
What is more disturbing in the SvK case is a finding that congestion shifting is abusive 
                                                           
707 In this respect see the results of the investigation into German electricity wholesale market subsequently 
carried out by the Bundeskartellamt, supra nn. 327 and 336. 
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in the first place. In that respect, concerns that the Commission might intervene in 
cases where an infringement is minor boils down here to an extreme case where there 
is no infringement at all. 
 
The cases studied in this thesis are in fact dubious from the competition law point of 
view (the SvK case) and the Commission’s concerns relate to infringements which are 
very difficult to prove (the E.ON case, the SvK case). This might seem to support the 
view that Article 9 might encourage the Commission to intervene in weak cases. 
However, it does not mean that the Commission would not have intervened in these 
cases, but for Article 9. At least, it is not clear whether the option to close cases under 
Article 9 has an impact (if any) on the Commission’s increased intervention in the 
energy sector. For instance, the E.ON case was a consequence of the energy sector 
inquiry and should not be viewed in isolation. Follow-up investigations against energy 
incumbents have built on the energy sector inquiry and were supposed to create a 
general impression that the Commission does not ‘waste words’ in its Final Report708 
and is determined to solve issues raised therein.709 The threat of high fines under 
infringement proceedings together with the prospect that structural changes will be 
imposed by the EU regulation sooner or later (e.g. in case of ownership unbundling) 
apparently created sufficient pressure on E.ON to offer commitments.710 It seems 
likely that the E.ON case would have been settled informally, had there been no 
commitment procedure to opt for. The SvK case is different insofar as it was triggered 
by a complaint, and it took the Commission quite some time to decide whether to deal 
with it under competition rules or not. In that respect the possibility of quickly 
reaching an agreement with SvK under Article 9 might have made the competition 
law route more attractive in comparison to other possible solutions. Still, there are no 
reasons why the Commission could not have reached an informal settlement with SvK 
to the same effect.  
 
                                                           
708 Final Report, supra n. 78. 
709 See e.g. N. KROES, supra n. 60. 
710 In particular, Commissioner Kroes’ statements made at that time about high fines and far-reaching structural 
remedies imposed under Article 7 were supposed to increase pressure on the companies. See N. KROES, supra 
n. 85, p. 4. 
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In result, it is not clear whether the existence of an Article 9 option played any role in 
the Commission’s decision to intervene under competition rules. Most of the recent 
energy-related commitment cases were a natural consequence of the energy sector 
inquiry and the Commission would have opened them anyway and tried to extract 
commitments informally. The reason why the Commission prefers to close a case 
under Article 9 is the fact that it can impose fines for non-compliance, and, more 
importantly,711 it can set some sort of precedence for the competition and business 
community, something which can only be achieved by a binding decision. The 
precedence-setting value of commitment cases, so frequently emphasised by the 
Commission, seems to be an important element of instrumentalisation, because it 
allows the Commission to achieve the desired regulatory objectives going beyond the 
individual investigation and draws competition enforcement somewhat closer to 
regulation. In fact, precedence setting played an important role in both analysed 
cases.712 This is actually a matter of concern, and can thus be viewed as a cost to 
instrumentalisation from the competition policy perspective. Given that Article 9 
cases are weak it would be undesirable if they served to clarify competition policy or 
contributed to the development of new legal principles or rules. Nevertheless, given 
the sector-specific context of these cases, there is little risk that the Commission’s 
methodology to assess competition problems identified therein (capacity withholding 
or congestion shifting) goes beyond competition enforcement in the electricity 
markets.713 
 
To sum it up, the two analysed cases are weak but it does not imply that the option to 
dispose of cases under Article 9 might impact the Commission’s case selection and 
prioritisation. To the contrary, the example of the Commission’s intervention in the 
                                                           
711 Undertakings usually comply with informal commitments as well, just because (instead of a fine for non-
compliance) they risk that the Commission re-opens its investigation. They also might want to keep a ‘clean’ 
record with the Commission. Thus, in that respect, I do not see much difference between a commitment 
procedure and a settlement.  
712 The E.ON case was supposed to set a standard for network divestiture remedies, whereas the SvK case was a 
clear message for other TSOs to respect internal market rules. Supra n. 547 and accompanying text. 
713 However, it might have some standard-setting effects in related industries. For instance, the Commission’s 
test for assessing the compatibility of long-term gas contracts with competition developed in the Distrigaz case 
(COMP/37.966 - Distrigaz) was then re-used in the case of long-term electricity contracts of EDF 
(COMP/39.386 – Long-term electricity contracts). See IP/10/290 of 17.03.2010. 
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energy markets show that the very presence of regulatory objectives leads to 
instrumentalisation of competition rules in general, and weak cases would have been 
targeted no matter whether Article 9 route was feasible or not. Lastly and most 
importantly, it’s not really the number of weak cases under Article 9 which should 
give raise to concerns, but the fact that because of Article 9 weak cases can become 
law.  
 
6.2.2. Suboptimal antitrust response (1b) 
 
Another point raised in the commitment debate related to the Commission’s antitrust 
response which might be disproportional to the infringement identified in the 
preliminary assessment. This problem occurs in both analysed cases and might have 
negative implications for the energy sector both at the policy level and at the market 
level, as discussed in section 6.1.4 above. 
 
The same risks can be identified, but this time from the competition policy’ 
perspective. At the competition policy level, precedence-setting effects of Article 9 
decisions can provide incorrect insights for future competition enforcement, insofar as 
‘[o]ther market participants can learn from the decision and the commitments what 
was considered by the Commission sufficient to remove the competition concerns’.714 
Given that concerns are far-fetched and commitments often do not even remove them, 
no lessons should be learnt from these cases. Again, given the sector-specific context 
of the cases, there is little risk that commitments offered in electricity cases can 
inspire the Commission or national competition agencies when enforcing competition 
law in other industries, so the risk of ill-developed standards relate to the electricity 
sector only.715 At the market level, specific commitment package might be ineffective 
or might even have a negative impact on competition. 
 
                                                           
714 European Commission, Antitrust Manual of Procedures, supra n. 43, chapter 16 on commitment decisions, 
para. 2.6. 
715 But see supra n. 713. 
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6.2.3. Pro-Article 9 bias (2) 
 
Lastly, some concerns were expressed that Article 9 can become a surrogate for 
Article 7, and because of that, all the benefits linked to an infringement decision (i.e. 
clarification of law, bringing an infringement to an end, public censure, deterrence, 
disgorgement of illicit gains, punishment and facilitation of damages actions) are lost.  
 
It appears that once Aticle 9 is instrumentalised, these concerns are not valid anymore. 
Both selected cases are not suitable for an Article 7 decision. As argued in chapter 3, 
E.ON’s alleged capacity withholding abuse would be extremely difficult to prove and 
the Commission would probably reach a settlement informally, otherwise would have 
to close its investigation without finding any infringement of competition rules.716 To 
the contrary, SvK was plain-spoken about congestion shifting, so it was less 
problematic for the Commission to collect necessary evidence and Article 7 decision 
was theoretically possible. However, the benefits of finding an infringement of 
competition rules in cases where the Commission pursues regulatory goals are highly 
undesirable, both in terms of precedence-setting and punishment effects. As explained 
above, some risks in terms of precedence setting are already present in Article 9 cases, 
and they are definitely higher in Article 7 decisions. Further, it would seem rather 
inappropriate to punish SvK for resorting to a method of congestion management 
practiced by all transmission system operators.  
 
Concluding, it seems that in cases where regulatory goals come into picture and skew 
both the Commission’s anticompetitive assessment and the antitrust response, Article 
7 route is not appropriate, especially because of its clear precedence-setting effects. 
 
                                                           
716 The Commission has launched parallel investigations against E.ON, RWE and Vattenfall accusing them of 
abusive capacity withholding. Only E.ON offered commitments, whereas the two other investigations were 
closed without any commitments being made. Subsequently, the Bundeskartellamt has carried out extensive 
investigations into possible capacity withholding in the German market between 2007 and 2008, but concluded 
that, in view of uncertainties, ‘the non-operation of profitable power plants identified in the […] inquiry [was] 
too limited to initiate specific abuse proceedings with respect to the period examined.’ See Bundeskartellamt, 
supra n. 327, Summary, p. 13. 
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6.2.4. The Commission’s smaller toolbox for regulatory purposes 
 
As argued in chapter 2, Regulation 1/2003717 introduced major changes to the 
Commission’s competition enforcement which all together make it an attractive set of 
rules for achieving regulatory objectives. To illustrate this, the E.ON case has been 
triggered by the sector inquiry pursuant to Article 17 and the Commission could 
extract far-reaching commitments pursuant to Article 9 because E.ON felt threatened 
by infringement proceedings and the imposition of structural remedies pursuant to 
Article 7 and high antitrust fines pursuant to Article 23 and periodic penalty payments 
pursuant to Article 24. When applied in the electricity sector Article 9 should not be 
viewed in isolation, but as a part of the competition enforcement toolbox harnessed by 
the Commission to help it create the EU internal market for electricity.  
 
The two analysed cases show that some concerns expressed in the commitment debate 
remain valid, once confronted with the Commission’s commitments-based practice in 
the electricity sector, and some are overblown. First of all, Article 9 should be viewed 
as one element of the competition policy toolbox and as such does not seem to have a 
big impact on the Commission’s case selection and priority-setting. Intervention is 
determined by the goals which the Commission strives to achieve with respect to 
electricity markets and antitrust intervention would take place anyway. Informal 
settlements would be then the preferred way of closing weak cases. Secondly, weak 
cases and disproportionate commitments pose a risk to competition policy insofar as 
they can establish incorrect legal rules and principles. However, precedence-setting 
effects of these cases are limited to electricity markets, so only a narrow sphere of 
competition policy would be negatively affected. Thirdly, at the market level, 
inadequate commitments can be ineffective or can result in harm to competition. 
Lastly, pro-Article 9 bias occurs but is rather required, given that cases driven by 
regulatory objectives are not really competition cases and as such should never set 
standards in competition enforcement. In that respect, if instrumentalisation of 
                                                           
717 Supra n. 14. 
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antitrust enforcement occurs, it would be more desirable from the competition policy’ 
perspective if cases were settled informally.  
 
6.3. ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The first leg of the research question can be answered in the affirmative. The 
Commission is very pragmatic in using all the instruments it has at hand to push 
forward its project of creating an internal market for electricity. This includes 
regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent 
that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome 
political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals.  
 
This contribution involves some cost, to energy policy, competition policy, and most 
importantly, to electricity markets. Two major risks can be identified.  
 
First of all, Article 9 cases, skewed by regulatory objectives, might provide incorrect 
insights as to the market problem at issue which might then be adapted by the 
complementing sector-specific regulation and, due to precedence-setting effects, 
competition policy applied to similar electricity cases in the future. Second of all, 
commitment packages are bargains between the Commission, pursuing regulatory 
objectives, and the companies, protecting their own interests. Consequently, such 
packages might not always address the competition and/or regulatory problems at 
issue, focusing instead on energy policy objectives. In the worst case scenario, this 
may result in less efficient markets. 
 
Thus, electricity markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application 
of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment 
decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in 
individual cases.  
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Concluding, Article 9 generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the 
internal electricity market, but its use for that purpose does not come without cost. 
Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the 
Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of Article 
9 so that it does not do more harm than good. 
 
6.4. SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
One possible extension of this research is to explore how workable and effective the 
offered commitments are in practice. This question is beyond the scope of this thesis 
and could be addressed by more empirical studies. The selected case studies illustrate 
that commitments packages can go well beyond what is necessary to solve the 
competition problems, or might not even address them properly. Do they then achieve 
the ‘hidden’ regulatory objective? For instance, it would be very interesting to see 
whether E.ON’s divestments of generation capacity indeed rendered the German 
market more competitive. Things can often go wrong with divestitures, due to 
information asymmetries coupled with the undertaking’s interest to protect the status 
quo. For instance, E.ON’s commitments might have resulted in asset swaps between 
the ‘big Four’, which would not have substantially affected the market structure for 
the better,718 and in the worst case scenario would have facilitated collusion.719 The 
SvK’s interim commitments to increase counter-trade and cease congestion shifting 
(apart from being inefficient) turned out to be completely ineffective.720 The 
introduction of market splitting in Sweden triggered follow-on actions challenging the 
                                                           
718 This point has been raised by third parties in the market test of E.ON’s commitments. Some respondents 
argued that swaps ‘should not be allowed as the number of buyers is thereby limited to those undertakings who 
own generation assets.’ In addition, they saw risk that swaps would result in an oligopolistic structure at the EU 
level. The Commission emphasised that the buyer is going to be chosen by E.ON ‘as long as he […] does not 
create prima facie competition concerns.’ The Commission did not see the risk of cross-border swaps, 
maintaining that the electricity wholesale market is national in scope. See Commission Decision, supra n. 320, 
para. 62.  
719 The risk of collusion increases with a more symmetric distribution of capacities, because ‘symmetric 
companies’ can more easily sustain a tacit agreement through retaliation. For relevant literature about how 
symmetry helps collusion, see e.g. O. COMPTE, F. JENNY and P. REY, ‘Capacity Constraints, Mergers and 
Collusion’ (2002) 46 European Economic Review, 1-31, K.-U. KUHN and M. MOTTA, ‘The Economics of 
Joint Dominance’ (1999), mimeo, University of Michigan, or P. BARLA, ‘Firm Size Inequality and Market 
Power’ (2000) 18 International Journal of Industrial Organization 5, 693-722.  
720 Supra nn. 513-514. 
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scope of the Commission’s commitment decision.721 More research focused on the 
actual impact of commitments on electricity markets would tell us more about the 
costs of Article 9 instrumentalisation and might thus be worth taking up.  
 
Further research might also take a closer look at the implementation of commitments, 
and in cases of behavioural remedies, firms’ adherence to commitments. The question 
about the effectiveness of commitments is closely related to designating an 
appropriate mechanism for their surveillance in the longer run. It would be interesting 
to see whether the Commission’s supervision in that respect is sufficient or whether it 
should be strengthened, for instance, by empowering NRAs/NCAs to carry out 
monitoring over the implementation and maintenance of commitments, and to report 
on their effects on competition in the electricity sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
721 Supra n. 646. 
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7. SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment 
decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. 
 
European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being EU 
regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments 
has been extensively discussed in the context of different sectors, and still attracts a lot 
of scholarly attention, both from academics and practitioners. One of the major 
concerns in this debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been 
observed that competition enforcement in Europe is triggered not only as a response to 
an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a 
powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory rather than 
purely competition goals. This is particularly true in case of formerly state-owned 
monopolies. Since their liberalisation, these industries have become an interface 
between the new sector-specific regulation and newly applied competition rules. As a 
result, the two regimes converged to some degree. On the one hand, sector-specific 
regulation aims now to facilitate competition in the newly created markets and often 
protects them from monopolistic practices. On the other hand, competition law in 
these sectors is sometimes applied beyond its proper limits in order to meet the 
objectives of sector-specific regulation. The latter phenomenon, i.e. instrumentalised 
competition enforcement, might have a substantial impact both on competition policy 
and regulation, and ultimately on markets to which they apply, and is thus worth 
considering closely.  
 
Commitment decisions are a relatively new and increasingly common way of closing 
antitrust investigations into market practices prima facie suspected of having anti-
competitive effects, whereby an investigated undertaking offers certain commitments 
to the Commission. If the Commission considers them sufficient to remedy its 
anticompetitive concerns, it makes them binding in the form of a commitment 
decision. At the same time, the central question as to whether the undertaking has 
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violated competition law or not, is left open. Instead of fully investigating the case in 
order to establish a breach of competition rules, the Commission only summarises its 
preliminary concerns regarding allegedly anticompetitive behaviour and specifies 
commitments agreed with the undertaking as a remedy to these concerns. 
 
It is a common view that the existing legal framework and practice surrounding 
commitment decisions might encourage and facilitate instrumentalisation. Namely, the 
Commission avails of the opportunity to use commitment decisions as a ‘quick fix’ for 
regulatory purposes, because of the relatively undemanding procedural requirements 
for their adoption, coupled with the broad discretion available to the Commission in 
accepting various forms of commitments, the lack of sufficient judicial control and the 
undertakings’ interest in avoiding fines for a violation of law. Further, it is argued that 
instrumentalisation of competition rules is more likely to occur in markets that are 
already subject to an intense regulatory intervention.  
 
This thesis focuses on competition enforcement in the electricity sector, where the 
regulatory objective of completing the EU internal market is clearly defined and the 
Commission’s incentive to use competition rules to promote this objective might be 
particularly strong.  
 
Over the last decade the Commission has been openly speaking about harnessing 
competition rules to foster the liberalisation and integration of electricity and gas 
markets, and thus push forward its energy policy agenda. In pursuit of this aim, it 
launched a sector-wide competition inquiry into European energy markets in 2005 and 
then followed up with a wave of commitment decisions in individual antitrust 
proceedings against electricity and gas incumbents. This intensified antitrust 
intervention provided for a substantial body of competition cases driven by energy 
policy objectives, i.e. liberalisation and integration of energy markets, rather than 
concerns about any alleged anti-competitive conduct.  
 
 277 
This thesis attempts to determine whether the Commission uses commitment 
decisions in the electricity sector in a regulatory fashion to promote primarily energy 
(rather than competition) policy objectives and, if this is the case, the thesis discusses 
the cost of such instrumentalisation. The core of this research consists of four articles.  
The first article discusses the new (post-2004) EU antitrust enforcement regime. In 
particular, it argues that sector inquiries, commitment decisions and structural 
remedies might facilitate instrumentalisation of competition rules, which is illustrated 
here by a relatively unproblematic use of excessive pricing provisions. In principle, 
overpricing by a dominant firm results in direct exploitation of customers, and should 
theoretically trigger an intervention on the part of the Commission under Article 102 
TFEU. In practice, excessive pricing actions have always been considered 
controversial and not without practical problems, and are thus launched by the 
Commission only in rare cases. However, since the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 and 
the increased empowerment of the Commission, several antitrust investigations have 
been initiated into price manipulation by energy incumbents. This thesis finds that 
sector inquiries, commitment decisions and structural remedies might encourage the 
Commission to take a more pro-active approach to overpricing, and to 
instrumentalisation of competition rules in general. This theoretical discussion of the 
first article is followed by two in-depth case studies concerning antitrust investigations 
in the electricity markets.  
 
The first case study focuses on the Commission’s investigation into alleged price 
manipulation in the German electricity wholesale market. The Commission accused 
E.ON of abusing its dominant position by withholding generation capacity in order to 
raise electricity wholesale prices. In spite of no convincing evidence, as well as flaws 
in its assessment, the Commission extracted from E.ON substantial capacity 
divestments. The conclusions of this case study indicate that instrumentalisation might 
have adverse impacts on competition policy. First, it leads to a number of ‘weak’ 
cases, based on far-fetched arguments. Second, it results in commitments which are 
not tailored to the abuse at issue but are in line with the Commission’s energy policy 
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objectives and, being an outcome of negotiations, are further swayed by the firm’s 
own strategic interests.  
 
The second case study concerns the Commission’s intervention in the congestion 
management methods of the Swedish network operator, Svenska Kraftnät (SvK). 
According to the Commission, SvK might have abused its dominant position by 
limiting cross-border transmission capacity in order to relieve congestion within 
Sweden. In response to the investigation, SvK committed to temporarily reduce 
transmission flow of electricity on internal network bottlenecks primarily by 
introducing national measures and by not reducing interconnection capacity. In the 
long-term, it agreed to split the Swedish market into multiple price zones.  
 
This case study consists of separate economic and legal analyses of the case. The 
economic analysis concerns SvK’s alleged abuse and the commitment package, and 
concludes with three observations. Firstly, it might be socially optimal to reduce 
cross-border capacity in response to internal congestion. Given that the Commission 
negotiated commitments from SvK without an in-depth economic assessment of the 
case, it risked preventing efficient behaviour. Secondly, handling internal congestion 
primarily by national measures is not socially optimal, and it cannot be ruled out that 
it reduces overall welfare. Thirdly, even though splitting the market into price zones 
may improve allocative efficiency within Sweden, it does not prevent SvK from 
potential manipulation of cross-border transmission capacity. 
 
The legal analysis attempts to show the Commission uses competition law 
enforcement to foster market integration in the electricity sector. Even though the 
Commission’s action under competition rules was contrived and lacked economic 
depth, the commitment package provided an economically sound, long-term solution 
to network access and congestion management in Sweden. Such a quick and far-
reaching change of Swedish congestion management could not have been achieved by 
Swedish policymakers or enforcement of the EU sector-specific regulation. 
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The thesis finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the instruments it 
has at hand to push forward its project of creating an internal market for electricity. 
This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. 
To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and 
overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy 
goals.  
 
However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to 
competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets 
themselves. Two major risks can be identified.  
 
(1) First, the Commission’s anticompetitive assessment of the case, often cursory and 
skewed by regulatory objectives, might provide incorrect insights. These insights 
might then negatively influence both electricity-specific regulation as well as 
electricity-specific competition enforcement. On the one hand, future regulation of 
electricity markets can build on these incorrect insights. On the other hand, these 
insights can be adapted by competition rules applied in the future to similar cases.  
 
(2) Second, commitment packages are bargains between the Commission, pursuing 
regulatory objectives, and the companies, protecting their own interests. 
Consequently, such packages might not always address the competition and/or 
regulatory problems at issue, focusing instead on energy policy objectives. In the 
worst case scenario, this may result in less efficient markets.  
 
Thus, electricity markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application 
of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment 
decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in 
individual cases. 
 
Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy 
objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not 
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come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity 
market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use 
of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good. 
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8. SAMENVATTING 
 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit een collectie essays over een instrumenteel gebruik van 
toezeggingen voor de voltooiing van de interne elektriciteitsmarkt.  
 
Het Europese beleid kan markten op vele manieren vorm geven, twee van de meest 
evidente manieren zijn regulering en handhaving van mededingingsrecht. Het 
samenspel tussen deze twee instrumenten trekt veel wetenschappelijke aandacht. Een 
van de belangrijkste zorgen in het mededinging vs. regulering debat is het 
instrumentele gebruik van mededingingsregels. Er is gebleken dat handhaving van 
mededingingsrecht niet alleen plaatsvindt als een reactie op schade als gevolg van 
concurrentiebeperkingen die voorkomt op de markt, maar dat het soms een krachtig 
instrument wordt in de handen van de Europese Commissie om reguleringsdoeleinden 
na te streven. 
 
Meer recent zijn zorgen geuit over de instrumentalisering van mededingingsregels in 
de context van de toezeggingen van de Commissie. In het bijzonder wordt betoogd dat 
het bestaande juridische raamwerk van toezeggingen hun gebruik voor 
reguleringsdoeleinden kan aanmoedigen en faciliteren. In dit proefschrift wordt 
gezocht naar voorbeelden van een dergelijke instrumentalisering in de 
elektriciteitsmarkt. De Commissie heeft gedurende het laatste decennium sterk 
ingegrepen in deze sector middels mededingingsregels en heeft een aantal 
toezeggingen gedaan, ingegeven door de doelstellingen van het energiebeleid, zoals 
liberalisering en integratie van elektriciteitsmarkten, en niet zozeer door zorgen over 
concurrentiebeperkend gedrag in het verleden. 
 
Dit proefschrift concludeert dat de Commissie erg pragmatisch is in het gebruik van 
alle mogelijke instrumenten die ter beschikking staan om het creëren van een interne 
elektriciteitsmarkt te stimuleren. Hierbij zijn inbegrepen regulering, handhaving van 
mededingingsrecht en allerlei vormen van politieke druk. Voor zover toezeggingen 
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sector-specifieke regulering versnellen en politieke impasses voorkomen, dragen zij 
bij aan de energiebeleidsdoelstellingen van de Commissie. 
 
Echter, instrumentalisering van mededingingsregels gaat ten koste van 
mededingingsbeleid, energiebeleid en allereerst ten laste van de elektriciteitsmarkten 
zelf. Twee grote risico’s kunnen worden geïdentificeerd. Allereerst zou de 
concurrentiebeperkende beoordeling van de zaak door de Commissie, vaak summier 
en beïnvloed door reguleringsdoeleinden, een verkeerd beeld kunnen geven. Deze 
zouden op hun beurt in gelijke zaken door sector-specifieke regulering en handhaving 
van mededingingsrecht kunnen worden aangepast. Ten tweede zijn toezeggingen het 
resultaat van onderhandelingen tussen de Commissie, die reguleringsdoelstellingen 
nastreeft, en de bedrijven die hun eigen belangen beschermen, zodat ze niet altijd de 
betreffende mededingings- en/of reguleringsproblemen aanpakken, wat in het 
slechtste geval in minder efficiënte markten kan resulteren. Kortom, 
elektriciteitsmarkten zouden negatief beïnvloed kunnen worden, hetzij direct, door de 
implementatie van inadequate toezeggingen in individuele gevallen, hetzij indirect, 
door toepassing van sector-specifieke regulering of mededingingsbeleid dat gebaseerd 
is op eerdere toezeggingen. 
 
Concluderend: toezeggingen hebben over het algemeen bijgedragen aan het creëren 
van de interne elektriciteitsmarkt, maar hun gebruik voor dit doel komt niet zonder 
kosten. Gegeven dat deze kosten uiteindelijk door de interne elektriciteitsmarkt 
worden gedragen, zou de Commissie toezeggingen uiterst voorzichtig moeten 
gebruiken om te voorkomen dat ze meer kwaad dan goed doen. 
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